Local government and social movements in Bologna since 1945 by Parker, Simon
Local government and social movements in Bologna since 1945.
Dissertation submitted in fulfilment of die requirements of the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy
by
Simon Frank Parker
o f
Magdalene College in the University of Cambridge.
Department of 
Politics
HesIinglOu, York, YOl 5DD 
Telephone (01904)433542 
U .  (01904)433563
T h e  U n i v e r s i t y o f fé ? Ì L
7nit.l1 rnmiilintents.
March, 1992.
Table of Contents
SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................... x
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...............................................xii
P R E F A C E  ............................................................................................xiv
Glossary of T erm s......................................................................................... xix
I N T R O D U C T I O N  ................................................................................................. 1
Part I. Methodology...................................................................................................... 1
1. The Study....................................................................................................... 1
2. A definition of terms......................................................................................1
(i) Local Government............................................................................. 2
(ii) Social Movements............................................................................ 4
Part II. Historical and Theoretical Perspectives........................................................... 8
1. Red Bologna...................................................................................................8
(i) Bologna PCI...................................................................................... 8
(ii) The ‘modello bolognese.’ ............................................................. 10
2. Italy as an ‘Exceptional’ State.....................................................................13
(i) Italy and the Welfare State in Europe: A Case of Arrested
Development............................................................................. 13
(ii) Restoration or Reform? State and Society in Postwar
Italy............................................................................................19
C H A P T E R  O N E  ...................................................................................................26
Social Movements, Political Conflict and Cultural Identity in Bologna 1945-1956. . . .  26
Part I. Togliatti, Emilia Rossa and the alliance strategy of the PCI........................26
1. Introduction................................................................................  26
The Growth of Emilian Communism................................................. 29
Part II. Economic re-organisation, industrial unrest and the Communist
leadership of the urban labour movement...................................................... 32
1. Introduction..................................................................................................32
2. The Industrial Labour Movement and the Reconstruction....................... 34
3. Cooperation in post-war Bologna: Between the movement and the
market................................................................................................... 43
Part III. Rural conflict and the growth of peasant militancy after the
Liberation......................................................................................................... 58
1. Introduction..................................................................................................58
2. The Agrarian Reform Movement and the Share-croppers’ Struggle
1945-1947...........................................................................................  60
3. Braccianti and Padroni: Rural Unrest in the Province of Bologna,
1947-1950........................................................................................... 67
Part IV. The ‘Partigiani della Pace’ and the Cold War in Bologna, 1949-
1953................................................................................................................  79
1. The Peace Movement in the Province of Bologna..................................79
2. ‘Lapeur du gendarme...’: The Stale’s response to organised protest
in the ‘anni duri.’ ............................................................................... 81
Part V. Communism and Popular Culture in Bologna 1945-1956........................  86
1. Introduction..................................................................................................86
2. Cultural policy in the alliance strategy of the PCI................................... 87
3. ‘The world the peasants made.’ Cultural identity and class politics
in post-war Bologna.............................................................................92
4. From the sacred to the profane: the Festa dell’Unità between folk
ritual and political hegemony......................................................... 103
C H A P T E R T W O ........................................................................................................108
Political and Urban renewal in the Communist Administration of Bologna 1945-1956. 108
1. ‘Il Comune Democratico’ - Municipal Reform during the
Reconstruction.................................................................................... 108
2. Funding the Reconstruction: The Problems of Local Authority
Finance and the Municipal Rating Councils..................................  113
3. Widening the Participator}' Basis of Local Government: the
‘Consulte Popolari.’ ........................................................................ 123
4. The City, Urban Planning and the Proposals for Decentralisation up
to 1960.............................................................................................  129
(i) The Urban Plans............................................................................129
(ii) The Integration of INA-Casa into the Piano Regolatore. . . 136
C H A P T E R  T H R E E ..............................................................................................143
The Battle for Bologna: the ‘Libro Bianco su Bologna’ and the Administrative
Elections of 1956....................................................................................................  143
1. The ‘Libro Bianco’ as a Critique of Modernity..................................  143
2. The Christian Democrat Campaign......................................................  148
3. The Communist Campaign........................................................................153
4. The Defeat of Dossetti and the New Politics of the Comune............  154
C H A P T E R F O U R .................................................................................................... 159
Bad Godesberg on the Reno? The 1959 Regional Conference, the Amendola
‘Revolution’ and Political Renewal in the Bologna Federation of the PCI. . . 159 
1. Introduction................................................................................................159
2. The ascendancy of the ‘Amendola faction’ and organisational renewal in
the Bologna Federation of the PCI............................................................ 165
3. The Conferenza regionale and the Communists’ response to the ‘economic
miracle’ and urban growth............................................................................ 174
C H A P T E R  F I V E ...................................................................................................191
Bologna Moderna. The Economic Miracle, Administrative Decentralisation and
Radical Planning in Bologna, 1960-1976.............................................................. 191
1. Introduction................................................................................................191
Part I. The Economic Boom and Industrial Development Policy......................  193
1. The Economic Miracle and the Emilian Model...................................  193
2. Economic Development and the New Politics of Local Government
Finance............................................................................................. 198
Part IL ‘La riforma senza riforma’: The Theory and Practice of
Decentralisation in Bologna, 1960-1976....................................................  206
1. The Idea of Neighbourhood and the legacy of ‘56..............................  206
3. Alliance Strategy and the First Phase of Decentralisation, 1960-
1967..................................................................................................  218
4. Demos in Suburbia: The Second Phase of Decentralisation,
1968-1973......................................................................................... 223
Part III. Communism, Construction & Conservation. Urban Planning and
the Development of the PEEP Projects in Bologna 1964-1978..............  232
1. Planning Bologna in the 1960s..................................................................232
2. The PEEP-Centro Storico: A Lesson in Radical Conservation. . . . 242 
Part IV. From Consolidation to Renewal: An Appraisal of ‘1’epoca
Dozziana.’ ................................................................................................... 247
C H A P T E R  S I X ........................................................................................................ 252
An Emilian Autumn: New social movements in Bologna 1967-1973............................. 252
1. Introduction ..............................................................................................252
Part I. The Student Revolt in Bologna, 1967-1970..............................................  255
1. The City and the LTniversily: from the Liberation to the Economic
Miracle and the expansion of the 1960s........................................... 255
2. The ‘Movimento Studentesco’ in Bologna, 1967-1970.......................  259
"Vogliamo parlare!": Between Movement and Institution. . . . 259
An attempt at dialogue....................................................................... 260
Fisica Occupata! The struggle intensifies......................................... 262
The < <Pancaldi> >  Occupation and the Student Movement
in Bologna.................................................................. . . . 266
Women’s Liberation and ‘68 in B ologna........................................269
The Movement in the Secondary Schools .................................  274
3. The PCI’s response to the ‘movimento studentesco’and the spread
of the movement beyond the university............................................278
Introduction......................................................................................278
The Student Movement seen from R om e........................................282
Part II. The Workers' Movement in Bologna 196S-1973.................................... 286
1. From the Faculty to the Factory: Operaismo and the M.S................286
The ‘Hot Autumn’ at AM F-SASIB................................................288
Taking Over the City? Housing and collective provision in
Bologna seen from the ‘Movement.’ .................................. 302
C H A P T E R  S E V E N ...........................................................................................311
The City of Ideas and the Idea of the City: Conclusions on movements, institutions
and Communist strategy in contemporary Bologna..............................................311
1. 1968 and the 'Emilian Model’in Bologna: An Afterview.......................311
2. The Return of the Repressed: The Movement of ‘77 and the crisis
of the ‘model’..................................................................................... 327
Cronastoria di Marzo ‘77...............................................................  328
A Body without Organs: Anatomy of the Movement of ‘77. . . 334 
The ‘appeal of the intellectuals* and the ‘Conference on
Dissent.’ ................................................................................ 338
The ‘Plague-Bearers’ and the PCI.................................................... 341
The Historic Compromise in Bologna ....................................... 346 5
3. Bologna in the 1980s: From reflux to the recovery of the model? . 354
Transformations................................................................................ 357
Una Città Diversa? The Limits to Participatory
Politics in Bologna................................................................. 359
4. The Idea of the City: Culture, History and Locale: or Political
Sociology Otherwise...........................................................................365
A PPEN D IX ......................................................................................371
BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................. 374
List of Tables.
Table 1. Employment in the metal mechanical industries in
Emilia-Romagna by size of firm and percentage share of the workforce, 1937-1961. . 40
Table 2. Industrial employment in Emilia-Romagna by size of firm, 1950.....................  41
Table 3. ‘Red’ Cooperatives in the province of Bologna, 1948-1950............................... 47
Table 4. Social composition of the Provincial Federation of Cooperatives and Mutual 
Societies of Bologna in 1950 and 1953................................................................................  50
Table 5. Political composition of the management committees of cooperative firms in the 
Province of Bologna in 1953................................................................................................. 51
Tables 6 & 6.1 Results of police and judicial action against the PCI, and labour and peace 
movement in the province of Bologna 1945-1950 and anti-Nato protests.........................S4
Table 7. Results of the 1956 Administrative Elections for the
Comune di Bologna............................................................................................................... 155
Table S. Agricultural activity by type of employment in the Province of Bologna in 194S and 
1961 as a percentage of all agricultural labour.................................................................178
Table 9. Changes in the agrarian structure of the Province of Bologna, 1961-1967. . 180
Table 10. Agrarian structure in the province of Bologna according to tenure, 1961-197ISO
Table 11. Proportion of unemployed among the active population in the Province of Bologna, 
1951-1961............................................................................................................................  181
Table 12. Composition of the Bologna Federation of the PCI by occupational category as a 
percentage of total membership, 1954-1977.....................................................................  182
Table 13. Average number of employees per firm in manufacturing industry in the city and 
province of Bologna, 1951 and 1961....................................................................................185
Table 14. Number of strike hours in the Province of Bologna 1950-1962....................  186
Table 15. Firms'and employees in the Bolognese industrial district according to size of 
workforce in the 1961 census................................................................................................196
Table 16. Number of employees and firms active in the pianura district of Bologna in 1966 
according to the period of establishment and type of enterprise..................................... 197
Table 17. Composition of cooperatives affiliated to Federcoop in the Province of Bologna, 
1952-1966............................................................................................................................ 202
Table IS. Results of the November, 1960 Administrative elections in Bologna. . . .  210
Table 19. Recommended government standards for educational provision and educational 
provision according to the Bologna Regulatory Plan of 1969.......................................... 240
Table 20. Results of the 196S General Election in the Comune di Bologna and for the two 
previous national and local elections.................................................................................. 290
Table 21. Rate of investment and degree of decentralisation among a sample of 
manufacturing companies in the Province of Bologna in 1975........................................ 293
Table 22. Percentage of voting population belonging to the PCI in the Comune di Bologna, 
1968-1976.............................................................................................................................  305
Table 23. Results of the 1970 Administrative Elections to the the regional government of 
Emilia-Romagna................................................................................................................... 307
Table 24. Results of the administrative elections to the Comune di Bologna, 1970. . 308
Table 25. Membership of main trade union confederations in Italy, 1968-1974. . . . 313
Table 26. Wage and Salary variation at 1970 and 1985 prices in Italy for the years 1970- 
1985. Gross wages and salaries per capita (’000 lire)...................................................... 314
Table 26.1. Wage and Salary variation at 1970 and 1985 prices in Italy for the years 1970- 
1985. Percentage changes...................................................................................................... 314
Table 27. Hours lost (000,000s), number of disputes (’000s), workers participating 
(000,000s) and national Teague table’ position (in parentheses) among the top six most strike- 
prone regions in Italy, 1968-1971......................................................................................  316
Table 28. Agriculture. Hours lost (’000,000s) and national Teague table’ in the top six most 
strike-prone regions in Italy...................................................................................................318
Table 29. Number of Strike Hours in the Province of Bologna, 1962-1975.................  319
Table 30. Manufacturing Industries. Hours lost (000,000s) and national Teague table’ 
position in the top six most strike-prone regions.............................................................. 322
Table 31. Total number of votes cast, percentage of the vote, and seats won in 
administrative elections to the Comune di Bologna, 1975-1985...................................... 326
Table 32. PCI share of the votes of different occupational categories in the province of 
Bologna, 1968-1976............................................................................................................. 350
Local government and social movements in Bologna since 1945.
XSUMMARY
Local government and social movements in Bologna since 1945.
PhD dissertation submitted bv Simon Frank Parker. Magdalene College. Cambridge. 
March 1992.
This dissertation is a case-study of the post-war administration of Bologna and the social 
and economic movements which developed in the province after 1945. The study 
describes the evolution of a distinct political and economic culture under the leadership 
of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) which has been called the ‘Bologna model* of 
administrative politics. As well as charting the growth of the model and its subsequent 
variations, the dissertation analyses the political function of the model and the 
contradictions which have emerged from its application over the last 40 years.
The dissertation begins with a resumé of the debate on Emilian Communism and the 
significance of Emilia for the rest of Italy and Europe. In chapter one, the share­
croppers’ and farm-labourers’ campaign for land reform is examined in the context of the 
alliance strategy outlined by the Communist leader, Paimiro Togliatti, in 1946. The 
remainder of the chapter deals with the industrial labour movement, the cooperative 
movement and the peace movement of the late 1940s and early 1950s. The chapter ends 
with an exploration of the role played by popular culture in the formation of political 
identity.
Chapter two deals with the Communist administration of Bologna from 1945-1960 
focusing in particular on early forms of popular participation in municipal affairs and on 
the development of town planning. Chapter three follows the key administrative election 
of 1956 when Giuseppe Dozza defeated the challenge of the former vice-secretary of the 
DC, Giuseppe Dossetti, whose radical vision for urban life (the Libro Bianco) was to 
become a key point of reference for future municipal reforms. In chapter four, the thesis
XI
focuses on Uie transformation of the Bologna PCI and the regional conference of 1959 
which marked a turning-point in the life of the Communist federation and in the PCI’s 
administrative practice. Chapter five once again focuses on the local administration and 
sets the political debate in the context of the changing economic structure of the province 
during the ‘economic boom.’ The decentralisation of local government and the 
establishment of a system of neighbourhood councils is described in part two, while part 
three is dedicated to an examination of radical planning and the conservation of the 
historic centre.
Chapter six returns to the study of social movements during the student and worker 
mobilisations of 1968 and the ‘Hot Autumn’ of 1969-1972. The chapter considers the 
relationship of the PCI to the new social movements and describes how the Communists 
and their collateral organisations were able to maintain their hegemony within the 
workplace and civil society. Chapter seven concludes the diesis by reviewing the 
‘Emilian model’ in the light of 1968 and assessing the most severe challenge to the PCI’s 
authority during the Movement of ‘77. The chapter ends with a section on die recovery 
of the ‘model’ and recent initiatives in decentralisation. In the final section, a ‘historico- 
culturalist’ approach to the study of urban politics and social change is recommended as 
the basis for future research in tiiis area of political sociology.
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P R E F A C E
Description of Sources.
A variety of primary and secondary sources were used for this study and in addition to 
citations in the notes, the main secondary references are contained in the bibliography. 
Primary material divides into four categories:
(i) Official publications of the Comune di Bologna and other local authorities.
- Minutes of the Consiglio Comunale
- Minutes of the Giunta of the Comune
- Minutes of council committees and commissions
- Town plans and viability studies
- Reports specially commissioned by the Comune (e.g. on administrative re-organisation, 
housing, youth policy etc.)
- Periodicals published by the Comune, including ‘Documenti del Comune’, ‘Bologna’ 
etc.
- Statistical publications for internal and public consultation, budget proposals and internal 
discussion documents.
- Speeches of the mayor and councillors
- Personally conducted interviews with politicians and council officials
XV
(ii) Party publications and documents1
- Minutes of the PCI Bologna Federation [R,B]
- Minutes of the Comitato Regionale (Emilia-Romagna) of the PCI [R,B]
- Minutes of the Direzione Nazionale of the PCI [R]
- Minutes of the Comitato Centrale of the PCI [R]
- Local, regional and national conference proceedings of the PCI
- Election propaganda and policy documents of the PCI (Federazione di Bologna) and 
regional and national publications. [R,B]
- Personal archival material e.g. the Archivio Dozza. [B]
- Electoral and general publications of other political parlies (especially the DC and PSD 
including conference proceedings and policy documents. [B]
(iii) Slate records and documents2
- Ministry of the Interior reports from its prefects in Bologna
- Ministry of the Interior reports from the Chief of Police and the Commander of the 
Carabinieri
- Miscellaneous reports, documents and intelligence
1 Sources are identified as follows: R=Istituto Gramsci Rome; B=Istituto Gramsci 
Emilia-Romagna.
2 All held in the Archivio Centrale di Stato, EUR, Rome.
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(iv) Press articles and general publications
- Reports of the local Communist press, La Lotta. 11 Progresso d’Italia. L'Unita. Emilia. 
Rinnovamento etc.3
- National PCI publications, especially Rinascita
- Reports of the non-Communist or anli-Communist press, Il Resto del Carlino. 
L'Avvenire d’Italia
- National press stories which comment on Bologna, La Corriera della Sera, etc
- International press reports on Bologna
- Leaflets, posters, designs relating to electoral campaigns, strikes, and to social protests 
(1968, 1977)4
Graphs illustrating the incidence of political and trade union meetings in Bologna 1948-53 
were collated from data in the prefectoral records of the Ministry of the Interior.
I made extensive use of the library and archive of the Istituto Gramsci (Emilia-Romagna) 
in Bologna and the national Istituto Gramsci in Rome where llie archives of the PCI 
which have been made available for public consultation are held. Research on the state’s 
observations and dealings with Bologna’s administrators, politicians and trade unionists 
was based in the Archivio Centrale di Stato in EUR, Rome where 1 consulted the files 
of the Interior Ministry. Additional material was consulted in the Biblioteca di Storia 
Moderna e Contemporanea (Rome) and tire Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale (Florence).
3 Newspaper articles only appear in the footnotes, but periodical and review articles are 
also contained in the general bibliography.
4 Mostly contained in the archive of the Istituto Gramsci Emilia-Romagna (AIGER).
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The primary material on the PCI locally covers the period from the Liberation to the 
early 1950s while the national parly documents in some cases have been consulted for the 
years up to 1956. Certain government sources were available for the period up to I960. 
Unfortunately strict embargoes apply to more recent material in the archives of the PDS 
(the ‘Democratic Party of the Left’ - the new name for the PCI adopted at the Rimini 
Congress of March, 1991) and the Ministry of the Interior and for this reason the bulk 
of the primary sources dealing with the PCI and the stale authorities is to be found in the 
chapters relating to the years 1945 to 1960.
The periodisation of most of the primary sources approximately corresponds to the era 
of ‘mass’ struggles which characterised Togliatti’s ‘Partito Nuovo’, up until the new style 
‘integrationalist’ strategy which the Bologna PCI adopted after 1959. I have tried to 
compensate for the lack of ‘insider’ sources on the PCI and the state authorities in the 
latter half of the thesis by including non-institutional accounts and interviews where 
appropriate. Documents, bulletins and leaflets from the student movement and ‘new left’ 
groups in Bologna have been used extensively in chapter six on the social movements of 
1968-1970 and chapter seven on the Movement of ‘77.
The Comune di Bologna’s own library and archive proved to be a rich source of material, 
and I was fortunate to be given access to internal memoranda and reports. Several 
interviews were conducted with politicians and officers who worked or are still working 
in the comune and I attended a number of election meetings, neighbourhood meetings, 
and local party gatherings from which I gained useful insights into the attitudes and 
feelings of the local population as well as the activists and administrators.
Kind friends also provided me with material which they had collected themselves, 
particularly on the movement of *77. But perhaps the greatest resource was being able 
to discuss Bologna’s distinctive political culture and its fascinating patch-work of radical 
traditions over a glass or two of San Giovese in a local osteria. The impressions I gained 
from these encounters cannot be easily footnoted here, but I hope that what appears 
below is suffused with the enthusiasm and curiosity which infected me when I began this 
research in the foggy winter of 1988.
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*Party which resulted from the merger of the PSI & PSDI 
in 1966 which dissolved in 1969.
PSDI Partito Social-Democratico Italiano
Italian Social Democratic 
Party
PSIUP Partito Socialista di 
Unità Proletaria**
Socialist Party of 
Proletarian Unity
PRG Piano Regolatore Generale General Town Plan (or Structure Plan)
PR Piano Regolatore Regulatory Plan
RF Rifondazione Comunista Communist Refoundation 
(former PCI)
UDI Unione delle Donne 
Italiane
Union of Italian Women
UIL
dissolved
Unione Italiana del Lavoro
** Splinter party from the 
in 1972.
Union of Italian Workers 
PSI, formed in 1964 and
Other terms
Aggiunto del Deputy mayor
sindaco
Artigiano
Assessore
Bracciante
Capoluogo
Artisan or craft worker. Because of the 
taxation and social security advantages, 
many small-business owners are 
registered as "artigiani' even though 
they have no recogniseable craft skills.
Departmental director and member of the 
council executive or giunta.
The American term "farmhand' comes closest 
to the original sense of the 
word in Italian. However this does not 
capture the casual nature of the employment 
(contrast with the "salariati'). Braccianti 
are often hired for the day or by the hour. 
They have the most precarious economic 
existence of all the peasantry.
Bologna is both the capoluogo
of its province and the Emilia-Romagna
region.
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A note on usage.
Throughout the dissertation I have preferred the capitalised form of 
Communist/Conimunism when describing or referring to the Italian Communist Party, 
its adherents, its strategy etc. Often the PCI is abbreviated to ‘the Party’ where it is 
obvious that the Communist Party is being discussed. When referring to ‘communism’ 
generically as an ideology and movement guided by the principles of Marxism I have not 
used the capitalised form. Although I have tried to be as precise as possible, there are 
times when either term would be appropriate (such as when referring to the PCI and the 
international communist movement collectively) and so readers should not treat this as 
a hard and fast rule. I have adopted the same method with the Italian Socialist Party and 
it can be assumed that ‘Socialist’ or ‘Socialists’ are members or supporters of the PSI, 
PSIUP or PSU.
The expression ‘soeialcommunist’ refers to the ‘popular front’ alliance of the PCI with 
the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) which continued formally and informally until Aldo 
Moro’s ‘centre-left’ administration of 1964. In the case of Bologna, however, the 
Communists ruled in coalition with the Socialists throughout most of the post-war period 
and the term is here used to describe the mass associations and the municipal 
administrations led by the PCI and PSI.
Declaration
Finally, I would like to state that this dissertation is the result of my own work and 
includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration.
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Glossary of Terms
Abbreviations
ACC Atti del Consiglio 
Comunale (Bologna)
ACLI Associazione Cristiana 
dei Lavoratori
ACS Archivio Centrale di 
Stato
AN PI Associazione Nazionale 
Partigiani d'Italia
APC Archivio Partito 
Comunista
ARCI Associazione Ricreativo 
di Circoli Italiani
CCD Commissione paritetica 
per lo studio dei 
problemi di 
decentramento
CCFL Comitato Centrale 
sulla Finanza Locale
CdL Camera del Lavoro
CdT Comitato della Terra
CGIL Confederazione Generale 
Italiana del Lavoro
Proceedings of the City 
Council (Bologna)
Italian Association 
of Christian Workers
Central State Archives 
(EUR - Rome)
national Association of 
Italian Partisans
Communist Party Archives
Association of Italian 
Recreational Clubs
Joint Council Commission 
for the Study of Problems 
of Decentralisation
Central Committee on 
Local Government Finance
Labour Chamber
Land Committee
General Confederation of 
Italian Labour
CISL
CP
CRAL
CTM
DC
Confederazione Italiana 
Sindacati Liberi
Consulte Popolari
Circolo Ricreativo
Assistenziale
Lavoratori
Consigli Tributari 
Municipali
Democrazia Cristiana
Italian Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions
People's Councils
Workers' Recreational 
& Welfare Centre
Municipal Rating 
Councils
Christian Democracy
FGCI Federazione Giovanile Italian Young
Comunista Italiana Communists Federation
AA
GM Giunta Municipale Council Executive
GPA Giunta Provinciale Amministrativa
Provincial Administratis 
Executive
IACP Istituto Autonomo Case Popolari
Autonomous Institute 
for Public Housing
IdF Imposta di Famiglia Family Tax
I CAP Imposta sulle industrie i commerci, le arti 
e le professioni
Tax on industry, 
commerce, arts & 
professions
INA-Casa Istituto Nazionale 
Abitazioni
National Institute 
for Housing
M.I.Gab. Ministero dell'Interno 
Gabinetto
Office of the Ministry 
of the Interior
M.S. Movimento Studentesco Student Movement
MSI Movimento Sociale 
Italiano
Italian Social Movement 
(Neo-fascist party)
PCI Partito Comunista 
Italiano
Italian Communist 
Party
DT Due Torri Electoral name of PCI 
in Bologna
PDS Partito Democratico 
della Sinistra
Democratic Party of the 
(former PCI)
PDUP Partito Democratico 
di Unità Proletaria
Democratic Party of 
Proletarian Unity
PIC Piano Intercomunale 
Comprensoriale
Municipal District Plan
PLI Partito Liberale 
Italiano
Italian Liberal 
Party
PRI Partito Repubblicano 
Italiano
Italian Republican 
Party
PSI Partito Socialista 
Italiano
Italian Socialist Party
PSLI Partito Socialista 
dei Lavoratori Italiani
Socialist Party of 
Italian Labour
PSU Partito Socialista 
Unificato*
United Socialist Party
C o l t i v a t o r e
diretto
Comprensorio
Consigli di 
quartiere
Mezzadria
Quartiere
Salariate
Sindacato
Sindaco
Direct cultivator or small-holder.
District - often refers to the ensemble of 
Eologna and its neighbouring towns or 
to a topographical area (i.e. the plain or 
the mountain district).
Neighbourhood councils
Literally 'half-sharer' in the crop- One 
of the most ancient forms of farm tenure 
where the produce is divided equally 
between the land owner and the farmer. 
However, it is unusual to find a neat 
50:50 division and a more accurate 
description of this type of farming 
is 'comparticipazione' or co-division.
Literally 'quarter' - derived from the 
Roman perpendicular town division. Because 
the modern city no longer corresponds to 
this pattern, the tex*m has been translated 
as 'neigboux*hood '.
A wage-laboux*ex* with regular employment 
who may or may not have accomodation 
provided by his employer.
Trade-union
Mayor
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1I N T R O D U C T I O N
Part I. Methodology.
K The Study,
This thesis is the result of 15 months archival and fieldwork in Italy between January 
198S and March 1991 and a total of 3 years of study and research in Cambridge and 
London. My intention from the outset was not to write a narrowly historical, political 
scientific or sociological account of post-war society and politics in Bologna. I 
wanted, wherever possible, to learn from other approaches to the subject and to 
integrate that knowledge into the broader analysis of local administration and 
urban/rural political organisation. I have drawn on the work of a variety of 
professionals from architects and town planners, to economists and statisticians as well 
as social scientists working in the fields of anthropology, politics, sociology and social 
policy. Also journalism has been a particularly useful non-academic resource, but 
since, for too long, the only English translation of an investigation into Bologna’s 
politics and society has been a work of straight reportage1, I believe that a critical 
and scholarly appraisal of this important subject is long overdue.2 In combining
1 Max Jaeggi, Roger Mueller, and Sii Schmid, Red Bologna. Writers & Readers, 
London, 1977.
2 A less well known and somewhat more cynical account of society and politics in 
Bologna is contained in John Ardagh’s, A Tale of Five Cities. Life in Provincial Europe 
Today, Seeker & Warburgh, London, 1979. Although Ardagli deliberately conveys a 
subjective impression of the city and its people, his description of the ‘Communist
different theoretical and empirical approaches I hope to have avoided the main 
weaknesses in the existing literature on Emilian Communism which are characterised 
by an epistemological monoculture and the absence, or insufficient use, of historical 
and cultural analyses.
2. A definition of terms.
(il Local Government.
The study of local government has traditionally been the domain of the political 
scientist interested in the analysis of representative democratic institutions. Because of 
this institutional frame, local government has almost invariably been regarded as a 
sub-division of the national state and the interchangeable use of the terms ‘local 
government’ and ‘local state’3 reflects the Michelsian bias of the literature towards an 
‘iron law’ conceptualisation of local administration.4 It will become clear to the 
reader that I favour a more elastic and porous concept of local government. The
bourgeoisie’ provides an interesting insight into the local power élite.
3 In llie English context, Cynthia Cockburn has made the strongest claim for seeing 
local government as merely an appendage to the national state with an imaginary degree 
of ‘relative autonomy.’ See The Local State. Pluto Press, London, 1986. This does not 
necessarily invalidate the usefulness of the term, however, particularly when a local 
authority is carrying out a statutory obligation such as the registration of births, deaths 
and marriages, the issuing of voting papers etcetera. In the Italian case it is also 
important to realise that the sindaco as well as being an elected politician is a state civil 
servant and therefore operates much more as an interface between central government and 
his or her local government than a council leader does in Britain.
4 Here I support Dunleavy’s assessment that,4...institutional approaches have actually 
produced very little direct evidence about policy determination. Policies are studied or 
analysed by such approaches only in a casual and superficial way.’ Patrick Dunleavy, 
Urban Political Analysis. Macmillan, London, 1980. p.165.
3organisation and political direction of the local administrations which are the subject 
of this thesis have, I would argue, more normative than positive qualities in that they 
are institutionally flexible and respond to more than just bureaucratic routines. Given 
the numerous possibilities the giunte of the soeialcommunist administrations had for 
‘bending the stick’ in the direction of local autonomy I would question Zariski’s 
assertion that ‘regional and local units of government possess only such powers as the 
national government chooses to allow them.’ Indeed a major argument of this thesis is 
that political power in the centre-periphery relationship was very far from being ‘one­
way.’5
In this dissertation, the primary local government institution which I examine is the 
Comune di Bologna. The comune, is the. most ancient form of representative 
government in Italy and it arguably remains the most important tier o f sub-national 
government today.6 There are in all sixty communes of varying sizes in the Province
5 Zariski, R. ‘Italy: The Politics of Uneven Development’, p.117 cited in Tarrow, 
S. Between Centre and Periphery. Grassroots Politicians in Italy and France. Yale 
University Press, London, 1977, p.124.
6 The creation of regional governments throughout the whole of Italy in 1970 
appeared to create an intermediate authority between city and town governments and the 
national state. As we see later, the battle for regional autonomy continues to occupy 
politicians on both sides of the political spectrum inspite of the devolution of major 
spending powers. The political role of the regions still seems to be only vaguely defined 
and the political parties have often found it difficult to organise themselves regionally. 
For a recent study of regionalisation in Emilia-Romagna see Leonardi, R. and Nanetti, 
R. The Regions and European Integration. The Case of Emilia-Romagna. Pinter, 
London, 1990.
A good example of the relative importance the PCI ascribes to the leadership of the 
regional capital as opposed to the region itself can be seen in the Communists readiness 
to trade the presidency of the Regione Emilia-Romagna for the mayoralty of Bologna 
after the April, 1990 local elections strengthened the positions of the Socialists. The fact
4of Bologna as a whole, bui I have chosen lo concentrale on the administration of the 
city itself because the capoluogo is not only the capital of the province and the region, 
it also accomodates the head-quarters of the region’s major finance and business 
organisations, the main trade union federations, the cooperative, artisans, and
, J
commercialists’ organisations, together with the command posts of the Italian state; 
the prefecture, the questura, and the headquarters of the army and Carabinieri.
Where aspects of the provincial or regional administration have an important impact 
on the decisions of the local ruling faction in Bologna (or vice versa), these will be 
discussed and analysed. Similarly, social movement activity (especially during the 
period of reconstruction) is often concentrated more in llie province than in the city, 
and in these cases the focus of the analysis will be on the smaller comuni and the 
social and economic groupings active outside the confines of the city itself. Obviously 
sub-communal forms of local administration such as the neighbourhood councils which 
are examined in detail in chapter five form an intrinsic part of the study of Bologna’s 
local government as do quasi-autonomous local government organisations such as the 
health authorities and the consorzi for transport, public hygiene and water and gas.
fifi Social Movements.
that the PSI was pressing for the poltrone of the sindaco suggests that the symbolic 
significance of the post was not lost on the Socialists either.
As Procacci shows, the importance of the commune in the social and political life of Italy 
has a long history. Referring to the rise of the commune in the middle-ages he writes, 
‘...the attachment to one’s own town, one’s own small nation, was the banner under 
which Italian commune life developed. In a world where a man was defined more by the 
town he belonged to than by his class or social level, and no condition seemed worse than 
that of the bandit or exile, the man who had no homeland and no roots.’ Giuliano 
Procacci, History of the Italian People. I-Iarmondsworth, Penguin, 1973, pp.28-29.
5Much more difficult to classify and explain is the concept of a social movement. The 
very use of the term to describe social forces outside the direct and formal control of 
political parties and institutions brings with it a set of assumptions about social and 
political autonomy and the nature of political conflict which critics of the concept 
regard as normative, insubstantial and unrigorous. I do not have the space here to do 
justice to the complex debate on the nature and meaning of social movements, but for 
the sake of clarity I intend to adopt a definition of the term which I will employ as a 
short-hand lor describing the organisations and associations which played an important 
part in the political and economic life of post-war Bologna.7
For the purposes of this study I intend social movement to mean an assemblage of 
individuals or groupings which acts in combination or separately to advance the 
interests of its members, or which seek to represent civil society as a whole through 
the expression of a popular will or sentiment with the express aim of altering the 
status quo (social, economic and political) in favour of the movement’s goal or goals. 
A social movement is the expression of a collective desire for change in the structure 
of society and/or social and economic relations. Social movements are also moral 
entities in the sense that they articulate a set of values and beliefs which derives from 
an understanding of justice, equity and freedom. The appeal to a wider ethical 
community and the representation of the movement’s demands in terms of universal 
moral criteria is a defining characteristic of such social formations.
Unlike the organisations described above, groups or associations which are formed to 
defend the status quo or to improve their privileged position within the state and civil
7 Key texts in this debate are Alain Touraine’s The Voice and the Eye. An Analysis 
of Social Movements. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 19S1, Francesco 
Alberoni, Movement and Institution. Columbia University Press, New York, 1984. On 
Italy, John Low-Beer, Protest and Participation. Cambridge University Press, 1978; 
Robert Lumley States of Emergency. Verso, London, 1990; Alberto Melucci, Nomads 
of the Present. Radius, London 1989; and Sidney Tarrow, Democracy and Disorder, 
Oxford University Press, 1989.
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society are treated simply as interest groups, since these organisations (such as 
agriculturalists’ or industrialists’ associations) generally have special and exclusive 
channels of communication with government and the national and local news media 
(which they often own). On the rare occasions when economically or socially 
privileged associations take direct action in defence of their claims, the objective has 
invariably been to restore this exclusive communication channel or to renegotiate the 
social contract agreed between the state and the socio-economic bloc which sustains it. 
If a group which previously belonged to the dominant or ruling economic or political 
establishment finds itself outside the new ‘historic bloc’, insofar as this association or 
organisation considers itself to be anti-systemic, it can be said to constitute a social 
movement (for example the monarchists after 1947 were anti-systemic politically, but 
were staunch defenders of the economic order and thus constituted a social movement 
only in a restricted sense).
Clearly, most of the social movements included under this definition will belong to the 
political constituency of the left, but this is by no means exclusively the case.
Catholic organisations such as Azione Cattolica and AGLI which militated for reform 
of economic and political policy would be included under this definition, as would the 
more recent expressions of Catholic evangelism such as Comunione e Liberazione and 
Movimento Popolare.
Trade unions present a particular problem because many economists and sociologists 
regard them as economic interest groups which act collectively on behalf of their 
members for improvements in wages and conditions and they are therefore not 
considered as political organisations in their own right. While accepting that the 
major function of a trade union is to advance the economic interests of its members, 
unlike in Britain and the United Stales, trade unions in Italy have been highly 
politicised and in virtually all cases have been established by political parties to defend 
the interests of the working class, not only against employers but also against the state
7apparatus itself.8
Because fascism took such great care to crush independent trade unions and to stifle 
industrial unrest, the right to organise which was won back by the labour movement 
during the Resistance has been strongly defended by trade unionists on the political 
level as much as at the negotiating table. The fact lliat trade unions played such an 
important part in the protests and agitations which periodically immersed the Republic 
from the turbulent years of the De Gasperi/Scelba administrations to the heady days of 
the ‘Hot Autumn’ and beyond, means that any study of the relationship between social 
movements and the Communist administration of Bologna which did not include an 
account of the activities of rural and industrial trade union organisations would hardly 
be worth writing.
Similarly although the cooperative and artisans federations are also primarily 
economic organisations, their origins are to be found in the resistance to industrial and 
agricultural monopolists, and historically must be considered as oppositional to the 
economic and political system which emerged in the rest of Italy after 1947.
Although such organisations have become powerful economic forces in Emilia- 
Romagna over the last thirty years, llie cultural and political force of the PCI’s 
economic collateral organisations has increased rather than diminished and their 
importance lor this study cannot be understated. By including what might be seen as *
* Labour movements and trade unions are seen as crucial to the concept of social 
movement in the work of Anthony Giddens, ‘Labour movements are contestatory 
associations,’ he argues, ‘whose origins and field of action are bound up with the spread 
of capitalist enterprise. Whether reformist or revolutionary, they have their roots in the 
economic order of capitalism, specifically in attempts to achieve defensive control of the 
workplace through unionism and to influence or seize state power through socialist 
political organisation. Particularly during the relatively early phases of the development 
of modern institutions, labour movements tended to be major carriers of appeals for 
freedom of expression and democratic rights.’ Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of 
Modernity. Polity Press, Cambridge, 1990, pp. 159-160
8economie interest groups within the category of social movements I do not mean to 
imply that such organisations are simply and exclusively social movements. Rather 
these social and economic formations often exhibit ‘movementist’ behaviour or traits 
during periods of great social mobilisation (such as protests against fascist terrorism or 
in defence of civil and political rights - for example during the Scelba period) while 
continuing to perform institutional or corporative functions. My concept of social 
movement is therefore a graduated one with polycentric, protest oriented groups such 
as the students’ movement at the top and economic, interest-based organisations such 
as the artisans’ and traders’ associations at the bottom.
Part II. Historical and Theoretical Perspectives.
1. Red Bologna.
(i) Bologna PCL
There have been many studies of ’Bologna la rossa’ but there is not one that has been 
able to explain why it is that the largest city outside the Sino-Soviet bloc to be 
administered by a Communist Parly, and the city which in 1989 still had 109,000 
members in a province among a population of 911,000, can flourish in a country 
where the left has never held power in its own right (other than during the special 
conditions of tire Resistance) and in a region where an industrial proletariat dependent 
on mass-manufacture has never established itself.
In November 1989, Achille Oechetto, the secretary of the PCI made a speech to a 
small meeting of partisans in Bolognina, a working-class suburb of Bologna where 
Communists control nearly all the seals on the local neighbourhood council and where 
each Sunday L’Unità can be seen protruding from every other letterbox in the 
gleaming entrance halls of the squat condominiums. In his address to the assembled
9comrades, Occhello announced a decision which was to quickly reverberate around 
Italy, Europe and the Communist world. The largest Communist Party in the West 
was to ‘re-constilute’ itself as a new political force which would renounce for ever its 
links with Soviet-style socialism in favour of a green-tinged social democracy 
represented by the German SPD, and to a certain extent the British Labour Party.9 
Cicchetto believed the PCI’s ideology and internal organisation were out of date and 
needed to be reformed, its exclusion from the family of democratic socialists, and 
more importantly, its exclusion from government had to end, as did the party’s 
traditional opposition to capitalism in all its manifestations.
Occhelto’s decision to make this announcement in Bologna was far from incidental. 
The city was to be the site the following year of the last congress of the PCI, and in 
1991 it was awarded the special privilege of hosting the first national festival of 
L’Unità under the auspices of the new Democratic Party of the Left (PDS).10 The 
members, militants, and leaders of the Bologna federation registered the highest 
support for the ‘svolta di Occhetto’ of any other party federation in the country. The 
Emilian Communists for so many years the spectres at the feast of Botteghe Oscure 
(the Rome headquarters of the party directorate), felt that at last their contribution to 
‘la Cosa’ had been recognised. Leading Emilian party leaders were coopted onto the 
new executive and many delegates from the region’s large federations were 
represented on the unwieldy national council with its 500 plus membership. At last 
Bologna’s time had come.11
9 For a good general survey see Chiara Valentina, La Cosa. Feltrinelli, Milan, 1990.
10 However the decision to hold this important fund-raising event in Bologna was not 
motivated by political considerations alone. The national ‘Festa dell’Unità’ incurred a 
massive loss when it was held in Florence the previous year and party managers had to 
accept that only in the ‘reddest’ provinces of Emilia (i.e. Modena and Bologna) was there 
sufficient volunteer labour and public interest to guarantee the festival’s success. On the 
post-war development of the ‘Festa dell’Unità’ in Bologna see chapter three, part four.
11 It is also significant that six months after the foundation of the Partito Democratico 
della Sinistra, Emilia-Romagna accounted for more than 50°?- of the national membership.
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This thesis is intended to shed new light on the historical development of the ‘Emilian 
road to socialism’ and the novelty of my argument lies in the suggestion that not only 
were the Emilian and Italian roads ‘twin-tracks’, but that the tracks themselves were 
far from parallel.
(iil The ‘modello bolognese.’
The idea of Bologna as a ‘model’ has stimulated much academic and political debate, 
but precious little discussion has been heard around the question, what is this model 
for? The following chapters are an attempt to address this question and to explain how 
and why the PCI came to power and the means by which the Communists have 
continued to exert that power in the forty five years since the end of World War Two.
The title of the thesis ‘Local government and social movements in Bologna since 
1945’ refers explicitly to the twin prongs of the PCI’s hegemonic project in Bologna - 
local government, and the mass associations of civil society (trade unions, 
cooperatives, artisans’ associations, sporting and recreational circles and similar 
organisations) which cemented the PCI into (he social and economic infrastructure of 
the city and province.
The study is not exclusively an anatomy of Communist hegemony. Others have 
already dissected it with varying degrees of success, my task however, is also to 
reveal what Communist policies for Bologna set out to achieve and what they actually 
did achieve. I aim to assess the success or failure of key Communist policies in the 
context of national spending and legislative constraints, the degree of central and local 
opposition, and the changing social and economic structures of the province. If 
Bologna is exceptional, why is it exceptional, and what significance does this have for 
our understanding of local political processes generally?
In 1946, Togliatti attempted to fashion a concept of ‘revolutionary reformism’ which 
was to be quite distinct from the earlier Socialist administrative experiences in Emilia
11
Romagna in the period before fascism.*2 In alliance with the ‘progressive’ elements 
ot" the lower-middle class, the self-employed, and the petty proprietors, the PCI was to 
construct a base from which the transition to socialism would be made. Although the 
transition could not obviously be characterised as socialist in itself, this ante-diluvian 
phase along the road to the Communist society would contain strong anti-capitalist 
elements. And it was through the development of these anti-capitalist and anti- 
monopolist tendencies that the steady democralisation and collectivisation of capitalist 
society was to occur.
With very few exceptions, parly historians and sympathetic academics (most of them 
from the United Stales) have taken Togliatti’s aspirations as if they were an uncanny 
prophecy which progressively unfolded in the following decades. From the many 
studies which came out of Bologna and Emilia-Romagna in the 1960s12 3 and 1970s14
12 Paimiro Togliatti, ‘Ceto medio e Emilia rossa’ in Critica Marxista. July-October 
1964, Nos.-1-5 pp. 130-158. This speech is examined in some detail in the following 
chapter.
13 Robert Evans’ study of Bologna’s administration dales from this time, but it is an 
altogether too credulous account of communism in ‘una città sola’ and tries to draw large 
conclusions from a very small survey of activists. Evans, R.H. Coexistence: Communism 
and its Practice in Bologna 1945-1965. University of Notre Dame Press, London, 1967.
14 Stephen Heilman’s doctoral thesis, ‘Organisation and Ideology in Four Communist 
Federations’, unpublished PhD, Yale University, 1974 provided the basis for a more 
searching analysis of the PCI at the local level in subsequent essays such as ‘The PCI and 
the Middle-Classes’ in R. Blackmer & S. Tarrow (Eds), Communism in Italy and France. 
Princeton University Press, 1975, although the references to the Bologna federation are 
rather oblique. Raffaela Nanelti also studied Bologna in her doctoral thesis, ‘Municipal 
planning through neighbourhood councils: a case study of citizen participation in the 
planning process in Bologna, Italy’, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Michigan, 
Ann Arbor, 1977’ and she has worked subsequently on regional planning and 
development in Emilia-Romagna. See Leonardi, R. & Nanelti, R. The Regions and 
European Integration. The Case of Emilia-Romagna, cit.
it would appear that Ihe via italiana al socialismo begins and ends in Emilia, but like 
all good roads it also led to Rome.
The assumption here was that ‘Red Bologna* was until very recently genuinely 
communist or ‘Eurocommunist’ (albeit more pluralist and democratic than its Soviet 
or Eastern European sister parties) and that the type of policies it implemented formed 
an integral part of the Italian road to socialism.15 In tills dissertation I set out to 
argue that both these claims are highly problematic. Instead I suggest that it is more 
accurate to describe the historical and cultural amalgam of reformist socialism, 
Communist organisation and diffused industrialisation as ‘Leninist Keynesianism.’
12
15 David Kertzer is quite explicit in claiming his is a study of local Eurocommunism, 
in the preface to Comrades and Christians he writes, ‘For readers who have come across 
accounts of ‘Eurocommunism’ more times than they can remember without ever learning 
of the lives of any ‘Euro-Communists’ who are not members of Parliament or 
intellectuals of renown, this book is intended to provide a glimpse into the social fabric 
of Euro-Communist experience. And for those curious about the coexistence of the 
strongest Western Communist Party with the bastion of the Catholic Church, focusing on 
the way in which the national conflict is played out in one local setting.’ David Kertzer, 
Comrades and Christians. Religion and Political Struggle in Communist Italy. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 19S0, p.XV. This last comment is particularly surprising 
given the major differences in PCI/Church relations at a national level and in Bologna 
itself.
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7 Italy as an •Exceptional* State.
i i i Italy and the Welfare State in Europe: A Case of Arrested Development. 
‘Italy is a combination of families not a state’ (Longanesi)16
It is my contention that notwithstanding the two decades of fascism, Bologna has 
always been the home of socialist reformism. Fausto Anderlini calls this political 
culture, ‘ideal communism, real social democracy,’ and social democracy was indeed 
the political form which the red communes in the post-war era took.17 But the 
isolation of the socialcommunist administrations from the mainstream political 
establishment and their geographical concentration in the north-east and centre of the 
country made it easy for the Christian Democrats and their allies to present Emilia- 
Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria and the Marches as aberrations from the rest of 
moderate, Catholic Italy.
The reality is quite different, it was the Christian Democrats who bucked the 
European post-war trend towards stale centred welfarism and redistributive economic
16 Cited in Schnapper, D. Sociologie de ritalie. Presses Universitaires de France, 
Paris, 1974, p. 10.
17 Anderlini, Fausto. Terra Rossa. ComuniSmo ideale, socialdemocrazia reale. Il PCI 
in Emilia-Romagna 1945-1990. Istituto Gramsci Emilia Romagna, Bologna, 1990.
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policies in national government. Thus, although Bologna’s post-war administration 
may have differed markedly from that of Rome or Milan, it shared many similarities 
with London, and with Vienna and Cologne.18 This was because on a local level the 
Socialists and Communists of Emilia-Romagna were attempting to build a democratic 
administration which could begin to redress the social and economic imbalances in the 
region and its capital, a strategy which shared many common features with social 
democratic (and even Christian Democratic) governments in the rest of Europe. Stein 
Rokkan, the leading authority on modern state development, has identified four main 
stages in the growth of the modern welfare state in Western Europe:
i) Stale formation - the establishment of the infrastructure of the nation-slate organised 
at the political, economic and cultural élite level based on the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of force and a civil and criminal legal framework capable of regulating 
conflict.
ii) Nation-building - the means by which the corporate mass of the state is widened 
through military conscription, compulsory education, the mass media etc. leading to 
an affective bonding between the élite and the mass.
iii) Participation - the process of active citizen participation in the state system through 
mass democracy and political citizenship.
iv) Redistribution - universalisation of the principle of economic justice through the 
establishment of public welfare services and social security systems and the
'* Most significantly these cities had a relatively high average income and stable left- 
wing political majorities which for most of the post-war period had exercised power 
under centre or centre-right national governments. As an example, the political 
composition of Cologne City Council in 1973 was 37 social democrats, 4 liberals, 26 
Christian Democrats; in 1972 Vienna City Council contained 66 socialists, 31 catholics 
and three liberals. Source: Robert Fried, Comparative Urban Politics. A Performance 
Approach. Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 19S0, Table 4.6 p.103.
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recognition of social rights and entitlements.19
Having arrived at stage one in the Unification of 1861, the Italian state attempted 
unsuccessfully to achieve stage two under the liberal-nationalist Giolittian regime. The 
crisis and then collapse of the liberal-nationalist government led to the twenty year 
dictatorship of Mussolini who tried to complete the nation-building phase at a forced 
march. The end of the Second World War and the introduction of full universal 
suffrage ought to have led to the completion of the participatory phase and a rapid 
transition to welfarism, but forty-five years later the full political and economic 
integration of the broad mass of the people into Italian society has arguably still not 
been achieved.20
Italy is not unique in veering away from the ideal-typical trajectory described by 
Rokkan, but it is exceptional in having not only one of the highest ratios of transfers 
and public expenditure in Europe but also in maintaining a consistently high level of
19 See Flora, P. ‘Stein Rokkans MakroModell der politischen Entwicklung Europas: 
Ein Rekonstruktionsversuch’, Kdlner Zeitschrift fur Sozioloeie und Sozialpsvchologie. 
33, 3, pp. 397-436 summarised in Peter Flora (Ed). Growth to Limits. The Western 
European Welfare States since World War II. Volume 2: Germany. United Kingdom. 
Ireland. Italy. Waller de Gruyter, New York, 1986 p.xvi. For another important 
assessment of the structural development of the modern slate see Anthony Giddens, The 
Nation-State and Violence, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985.
20 The negative public perception of the Italian state has been consistently charted by 
European opinion surveys. In 1973 Eurobarometer asked a representative sample of each 
European Community country about their level of satisfaction with their democracy, 3095 
of Italians replied that they were ‘Not at all’ satisfied, the highest level of dissatisfaction 
in Europe (the United Kingdom followed next with 20 °5 while the figure for the EC as 
a whole was 1895). In 1983 the number of very dissatisfied respondents in Italy actually 
increased to 31 95 while the European average fell to 1495. Cited in Maria Weber, Italia: 
paese Europeo? Franco Angeli. Milan. 1986 p.156.
deprivation. The single most persuasive explanation for Uiis discrepancy (which is 
bom out by all the investigations into inequality in Italy) is that the vast sums 
expended by the Italian stale are not reaching the poor and the very poor, while the 
txx burden of the bottom third of the population has continued to increase in real 
terms relative to the top third of the population.
For example, between 1950 and 1970 Italy had the worst record in Europe in terms of 
labour's share of the national income. Five years after the end of tire Second World 
War the share of national income going to Italy’s workforce was 49%, compared with 
55% in Austria, 5S% in Germany and 6S% in the United Kingdom. Fifteen years 
later the figure for Italy had risen to only 52 % while the respective share of GDP for 
Austrian, German and British labour had risen to 63%, 65 % and 76% respectively.21
While it is true that Italy has devoted a large percentage of its national income to 
public expenditure (24.S% of GDP in 1951 and 44.4% in 19S0), this should not be 
taken as an index of a general relative improvement in the quality of life of the mass 
of the population, particularly at the lower end of the income scale.22 The 1951 
Parliamentary Commission into destitution found that 12.1 million Italians, 23.3% of 
the population, were living in destitution or conditions of hardship.23 The economic
16
21 Figures taken from Franz Kraus, ‘The Historical Development of Income 
Inequality in Western Europe and the United Stales', in Peter Flora and Arnold 
Heidenheimer (Eds) The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America. 
Transaction Books, London, 1981, Chapter 6 pp. 187-236, table 6.3.
22 Piero Bassetti argues that ‘the Italian miracle, in point of fact, is to be found in the 
disproportion which exists between productivity and wages’, quoted in Percy Allum, 
Politics and Society in Post-War Naples. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973, 
p. 15.
23 Maurizia Ferrera, ‘Italy’, in Peter Flora (Ed), Growth to Limits. The Western 
European Welfare States since World War II. Volume 2: Germany. United Kingdom. 
Ireland. Italy. Walter de Gruyter, New York, 1986, pp.393 & 419-420. A historical 
reconstruction of the enquiry can be found in Braghin, P. Inchiesta sulla miseria in Italia
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boom of the late-1950s cancelled out much of this acute poverty but at the cost of 
displacing millions of families and thousands of communities to the industrial north of 
the country where living conditions were primitive mid public sendees virtually non­
existent.24
A study commissioned by the European Commission undertaken by G. Sarpellon 
found that in 1978 there were still 1,625,000 families living below the ‘destitution’ 
line (9.4% of the population) in and 3,626,000 families (20.4/5 of the population) 
were found to be ‘in need.’ As in 1951, Ferrera observes, these families tended to be 
massively concentrated in Uie south.25 This north/south divide continued to widen 
after 1945 inspite of massive state aid to the poorest regions channelled through funds 
such as the ‘Cassa per il Mezzogiorno.’
Percy Alluni has shown how in the case of Naples, clientalism and corruption grew up 
around the central and local state to such an extent that ‘pork barrel’ politics became 
the modus vivendi for all the parties with the possible exception of the extreme 
left.26 By contrast in the Veneto where the DC has dominated the political scene 
since the war, the efficiency and probity of Christian Democrat local administrations
(19bl-1952>r iànauai, Turin, 1978.
24 See Paul Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy. Society and Politics 1943- 
19S8f Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1990, p.223n.
25 18fó of the total southern population was recorded as ‘destitute’ and 18.1% ‘in 
need’ in 197S. Ferrera, M. cit. p.42l.
26 Percy Alluni, Politics and Society in Post-War Naples, cit. Although during the 
Communists’ brief taste of power from 1975-1980, the left-wing giunta was itself accused 
of comipl administration, see Judith Chubb, ‘Naples under the left. The limits of local 
change,’ Comparative Politics. Voi. 13, No.l, 1980, pp,53-78. An illuminating 
comparative study of Bologna and Naples which focuses on welfare provision in 
particular is provided by V. Capecchi & E. Pugliese, ‘Due città a confronto: Bologna e 
Napoli’, Inchiesta. Voi.Vili, Nos. 35-36, pp.3-54.
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has rarely been questioned.27 Many writers therefore argue that the affinity between 
red’ and ‘white’ administrations in northern Italy is much greater than between 
Christian Democrat controlled cities like Brescia and Bari. It is important therefore to 
see northern Italy and particularly the Valle Padana as an intrinsic and important part 
of Europe’s soulliem industrial zone with one of the highest standards of living in the 
EC. Few comparative studies have been made between ‘red* and ‘white’ city 
administrations in the ‘third Italy’28 but single studies would lend to suggest that 
although ideological explanations for policy measures will vary between the parties, 
the actual variations in expenditure and housing and sendee provision will be relative 
rather than structural.29
Welfarism does exist in Italy, but it is heavily concentrated in the populous cities of 
the northern plains and is still strongly associated with charitable associations 
connected to the Church or voluntary bodies operating in many cases on an ad hoc 
and non-slatulory basis.30 In Bologna where stage three and four of Rokkan’s 
growth model can be observed very clearly, we still need to be wary of seeing the
27 Although it should be said that the penetration of organised crime into the large 
northern cities is raising concerns about the allocation of lucrative local government 
contracts to firms connected with known mafia families.
25 The most important study still remains A. Bagnasco, Tre Italie. La problematica 
territoriale dello sviluppo italiano, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1977. The ‘third Italy’ refers to 
the ‘diffuse industrialisation’ regions bordering the Adriatic coast and the Appenines 
which stretch from the northern Veneto as far south as Bari.
29 The sociological studies undertaken by the Istituto Cattaneo in the late 1960s on 
the ‘red’ and ‘while’ zones of northern Italy have provided this comparison for the main 
political parties. See, various authors; L’organizzazione politica del PCI e della DC. II 
Mulino, Bologna, 1968; L’attività di partilo. Un’indagine sui militanti di base nel PCI 
e nella PC. Il Mulino, Bologna, 1967; La presenza sociale del PCI e della P C . Il 
Mulino, Bologna, 1968.
30 See Achille Ardigb, Crisi di governabilità e mondi vitali. Cappelli, Bologna, 1980.
evolution of social policy in terms of the construction of a local welfare state when it 
would be more accurate to refer to a welfare system. These cultural and religious 
determinants of social policy very strongly condition the progress towards a 
participatory, redistributive and welfare based society on the North European model, 
even in the pro-egalitarian and lay political context of Communist local government in 
Bologna.
bit Restoration or Reform? .State and Society in Postwar Italy.
Many historians and writers on contemporary Italy have defined the period from 1943 
to 1948 as a lost opportunity. The newly approved Italian constitution enshrined some 
of lite most advanced ideas on civil, political and economic rights and freedoms of any 
democratic state in Europe and the political formations which were committed to 
reform saw the creation of the Republic as an opportunity to break decisively with 
Italy’s fascist past and to build on the values and aspirations which had been nurtured 
during the Resistance. However De Gasperi’s ejection of the Communists from his 
cabinet in 1947 and the Christian Democrats’ landslide victory in April 1948 finally 
destroyed any possibility of a pluralist approach to the enormous challenge of the 
reconstruction.
‘The new centre coalition led by the Christian Democrats’, Ferrera writes, ‘opted for 
a restoration of the pre-war institutional framework’, ruling out, ‘...after, 1948, any 
strategy for radical change. Thus, the traditional traits of the Italian welfare state 
were, maintained and the ‘natural’ continuation of the pre-war experience was 
promoted. The welfare issue soon moved back to the periphery of political debate 
and competition, with social policy remaining for two decades a fragmented area of 
marginal adjustments, additive expansions and clientilistic exchanges.,M
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Welfare was not the only victim of this institutional restoration. The provisions for 
local and regional autonomy which were such an important element of the Italian 31
31 Ferrera cit. p.390.
20
constitution did not acquire the status of law until the 1970s, forcing local authorities 
to rely on powers which were introduced in 1915 and 1934.32 This was not in any 
sense the result of a failure on the part of the governing coalitions to agree on the 
shape and content of local authority powers, since, a wide degree of consensus had 
been achieved during the Constituent Assembly when the future political compleion of 
the putative republic was uncertain. Only when it became clear that regional 
autonomy would mean handing power over to socialcommunist administrations in a 
large part of the centre-north did the DC’s enthusiasm for comprehensive regionalism 
evaporate.
Here again the Italian Christian Democrats demonstrated their willingness to deviate 
sharply even from the philosophy of other European Catholic parties. A defining 
characteristic of Christian Democracy in other countries had been the notion of 
‘subsidiarity’ which meant that the intervention of a higher authority could only be 
justified when a particular need cannot be met by a lower social group or unit of 
government. This reflected the Catholic Church’s stress on the organic community 
and its attendant rejection of mass society and the social fragmentation which it 
engenders.33
The policy of the De Gasperi governments and their successors was in the opposite 
direction. Local authorities found that their powers and resources were steadily 
diminishing while the state provided its prefects and police and carabinieri chiefs with 
unprecedented powers to suspend, arrest and prosecute Communist and Socialist 
mayors and councillors, to ban political demonstrations and meetings and to veto a
32 The only exceptions were the ‘special regions’, Sicily, Sardinia, Trentino-Alto 
Adige and Val d’Aosta which were established between 1946 and 1949 to defuse the 
threat posed by separatist movements. An additional ‘special’ region, Friuli-Venezia- 
Giulia was created in 1963. They had their own regional governments with limited 
decision making and spending powers.
33 Harold L. Wilensky ‘Leftism, Catholicism, and Democratic Corporatism’, in Flora 
& Heidenheimer cit. p.352.
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council’s budget or in extremis to dissolve the council altogether.34
The ‘red’ administrations and the peasant leagues and trade unions under the left’s 
control bore the brunt of these attacks in the first ten years of post-war Italy, but the 
PCI under Togliatti steadfastly refused to channel this popular resistance in an 
insurrectionary or subversive direction even when after the attempt on the life of the 
PCI’s leader in 1948 several major cities in northern Italy fell under the control of 
striking workers. In Emilia-Romagna, where the PCI’s organisation and membership 
was strongest, the ‘spontaneous’ outbreak of collective rage was controlled and 
measured. The Communists’ reputation for responding in a dignified and lawful way 
to the ‘provocations’ of the stale and the opponents of Communism was established in 
these years. But was Togliatli’s ‘new party’ merely displaying the veneer of legality 
and a commitment to democracy and would the Italian Communists really refuse to 
seize power by force if Moscow ordered them to? These were the questions that the 
PCI’s critics on a local and national level constantly raised when Communist leaders 
tried to stress that the party was a legitimate and genuine part of the Italian Republic.
The history of the Communist administration of Bologna can to a large extent be seen 
as an answer to the PCI’s critics. When the Christian Democrats accused the giunta 
of authoritarianism and secretiveness it responded with ‘open government’ and new 
forms of citizen participation. Charges of unresponsiveness to public opinion and 
excessive centralisation were met with administrative decentralisation and the 
establishment of neighbourhood councils. Accusations of unrestrained urban growth 
and insufficient service provision encouraged conservation-led planning and major 
improvements in the service infrastructure. If Bologna became a showcase for the 
Italian Communist Party it was precisely because on an administrative level it 
displayed none of those features of ‘actually existing socialism’ which had provided 
the DC and its foreign and domestic allies with the propaganda means to defeat the 
socialcommunists on a national level.
34 These developments are dealt with in some detail in chapter three, c. >
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Were it not for the fact that Bologna has been led by a Communist party it is doubtful 
that the city would have excited sudi international interest in its internal polities and 
economic and social organisations. However by questioning the value of using 
‘communist’ as a meaningful adjective for the political and ideological configuration 
of Bologna’s ruling class, I do not want to suggest that organisationally or culturally 
Emilian Communism and European social democracy are equivalent terms. Stripped 
of its sinister Cold War connotation, the concept (although not the expression) 
doppiezza has much to recommend it as an explanatory model for the process of 
accommodation and transformation which characterised the Emilian road to 
socialism.35
The period in which the term was pejoratively used refers to Togliatti’s ‘partito 
nuovo’ in which llie Leninist party machine was given the task of reinforcing the 
democratic and constitutional structures of the bourgeois slate in order to prevent a 
slide back into fascism. The strategy required an implicit abandonment of the 
revolutionary road which Togliatti had already veered away from at Salerno in 1944. 
The PCI's embrace of parliamentary democracy did not however signify an overthrow 
of the fundamental principles of Marxism which had guided the- party since the days 
of Gramsci, Bordiga and Tasca. Capitalism was still lite mortal enemy of the working 
class, but its overthrow required more than the active intervention of the vanguard 
party in directing the struggles of llie urban proletariat and the peasantry. New allies 
had to be recruited to the war of position between the forces of socialism and 
capitalism. I have already mentioned how this ‘svolta’ was quickly translated into a 
concrete strategy for winning over the ceti medi in ‘red Emilia’. Its success depended 
not only on the willingness of the petty bourgeoisie to participate in the PCI’s anti­
monopolist and anti-clerical campaigns, but also on the ability of the PCI and its 
‘collateral’ organisations to build a genuinely mass and socially variegated base from
35 The term can be translated as ‘duplicity’ or ‘duplicitousness', but ‘dualism’ or 
‘duality’ best captures the essence of the description without ascribing to it a pejorative 
meaning.
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which to challenge the values and structures of the Christian Democrat state.
Democratic centralism as a method of political organisation was peculiarly well 
adapted to this task. The experience of the Resistance had inculcated the values of 
discipline, loyally and solidarity in the membership of the party and the Liberation 
and the challenge of the reconstruction offered the PCI an opportunity to widen its 
socio-economic base and to directly involve the mass in its activities. This dichotomy 
between Italian Communism and European social democracy was more than simply a 
variation in political style or behaviour.36 Politics as lived experience was 
qualitatively different in Communist Bologna because the PCI existed as a dynamic 
force in society, which was able to shape and direct the social and political
36 Referring to the PCI’s ability to manage ‘capitalist rationalisation’ in Emilia- 
Romagna, Anderlini argues,
‘It was in this context that the Emilian PCI emerged, but by not exploiting the potential 
which the shell of negative integration retained in order to develop an extension of 
reformist politics in direct (even if implicit) consonance with the European social 
democratic experience.’ - ‘Negative integration’ is a term which Anderlini uses to 
describe the socialisation process of the Emilian working-class through the political and 
social direction of the PCI in Emilia. This process is ‘negative’ in as much as the 
Communist culture must necessarily be oppositional to the power structure of the Church 
and state.
However, the encouragement of local capitalism does not have to imply a social 
democratic form of local administration. Social democracy is not just Schuman’s ‘social 
market’ it is a hybrid of reformist political cultures rooted in the labour movement and 
committed to parliamentary democracy. In economic policy, social democracy has 
embraced models as widely different as centralised state planning and liberal 
Keynsianism. By not defining what he means by ‘European social democracy' Anderlini 
risks conflating Emilian ‘communism’ with any reformist capitalist political system. 
Anderlini, Terra rossa, cit. p.12.
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movements from which it drew its strength. Where Bolognese. Communism does vary 
considerably from the political practice of the PCI in many other parts of Italy and at 
the level of the national leadership is in its great capacity for innovation and its 
concern to be more than just a party of the industrial working-class and poor 
peasantry. This meant that as the strategy of the local Communist leadership 
changed, particularly in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the identity and function of 
the Party also changed.
If the 1940s and 1950s in Bologna were characterised by a collective defence of 
working class organisation through the institutions of local administration, the 1960s 
and 1970s witnessed a shift in the PCI’s concept of local government away from the 
‘movemenlisl’ notion of the comuni as a vehicle for organising collective opposition to 
the conservative state and towards an appreciation of local government as capable of 
effecting social and economic advances in its own right. Whereas in the first fifteen 
years after the war, the administration of Bologna could be described as communist in 
form and style but social democratic in terms of political content, the period after 
I960 witnessed a transition to a more technocratic and pluralist rhetoric which often 
masked quite radical innovations at the level of social and economic policy. By the 
1970s Bologna had won an international reputation for socially conscious planning, 
and its initiatives in the area of municipal decentralisation and popular participation 
were widely imitated. However, the transition to an urban-industrial society could not 
operate under laboratory conditions, Bologna’s ruling political caste was not immune 
to the student and worker mobilisations of 1968-1972 and at the time of the Movement 
of ’77, PCI leaders found themselves to be the object of a youth and student revolt 
which prompted discussion of the ‘crisis’ of the Bologna model.
In the following chapters these social, economic and cultural transformations are 
examined in relation to the political strategy which Paimiro Togliatti first expounded 
in Reggio Emilia in 1946. In the following chapter we explore the application of the 
‘Reggio doctrine’ in the social movements which emerged in the province of Bologna 
in the first decade after the Liberation and chart the development of a highly 
politicised labour movement and the culture of resistance which helped to lay the
25
oundations for the construction of Communist hegemony.
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C H A P T E R  O N E
Social Movements, Political Conflict and Cultural Identity in Bologna 1945-1956.
Pan f. Togliatti. Emilia Rossa and the alliance strategy of the PCI.
1. Introduction
‘Bella regione l’Emilia’, Paimiro Togliatti declared to a large audience of Reggio 
Communists in September 1946, taking obvious satisfaction from his party’s rapid 
growth and solid presence in a region which he described as, ‘dear to all Italians but 
especially to those for whom the cause of the emancipation of the workers is close to 
their hearts.’1
Togliatti was a keen student of the historic and cultural traditions of Emilia and 
showed a sophisticated knowledge of its revolutionary and reformist leaders from the 
time of the Risorgimento and beyond. His understanding of dialect and peasant 
folklore illustrated his awareness of how rural conflict persisted and was reproduced 
in the daily lives and culture of the mezzadri arid landless labourers. Togliatti’s skill 
lay in his ability to map the political strategy of the ‘partito nuovo’ onto the 
micropolitics of Emilia’s highly differentiated socio-economic landscape. If Molinella 
or Forlì and Faenza were to be won over to the socialcommunists an appreciation of 
how and why they had become reformist, Republican or Christian Democrat was 
necessary. This required a continuing ‘rearticulation’ of the region’s radical tradition 
as a historical development towards a democratic and socially equitable society under 
the leadership of the Italian Communist Party and its Socialist allies.
Unlike, the liberal democrats of the Partito d’Azione, Togliatti did not see the 
bourgeoisie as the civilising force of post-industrial society. On the contrary, the PCI
1 Paimiro Togliatti, ‘Ceto medio e Emilia rossa’ in Critica Marxista. July-October 
1964, Nos.4-5 pp. 130-158.
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leader maintained an orthodox Marxist contempt for a class which he believed had set 
back the course of human progress by its alignment with the repressive forces of 
capitalism during every major rupture in the historic bloc of the dominant class. The 
distinction between ‘borghesia’ and ‘ceto medio’ was therefore an attempt to 
distinguish the regressive from the potentially progressive elements of the middle 
strata of Italian society. Again Togliatti adopted a strictly Marxist classification by 
defining as bourgeois social actors who through their ownership of the means of 
production or land and property directly or indirectly enjoyed control over their fellow 
citizens. The ceti medi were intermediate between this capitalist middle-class and the 
great mass of industrial and agrarian workers who could only sell their physical labour 
power. Among this vast ensemble of the intermediate class Togliatti included all 
white-collar employees, small traders, small and medium shopkeepers, petty 
proprietors, commercial traders, intellectuals such as teachers, univerity professors, 
priests, professionals of every type together with ‘men of great culture', artists, poets, 
scientists and writers. To this primarily urban definition of the ceti medi Togliatti 
also added the rural categories of the mezzadria, the small ‘direct cultivators’ and 
tenant farmers.
It was Togliatti’s belief that the failure of socialist reformism and the advent of 
fascism was strictly connected to the Socialists’ inability to unite the proletarian and 
semi-autonomous rural workforce in a collective economic struggle against the great 
landowners. The Socialists’ unshakeable commitment to the ‘proletarianisation’ of the 
share-cropping and petty proprietorial classes had in the past led to the isolation of the 
braccianti and the red leagues and driven many of the independent peasants into the 
arms of the fascists. However partial this account of the history of agrarian conflict 
may have been, the significance of Togliatti's discourse lay in the fact that he intended 
to fuse the now ideologically voided Socialist Parly to a political strategy which would 
renounce once and for all the Soviet model of land nationalisation and collectivisation 
and defend the small proprietor and share-cropper from the worst excesses of agrarian 
capitalism.
Without any doubt the Reggio speech was one of the most significant explanations of
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ihc Communisi Parly’s alliance strategy in the post-war period. In the context of 
Emilia-Romagna where the PCI was the dominant social and political force, its 
implications were even more profound. The political doctrine established by Togliatti 
in 1946 formed the strategic foundation for all the Party’s interventions in local 
administration, the trade unions, cooperatives and mass associations at least until the 
'opening to the left’ which brought Nenni’s socialists into government in the early 
1960s and arguably until llie final collapse of the historic compromise in 1979. ‘Ceto 
medio e Emilia Rossa’ thus provided a blueprint for political action which Bologna’s 
Communist leadership rapidly applied in their organisational and propaganda work.
The Reggio doctrine was clearly enunciated by Colombi in his capacity as regional 
secretary for Emilia-Romagna at the 6lh Congress of the PCI in Milan in January 
1948. Referring to the alliance with the peasantry Colombi remarked that,
‘Our constant preoccupation has been not to fall into the old errors and to remember 
that inspite of the fact that a relatively important industrial development has taken 
place in lite last 25 years, Emilia remains a predominantly agrarian region.*
The basis of this social alliance lay in the Resistance when,
‘...every farm house was a partisan base, the farmer’s son fought in a formation,’ 
and, ‘..the brotherhood of arms which lite war of liberation achieved was the cement 
which first united the workers of the city and those of the countryside, the rural 
labourers with the share croppers and the direct cultivators.’2
If the battle for work and a decent standard of living for the working class was to be 
won the s tru g g le  m u s t  e x te n d  i t s e l f  to  w id e r  e c o n o m ic  categories who share a direct 
or indirect interest in the outcome of a struggle for a more equitable distribtion of
2 Arturo Colombi, ‘I comunisti emiliani al lavoro’ (Rapporto al VI Congresso del 
PCI, Milan, 8th January 1948) in P.P. D’Attorie (Ed) I comunisti in Emilia-Romagna. 
Istituto Gramsci, Bologna, 1981, pp.53-54.
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v. calth and income. Colombi specifically included technicians, employees, traders, 
and hotel keepers as potential allies in the Communist campaign against 
unemployment and inflation. Similarly in the countryside the landless labourers’ 
defence of the ‘imponibile di mano d’opera’ placed these workers in a similar 
antagonistic relationship with the large landowners as the share-croppers who were 
demanding a revision of the farm contracts.3
In its desire to make the Communist Party a genuinely ‘mass party’ which would 
include these intermediate strata the Communist leadership in Bologna seized on 
Togliatti’s injunction to build the ‘parlilo nuovo’ with great enthusiasm and it was 
with the spirit of the ‘costruttori’ that the cadres set about their task.
The Growth of Emilian Communism.
The most startling feature of Italian Communism in the period following the fall of 
fascism was the PCI’s metamorphosis from a semi-clandestine, vanguardist Bolshevik 
p a rty  to a mass movement which had a presence in nearly every field in the social and 
economic life of the nation. From an estimated 40,200 members in 1944 the national 
party had risen to 1,770,S96 by the end of 1945. Two years later the number of 
Italians holding the tessera of the PCI had reached the impressive total of two and a 
quarter million.4 5
Emilia-Romagna was the engine room of this dynamic political organisation; in 1953 
it accounted for over half a million, or one fifth of the PCI’s national membership3 in 
a region which accounted for only one thirteenth of the national population. By 1954,
3 Arturo Colombi, T nostri compiti di lavoro e di lotta’ (Comitato Regionale 
Emiliano PCI lltli September, 1943), in D’Attorie ibid. p.65.
4 Magna, N. ‘Dirigenza e base’ in Aceornero, A. (Edl L’identità comunista. Riuniti, 
Rome 19S3 cited in Cris Shore Italian Communism: The Escape from Leninism. Pluto 
Press, London, 1990, p.96 and Anderlini Terra rossa cit. See also Fig. 1.
5 Precisely 568,042, equal to 1 6 . 0 5 of the population of the region. Vincenzo 
Galletti, T1 PCI in Emilia’, in Emilia. 25 (New Series) Year III, March 1954, pp.S3-S5.
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more than 16% of the population of Bologna belonged to the PCI (a proportion only
exceeded by Reggio with 17.6% and Modena with 17.42).6 The taxonomy of the PCI
membership strongly reflected the Party’s base in the working class society of the
region and its strength among Emilia-Romagna’s large peasant population. Industrial
%
or craft workers amounted to 135,356 of the membership (28.53% ), braccianti made 
up 120,519 (25.38%) and mezzadri 86,302 (IS. 19%), peasant proprietors were a 
small but significant 15,663 (3.3%) while artisans, small traders and shop-keepers 
together made up 24,391 (5.14%); intellectuals, professionals and students were the 
smallest category with 2,254 members.
Bologna’s importance as a mechanical engineering and metal manufacturing centre 
helps to explain the higher proportion of industrial workers among the the federation’s 
129,274 members.7 In 1954, 35.7% of the Bologna Federation of the PCI were 
workers compared to 17.5% who were rural wage-labourers and 15.8% who were 
share-croppers. Peasant proprietors constituted a smaller proportion of the Bologna 
PCI than in the region while the number of artisans, small traders and shop-keepers 
was similar to the regional level. As in llie region as a whole, professionals, 
intellectuals and students propped up the bottom of the occupational category league 
table in the province of Bologna accounting for 2.5% of total membership.
‘Housewives and pensioners’8 constituted a significant 20.6% of the Bologna party, 
higher than their 18.5% of the regional membership.9
If we examine this regional and local picture in the context of the growth of the 
Communist Parly nationally, an interesting contrast emerges. From a total of 
2,252,446 in 1947 the national membership of the PCI fell to 2,145,317 in 1954,
6 See Figure 1.
7 See Figure 2.1.
f It is significant that the PCI chose to group these two ‘economically unproductive’
categories together.
9 Source Direzione PCI/Istat cited in Anderlini cit. p.83.
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whereas the Party in Emilia actually grew, rising from 435,5SS in 1947 to 478,274 in 
1954. For the same period, the membership of the Bologna Federation of the PCI 
rose from 10S,650 to 129,274.9 With llie exception of 1953, from the end of the war 
to the watershed year of the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956 the Bologna Communist 
Party experienced continuous growth during a time in which national party 
membership declined in absolute terms (1951, 1952, 1955).10 While it is difficult to 
isolate the factors which accounted for the relative success of the Bologna federation 
particularly during the the most bitter years of the Cold War, a significant 
contribution to the spectacular growth of the Party in this period must have come from 
the organisation and leadership of the PCI itself, and also from the degree of 
mobilisation which the mass movements associated with the Party were able to 
achieve in the face of very tenacious opposition from the state and rural and industrial 
capitalists. In part two we examine the resurgence of class conflict in the Bolognese 
countryside in the light of Togliatti’s alliance strategy and national developments in 
the benighted agricultural reform campaign.
9 Anderlini cit. p.391 and Franco Pire Comunisti al potere: Economia, società e
sistema politico in Emilia-Romagna 1945-1965. Marsilio Editore, Venice, 1983 p.14.
10 Source Direzione PCI/ISTAT in Anderlini oil. p.83.
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Part II. Economic re-organisation, industrial unrest and the Communist leadership of 
the urban labour movement.
1. Introduction.
‘The exploitive relationship is more than the sum of grievances and mutual 
antagonisms. It is a relationship which can be seen to take distinct forms in different 
historical contexts, forms which are related to the corresponding forms of ownership 
and State power.’ (E.P. Thompson)11 12
The 5th Congress of the PCI held in Rome between December 1945 and January 1946 
provided the first opportunity in eleven years for the leadership to directly address the 
Party’s rank and file and to define more clearly the organisation and objectives of the 
'partito nuovo’. Given the continued allied military presence in Italy and the urgent 
need to undertake the political and economic reconstruction of the country, the 
resolutions and speeches mostly focused on the importance of the restoration of 
democracy and the exclusion of fascists from the state and public life. Following the 
‘svolta di Salerno’, the PCI had been swollen by hundreds of thousands of new 
members and this meant that the ‘identity’ of the Party needed to reflect the mass 
nature of the organisation and the new tasks which faced the Party as a senior partner 
in any provisional national administration.1'
The ‘politica di Salerno’ required the elimination of any residual elements of 
‘sectarianism’ and ‘opportunism’ which might have carried over from the Resistance, 
and the. opening out of the Party to all the democratic and progressive elements 
present within Italian society as a whole. This was vital if the PCI was to become a
11 The Making of the. English Working Class. Gollanez, London, 19S0, p.222.
12 Paimiro Togliatti, ‘Rapporto al V congresso del PCI’ in Alberto Cecchi (Ed), 
Storia del PCI attraverso i congressi. Newton Compton, Rome, 1977, pp. 15-74.
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true party of government and Togliatti articulated the style as much as the content of 
this strategy when he stated, ‘We do not emphasise the class struggle but the national 
struggle.’13
The subordination of the class struggle to ‘national interest’ was also apparent in the 
resolution on industry and agriculture, because although the PCI proposed the 
nationalisation of large monopolies, banks and insurance companies, the essential 
features of capitalist production were to remain. The institution of a national planning 
and production system (a scheme which Fanfani implemented and later abandoned) 
together with the introduction of some democratic work-place controls in the form of 
the ‘consigli di gestione’ were intended to counter-balance the distorting effects of the 
market. But in this respect the PCI measures seemed little different from the 
corporatist-interventionist proposals of the ‘social Catholic’ group within the DC.14
However, because Emilia-Romagna had very few firms that were likely to be 
nationalised by a future socialist government, the Communist militants in the factories 
and workshops of Bologna were not even offered the prospect of regulated and 
guaranteed employment within a stale industry. Similarly, any national economic plan 
would be aimed primarily at the northern heavy industrial sector leaving small and 
medium firms to develop their own investment plans. This left only the ‘consigli di 
gestione’ as a potential vehicle for employees’ control over their workplaces, but in 
practice the councils met infrequently and their proceedings became increasingly 
ritualistic and remote form the negotiating process which had been newly established 
between the employers and the trade unions. The rapid re-establishment of trade 
union leadership within the industrial working-class of the province and the unifying
13 Quoted in Lawrence. Gray, ‘From Gramsci lo Togliatti: The "Partito Nuovo" and 
the Mass Base of Italian Communism’ in Serfaly, S. & Gray, L. (Eds), The Italian 
Communist Party. Yesterday. Today and Tomorrow. Aldwych Press, London, 1981, 
p.25.
14 Ibid. On the ‘Chronache sociali’ group of left Christian Democrats see below, 
chapter two, section one.
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function of the Federal Labour Chamber was to be a decisive factor in the disciplined 
response, of the Bolognese labour movement to the challenges and conflicts of the 
post-Liberation period.
2. The Industrial Labour Movement and the Reconstruction.
‘...should trade unionists be subordinate to the party? To put the question in these 
terms would be a mistake. The question should be put like this: every member of the 
party is subordinate to its leadership. There cannot be a subordinate relationship 
between trade union and party if the trade union has not spontaneously chosen a 
member of the party as its leader: this means that the trade union accepts the 
directives of the party and therefore it freely accepts (infact it wants) this control over 
its officials. * Antonio Gramsci.15 16
The re-birth of trade unionism in Bologna occurred during llie dark winter of 1944 
when Bologna was still under the complete occupation of the German army. The first 
foundation of the free trade unions of Bologna took place in November, 1944 in a 
church in the heart of the old city. Several unions were represented including most 
importantly Federterra and the metal workers unions. However, it was not until the 
following January that the newly formed executive committee of the Federal Labour 
Chamber was able to announce the constitution of a united trade union movement.
The Labour Chamber was officially confirmed as the legitimate representative of 
Bologna’s workers by a prefecloral decree of 22nd April which transferred the 
functions previously attributed to the fascist ‘Provincial Union of Workers’ to the new 
body.1*
15 Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere. Voi.I. Einaudi, Turin, 1975, p.321 
[Miscellany 1930] cited in Piro Comunisti al Potere cit. p.57.
16 Dario Ventura, Sindacato c- ricostruzione a Bologna 1945-1943. Editrice Sindacale
Italiana, Rome, 1981, p.2.
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/  bombardments of the winter offensive had left very little of Bologna's 
trial infrastructure intact. Virtually all of the city’s major factories and 
.idustries had either been destroyed or seriously damaged and of the 20,000 workers 
employed in industry before the war only 2,000 were able to return to their original 
places of work after the Liberation.17 18 Although the Allied Military Government 
officially recognised the Labour Chamber on the Sth May, the Labour Office of the 
AMG insisted that every agreement made between the employers and the Camera del 
Lavoro should be submitted to it for written approval. The rapid restoration of 
democratic industrial relations was signalled by the fact that 29 agreements were made 
between the Labour Chamber and the Association of Industrialists in the first three 
months after the Liberation.
Within a year the number of trade unionists in the province had grown to 166,115 
organised in 46 federations and trades, a phenomenon which highlighted the 
importance of Bologna within the Italian labour movement. As Ventura observes, ‘in 
other regions the influx was slower in its development and...more laborious especially 
in the south.’ 14
However, with memories of forced labour and inhuman wages and conditions still 
fresh in the minds of the work force, labour relations in the city and province of 
Bologna were far from convivial. The workforce at Ducati were particularly angry 
that the Ducati brothers were still at liberty when they had been die-hard collaborators 
with the fascist and Nazi regime until the last moment. Several Ducati workers had 
also been arrested after being denounced by the owners as ‘undesirables’ and 
antifascists and a mass meeting of employees demanded the ‘arrest and prosecution of 
the ultrafascist Ducati brothers for the crime of high treason against the nation.’19 
These popular demands for ‘epurazione’ and the prosecution of fascist collaborators
17 Ibid. p.18.
18 Ibid. p .l.
19 ‘Un ordine del giorno delle maestranze della <  < Ducali > >  ’ in Corriere
dell’Emilia 2nd June, 1945, Voi. 12, No.38. in Ventura cit. p. 19.
reflected a groundswell of public opinion which the Communist Party thought it 
necessary to control in order to prevent the tensions and conflicts of the Resistance 
from ruining the delicate process of democratic renewal and reconstruction which 
required the energetic participation of all the elements of Italian society.
In an article written a month after the Ducati protest meeting, the federal secretary of 
the PCI made a clear statement of the Communist Party’s position,
‘...Communists are also prepared to tolerate those industrialists who are not too 
compromised with fascism or with nazism and who can show proof of their 
repentance..’, but this depended on the industrialists, ‘...showing proof of their good 
will by putting all of their resources at the disposition of the country for its 
reconstruction. ’20
The Communists’ strong presence in the Federal Labour Chamber and the ‘consigli di 
gestione* was also reflected in the tough attitude to ‘industrial discipline’ which trade 
union officials took whenever ‘wild-cat strikes’ broke out. When an unofficial strike 
stopped production at the Weber plant in November 1945, not only did the trade 
unions order llie employees back to work but the Camera del Lavoro actually 
countersigned the strike leader’s dismissal and the suspension of four co-organisers.21
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If this was an example of the PCI’s opposition to militant industrial unrest from an 
organisational perspective, Giuseppe Dozza explained to the members of the regional 
comitlee of the Emilian Communist Parly why such conflict was undesirable on a 
strategic level,
‘...when the Labour Chamber negotiates to obtain some advantages for the workers it
20 Arturo Colombi, ‘Stroncare la < < mano ossuta della fame> > ’ in La Lotta. 30th
June, 1945, Vol.II, No.7.
21 Ventura cit. p.34.
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should remember the legitimate interests of the small industrialists: they cannot meet 
a back-dated increase in salaries. We must be aware of this and make the masses 
understand that sometimes these small industrialists have needs of Uieir own.’"
Acknowledging that this would create problems for the PCI’s claim to be the sole 
defenders of the working-class, Dozza added,
‘...I know that there are difficulties but we must regulate them because otherwise our 
policy towards the ceti medi cannot work.’2 3 24
Colombi, in his capacity as regional secretary, also emphasised the importance of 
preserving good relations with the small and medium entrepreneurial class,
‘Generally we have a good policy towards the ceti medi but they are being frightened- 
off by the demands of the Labour Chamber. It’s time that we represented their (the 
ceti medi'si problems and highlighted the conflict of interests that exists between them 
and the great industrialists by demonstrating that this is a factor which unites them 
with the workers in Uieir struggle against the common enemy.’21
The common enemy in the late 1940s was not only monopoly capitalism but economic 
depression, rampant inflation and high levels of unemployment. In the province of 
Bologna alone, the number of unemployed industrial workers had risen from 26,735 
in September 1947 to 31,457 a year later. In the same period industrial production in 
Emilia-Romagna fell by as much as 30-35 % with the construction industry suffering a
22 Comitato Regionale del PCI (Bologna - 23rd June, 1947), APC MF. 141/32-96 
p.34.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid. p.20.
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massive fall in production which varied between 50 % and 60-70% across the 
region.25
The process of de-industrialisation also produced high levels of unemployed among 
the skilled engineering trades in llie city. This was largely a consequence of the 
decision by the state agency which had the responsibility for re-structuring large 
factories in Emilia-Romagna (FIM - fondo per l’industria meccanica) to dismantle 
virtually all the industries which were involved in war production. This meant that 
Ducati which had 6-7,000 workers at the end of the war, employed only 1,300 in 
1954, while tire smaller firms of Calzoni and Cogne shrank from 1,600 to 130 and 
from 2,400 to 600 respectively.26
There can be no doubt that the collapse of large-scale manufacture caused great 
hardship for many thousands of Bolognese families, but as with the ‘Reggiane’ 
workers who continued to assemble tractors and even designed and manufactured a 
new model after they had occupied the factory, the metal mechanical workers in 
Bologna refused to abandon their skills and collective working practices.27 
Unemployment created the conditions for the emergence of an ‘entrepreneur force’ 
who with very little capital established himself as a new type of artisan producing
25 Evangelisti argues that the collapse of engineering and manufacturing industry in 
Emilia-Romagna was a direct consequence of Einaudi’s deflationary autumn budget of 
1947 which severely restricted the availability of credit to private firms, and particularly 
small and medium-sized companies. By 1948 the level of regional unemployment had 
risen to 29.9% of the active population. Valerio Evangelisti, ‘Le radici nel nuovo 
precariato, 1945-1980’ in V. Evangelisti and S. Sechi, Il galletto rosso. Precariato e. 
conflitto di classe in Emilia-Romagna ISSO-1980. Marsilio Editori, Venice, 19S2, p.86.
26 Vittorio Capecchi, ‘Classe operaia e cultura borghese: Ipotesi di un ricerca in 
Emilia-Romagna’ in Capecchi. V. (Ed), Famiglia operaia, mutamenti culturali. 150 ore. 
Il Mulino, Bologna, 1982, p.262.
27 For an account of the ‘Reggiane’ occupation and the production of the R60 tractor 
see S. Tati», A voi cari compagni. De Donato, Bari, 19S1 cited in Capecchi ibid, p.254.
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anything from small machine parts to buckles and fasteners.28 Bergonzini qualifies 
this positive evaluation of industrial restructuring by demonstrating that many smaller 
enterprises suffered because they relied on larger local manufacturers for the bulk of 
their sales.29 But Capecchi sees this ‘ridimensionamento’ as fundamental to the 
growth of an autonomous core of worker-entrepreneurs who were later to provide a 
vital link between the soeialcommunist sub-culture and the productive middle class.30
28 See Daneo, C. ‘Struttura economica e strategia politica del dopoguerra’, in Note 
e Rassegne. 1971, No.33-34 in Capecchi ibid.
29 L. Bergonzini, ‘Il mercato di lavoro nell’industria emiliana’ in Atti della 
Commissione parlamentare di inchiesta sulla disoccupazione, Voi.Ili, Tome 2, Rome, 
1953 in Capecchi ibid, p.263.
30 See Table 1 and also, V. Capecchi, ‘L’Industrializzazione a Bologna nel novecento 
dal secondo guerra ad oggi’, Storia illustrata di Bologna. C>/Vr AIEP Editore, Milan, 
1990, p. 165.
Table 1. Employment in the metal mechanical industries in
Emilia-Romagna by size of firm and percentage share of the workforce, 1937-1961.
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Size of Firm 1937 1951 1961 l
1-10 28.6 36.9 37.4
11-100 16.3 23.1 32.6
101-500 34.4 18.6 10.3
501 + 34.4 18.6 10.3
Totals 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: ISTAT/ V.Capecchi, ‘Classe operaia e cultura borghese’ cit. p.251.
The Communist Party exploited a peculiarity in thè economie structure of Emilia- 
Romagna (the relative lack of large firms) by portraying the absence of monopolies as 
a cultural and ideological feature of Emilian society.31 32The low level of industrial 
concentration could be presented in terms of a collective ‘refusal’ of the most 
pernicious forms of capitalism as much as a result of (he deliberate discrimination of 
the government and Confindustria against the ‘red region.’3- Long before Emilia-
31 For the early history of industrial organisation in Emilia-Romagna, see Paolo 
Tirelli, ‘Aspetti economico-sociali dell’agricoltura tra il 19IS e il 1926’ in Aldo Berselli 
(Ed), Storia della Emilia Romaena Voi.3. Santerno Edizioni, Imola, 19S0.
32 See Table 2. Discrimination against Emilia-Romagna in the distribution of 
Marshall Aid was very marked, for example Piedmont and Lombardy received 25% and 
28% of heavy equipment purchase funds, while Emilia-Romagna received 0.7?ó. Vittorio 
Capecchi, ‘L’industrializzazione a Bologna nel novecento. Dal secondo dopoguerra ad 
oggi’, in Walter Tega (Ed) Storia Illustrata di Bologna 9/V . AIEP Editore, Milan, 1990,
p.162.
Romagna and the Vendo became identified as a ‘third Italy’33 the PCI’s stress on the 
uniqueness of the regional economy gained credence because local industry was 
beginning to regenerate in the mid-1950s inspite of what amounted to an investment 
strike by the state and the major banks.34
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Table 2. Industrial employment in Emilia-Romagna by size of firm, 1950.
Size of Firm Number of Firms Employees
1 to 50 78,123 165,280
51 to 1000 717 106,768
More than 1000 21 35,399
Totals 78861 307,456
Source: Luciano Bcrgonzini, 'll Piano di Lavoro in Emilia’ in Emilia. November, 1950 reprinted in 
D’Attorre, I comunisti in Emilia-Romagna, cit p.S7.
The effectiveness of the process of provincial/regional accumulation depended on the 
maintenance of a stable labour force which could develop and widen its skills base 
while continuing to provide strong demand for locally provided goods and services. 
However, this virtuous circle became a reality only in the latter half of the 1950s
33 A. Bagnasco Tre Italia: La problematica territoriale dello sviluppo italiano , 
Bologna, Il Mulino, 1977.
34 Franco Piro confirms this observation when he argues that ideological motives 
governed the allocation of investment funds during the first phase of the reconstruction 
to the extent that, ‘...where the Communists were strong, the resources should not be 
sent.’ Piro, F. Comunisti al potere cit. p.92; and see also, ‘Utopia e realta del modello 
emiliano’, in S. Conti, R. Lungarella, F. Piro, L’economia emiliana nel dopoguerra. 
Marsilio, Venice, 1979.
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when together with the rest of north and central Italy Emilia-Romagna experienced the 
take-off in growth associated with the ‘economic miracle’.55 Until then the 
Bolognese economy continued to contract in spite of a general revival in consumer 
demand in other parts of Italy.
Outlining the potential application of the CGIL’s ‘Piano di Lavoro’ in Emilia- 
Romagna, Bergonzini identified the three most important problems which affected the 
regional economy; the problem of large-scale industry under the control of the FIM 
(and hence under constant threat of closure) and the difficulties experienced by small 
and medium sized firms in the Bologna-Modena-Reggio zone; the lack of agrarian 
reform, problems of social relations in the countryside, and the transformation of 
200,000 hectares of uncultivated or infertile land into farmable land in the Po delta; 
and finally the need for a different trade policy which would permit the re-opening of 
domestic and foreign export channels for Emilian industrial products.35 6
But without the sales, marketing and distribution resources available to large firms, 
the local family-centred entrepreneurs of Bologna risked being restricted to a regional 
or even provincial market for their goods. The Communist leadership recognised that 
in order to counter the effects of the increasing domination of manufacture and retail 
sales by national and multi-national monopolies it would be necessary to provide the 
technical and financial resources which individual firms were unable to provide. As 
we shall see in the following chapter, on an administrative level important assistance
35 Commenting on the political rationale for the encouragement of small enterprise 
by the ‘comuni rossi’ Sabel & Piore write, ‘In areas dominated by the Communists (such 
as Emilia-Romagna), [local] government intervention was motivated not by a vision of 
a new industrial order; rather, it was motivated by a determination to secure if not the 
allegiance at least the neutrality of small business, and so to counter a reemergence of 
the Fascist bloc of petty bourgeoisie and big capital, as had existed in the 1920s.’ C. 
Sabel & M. Piore, The Second Industrial Divide. Possibilities for Prosperity, Basic 
Books. New York, 19S4, pp.228-229.
36 Bergonzini II piano di lavoro cit. p.86
was provided by the comuni, but in the economic field, the Party’s hopes for 
regeneration and employment were increasingly invested in the traditional centre of 
worker self-management, the cooperative movement.
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3. Cooperation in post-war Bologna: Between the movement and the market.
The cooperative movement in Bologna was re-constituted under the organisational 
direction of the ‘Federazione delle Cooperative’ (Federcoop) in the first months after 
the Liberation. The statute of the new organisation approved at the first provincial 
congress in Bologna declared that the provisional committee should, ‘promote the 
constitution of cooperatives of consumers, production, labour, tansport and 
agriculture, and credit and insurance, aiming at the moral and material improvement 
of the working-class.’37 Like the provincial CLN, the composition of the provisional 
committee of Federcoop reflected a broad spectrum of political parties from the 
Liberals to the Communists. This political pluralism made the approval of article 3 of 
the statute even more remarkable because cooperatives were defined as, ‘organisations 
created and sustained by the working class and as an instrument for safeguarding 
their ideal and material interests on the economic and trade union and political 
level.’38 There is no doubt that the early architects of Federcoop saw the 
organisation as both a representative of cooperative enterprise and a campaigning 
movement for political and economic reforms in defence of the working class.
However, the accord between the parties proved to be shortlived, and on the 5th July,
37 Enea Mazzoli, ‘Le cooperative unitarie a Bologna’, Emilia. Year VII, No. 12, 
December 1955, pp.329-334.
38 Ibid. Emphasis added.
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1945 the Christian Democrats withdrew their representatives front the federation. 
Inspite of their refusal to attend the Federation meetings in an official capacity, the 
Christian Democrats were active in individual cooperatives, and this ‘half-in, half-out’ 
relationship with the Federcoop continued until 1953 when the Catholics withdrew 
completely from all cooperatives under socialcommunist control to form their own 
provincial association.
The PCI was extremely wary of openly championing cooperativism as a solution to 
the economic difficulties of the province for two main reasons. First, the original 
political inspiration for Emilian cooperation was the same social reformism which the 
Communists believed had helped to weaken the class struggle and had opened the way 
to fascism. Second, the idea of an alternative to the capitalist mode of production 
without a proletarian revolution was unthinkable and potentially reactionary if 
cooperative enterprise came to be seen as an end in itself.59
Speaking on behalf of the direzione of the PCI, Novella outlined the Party’s position 
on cooperatives at the 2nd Congress of Communist Cooperatore in 1950. The 
national leadership's view was taken up by the federal committee member responsible 
for cooperative organisations in Bologna who reminded the committee of Novella’s 
contention that, as far as a cooperative enterprise was concerned there was, ‘no 
difference in its economic actions from that of a private firm. ’ Mazzolani therefore 
concluded that, ‘...there is no element of conflict between a cooperativist economy 39
39 Referring to the share-cropper/small farmer mentality in relation to the collectivist 
traditions of the braccianti. Grieco talked of the long and difficult passage to socialism, 
’one passing through capitalism and the other passing through cooperation.’ R. Grieco, 
’Come è possibile risolvere la questione agraria in Italia’, in ’Introduzione alla riforma 
agraria’, Turin. 1949, cited in Viviana Pierleoni & Maria Rosa Pancaldi, La formazione 
della mentalità < < collettiva> > nelle campagne bolognesi. 1943-1947. C.C.M.L.C.,
Bologna, c.1978.
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and a capitalist economy.’40 412
As with every other ‘mass organisation’, the PCI regarded the cooperative movement 
as an institutional asset which could communicate the aims and values of the Party to 
ordinary members and workers and where possible mobilise groups of cooperators 
around the collective struggles the Party was promoting. This required wliat the local 
leadership of the federation described as a ‘work of ideological clarification’ on the 
directors of the cooperative firms of the province, many of whom still clung to the 
idealistic visions of Prampolini and Zanardi which equated cooperation with socialism. 
As Mazzolani complained, ‘...our cooperative managers do not have the capability of 
directing their actions with the tenacity that the struggle demands.’11
One of the solutions offered for correcting this deficiency was the establishment of a 
‘school for cooperators’ along the same lines as the trade union and party schools.’2 
The problem with this type of ‘political formation’ was that the people towards whom 
it was most directed, the managers and directors of the cooperatives, were usually 
unable to attend because of their work commitments. Almost every intervention made 
at federal committee level complained about the ‘distance’ between the cooperative
40 Mazzolani, Report to the Executive Committee of the Bologna Federation of the 
PCI, ‘La cooperazione e il Partilo nella nostra provincia’, 3rd February, 1950. APC MF. 
0325/1097.
41 Ibid.
42 Bologna was one of three national centres for the training of PCI cadres and it ran 
several popular ’short courses in Marxist theory, the emancipation of the peasantry, party 
organisation, the emancipation of women and Italian history. Federazione PCI di Bologna 
APC 0325/1956-1958. For a comprehensive analysis of the work of party schools in 
Modena see David Travis, Communism in Modena: the development of the PCI in 
Historical Context (1943-1952». unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Cambridge, 
1985, chapter six and also ’Communism in Modena: the provincial origins of the Partito 
Comunista Italiano (1943-1945)’, in the Historical Journal. Voi.XXIX (1986), pp.875-95 
by the same author.
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leaders and the party apparatus and talked in exasperated tones of the isolation of good 
Party militants in the cooperative organisations/3
An attempt by the more moderate members of the lederai committee such as Cenerini 
and Dal Fiore to urge the Party to deal with the problems of the cooperative 
movement sector by sector rather than proposing a universal remedy for the entire 
organisation were met with a strong rebuff by secretary Bonazzi,
‘The federal committee is the most important organ of political direction and as such 
it sees the problems of cooperation in our province from a political and general 
organisational stand-point without going into its specific aspects; it sees things from 
the point of view of the class struggle and the formation of a democratic 
consciousness among the broad mass of cooperation.’43 4
But while the federal secretary lamented the lack of control which the Party exercised 
over individual cooperatives and sectors, this was the criticism of a father for his 
prodigal son, for their was no doubt that the cooperative movement was perceived as 
part of the extended family of Bolognese Communism. For this reason the growth or 
decline of the cooperative movement was interpreted as a strengthening or weakening 
of the PCI’s economic and political power in the province. Comparing the situation in 
1946 to that of 1950, Bonazzi reported that the membership of agricultural 
cooperatives had remained static at 27,000. consumer cooperative membership had 
declined from 60,000 to 55,652 while production coops had increased their 
membership from 8,000 to 11,067.45
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
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Table 3. ‘Red’ Cooperatives in the province of Bologna, 194S-1950.46
—  
Type of Cooperative 1948 1950
Production and labour 
cooperatives
120 168
Consumer cooperatives 80 71
Agricultural cooperatives 17 49
Others 150 97
Total number of 
cooperatives
398 Ui 00
Source: Federazione PCI di Bologna, APC 0325/1657, 1950.
The two main factors which contributed lo the decline in the number of cooperatives 
and absolute membership of Federcoop during this period were the protracted 
economic recession and llie effects of the rapid polarisation of civil society following 
the 194S elections.46 7 Although this left socialcommunist cooperatives more isolated, 
they were an isolated majority, and far from being disheartened by the economic and 
legal restrictions which the government was imposing on cooperative enterprise, the 
new managers showed an even greater dedication to building and improving the 
cooperative movement in the province.48 Leading figures in Federcoop such as Dal
46
47 See Table 3.
48 It is significant that Prefect Borghese (who admittedly was a former Socialist leader 
of the CLN during the war) complained of the discrimination against construction 
cooperatives in the awarding of slate contracts for reconstruction work inspile of the fact
48
Fiore, Mazzolani, and Colombini were also senior members of the provincial 
federation of the PCI and their technical and managerial skills were regarded as highly 
as their political commitment. By launching initiatives in favour of flood victims 
from the south and setting-up soup kitchens for the unemployed during the winter, the 
cooperative leaders showed their sensitivity to the political as well as the humane need 
for welfare and solidarity.49 50 Not only did this put the charitable organisations of the 
Church on the defensive, it also served as an example to a government which 
appeared deaf to the calls for a slate welfare and emergency programme which would 
guarantee Italians more than the limited public assistance which fascism had extended 
to certain privileged categories of workers.
Nevertheless complaints that the cooperatives were politically weak and over- 
concerned with the economic dimension of their operations continued to be heard at 
federal committee level. Cenerini, in particular, criticised cooperative managers for 
not doing more to advance the cause of Communism in their day-to-day work, arguing 
that the 56 cooperative retail outlets were 56 potential sites for the dissemination of 
propaganda for the socialist movement, an operation which was deemed necessary 
because, ‘...the shopkeepers never waste an opportunity to use their stores for 
propaganda against us. ,5°
As a solution to this lack of political direction, Cenerini suggested the establishment 
of a core of what amounted to Parly commissars working alongside the cooperative 
directors and instructing him (and less frequently her) on the correct political course.
In addition he felt that the PCI’s school for trade unionists and cooperators lacked
that these cooperatives tendered at lower prices. Report of the prefect, ACS M.I.(Gab) 
215/22515 2nd April, 1946.
49 The prefect noted llial Federcoop was coordinating the collection of food, blankets 
and clothing donated by its member organisations for the victims of flooding in Campania 
in November, 1949. ACS M.l.(Gab) 42/3014.
50 Meeting of the federal committee of the Bologna PCI,
3rd February, 1950. APC MF. 0325/1108
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theoretical depth and that cooperative managers should be required to attend a more 
ideologically exacting course at the school for Party cadres. Leaving aside the vexed 
question of Communist attitudes towards the ceti medi (who certainly would have 
included the haled ‘bottegai’), Cenerini’s comments suggest that a strongly Bolshevik 
concept of the PCI’s function at the head of the social and economic movements in the 
province still persisted among many of the senior Party activists.51
Whatever the political critique of the cooperatives’ activity in Bologna might have 
been, by the middle of the 1950s the movement’s commercial and economic success 
was unquestionable. Emilia’s correspondent described the Cooperative Federation as, 
‘...a force which has a considerable weight in the economic life of the province, (and) 
a very great influence on public opinion as a mature movement which is conscious of 
the prospects for development...’52
In 1953, consumer cooperatives accounted for 15% of all retail sales in the province 
and their market strength undoubtedly helped to lessen the impact of price rises, 
although inflation continued to increase. Membership had stabilised at around 70,000 
and the greater presence of white-collar members revealed that the organisations were 
able to appeal to a wider occupational spectrum than in the first years after 
Liberation.53 By 1954, the 376 cooperatives which traded in the province together 
employed 116,818 men and 33,535 women. Some of the agricultural cooperatives 
were described as ‘model firms’ by the Ministry of Agriculture which awarded several 
prizes for the quality and quantity of rice production, and foreign agriculturalists often 
visited the province to observe new farming techniques which were being 
experimented by the larger cooperatives.54
51 Ibid.
52 E. Mazzoli cit. p.333.
53 See table 4 below.
54 Mazzoli cit.
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Table 4. Social composition of llie Provincial Federation of Cooperatives and Mutual 
Societies of Bologna in 1950 and 1953.55
Occupation Number of Members %  of Total I
Braccianti 15,284 21.9
Workers 31,875 45.69
Tenants 707 1.01
Mezzadri 5,846 8.37
Direct cultivators 1,376 1.96
Housewives 6,528 9.36
Professionals 818 1.26
White-collar employees 7,061 10.45
Total 69,495 100.00
Source: Mazzoli cit. p.33.1 and Bologna p£l internal documents.
The Communist Party continued to dominate the management councils of nearly all 
the cooperatives in the province, but the PCI defended its majority position by 
claiming that this was simply a measure of the Party’s political strength in the local 
community.5 6 This was certainly true, but it also allowed the PCI to apply some 
political direction to the running of these collective enterprises even if this remained 
largely symbolic. Inspite of the clarion calls for a closer scrutiny of cooperative
55 Based on 69,495 members, or 94.75‘"'S of the total. The percentage of rural ‘ceti 
medi’ in the producer cooperatives was approximately equivalent to their share of the 
rural population. The same could not be said for the city however, where only 4% of 
the membership of labour or production cooperatives was non-manual.
56 See Table 5.
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management by senior Party cadres, there is no evidence that this had an appreciable 
impact on the day-to-day administration of these firms, which as Novella conceded, 
were forced to compete in the capitalist market as any other capitalist enterprise.
Table 5. Political composition of the management committees of 
cooperative firms in the Province of Bologna in 1953.57
Party No. of Councillors % of Total I
Communist 1,506 59.4
Socialist 633 24.97
Social Democrat, DC, 
Independent etc.
396 15.63
Total 2,535 100.00
Source: Mazzoli cit.
The cooperative movement was important to the PCI for demonslrational rather than 
confrontational reasons. It existed as an alternative economic system even if most 
Party hierarchs were hostile to any suggestion that cooperative enterprise might be 
able to replace capitalism. Any challenge to monopoly power was seen as a positive 
step on the Italian road to socialism, and in Emilia where retail monopolies had yet to 
establish themselves by the early 1950s, consumer cooperatives gave the Party some 
leverage with the small producers and retailers who were fearful of unrestricted 
competition. But as many leaders of the Party and Federcoop admitted, cooperativism 
was a confined world which continued to reflect the workerisi defensiveness of the 
early Social Reformists. Bonazzi and his colleagues did not want to see a return to 
‘socialist utopianism’ and the success of the post-war cooperative movement 
threatened to revive this idealism particularly among the older Socialists who still
57 Based on 96.4% of all council members.
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management by senior Party cadres, there is no evidence that this had an appreciable 
impact on the day-to-day administration of these firms, which as Novella conceded, 
were forced to compete in the capitalist market as any other capitalist enterprise.
Table 5. Political composition of the management committees of 
cooperative firms in the Province of Bologna in 1953.57
Party No. of Councillors % of Total
Communist 1,506 59.4
Socialist 633 24.97
Social Democrat, DC, 
Independent etc.
396 15.63
. .
Total 2,535 100.00
Source: Mazzoli cltT
The cooperative movement was important to the PCI for demonstrational rather than 
confrontational reasons. It existed as an alternative economic system even if most 
Party hierarchs were hostile to any suggestion that cooperative enterprise might be 
able to replace capitalism. Any challenge to monopoly power was seen as a positive 
step on the Italian road to socialism, and in Emilia where retail monopolies had yet to 
establish themselves by the early 1950s, consumer cooperatives gave the Party some 
leverage with the small producers and retailers who were fearful of unrestricted 
competition. But as many leaders of the Party and Federcoop admitted, cooperativism 
was a confined world which continued to reflect the workerisl defensiveness of the 
early Social Reformists. Bonazzi and his colleagues did not want to see a return to 
‘socialist utopianism’ and the success of the post-war cooperative movement 
threatened to revive this idealism particularly among the older Socialists who still
57 Based on 96.4% of all council members.
played a key role in the ‘giunta d’intesa’ between the PCI and PSI. Too much 
criticism of cooperation would encourage greater calls for autonomy among the anti- 
fusionists in the PSI, too little could be seen as a concession to the neo-reformists’ 
belief in the achievability of working-class autarchy.
However disingenuous the ‘alternative model’ which the cooperatives represented, the 
development of these ‘progressive enterprises' did at least allow the PCI to contrast its 
economic organisations with those of the major capitalists and employers whose 
combative stance against the industrial labour movement was becoming ever more 
pronounced. In the following section, the implications of this growing industrial 
conflict are considered in terms of the political strategy of the PCI.
(vl Working-class unity and the political organisation of labour.
In the late 1940s, Communist Party hegemony in the work-place was threatened by 
two quite different but equivalent perils, unemployment and the ‘free’ trade unions.
In February 1950, the Federal Labour Chamber recorded 205,796 members as 
compared to 242,764 in the previous year which meant that the CGIL had only 
retained 86.7fo of the workers it enrolled in 1949. Recruitment was down in nearly 
every category, but was particularly poor in government offices and agencies, the post 
office, commerce, clothing and textiles, banking and insurance, and entertainment.
In his report to the federal executive committee, Venturoli suggested that the 
persistance of high levels of unemployment was an important explanation, but whereas 
FIOM had continued to enrol 1,500 redundant workers in the organisation, most other 
trade unions did not organise the unemployed. One of the chief reasons for the drift 
of unemployed workers away from contact with the labour movement was, as 
Venturoli admitted, a result of the removal of the 'uffici di collocamento’ from trade 
union control, meaning that local labour chambers lost contact with workers who had 
been made redundant.5* This was a direct sign of the structural damage which the 58
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58 APC MF. 0325/1139-1140. Giuseppe. Venturoli, ‘Problemi sindacali’, report to the 
Central Committee of the Bologna Federation of the PCI, March 1950.
government had inflicted on the labour movement, but the indirect attacks on the 
socialcommunist leadership of organised labour were no less significant.
At the important Sabiem plant, the ‘Saragalians’ were able to win 91 votes in the 
election to the factory council in 1949 while the Communist candidates were only able 
to poll 6 votes, and although this was an unusual result, as Venturoli complained, 
‘Many errors that were made by the comrades at Sabiem are also being made in other 
factories.’59 60By contrast, ACLI was seen as less of a threat in the city because it 
tended to concentrate its membership in the mountain comuni of the province and in 
sectors where the socialcommunists had never established a dominant position such as 
schools, banks, small farms and among white-collar employees.00 An impression of 
the relative strengths of the parties within the trade union organisations of the 
province can be gained from figures which the PCI produced for the elections to the 
Federal Labour Chamber in 1949. The Communists were the largest party with 
56,723, followed by the Socialists with 14,169 while the Christian Democrats and 
PSLI (later PSDI) polled 6,163 and 4,447 respectively.
The PSLI was described by the PCI as, *...a party in the service of the national 
bourgeoisie and America...’ but the Communists were careful not to underestimate a 
political organisation which had the capacity to spread anti-Soviet and anti-Communist 
propaganda and to recruit ‘new socialist reformists’ especially, ‘ex-fascists.’61 In 
general the PCI could take some comfort from the relatively low level of active 
opposition to its trade union organisation at plant or shop-floor level, but the
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59 Ibid.
60 Comitato regionale emiliano PCI, ‘Le organizzazioni clericali in Emilia’, 18th 
October, 1949 in D’Attorre I comunisti in Emilia-Romagna, cit. p.72.
61 Comitato regionale emiliano PCI, ‘Il PSLI in Emilia’, llth  March, 1949, in 
D’Attorre ibid. p.70. The PSLI’s own union the FIL (Federazione Italiana dei 
Lavoratori) was particularly strong in Baricella where it had a closed-shop agreement 
with the landlords which effectively kept out members of the CGIL. Casali & Gagliani 
cit. p.275.
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increasingly steep decline in trade union membership and the inefficiency and lack of 
commitment of some of the older union militants was a cause for concern. What the 
Communist Party feared was not a rival trade union challenge to its leadership of the 
labour movement (except in a few Social Democrat strongholds such as Molinella or 
Budrio), but a gradual growth in disaffection among the politically inactive workforce. 
The Christian Democrats knew they could not convert a former Socialist to Catholic 
unionism, but by an assiduous anti-Communist propaganda campaign they might 
persuade him that the extremists who ran the ‘red’ unions had no interest in their 
members but were simply using the workers to undermine democracy and the rule of 
law. The prefect was convinced that the Communists were intent on keeping the 
workforce in a constant state of agitation because they knew that a static and silent 
proletariat was vulnerable to this type of de-alignment.62 3
The killing of six foundary workers by the police at Modena on the 9th February,
1950 gave the Communist Party an opportunity to organise and direct the urban labour 
movement in the first political demonstration of collective anger since the ‘attentato a 
Togliatti’. In secretary Bonazzi’s report to the federal committee on the response to 
the massacre a good impression can be gained of the PCI’s relationship to the trade 
union movement in the province. Describing the spontaneous walk-outs and 
demonstrations of the city’s workforce as ‘good and opportune’, Bonazzi criticised the 
local trade union leadership for not mobilising their members immediately news of the 
massacre was received. He claimed that some union officials even dissuaded workers 
from striking because they had not received official instructions to take industrial 
action.
62 ‘...any pretext is used to keep the brains of their supporters occupied, and a real 
bombardment of meetings...(is kept up) in order to give them no time to think in an 
autonomous and subjective way.’ ACS M.I.(Gab) 42/3014, report of the prefect for 
November 1949. Data on political meetings collected by the questura between 194S and
1953 reveals the high level of political activity which the Camera del Lavoro and the 
parties of the left maintained compared to the Christian Democrats. See Figures 2.2 to 
2.9.2.
This timidity was understandable given the extent of the control exercised by the Party 
apparatus over the general strike that was called throughout the province for the 
following day and which Bonazzi later went on to describe:
‘The Party politically determined the nature and direction of the battle, and when we 
say this we mean that the comrades who direct the mass organisations had agreed with 
the Party on the way to proceed, that there was discipline, that the Party managed and 
followed its development not only through its control of our comrade trade union 
leaders, but also through its own organisations, the lederai apparatus, the Party 
sections and its cells. These are all positive features.’63
The federal secretary was generally pleased with the trade unions’ mobilisation of the 
work force but another important test of the Party’s organisational and political 
strategy had been the collaboration with the PSI which was described as good in the 
province but deficient in the city. A major demonstration of this type also gave the 
PCI an opportunity to review the work of its trade unionists. In a style reminiscent of 
Alenin’s ‘What Is To Be Done’, Bonazzi warned that,
‘The very nature of the trade union official’s job can easily lead him to lose sight of 
.he fundamental objectives of the struggle of the working class. In the mind of the 
rade union leader even a conservative, non-revolutionary mentality can develop that 
ries to resolve questions through compromise and by undervaluing the one and only 
tolitical aim of the working class. Together with the trade unions we must therefore 
dvance the workers’ movement until our objectives are realised, until the proletarian 
evolution and socialism are achieved.’64
ut if the strikes and protests lacked a firm and decisive political leadership, the trade
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63 APC MF.0325/1066, Enrico Bonazzi’s report to the central committee of the 
Dlogna federation of the PCI on the ‘sciopero generale per i fatti di Modena,* March
;o.
64 Ibid. APC MF.0325/1065.
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unions were less at fault than the Communist Party itself which not just in Bologna 
but all over Italy, ‘...failed to hold (its) trade unionists...sufficiently close to die 
Party, not just in a physical sense, but from a disciplinary, political and ideological 
point of view.’65 6
There was thus no conception of a flexible relationship, let alone autonomy, existing 
between the PCI and the most important social movement in the province.
However this did not alter the triumphant assessment of the day of action, for 
although the prefect refused both the CdL and mayor Dozza the right to assemble in 
Piazza Maggiore, the PCI claimed that as many as 100,000 workers occupied the 
city’s main square, that virtually all the shops were closed (a claim strongly contested 
by the prefecture), and that, ‘...many people who are not on our side felt hostility 
towards the rulers of our country on that day.’ But Bonazzi also admitted that the 
Bolognese bourgeoisie would pul up a fight if they felt their interests were threatened, 
‘We must not believe that on every occasion they will shut up shop and disappear.’ 
This comment revealed the federal secretary’s open contempt for the very ‘ceto 
medio’ with whom Dozza and Colombi, echoing Togliatti, were urging Communists 
and workers to collaborate.®* The fact that no other member of the central 
committee challenged Bonazzi's ‘sectarianism’ suggested that the appeal of class 
alliances was conditional on the petly-bourgeoisie falling into line with the political 
objectives espoused by the local federation at any given time.
The government’s offensive against the PCI and its collateral organisations had 
revived a certain die-hard mentality among local Communist cadres and leaders which 
placed a greater emphasis on the strength of the Party apparatus and the need for a 
more politically committed membership. In 1950, lor example, the Party introduced a 
rule that ever}' comrade who was employed must be a member of his or her factory 
cell. This represented a further move towards a ‘worker-militant’ membership profile
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid. 0325/1067.
57
which the PCI in re-building its factory organisations had begun in the crisis year of 
1948.67 Within four years of the instruction to create factory cells, 350 new cells 
had sprung-up in Emilia alone. However, 70‘o of the workers who were members of 
the PCI also remained in their territorial cell which suggested that the Party was 
undecided on the best form of grass-roots organisation to adopt and where possible 
encouraged its members to join both groups.6’
Until the mid-1950s the Bologna Federation of the PCI was continuing to increase its 
membership inspite of a serious national decline.69 The Party was not only 
numerically stronger it was also politically tougher, those who remained or joined the 
Party during the fiercest years of the Scelbanile offensive against the Communist 
movement were regarded as more committed, more combative and more politically 
aware than the Party had been in the 1940s. As we have seen, part of the reason for 
the higher profile of militants and active rank-and-file members in llie Bologna 
federation was to do with better organisation, propaganda and political education. 
However, the most convincing explanation for the dynamic growth in Communist 
activity in these years was the PCI’s close involvement with the agrarian disputes of 
the second half of the 1940s and the campaign for peace and disarmament in the early 
1950s.70
In the first years after the war, Togliatti and the leadership of the ‘partito nuovo* had 
discouraged the social mobilisation of the working mass for reasons which are well 
known (dislike for ‘adventurism’, fears of a Greek-style civil war, commitment to a 
peaceful transition to democracy, and the need to exert stronger control over the trade 
union organisations). But by the late-1940s and early 1950s the peasants and workers
67 Casali & Gagliani cit. p.269.
68 Ibid.
69 See Figure 1. As we have noted this was almost entirely due to a rapid growth of 
the FGCI in the first half of the 1950s.
70 See figures 2.7 to 2.9.2.
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who had obeyed the call to support the constitutional establishment of parliamentary 
democracy grew disillusioned at the lack of progress towards the economic justice 
which the Constitution had promised. Paradoxically» the revival of organised protest 
which the lack of reform generated also revived interest and support for the 
Communist Party which was seen as Uie one political force capable of resisting the 
combined attack of the government and employers with any success. In the second 
part of this chapter we trace the development of the twin campaigns for new farm 
contracts and for improved wages and conditions for farm labourers which 
Confederterra conducted in the 1940s, and we analyse this conflict in the light of the 
Communist Party’s own reform proposals and the centrality of its policy on rural 
alliances.
Part III. Rural conflict and the growth of peasant militancy after the Liberation.
1. Introduction.
The ‘brotherhood of arms’ which symbolised the political unity which the Communist 
Party aimed to build at the base of Bolognese society was firmly rooted in the political 
culture of the peasant leagues which began to recruit and organise again after the 
Liberation. The ‘Confederation of Agricultural Workers’ (Federterra) was undeniably 
the most powerful force among the agricultural workers of the Emilian countryside 
and could boast a long tradition of organised struggle against the powerful landowners 
of the Valle Padana. After the war, Federterra emerged with the experience of 
twenty years of fascist repression ‘on its shoulders’ but with new, younger ‘capi’ who 
were resolved not to allow the various categories of its membership to be divided 
against themselves. Helped by the political and military training which the Resistance 
struggle provided, the Federterra leaders were organised and determined not to allow 
the landless peasants to face similar or worse levels of unemployment and deprivation 
than the braccianti experienced during the pre-war years.
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Recognition of the disastrous consequences which ‘bracciantile’ centred ‘maximalism’ 
had had on the peasant leagues during the last great rural conflict in 1919/1920 
persuaded the PCI’s leaders in the peasant leagues that the campaign for better wages 
and employment for the landless labourers had to be subordinated to the share­
croppers’ struggle for an improved farm contract if the Party’s social alliance strategy 
was to succeed.71 Because the DC had virtually abandoned the field to the left, the 
landowners’ intransigence offered the Communist Party an excellent opportunity to 
build a hegemonic presence within a stratum of the rural workforce which had 
traditionally been suspicious of and resistant to the appeals of socialism.
Local communist figures such as Luciano Romagnoli, who was to become a provincial 
and then national leader of Federbraccianti helped to create a unity of purpose among 
the various components of the rural trade unions which reproduced in many ways the 
organisational and political discipline of the Resistance.72 Romagnoli was an 
‘organic’ Gramscian in his political and economic strategy and he waged the war of 
position with great skill, holding back the landless labourers from a frontal asssault on 
the landowners until the autumn of 1947 when the entire Valle Padana was convulsed 
by a series of powerful strikes and boycotts which heralded a new stage in the 
struggle against landed privilege and exploitation.73 We will return to the events of 
1947 later in the chapter but in order to understand the evolution of rural protest in 
Bologna we now need to consider the impact of the share-croppers’ struggle on the 
political and economic organisation of the province.
71 On the early history of Federterra in the Province of Bologna see Capecchi, ‘Classe 
operaia e cultura borghese’ cit. p.218 and the classic study by Renato Zangheri, Le 
campagne emiliane nell’epoca moderna. Feltrinelli, Milan, 1957.
72 D’Attorre La Politica, cit. p.167.
73 Ginsborg, cit. p. 114.
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2. The Agrarian Reform Movement and the Share-croppers’ Struggle 1945-1947.
Throughout the summer of 1945 wave after wave of demonstrations shook nearly 
every comune of the province as rural workers protested at dramatically rising prices 
and the growth of the black market.74 Often these protests were linked to more 
explicitly political demands such as calls for the immediate and comprehensive 
‘epurazione’ (clean-up) of fascists and the admission of partisans into the state police. 
Increasingly demands for agrarian reform were seen on placards and banners as 
Federterra and the local labour chambers began a concerted campaign to reform the 
‘patto colonico’. The ‘patto’ was the farm contract which regulated the relationship 
between the share-cropper and the proprietor, and its origins dated at least as far back 
as the Romans. As we have seen this form of farming was very diffused in Emilia 
and particularly in the province of Bologna. Essentially the contract which was in 
force until 1943, when the fall of Mussloiini threw the entire agrarian structure into 
crisis, was the product of the pre-fascist Giolittian regime’s reform of 1920 and was 
known as the ‘Patto Paglia-Calda.’ Yet this legislation was universally revised in the 
landowners favour by subsequent fascist decrees.
This complicated national framework was further entangled by local variations of the 
‘patto’ where the authority of custom and tradition was reinforced by the landowners’ 
use of the courts to oblige his farmers to produce certain types of crop (invariably the 
more profitable) or to divide the produce in his favour. The Federterra maintained 
that the ‘patto colonico’ was legally and morally indefensible since it was imposed by 
force on a mezzadria which had been stripped of its rights and legal protection.
74 30,000 people demonstrated in the towns of Anzola nell’Emilia, S.Giorgio di 
Piano, Mordano, Minerbio, Bazzane, S.Giovanni in Persiceto, Granarolo, S.Pietro in 
Casale, Galiera and Pieve di Cento between the end of June and the middle of July 1945. 
Report of the Commander in Chief of the Carabinieri, 8th August, 1945. ACS 
(M.I.Gab) 190/21135/11 (1945-46).
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Unable to produce a revision of farm contracts that would be acceptable to the share­
croppers and die agrari, the agriculture minister Gullo issued what amounted to a 
holding decree in April 1945 which ordered the deferral of contract revisions until one 
year after the end of the war.
Against this background of growing rural discontent and a strong antifascist political 
culture which was directed mainly at the agrarian supporters and members of the 
blackshirts, it was inevitable that conflict would openly explode between the agrari 
and the leagues at the first opportunity after the Liberation. The ‘vertenza agraria’, as 
the press labelled the dispute between the landowners and Federterra, polarised very 
rapidly into a demand on one side for a 10?* to 15 % increase in the peasant’s share of 
the crop and livestock and on the other the owners refusal to accept even the smallest 
modification of the contract.75
The position of the national government under Ferruccio Parri and the territorial 
Allied Military Government was against revision ‘pending legislation' which 
Federterra regarded as an invitation to the landowners to maintain their intransigent 
position. Such a policy was unlikely to defuse the rural tensions which led to the 
blockading of grain stores at Sesto Imolese in August 1945 which the chief of police 
described as ‘..una piega drammatica.’76 The mobilisation intensified in the harvest 
season when landowners were at their most vulnerable to strikes and boycotts.
In response to a call from all the labour chambers of Emilia-Romagna, on the 9th 
August a demonstration in defence of Federterra’s campaign and jobs and wages was 
called in every provincial capital of the region. In Bologna alone the Giornale 
dell’Emilia reported a crowd of 150,000 demonstrators who had come from many of
75 At the provincial conference of Federterra in June 1945, the delegates approved 
a division of 6 0 for the farmer and 40*$ to the owner with all the expenses for the 
repair of wartime damage to be paid by the owner. (MI.Gab) 192/21221 (1945-46).
76 ACS CM.I.Gab) 192/21221 (1945-46) Police report, 4th August, 1945.
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the outlying towns of the province winding their way through the streets preceded by 
‘only one banner, the tricolour of the Labour Chamber and its Executive 
Committee.,77
Demonstrations and protests continued into the autumn as the campaign of the 
mezzadri assumed an ever greater importance within the agricultural reform 
movement. On the 4th October, Giuseppe Di Vittorio addressed a crowd of 30,000 
people in Bologna’s Piazza Maggiore in support of the share-croppers demands for a 
new farm contract.7 8 The share-croppers dispute was the first important test of the 
rural solidarity which the Communists and Socialists had tried to build in the 
countryside during and after the Resistance. It was therefore vital that the agrari were 
met with a united and disciplined opposition capable of resisting intimidation from the 
landowners and their police protectors.
A meeting at the regional CLN headquarters in July, 1945 between the landowners, 
Federterra, the prefect and the AMG provides a unique insight into the political and 
economic conflict which erupted in the Bolognese countryside that summer. The 
prefect records that,
‘...when the representative of the Labour Chamber intervened declaring that any 
discussion was irrelevant because the peasants were already sub-dividing their 
products according to the percentage laid down by Federterra - this outburst irritated 
the Allied officer who jumped up and punched the table violently declaring “No! We 
are in charge here; the products will be divided 50*50," and with that he abandoned 
the meeting without so much as a salute. The prelect followed the Allied officer 
commenting, "See how they treat us?" to which the representative of the Labour 
Chamber replied, "It doesn’t matter, the revolution is coming." And thus the meeting
77 ‘La grandiosa dimostrazione delle libere forze del lavoro’ Giornale dell’Emilia. 
10th August 1945, Vol.l. No.22. in Ventura cit. p.31.
78 Ibid. Police report 4th October, 1945.
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ended.'79
Federterra’s confidence was born out by successive reports from the authorities which 
admitted that many landowners ‘through fear and intimidation’ had agreed to sign new 
contracts according to the quotas laid down in the ‘libretto’ issued to every share­
cropper by Federterra. This booklet described the proportion of each crop and farm 
product that the peasant should consign or keep and it varied depending on the quality 
of the land (for example in the mountain zones much of the land was uncultivatable 
because of mines and unexploded shells). The proportion of crop given up also varied 
according to whether the peasant had made a contribution for 1944 which many had 
not been able to because of crop damage or the removal or slaughter of Uieir animals 
by the Germans. In the face of such a careful and detailed ‘autoriduzione' of the 
share-croppers’ dues, the landowners had only the option of legal action and distraint 
of goods as a remedy. This proved ineffective in a climate of continual mobilisation 
which even Federterra found hard to control. Indeed the Vice-Commander of Uie 
Carabinieri admitted that in August the situation in the province was deteriorating 
rapidly due to the intransigence of the landowners.80 With no agreement in sight by 
December the prefect was forced to call on the Communist mayors of the comuni to 
abstain from taking direct intiatives in the disputes while he praised the Federterra 
leaders for their attempts to calm the situation.81
In the new year, the prefect's position had changed and he appealed to the Minister of 
the Interior for permission to endorse the 60:40 division approved by most of the local 
councils in the province.82 Inspite of the Interior Ministry’s insistence that revised 
contracts were illegal under a Decree of the 19ih October, 1944, increasing pressure 
was being brought to bear on the agrari by the prefect, the CLN, Minister Gullo and
79 ACS (M.I.Gab) 192/21221 (1945-46) 13lh July, 1945.
80 Ibid. Report of 16th August, 1945.
81 Ibid. Prefect’s report of 16th deeember, 1945.
82 Ibid. Telegram from Prefect to Interior Ministry, 9th January, 1946.
Under-Secretary Segni to accept the new balance of power in the countryside and 
approve the revised contracts.
A significant obstacle to the resolution of the conflict had been the spate of attacks 
and killings directed at large landowners folk-wing the Liberation. But it is difficult 
to quantify the number of landowners who were killed as a direct result of the rural 
mobilisations for new contracts. A list of murdered or disappeared landowners 
compiled by the Questura di Bologna in 1946 suggests that ordinary criminal motives 
were responsible for most deaths which often resulted from an attempted robbery, but 
the police were confident that at least six landowners who were active members of the 
PNF or known members of Nazi fascist squads were killed for revenge. The fate of 
Enrico Bassi assassinated in July 1945 in the remote village of Crespellano was typical 
of such ‘partisan justice’. His bullet ridden body was found with a sign attached to it 
which read, ‘questa e la fine del segretario del l'ascio.’83
In order to demonstrate its complete opposition to violence Federterra issued a joint 
leaflet with the Agriculturalists’ Association in March 1946. Both organisations 
roundly condemned the killings and assaults, but only Federterra referred to the need 
to stamp out fascist violence which had resulted in the deaths of several former 
partisans. With the public condemnation by the CLN, the PCI, ANPI and other mass 
organisations of the perpetrators of these murders, tensions began to ease in the 
Spring of 1946. By May of that year, the CGIL was confident enough to write to 
Minister of the Interior Romita quoting the Secretary of the Provincial Labour 
Chamber’s assertaion that the ‘vertenza’ was all but over since nearly all the owners 
had agreed to the new contracts.84 Ironically it was the prefect’s delay in signing 
agreements for the ‘Opere Pie’85 which was prolonging the unrest in the eastern parts
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83 ACS (M.I.Gab) 192/21221 (1945-46) Undated police report.
84 ACS (M.I.Gab) 192/21221 (1945-46). Letter to On. Giuseppe Romita 17th May, 
1946.
85 These were former Church lands administered by the state and the local communes, 
their income was originally intended to finance the Church’s charitable work.
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of the province and the trade unions urged the government to intervene to prevent 
strikes and boycotts continuing into the summer.
The national government had been almost as exasperated by the intransigence of the 
landowners as the peasant leagues themselves, but because of the dependence of the 
Christian Democrats on the electoral patronage of the southern 'latifondi', a thorough­
going reform of Italy’s feudal agricultural system was unlikely to succeed. De 
Gasperi responded to the CGIL's appeal for government intervention to solve the 
dispute between share-croppers and owners in June 1946 with a recommendation that 
landlords should make a contribution of 24 of one year’s income to make good war 
damage together with another 10*o for improvements to the land. However the Prime 
Minister refused to alter the 50:50 division in the product which had been the main 
target of peasant opposition. However limited its provisions the 'lodo De Gasperi’ did 
nevertheless represent the first attempt at improving the situation of the share-cropper 
population in the teeth of very fierce resistance by the landowners. However, because 
the ‘lodo’ was literally a gift or award it was not legally enforceable and the 
landowners did their best to ignore it.30
In July 1946 the prefect reported that the Agriculturalists’ Association had refused to 
declare its position on the ‘lodo’ because it feared that a movement towards 
acceptance might be taken as an admission of defeat.37 This was an astonishing 
position for the landowners to adopt since Federterra, as we have seen, had been 
remarkably successful in implementing its own 60% division of the product on the 
beleaguered agrari and the association had much to gain by negotiating acceptance of 
the ‘lodo’ with Federterra. The following month the landowners’ position had 
hardened into a net rejection of the ‘lodo’ although some individual landowners had 
agreed to new contracts. Even the prefect found this stance unreasonable and 
suggested that the dispute could only be resolved by converting the ‘lodo’ into *87
M Ginsborg, cit. p.109.
87 (M.I.Gab) 215/22515 (1946) Report of the Prelect, 3rd July, 1946.
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legislation.88
By the summer of 194S the two sides in the dispute were no nearer to a formal 
conclusion of the ‘vertenza’ than they had been in 1946. At the Christian Democrat 
national congress on agricultural reform in June, 1948 the party’s leadership once 
again side-stepped die issue fearing the alienation either of the agrarian elites or the 
small proprietors who constituted a vital electoral force in the soudi and north east. 
The party leadership thus avoided open conflict by passing a final resolution which did 
not state under what conditions land would be conceded to peasant families or which 
landowners would be required to make the concessions. From a political standpoint 
this was obviously necessary if the left and right of the DC were to reach an 
agreement, but the direct consequence was that neither the landowners nor the peasant 
leagues had any motive for declaring a truce.89 Indeed the authorities admitted that 
far from rapidly eliminating rural strife as the Modo’ De Gasperi had intended, the 
organised campaign against the landowners continued into yet another harvest season 
and the government’s refusal to implement a comprehensive reform ensured that the 
momentum of the rural protest movements remained constantly high.90
In the absence of a legal framework for the distribution of the farm product a ‘modus 
vivendi’ was arrived at which left the mezzadria with between 50ft and 53ft of the 
crop, an arrangement which was authorised by the prefect who gave orders to
88 Ibid. 5th August, 1946,
89 M.I.t'GalV) 85/14903 (1948) Commander-in-Chief o f the Carabinieri’s report on 
the political situation in Emilia-Romagna, 23rd June, 194S.
90 Emilia-Romagna did not benefit from the piece-meal agrarian reforms introduced 
to placate the southern peasants such as the ‘legge Sila’ or the’legge stralcio’. Segni’s 
bill introduced in November 1950 which aimed at incorporating some of the Federterra 
demands never progressed beyond the agrarian commission of the Senate where it was 
killed by a powerful mobilisation o f agrarian interests. See Ginsberg, cit. p. 13S.
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confiscate legally any additional products which the peasants had tried to keep.91 
The landowners felt they had been betrayed by the DC but with the declining 
influence of the agrarian elites in an Italy increasingly dominated by northern 
industrialists and the politics of Marshall Aid, local Christian Democrat leaders saw 
more advantage in encouraging the growth of the ‘Coldiretti’ and independent small 
farmers than defending the privileges of a landed aristocracy which had always been 
closer to the politics of the PNF than Don Luigi Sturzo and his followers.
By the end of 1948 although the share-croppers’ dispute had not been formally settled, 
the ‘vertenza’ of the mezzadri became eclipsed by the landless labourers who now 
took centre stage in the class struggle of the countryside.
3. Braccianti and Padroni: Rural Unrest in the Province of Bologna. 1947-1950.
In 1951 the rural workforce in the province of Bologna was still overwhelmingly 
dominated by braccianti who constituted 289,000 of the peasant population compared 
to 190,000 petty proprietors and share-croppers.92 Agricultural production had been 
severely affected by the war, both in terms of the physical damage done to farms and 
because vital machinery, fertilizers and transport were all in short supply. The 
consequences for the landless labourers of Bologna were particularly disastrous. If we 
take 1938 as a base of 100, the cost of living index rose to 4S42 in January' 1948 for 
Italy as a whole while by December 1947 it had reached 5096 in the province of 
Bologna. In this period retail prices increased by as much as 47 limes but the average 
income of a farm labourer increased by only 20. The desperate condition of the 
braccianti was further compounded by very high levels of unemployment. In January
91 Report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Carabinieri on the political situation in 
Emilia-Romagna, M.I.(Gab) (1948) 85/4903 15th August, 1948.
92 Capecchi, ‘Classe operaia e cultura borghese’, cit. p.196
1947, of the 27,172 farm labourers registered with the municipal labour offices 
22,523 were unemployed. Unemployment affected women particularly badly, in the 
same month, of the 25,412 women workers who registered for work virtually all were 
unemployed (25,106).
The braccianti had none of the welfare protection which industrial workers enjoyed, 
such as the ‘assegni familiari’ (a wage supplement which varied according to the size 
of a worker’s family) or health insurance and welfare assistance,Labourers’ incomes 
especially in the mountain zones had fallen below subsistence levels during the war 
and remained so in the years immediately following the Liberation.03
In the first ten years after the Liberation working opportunities for the braccianti 
steadily worsened; in 1946 the yearly average number of working days was 240, in 
1949 this had fallen to 170 and in 1953 it had declined to 110. In the ‘bassa’ town of 
Crevalcore, for example, the braccianti worked an average of 100 days in 1953, in 
1948 they would have earnt a total of 159,000 lire a year, in 1953 they eamt 110,000 
lire. The scarcity of employment could not but have disastrous consequences for the 
family economy of Bologna’s landless labourers. An enquiry into poverty in the 93
93 In the 1950s the American anthropologist Edward Ban field felt able to write, ‘Most 
people in Montegrano are desperately poor. Many have nothing to eat but bread, and not 
enough of that...There is no time for political life in a society so poor.’ (Edward 
Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. The Free Press, Glencoe, 111. 1958. 
p.33). Banfield’s research suffered from his a priori refusal to see peasant society as 
geographically and historically variegated (the political passivity he claimed to observe 
was not even characteristic of large parts of southern Italy). In the province of Bologna, 
the 1951 Parliamentary Commission on Poverty found a high percentage of peasant 
families were malnourished and suffered from skin diseases such as pellagra which were 
the result of a monotonous diet. But it was from the most poverty stricken zone of the 
province (the ‘bassa Bolognese’ ) that most of the members of the PCI and Federbraccianti 
came and the ‘bassa’ established itself as the epicentre of the Valle Padana strike 
movement.
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province of Bologna conducted by La Lotta in 1954 found that among, ‘...braccianti. 
mezzadri, workers of every kind from the city, from the mountains and hills or from 
the "bassa"’, everywhere there existed,’...a terrible destitution, everywhere a 
collective struggle against poverty.’”4
A letter by a woman farm labourer published by La Lotta in 1954 provides a glimpse 
of what living conditions were like for the great majority of the braccianti of the 
‘bassa’ Bolognese in these years,
‘I am a bracciante but I can’t work much because of the baby who is still very young. 
Last year I made 40,000 lire, and this year I’ve earnt only 20,000. My husband is 
also a bracciante and last year he earned 110,000 lire; let’s hope it will be like that 
this year. I have a hen, and today she laid an egg and that egg was all that I had to 
eat today. Even now I’m hungry, my head is spinning. But I’d rather not have any 
more debts even if I have to go without food. We have no light, no water and no 
toilet here. I have to go half a kilometer to reach the nearest well and then climb all 
the steps with the heavy buckets.'94 5
The post-war struggles which Federterra began in the summer of 1946 with its 
campaign for the implementation of the Gullo reforms must therefore be considered 
against a background of severe privation which no act of legislation, liberal, fascist or 
post-war had done anything to improve. Although Federterra’s demands were 
extremely moderate the tripartite leadership of the CGIL decided that the need to 
preserve national solidarity and to generate economic recovery meant that the 
negotiations over wage increases had to be subordinated to the ‘national interest’. If 
battle was to be joined with the agrari it would have to be postponed until the share­
croppers’ dispute had been resolved and for agriculture production to return to pre­
war levels.
94 Giuseppe Brini, ‘La miseria a Bologna’, Emilia, Year 3, No.30 (New Series), 
August 1954, pp.237-240.
95 Ibid, p.239.
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But if the agrarian ‘reforms’ had offered little comfort for the northern mezzadri, the 
DC’s proposals were even less attractive to the landless labourers of the Po valley 
who saw De Gasperi’s and Segni’s initiatives as only of benefit to the wealthy small 
farmers.96 The conduct of the mezzadria dispute had shown that direct action against 
individual landowners produced results, and as it became increasingly obvious that the 
DC had no intention of introducing a comprehensive, land redistribution scheme, the 
focus of the conflict once again moved from Rome to the countryside.
The re-organisation of Federterra as Con federterra in the autumn of 1946 considerably 
strengthened the organistational capacity of the rural trade unions on a national and 
local level and the union rapidly established itself as a responsible and intelligent 
movement for reform which attracted cross-party support.97 As we have seen the 
‘lodo’ De Gasperi was in part an acknowledgement of the importance which 
Confederterra had acquired in the development of agricultural policy. Although the 
‘lodo’ contained no direct provision for landless farm workers it did at least 
recommend that 4 % of a farm’s gross production should be set aside for paying casual 
labour to repair and improve the land and buildings. This was an important provision 
because it was seen as an early indication of Confederlerra’s success in linking the 
campaign over the share-croppers’ contract to the problem of rural unemployment 
among the landless labourers.
By the time of the first provincial conferences of each of the components of 
Confederterra in the winter of 1946/47, Federmezzadri and Federbraccianti had 
already registered a strong growth with 29,224 and 51,239 members respectively and
96 P.P. D’Attorre, ‘La Politica’ in, Zangheri, R. (Ed), Bologna. Storia delle città 
italiane. Laterza, Bari, 1986, p.167.
97 The decision to reconstitute Federterra as Confederterra was taken at the 1st 
National Congress of Federterra which was held in Bologna between 17th and 21st 
October, 1946. Four distinct categories were created; braccianti and salariati, coloni 
(tenants) and mezzadri, farm employees, mechanics and technicians, and direct 
cultivators. Bozza, cit.
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by February 1947 even the Associazione Coltivatori Diretti which had a much smaller 
potential membership base could claim $,400 adherents.
The first congress of Federterra/Con federterra was remarkable for the moderate tone 
of the speeches delivered from the platform,
‘We must admit...that in many cases we are not able to manage farms cooperatively 
in a way that will be agriculturally productive.,!>s
The speaker then went on to insist that the first priority of Confederterra was to 
defend the welfare of the small peasant farmer. The Communist Party’s agricultural 
expert Ruggero Grieco underlined this strategy when he wrote,
‘Socialism will be won in Italy by actively supporting the millions of peasants who 
have won the title to the land once owned by the great proprietors.’”
While this may have been the only policy capable of winning support among the poor 
peasantry of the mezzogiorno where the Segni reforms had had an appreciable impact, 
in the north and in Emilia in particular there were very few tangible advantages of the 
reforms to be seen among any category of farm worker.
The real issue for the landless labourers of the Valle Padana was not the ownership of 
land but the struggle for a living wage.
The economic condition of the braccianti, the universal experience of poverty wages 
and the scarcity of employment, not only encouraged a unity of action but also 
fostered the perpetuation of divisions between the braccianti and other categories of 
rural workers which the speeches and slogans of politicians and trade union leaders 98
98 Vidimali, address to the 1st Congress of Con federterra, in La Voce dei Lavoratori. 
Vol.l, No. 13, 19th October, 1946 cited in Bozza ibid.
99 R. Grieco, T comunisti e la lotta per la riforma agraria,’ Rome, 1949, in Bozza 
ibid.
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could not easily overcome.
The first major braccianti strike was called to demand equal benefits and entitlements 
for rural workers in August 1947 and it rapidly spread throughout the whole of the 
Valle Padana. The demands of the Confederterra were very straightforward; the 
elimination of hourly pay and its replacement with a basic rale, the linking of the 
‘contingenza’ to the ‘scala mobile’ (which already applied to industrial workers), full 
insurance cover for machine operators and belter rales of pay, recognition of the trade 
union labour exchanges and recognition of the ‘farm councils.,1W The 
Agriculturalists’ Association responded to the accusation that Confederterra was not 
making these demands anywhere else in Italy and that the strike had only a political 
objective.
Not only did all the various components of Confederterra endorse the strike call, but 
all three currents of the executive (Communist, Socialist and Christian Democrat) 
supported the strikers demands, although in an interview with L’Avvenire d’Italia. 
Romagnino, the Provincial Secretary of Confederterra for the DC, denounced the 
socialcommunists for calling a strike for ‘narrowly political ends.’ Romagnino’s 
‘defection’ provided an early indication of the impossibility of sustaining a broad trade 
union front in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and hostility.10 01
The dispute lasted front the 7th to the loth August 1947 and involved 15,000 
braccianti and 1,720 technicians and farm employees. It was a triumphant display of 
the PCI’s non-aggression pact with the smaller and intermediate landowners since the
100 Anna Maria Bozza, ‘Le lotte nelle campagne bolognesi; 1946-1949’ in Storia 
Contemporanea. Year XXVI, No. 117, Ocl-Dec. 1974, pp.73-98.
101 However the strenghth and support for ‘white unionism’ at this time should not 
be over-estimated. The prefect admitted that in the summer of 194S ACLI was not yet 
a significant labour organisation and that, ‘...public opinion does not support the 
establishment of rival white unions and would prefer an independent grouping within the 
CGIL.’ ACS M.I.(Gab) 85/4903, 15th August, 1943.
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action was exclusively directed against the agrari and capitalist estates. Confederterra 
claimed ‘a net victory for the braccianti * highlighting the massive participation of the 
base and the solidarity displayed among the different categories of peasants which 
allowed ‘the overcoming of narrowly economists or corporativistic demands.’,(e
The struggle for the imposition of the ‘imponibile di mano d’opera’ also had a 
symbolic significance for it divested the large landowners of the power to decide the 
fate of individual workers and it was seen by the braccianti very' much as a liberation 
from the ‘slave’s market’ of the daily hirings in the piazza. The ability to control the 
supply of labour to the large estates through the ‘uffici di collocamento’ was also 
considered to be a vital step forward in the emancipation of Italy’s peasantry from the 
‘padroni’ and the ‘signori.’ The Communist Party recognised the justice of the 
landless labourers’ cause but it constantly sought to direct the protests through an 
organisational matrix which would include even categories of farm owners who the 
braccianti had been traditionally hostile lo (sudi as the small or intermediate 
proprietors and the wealthier tenant farmers who regularly employed wage labourers).
The PCI attempted to group all these categories under the organisation of the 
‘Costituente della Terra’ which had been established to campaign for the reform of 
agriculture in Italy and to implement the provisions of the Constitution concerning 
land ownership and farming. However, the objective of the ‘Costituente della Terra*, 
as with the later ‘peace commissions’ was not only to bring about a change of 
government policy, but was also intended to expose the DC’s increasing dependency 
on big business and the agrari. By persuading moderate voices in rural society that the 
PCI’s programme was realistic, fair and beneficial to the vast majority of small and 
intermediate farmers, the Communists hoped to de-couple the rural petty bourgeoisie 
from the powerful influence of the Church and Christian Democracy.
In order to fulfil this function the ‘Costituente della Terra’ was organised on a local 102
102 Bozza cit.
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level through a number of ‘comitati della terra’ which were directly elected by 
assemblies of the inhabitants of individual rural comuni and were intended to include 
representatives of all the economic and social organisations present in each commune 
(cooperatives, youth associations, war veterans, ex-parlisans etc.) together with 
important local figures such as doctors, teachers, pharmacists, lawyers and 
‘progressive’ entrepreneurs. It was envisaged that the committees would coordinate 
and support the activities of local agricultural movements such as the land 
occupations, ‘reverse’ strikes and struggles over farm contracts as well as more 
general economic problems such as the development of rural industries, cooperatives, 
roads and schools. In addition the ‘comitati della terra* were expected to play an 
arbitrating role in disputes between the different categories of farm workers.
It cannot be said that in Bologna or in Emilia-Romagna generally the ‘comitati della 
terra' acquired the same significance as they had in the south. This was undoubtedly 
because the 1948-49 wave of strikes in the Valle Padana were entirely directed by 
Confederterra unlike in the mezzogiorno where the absence of a powerful union 
organisation meant that the ‘comitali della terra’ did have an important role in 
directing and coordinating land occupations and strikes. Another important factor in 
the failure of the committees to establish themselves in Emilia was the Christian 
Democrats’ triumphant victory in the general election of the 18th April which allowed 
the agrarian bourgoisie to reassert its domination over the professional and lower- 
middle class strata of rural society. Under these conditions the type of progressive 
pluralism which the PCI aimed to promote through the ‘comitati della terra’ had little 
chance of success.
When the next major confrontation between the landowners and llie Confederterra 
erupted in May/June of 1948, the parliamentary reform proposals of llie PCI appeared 
completely irrelevant to the resolution of what was to become a violent and protracted 
struggle between a by now prepared, confident and well organised agrarian elite and a 
no less determined and motivated landless labourers’ movement.
The 1948 strike lasted from the 23rd May to the Slh June, and the first week passed
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off peacefully and without incident. Vet when it became clear that the landowners’ 
association had no intention of negotiating on the substantive demands made by 
Confederterra, the anger and militancy of the workforce took even the strike leaders 
by surprise. At Decima di Persiceto an organised attempt to break the strike by the 
local landowner and supporters of the PSLI was blocked by a large crowd of 
demonstrators. However the indiscriminate beatings of the ‘Celere’ forced the strikers 
to flee while the union leaders present at the picket were all arrested for public order 
offences. The intransigent stance of the landowners was also clearly demonstrated at 
Argelato when the Marquess of Talon insisted on an escort of armoured cars to move 
his animals and ‘crumiri’ through the lines of demonstrators, the predictable result 
was bloodshed and injury caused mainly by the indiscriminate driving of jeeps and 
motorcycles into the crowds at high speed.103
Immediately following the Decima di Persiceto incident a general strike was called in 
Bologna for the 4th of June which the then federal secretary of Confederterra, Enrico 
Bonazzi described as, ‘a truly grandiose demonstration of conscious force, trade union 
discipline and civil responsibility on the part of union leaders and Bologna’s workers,’ 
while the prefect reported that the ‘effectiveness of the trade union alliance has 
surprised public opinion which expected it to be more badly affected by the impact of 
PSI/PCI divisions.’104 The ‘army of attack’ as Bonazzi described the mass of 
striking labourers and riceworkers was strong enough to persuade 35 %  of the estate 
owners to agree to Confederterra’s demands but by the same token two-thirds of the 
owners clearly had no intention of making any concessions.
The proposals which Confederterra had put forward in the spring of 1948 were
109 The Argelato incident is commemorated in a song ‘Siamo partite il 5 di luglio’ 
which is discussed in the final part of this chapter.
104 Enrico Bonazzi, ‘Politiche e lotte agrarie, Bologna 1945-1955’ in L. Bignami (Ed) 
I braccianti. Venti anni di lotta. Editrice Sindacale Italiana, Rome, 1969, p.258.
ACS M.I.(Gab) 81/4S14 Report of the Prefect, 30lh June 1948.
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guaranteed to enrage the landowners’ association who like the state authorities had not 
expected to see demonstrations of solidarity between urban and rural workers and 
between the various categories of their dependents and employees. Confederterra’s 
five demands struck at the roots of the protec ted relationship between landowner and 
client which the fascist regime had strengthened and preserved. The union called for 
a new farm contract for share-croppers, adequate wage increases for salaried workers 
and mondine, a new contract for small tenants, the renewal of a series of legal 
provisions for farm improvements, and provision of nurseries tor the children of farm 
labourers.
Although the 1948 strikes ended in stalemate, Confederterra emerged greatly 
strengthened and began to focus its attention on more strategic objectives such as the 
defence of trade union control over labour exchanges. This was an issue which the 
peasant leaguers felt very strongly about since no fewer than 615 worker-controlled 
offices had been established in the Valle Padana alone in the first few years after the 
war.105 A national strike was called on 21st August 1948, and although it mobilised 
thousands of braccianti against Fanfarii’s planned nationalisation of the independent 
labour exchanges, the movement was not strong enough to prevent the bill from 
passing. By the following April the CGIL was forced to bow to the inevitable and 
accepted the transfer of the labour exchanges to the slate in return for the small 
concession that workers’ representatives would be consulted over the running of the 
new offices. In Emilia where the establishment of autonomous worker-controlled 
labour offices had been a hard one achievement which only fascism had been able to 
take away, the CGIL capitulation was seen as nothing short of total defeat.
The ‘collocamento’ compromise had a destabilising effect on the conduct of the new 
round of wage negotiations which inevitably ended in another series of strikes in the 
province of Bologna in May and June 1949. The weakened position of the CGIL 
partially explained the intensity of the conflict, but no less important was the shift to
105 See E. Bonazzi, ‘Uniti in difesa del collocamento’, La Lotta. Vol.l No.4, 28th 
January, 1948.
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the right of De Gasperi’s government and the free-hand given to his interior ministry 
to use force to suppress the labour and social movements under the control of the 
PCI. In response to the violent tactics of the landowners and state authorities, the 
braccianti adopted new methods of struggle such as the ‘sciopero a rovescio’ (reverse 
strike)106, and forms of active’ strike involving the carrying out of tasks and repairs 
which the landlord had not asked to be done while refusing to perform the jobs that he 
did. Land occupations which had been a favourite lactic of the southern peasantry 
were increasingly frequent in parts of the ‘bassa’ Bolognese where the local mayor, 
Communist and Socialist deputies and the labour chamber representatives would help 
to symbolically ‘plant’ a strip of uncultivated land together with hundreds of braccianti 
and their families.
Throughout the dispute Confederterra was careful never to allow the smallholders, 
tenant farmers or share-croppers to suffer from the strike action. In fact striking 
braccianti often volunteered their labour to help smallholders with farm jobs which the 
farmer’s family could not perform on their own. Luciano Romagnoli described the 
significance of this cooperation,
‘This plan allowed the consolidation of the alliance between the proletariat and the 
intermediate groups in the great mass of peasantry. The peasant cultivator whether he 
is a proprietor or a tenant or a share-cropper does not want a strike for the simple 
reason that on that farm or that small parcel of land he harvests ‘his’ grain and the 
fodder for ‘his’ cow. It does not matter if his grain or his cow will mostly belong to 
the landlord or go to the capitalist state. To strike against him or worse to force him 
to strike means making an enemy of him, pushing him into the arms of the agrari,
106 This involved groups of peasants carrying out improvements to a farm in order 
to highlight the poor stale into which many landowners had allowed their estates to fall 
and the potential work for unemployed farm labourers which was available if owners 
were forced to invest their profits.
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creating a manipulate mass to be used by the reactionaries against the strikers.’107
On the 22nd June, 1949 Confederterra called off one of the bloodiest and bitter 
strikes in post-war Italian history after the strikers had won a promise from Confida 
that negotiations would begin over a national contract before November, that 
unemployment rights would be extended to the braccianti and that social insurance and 
other benefits would also be extended to rural workers. However, only the salariati 
extracted an immediate concession from the landowners having won the right not to be 
dismissed without ‘just cause’.
The braccianti had to wait until May 1950 before a national agreement was signed 
with the employers while a separate deal was concluded with the salariati in July, 
removing the prospect of a single national contract for both categories. By then 
agricultural production had returned to pre-war levels for the first time and rural 
unemployment had also slowly begun to decline, the ‘struggle’ took on new and more 
institutional forms. Although four years of rural conflict had yielded some positive 
results, from the labour movement’s point of view the overall balance sheet was 
disappointing. The Catholics and the Social Democrats had both established rival 
organisations aimed at attacking the dominant position of the PCI within the rural 
workforce rather than capitalists and landowners, the DC and its ‘quadropartito’ 
coalition was stronger and more combative than at any time in the lifetime of the 
Republic, and the international situation appeared to be degenerating so rapidly that an 
east/west conflict seemed a strong likelihood. The organisational and mobilising 
strength of the PCI which by 1950 had become quite considerable was recruited to the 
international campaign to prevent nuclear conflict between the powers. The 
‘movimento per la pace’ became the new focus for the Communist Party’s alternative 
vision of peaceful co-existence and social progress, and in the province of Bologna it 
was to achieve an exceptionally high profile.
107 L. Romagnoli, ‘Le alleanze’ in Guida dell’operaio agricolo, 1949, Vol.l, No.7, 
p.26, cited in Bozza cit.
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Part IV. The ‘Partigiani della Pace’ and the Cold War in Bologna. 1949-1953.
1. The Peace Movement in the Province of Bologna.
Of a total population of 3,338,721 inhabitants in Emilia-Romagna, 2,127,044 signed 
the petition organised by ‘Partisans for Peace’ in support of the Stockholm Declaration 
against the use of atomic weapons. Between June and October 1950, 516,977 people 
out of a resident population of 714,705 signed the appeal in the province of Bologna 
alone, and with 2,083 individual committees (he province had by far the largest 
number of peace groups in the region.108 Each committee was organised on one of 
four levels; by municipality, neighbourhood, firm and village or apartment block.
The groups were intended to be non partisan and aimed to include the widest possible 
cross-section of the local population. The ‘movimento per la pace’ prided itself on the 
adhesion of intellectuals, professionals, the lower middle class and Catholics to the 
anti-nuclear cause.
In order to preserve this broad base of support the peace campaigners declared that 
‘the Movement does not have its own ideology...neither does it propose to put itself 
under the flag of this or that ideology or conception of the world.’ The leaders of the 
Movement even made parallels with the unity the alliance between the internationalist 
proletariat of Imola and the nascent agrarian capitalist bourgeoisie during the 
Unification and the anti-Nazi front which developed in the province in llie 
Resistance.109
One of the media for this ‘pacific alliance’ of social classes was the so-called 
‘Quaderni della Pace’. The ‘quaderni’ were records of public meetings, work-place 
discussions and formal questionnaires which activists organised in order to solicit the 
broadest range of opinions on the nuclear question and the prospects for world peace
108 R.M. ‘Il plebiscito antiatomico’ Emilia. No.9, Year II, August 1950, p.259.
109 Antonio Del Geurcio, ‘I Partigiani della Pace in Emilia’, in Emilia, (III), No.14, 
January 1951, pp.3-7.
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and disarmament. The PCI was particularly keen to record ‘pro-peace’ comments and 
statements from local churchmen and establishment figures such as school-teachers, 
university professors, lawyers, doctors and other professionals. The ‘best’ material 
was selected for publication and featured in the movement’s monthly review *La 
Tribuna della Pace.’ Although the PCI’s opponents were scathing about the genuine 
plurality of opinions expressed in the publications of the ‘Partigiani della Pace’, it is 
reasonable to assume that the atomic threat was also felt by non-Communists and 
Catholics who may not have taken part in these discussions but were at least prepared 
to add their names to a petition.
In fact the organisers of the petition claimed that more than two-thirds of all the 
signatures from Bologna, Modena, Reggio, Ferrara and Ravenna were collected after 
the Korean War began during the most bitter phase of the anti-Communist assault by 
the government forces. By stressing the mediating nature of the Stockholm appeal and 
the non-alligned nature of the peace movement the PCI sought to reinforce the 
‘progressive alliance’ which had characterised the post war politics of Emilia since the 
Resistance. Del Guercio made this connection more explicitly by citing a passage 
from Togliatti’s ‘Ceto medio e Emilia Rossa’ in which Togliatti praises even the 
landowning bourgeoisie for its entrepreneurship, its technical innovations and the 
implementation of irrigation schemes and land improvements which made some parts 
of the country ‘socially more advanced than the city.’"0 The point the author was 
attempting to make was that even bourgeois and Catholic society had an interest in 
preventing a further world conflict. If the ‘Partigiani della Pace’ had managed to 
achieve this degree of social and political consensus, the movement’s achievements 
would have been considerable. In fact, on an institutional level opposition to the 
Stockholm appeal and its supporters was very great, and in some ways this made the 
Movement’s success in recording such a high level of support in the province even 
more remarkable.
1,0 Ibid p.7.
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2. ‘La pe\ir du gendarme..,*: The State’s response to organised protest in the "anni 
duri.*
The state authorities certainly recognised the peace movement as a potential threat to 
Italy’s continuing membership of the Atlantic Pact and were convinced that the 
‘Partigiani della Pace’ was yet another example of the Communists’ cynical and 
instrumental manipulation of public opinion. In 1950, General Carlo De Simone was 
dispatched to Bologna as prefect on the instructions of Scelba in order to control the 
socialcommunists increasingly vociferous and effective propaganda and organisation in 
the province. De Simone was a committed disciple of Scelba’s ‘hard-line* strategy 
which had targetted Emilia-Romagna as the bedrock of Communist subversion and 
which sought to harass and prosecute leading militants on the slightest of pretexts.
During the anti-Korean War campaign which look on a particular intensity in the latter 
half of 1950, De Simone issued an ordinance which forbade the collection of 
signatures calling for a ban on nuclear weapons, ‘...because of tire psychological 
consequences which it might have in heightening the stale of apprehension in the 
population,* and also because it, ‘aimed at exacerbating the already severe division 
within public opinion.’" 1 The local questura also gave notice that all public 
meetings dealing with these issues would be banned.
Dozens of arrests followed the ban and activists were prevented from conducting 
door-to-door signatures and for ‘unauthorised’ street petitioning. From the many 
reports which described the arrest and charging of peace petitioners in virtually every 
comune in the province it was clear that the police and carabinieri were carrying out a
,n M.I.(Gab) 28/11422/14, report of the prefect 14th July, 1950.
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politically motivated strategy aimed at outlawing llie peace movement. Often arrests 
would be made so that the police would be able to confiscate petition forms as 
‘evidence’. Because trials took many months to come to court, in this way the 
authorities could disrupt the peace campaigners very effectively even if (as mostly was 
the case) the charges were later thrown out.112
These ‘energetic interventions’ (as the carabinieri euphemistically described them) 
against the ‘Partigiani della Pace’ formed part of a wider pattern of violent 
confrontation and intimidation which was at the centre of the government’s strategy of 
isolating the Communists from wider society. 19-19 and 1950 were two of the most 
bloody years of social conflict in Emilia which not only included the massacre of 
striking workers in Modena referred to above, but also the deaths of Maria Margotti, 
a rice worker, and Loredano Bizzarri a bracciante who were both killed during the 
rural labourers’ strikes of May and June, 1949.
Between the elections of the 18th April, 1948 and January 1950 no fewer than 1,400 
people were charged and remanded in custody for various offences, among whom 
were 44 trade union leaders, 10 Communist Party leaders and 4 mayors. 27 received 
prison terms, 134 were conditionally discharged, and 203 were found not guilty. 
Several leading Communists faced criminal prosecution including Bonazzi who had 
already been found guilty of a previous offence and sentenced to 8 months 
imprisonment. Dozza and Malaguti the secretary of the Federal Labour Chamber 
were also charged with ‘defamation of the state.'113
1,2 M.I.(Gab) 28/11422/14 (1950-52), police report 29th November, 1950.
113 See table 5.1. Many consigli comunali were dissolved by prefectural decree and 
their mayors charged with the criminal appropriation of grain (i.e. the distribution of 
wheat from the ‘granai del popolo’ to the local population without the permission of the 
state authorities). In October 1947, nine comuni in the province were without a mayor 
or had been suspended. See ACS M.I.(Gab) 69/425Ó, undated prefect’s report circa 
October, 1947. On the prefect’s ‘over-stepping’ of his legal powers for suspending and 
charging Communist mayors for allowing municipal employees to strike in protest at the
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An extraordinary meeting of the central committee of the Bologna federation of the 
PCI was held in March 1950 to discuss the government’s offensive against the left and 
the labour and social movements allied to it. As secretary of the federation, Enrico 
Bonazzi described how the government had banned the sale and distribution of the left 
press (and in particular L'TJnital. had outlawed the occupation of uncultivated land, 
forbidden the holding of factory meetings by the workforce (i.e. trade union and 
factory council meetings) and had stopped all public meetings and demonstrations for 
a period of three months."4 However inspite of these difficulties Bonazzi assured 
his comrades that the Party had no intention of allowing reactionary forces to disrupt 
its political work. 14
visit of President Eisenhower see Giuseppe Branca, ‘Denunzie e sospensioni di sindaci’, 
Emilia. Year 3, No. 16, March 1951, pp.97-98.
114 APC 0325/1231 ; Extraordinary meeting of the Central Committee of the Bologna 
Federation of the PCI, 21st March, 1950. See Table 6, MF. 0325/2007-S, Report to 8th 
Provincial Congress of the Bologna Federation, December 1950.
Table 6. Results of police and judicial action against the PCI, and labour and peace 
movement in the province of Bologna 1945-1950.
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Dead 2
Injured 603
Stopped & questioned 8,600
Detained 1,204
Prosecuted 3,161
"“Convicted 1,606
Acquitted 1,397
Amnesties 55
Cases dismissed before trial 105
Awaiting trial 418
On remand 1,352
Source: Federazione t*CI di bologna, APC 032:>/2007-8, December 1V5Ù.
(* Sentenced to a total o f 658 mentii: imprisonment)
Table 6.1. Police and judicial action against the anti-NATO protests and the 
‘Stockholm Appeal’ petition in the province of Bologna, 1950.
Charged 209
"“Convicted 84
Acquitted 125
Source: Federazione PCI di Èologna, APC 0325/2007-8, December 1950. 
(* fined a total o f 324,000 lire)
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Among rank-and-file Communists there was a genuine belief that the actions of the 
socialist countries held the key to world peace and that detente could be effective only 
if Western governments were besieged by a mass call for disarmament and a reduction 
in international tension from their electorates. The ‘Partisans for Peace’ were crucial 
in the creation of this climate of opinion. Once again Giuseppe Dozza was to 
symbolise the new Cold War strategy of the PCI with its emphasis on international 
solidarity and collective mobilisation against the threat of nuclear war. Dozza went 
through many changes of title from ‘mayor of the Resistance’ to ‘mayor of the 
Reconstruction' and as a member of the World Peace Council elected in Warsaw» the 
previous November he was awarded the title ‘mayor of peace' by Bologna’s 
communists.
From the point of view of the ‘Movimento per la Pace’ and the PCI this was not an 
empty claim. Dozza presented 17 million signatures in favour of the Stockholm 
appeal to the Warsaw congress which included 60% of the inhabitants of his own city. 
At a time when the Truman Doctrine and United Slates aggression against socialism as 
an ideology and as a movement was at its height, for the PCI the importance of the 
peace movement in Emilia-Romagna and Bologna lay mostly in the opportunity it 
offered the left to appear as pluralistic and capable of placing ‘morality’ and 
‘humanity’ above the sordid business of power politics. It was not a representation 
which convinced all sections of Bolognese society and L’Avvenire d’Italia and II Resto 
del Carlino waged an unceasing counter-offensive in their pages to disabuse the 
Emilian population of the notion of an independent and neutral Communism. 
Nevertheless the buoyancy of electoral support for the PCI in Bologna in 1951 and 
1953 pointed to the Party’s establishment of a solid core of support among the 
working-class and an increasing number of the lower-middle classes of the province 
which neither the Vatican nor the government parties were able to penetrate.115 In
115 By the summer of 1955 the campaign was still very active and prefect Spasiano 
was obliged to report that, ‘the PCI is working on a fertile ground of support from which 
it expects to have a major electoral return.* In some of the remoter provinces the prefect 
also noted that peace activists had established a dialogue with local Catholics. ACS

the following section we explore llie social and cultural factors in the creation of 
Communist identity which help to explain this political success.
Part V. Communism and Popular Culture in Bologna 1945-1956.
1. Introduction.
The success of the Communist Party as a hegemonic force within the base culture of 
Bolognese society was connected to its ability to transpose the traditional structures of 
worker/peasant identity created by the Socialists in the first two decades of this 
century onto a new ethico-political formation which incorporated the themes of anti­
fascism and Resistance and combined these with new forms of solidarity and mass 
action. Where Emilian Communism differed substantially with its socialist reformist 
predecessor was in its ability to connect together different struggles, often linked to 
heterogeneous socio-economic groups, under the same banner. If reformist socialism 
had been a predominantly rural political movement, reform Communism placed at 
least equal emphasis on the need to establish a hegemonic presence in the cities. In 
this task the Party was undoubtedly aided by the influx of rural workers into the 
capoluogo which took on a spectacular rate of growth in the late 1950s and throughout 
most of the 1960s.* 116
The Communist Party was therefore laced with the difficult task of appealing to two 
quite distinct categories of labour bolh of which exhibited strong internal 
differentiation. Unlike in the predominantly ‘white’ zones of the Valle Padana (such 
as the Veneto)117, demographic and occupational changes in the province of Bologna
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M.I.(Gab) 23/1492/14 25th June, 1955.
116 The implications of this migration for planning policy in the Comune di Bologna 
are explored in the following chapter.
117 For an excellent account o f the impaci o f migration on radical peasant protest in
the Veneto see Piero Brunello, 'Contadini e < < repetini> > : Modelli di
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did not lead to a dispersal of radical ‘voice’. This was because the PCI’s dual 
presence in the rural and urban working-class community provided a continuity of 
values and shared experience which helped to counter the disaggregating effects of 
urbanisation.m Here we examine how changes in the provincial economy and 
labour market affected the strategy and political success of the PCI and how social 
change and collective identity was mediated through cultural practices which 
challenged as well as legitimated the Party’s hegemonic project.
2. Cultural policy in the alliance strategy of the PCI.
Togliatti certainly did not undervalue the cultural question; reflecting on the 
establishment of the Party’s ‘cultural commissions’ in 1950, he wrote that the duties 
of its representatives were to, ‘...consider why cultural expressions which could 
provide the basis for...a new culture have not yet done so.’ Togliatti defined these 
expressions as having an ‘organisational, economic and political nature,’ and they 
included the Party itself, the trade union movement and its capillary organisations, the 
network of other associations linked to the Party and, ‘...the intense associative 
activity which covers all sectors from hunting to fishing.’ But if, as Togliatti agreed, 
these phenomena were already ‘culture’, they only provided a part of the picture. 
Organisation was one thing, but concrete cultural activity was quite another, and it *
stratificazione,’ in Silvio Lanaro (Ed), Il Veneto. Einaudi, Turin, 1987. The author 
argues that the higher degree of ‘proletarianisation’ among the peasantry of the lower Po 
reduced the propensity to immigration which was much higher among the more 
heterogeneous peasant communities of the north and west.
The term ‘voice’ as used here refers to the work by Hirschman, Exit. Voice and 
Loyalty and particularly to its application in the Emilian context by Anderlini. See 
Anderlini, Terra Rossa, cit. p.62.
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was here in Toglialti's view that the Party needed to make greater efforts.119 120
Paolo Fortunati shared Togliatti’s concern and his assessment of the cultural activity 
of the Bologna Party was not optimistic,
‘...cultural work does not exist...it is in net decline when in fact it needs to be 
intensified particularly since we are coming up to the electoral campaign. The 
Labriola (Circle) is deserted...today there are many more important things than the 
cinema, there is the problem of war and peace, these are profound problems and in 
this Circle it’s possible to hold debates, conferences and, when the time is right, 
attract the attention of the general public...’, which, ‘...helps us to prepare ourselves 
because we must be able to talk and have discussions...we must put ourselves to 
work, in a city like Bologna we must give the impression that we are addressing the 
essential problems of the Italian people.’130
The PCI had been very successful in conveying its idealism and its political 
programme to the working mass of Bolognese society but the membership profile and 
voting patterns of the Communist Party revealed a difficulty in establishing itself as 
the natural choice of the white-collar and professional classes.121 Fortunati argued
119 Paimiro Togliatti, Rinascita. 26ih September, 1964, cited in Salvatore Sechi, 
‘Politica delle alleanza ed egemonia del PCI in Emilia’, in Inchiesta. Sept-Dec 1978, 
pp.61-71.
120 Paolo Fortunati, address to the central committee of the Bologna federation of the 
PCI, APC 0325/1015, 1950. The previous year the prefect had noted that, ‘the so-called 
"national office for cultural work of the PCI" has had no resonance on a local level.’ 
This seems to confirm Fortunati’s view that the Bologna Party was not staking a claim 
to the cultural high-ground of public life. ACS M.I.(Gab) 42/3014, report of the 
prefect, 1st August, 1949.
121 For example, the number of student members of the Bologna federation fell from 
217 in 1951 to 185 in 1952, 174 in 1953, 140 in 1954 and 133 in 1955. The number of 
intellectuals enrolled in the Party declined from 513 in 194S to 354 in 1953. Casali and
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that it was the task of the Party’s intellectuals to increase the PCI’s appeal to the 
urban middle-classes.122 But the Party’s ambiguous altitude towards its intellectuals 
did not help the conduct of the cultural war of position which had been grudgingly 
delegated lo its ‘educated’ cadres.1-3
In a speech to the 6th Congress of the PCI in Milan in January, 194S, Togliatti 
spelled out what he felt to be the deficiencies of the Party’s intellectual members. 
These could be summarised as a tendency towards cliquism, abstruseness, disdain for 
collective participation and discussion, and perhaps worst of all a certain 
preoccupation with modes of thought and writing consistent with a decadent and 
bourgeois tradition.124 The remedy offered by Togliatti was an attentive reading of 
the classics of Marxism and particularly the works of Engels, Marx, Lenin and Stalin 
who in their work expressed the crystalline purity of thought which the Communist 
intellectual required.125
Gagliani cit. p.272.
122 In 1951, Fortunati became a member of the editorial committee of the PCI’s re­
launched theoretical journal. La Società. It was significant, given Togliatti’s conviction 
that insufficient attention had been devoted to the study of Marxism, that the journal 
changed its focus from film and literature criticism to the relationship between the human 
sciences and Marxist doctrine. Ajello Nello, Intellettuali e PCI. 1944-1958. Laterza, Bari, 
1979, p.445
123 Bonazzi complained that, ‘..we are not yet able to make certain that comrade 
intellectuals are non-sectarian and that there are activists among the intellectuals. All in 
all it’s easier to send a rank-and-file comrade to speak to rank-and-file Saragatians with 
whom he’s maybe quarelled than to send our comrades to talk politics with the 
intellectuals.’ Meeting of the central committee of the Bologna federation of the PCI, 
6th November, 1950. APC 0325/1906.
124 Paimiro Togliatti, ‘Dal rapporto al VI Congresso del PCI’ in La politica culturale. 
Luciano Gruppi (Ed), Editori Riuniti, Rome, 1974, pp.38-91.
125 Ibid p.90.
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But if the objective of Party propaganda was to win the allegiance of that part of the 
bourgeosie whose political consciousness had been formed llirough a reading of 
Croce, Salvemini, Vittorini and other dangerous manifestations of liberal thought and 
literature it was very unlikely that this social group could be drawn to democratic 
socialism by Marxist plain-speaking alone.1"6 From his published ancles it is easy to 
gain the impression that Togliatti saw the world of bourgeois culture as the mortal 
enemy of socialism,
‘The pedagogy of decadent capitalism is that of ‘Reader’s Digest’, of the social 
weeklies of ‘Azione Cattolica’; the academic and journalistic mafias who block the 
road to non-conformists; of the press campaigns which impose certain ways of 
thinking, certain ideal types, tendencies and phobias on ordinary men and women, 
(and) of the schools run by Catholic or Crocean priests.’126 27
But in the same exposé of the vituperative nature of bourgeois cultural domination, 
Togliatti defended Eastern European and Soviet artists lor their revival of ‘popular’ 
folk traditions,
‘They tell us that it is wrong, for example, to draw the attention of musicians to the 
study of popular songs; or for writers to be in continual contact with everyday life.’
But while Togliatti might have been prepared to defend ‘proletarian art’ in llie USSR 
and Eastern Europe, he knew that Italian intellectuals wanted to liberate themselves
126 As editor of the philo-Còmmunist critical journal Politecnico. Vittorini could be 
considered as a maverick Communist intellectual, but his interest in American thought 
and culture and his openess to non-materialist criticism often antagonised Togliatti who 
frequently attacked him through the pages of Rinascita. See Stephen Gundle, 
‘Communism and Cultural Change in Post-War Italy’, unpublished PhD thesis, 
Cambridge University, 1985,
127 Paimiro Togliatti, ‘Direzione ideologica’, Rinascita. Year VI, 1949, No.5 in 
Paimiro Togliatti, I corsivi di Roderigo. Editori Riuniti, Rome, 197S, cit. p.152.
from the aesthetic dictates of ‘official’ art, literature, cinema and design which 
fascism had imposed. The tension between the PCI’s need to win over the ceti medi 
and its disdain for the liberal values associated with this class was evident in the failed 
campaign to defend the cultural virtue of Emilia-Romagna which the Communist Party 
initiated in 1949.
The ‘Comitato di difesa e valorizzazione del buon nome dell’Emilia’ (or Comitato pro 
Emilia) was a group made up of mayors, politicians, entrepreneurs, industrialists and 
‘eminent men of science and letters.’ Under the chairmanship of Giuseppe Dozza, 
the committee established several commissions and sub-commissions each of which 
had a specific responsibilly for areas of activity such as sport, science, art, tourism, 
town planning, theatre and so on. However, after a short time the various groups 
stopped functioning Bergonzini claimed, ‘because of lack of funds.’
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In reality, the political polarisation between the forces of the centre-right and the left 
was bound to have repercussions within the artistic, academic and intellectual 
community of the region, and the ‘Comitato pro Emilia’ was an early example of the 
debilitating effect of the Cold War on the PCI’s alliance strategy. But there was 
another more profound and lasting reason for the failure of the PCI to establish itself 
as the patron of the entire ‘cultural community’ in Bologna and Emilia-Romagna. This 
was because among the Emilian peasantry there already existed a rich and varied sub­
culture which had developed through the Risorgimento and the era of socialist 
reformism and which presented itself in new and combative forms during the great 
social mobilisations of the 1940s and 1950s. This ‘culture of resistance’ was deeply 
hostile to the economic domination of the urban bourgeoisie although often accepting 
of the bourgeois literary and theatrical tradition. The collective identity of the great 
mass of the ‘compagni’ who rallied to the Commmunist Party in the post-war period 
was formed in this complex world of cultural resistance and exchange. The re- 
aiticulation of the highly slrucluraled mentalities of the peasantry and urban working- 
class in the form of political solidarity and Parly loyally is the key to understanding 
the successful establishment of Communist hegemony within the subaltern classes of
'Contadini' and 
'mondine' of
the bassa Bologn 
c.1950-
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post-war Bolognese society.128
3. ‘The world the peasants made.* Cultural identity and class politics in post-war 
Bologna.
The construction of working class identity in the immediate post-war period depended 
on the Communist Party’s ability to combine the ‘action oriented’ elements which had 
traditionally existed in the urban and rural labouring classes (from anarcho-syndicalists 
to socialist reformists and cooperators) with an appeal to the two most powerful 
‘popular’ sentiments which characterised the early years of the Cold War. The first 
consisted of an oppositional culture based on the powerful dichotomy between ‘us and 
them’ where ‘they’ were principally the (ex) fascists and great proprietors, and the 
second was the perception of the Soviet Union as a nation in which the Revolution had 
actually succeeded and worked.129 The ethical base of this political/class dichotomy 
combined with the utopie appeal of the Soviet myth to produce what Anderlini has 
called a ‘universalistie-esehalological’ concept of social equality which was as, if not 
more robust and convincing than the Catholic ‘world view’ against which the 
socialcommunist sub-culture actively competed. Indeed the rooted tradition of anti-
128 Mentality is used here to describe the coalescence of ‘...sentiments of integrated 
social groups, their choices, and wishes; of specific themes (such as attitudes towards 
miracles or death) or to emergent social categories (such as merchants in feudal 
society)...’, Jaques Le Goff, ‘Les mentalites’ in Fai re de THistoire. Gallimard, Paris, 
1974, (Part III) p.84.
129 Capecchi, V. Classe operaia e cultura borghese cit. p.253. Stephen Gundle 
writes, ‘The PCI’s own culture and popular political identity...relied heavily on a Soviet 
myth in the immediate post-war years. Togliatti may have searched for an original 
political line, but the banners, portraits, books, propaganda and ideas which the comrades 
on the ground floor came in contact with were practically all of Russian origin’, Gundle 
cit. p.51.
clericalism which was a feature of both republicanism and social reformism made it 
even harder for Catholicism to articulate itself as a popular force, particularly given 
the Church’s ambiguous relationship to fascism.
The process of industrialisation and the transition from ancient to modern forms of 
production, communication and exchange had a profound effect on the subaltern 
culture which emerged after the Second World War. Two decades of fascism and the 
severe privations of war and the Resistance all combined to transform the cultural 
expression of worker and peasant identity, if not in form then certainly in content. 
Although the dichotomies described above were common to industrial workers and to 
the braccianti and mezzadri of the Bolognese countryside they were not shared in 
equal measure. It would be obvious, for example, that the appeal of the Soviet Union 
would be greater for industrial workers who more readily identified with the image of 
labour and social equality portrayed in films and the Parly literature about the USSR. 
Rural workers by contrast felt the oppressive presence of the ‘padrone’ and the social 
control of the priest much more tangibly than workers in the city, and for this reason 
alone the peasant’s world view was likely lo be local rather than global and to offer a 
rich patrimony of memories of collective struggle and a folk history that their urban 
counterparts mostly lacked.
Clearly the various manifestations of working-class cultural identity did not appear as 
static, individuable and self-contained instances. The pattern of cultural life among 
the rural and urban working class was highly variegated and the degree of cultural and 
recreative association depended very much on the sparseness or density of population, 
as well as on the availablity of transport (particularly primitive in the mountain 
comuni), the existence of social spaces (parish halls, case del popolo, osterie), the 
disposable income of families, their working hours and so on. Land-owners feared 
that socialising between mezzadri, braccianti and salariati would breed discontent and 
militancy, for this reason ‘osterie’ were provided exlusively for the use of mezzadri 
belonging to a particular estate. It was in order to counter this deliberate isolation of 
share-croppers and landless peasants that the PCI began to re-open the ‘ease del 
popolo’ which had been destroyed or taken-over by the fascists before the war, with
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the aim of re-establishing that sense of collectivism and solidarity which had been all 
but removed from working-class life under fascism.130
Another fundamental determinant of cultural behaviour was the level of education 
which individual workers and peasants had acquired. Mass literacy was only 
beginning to be generalised in the 1940s and 1950s but it was a painfully slow 
process. The more economically backward and physically remote the settlement, the 
more likely the inhabitants were to suffer from high levels of illiteracy. Lack of 
educational development set limits on the Communist Party’s abilty to cultivate a high 
level of political consciousness among its members, many of whom had only an 
elementary education. The Party tried to encourage initiatives such as the ‘università 
popolare’ and the evening schools which were mainly involved in vocational training, 
but obviously the PCI alone could not compensate for the deficiencies of the Italian 
education system which the DC seemed to be in no great hurry to correct.131
Rather than relying exclusively on scattering propaganda indirectly at the masses in
130 In only the first half of 1921, 121 workers’ institutes in Emilia-Romagna were 
destroyed by fascists; A. Tasca. Nascita e avvento del fascismo. L’Italia dal 1918 al 
1922. Florence, 1950, pp. 174-175, cited in G. Adani &  G. Tamagnini (Eds) Cultura 
popolare nell’Emilia-Romagna. Strutture rurali e vita contadina. Silvana Editoriale 
d’Arte, Milan, 1977 p.241. A good account of the fascist suppression of the Socialist 
and labour movement in the province of Ferrara can be found in Paul Comer, Fascism 
in Ferrara. 1915-1925. Oxford University Press, London, 1975, especially pp.l3S-141.
1319.3% of the north-eastern and central provinces of Italy were recorded as illiterate 
at the 1951 census (Ginsborg, cit., p.440). According to Luciano Bergonzini, in 1950 as 
many as 40% of the peasants in some communes of the ‘bassa ferrarese’ could not read 
and write. The conditions in the ‘basca bolognese’ were not much belter where the level 
of unemployment was similar to the province of Ferrara (more than S0% in places). See 
Luciano Bergonzini, ‘II Piano del Lavoro in Emilia’ in Emilia. November, 1950 reprinted 
in ‘I comunisti in Emilia-Romagna’ cit. p.83.
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the vain hope that some of it might be absorbed,132 the Communists applied the 
Gramscian principle of using militants who had a certain weight and ‘presenza* in 
their local community as organic intellectuals who could be used to channel the ideas 
and values of the Party to work-mates and friends. These militants, because they 
volunteered to carry on this type of work for the Party had the merit of being 
enthusiastic and hard-working, but they often did not possess what the Party called 
‘mature political consciousness*. In other words the street level or shop-floor activists 
often lacked a political education as well as a general education. Here lay the 
essential difference between the Communist Parly and its Socialist allies, and between 
the Communist Party and every other political party in Italy; the PCI had an 
essentially protestant conception of political behaviour, it held the principle of the 
‘priesthood of all believers’ and wanted its supporters to be able to communicate an 
intelligent case for socialism as theorised by Engels, Marx, Lenin and (in a truncated 
form) Stalin to a general public.133 134 Not every Communist member could fulfil this 
function (and this was accepted by Togliatti as an inevitable consequence of the 
‘partito nuovo’) but lesser activists could at least be inducted into the moral universe 
of Italian Communism by reading an appropriate selection of contemporary fiction.
In describing the literature which particularly attracted the Communist militant, 
Santomassimo provides us with a picture of the cultural references of a typical activist 
and describes how they were strongly influenced by the reading of socialist classics 
such as Gorky’s The Mother, and the great epics and adventure stories of Victor 
Hugo, Eugene Sue and Jack London.'34 But Santomassimo argues that this was
132 This is not to say that the PCI doubted the efficacy of centralised propaganda as 
we see below.
133 If a non-active PCI household possessed one recommended text it was most likely 
to be Stalin’s ‘Short Course’ History of the CPSU. See Grant Amyot, The Italian 
Communist Party. The Crisis of the Popular Front Strategy. Croom Helm, London, 
1981, p. 133.
134 G. Santomassimo, ‘Radici deiranlifascismo popolare’ in Italia Contemporanea, 
cited in Capecchi ‘Classe operaia e cultura borghese’, cit. p.253.
often not a ‘spontaneous’ act of popular cultural consumption because the local 
‘agitation and propaganda’ commission, or if it existed, the cultural commission of a 
federation would try to recommend literature aimed at promoting a ‘social 
consciousness’ among the iscritti.
The extent to which working-class cultural consumption was successfully ‘directed’ by 
the Party machine is hard to estimate, but the low circulation rates for Party 
newspapers including L'Unità suggest that few members ‘lived and breathed’ the Party 
in a Bolshevik sense, although many would have attended the PCI’s social and 
recreative institutes such as the case del popolo, the circoli ARCI and USPI, the 
CRAL and the many trade union dopolavoro organisations which attracted PCI 
supporters.
The Communist Party was on much firmer ground when it came to organising 
‘spettacoli’, because literacy levels had no bearing on the enjoyment of a game of 
bowls (boccie), a ‘balla liscio’ or a dialect play. In the domain of the ‘parole* the 
Communist Party was able to insert itself within the complex matrix of traditional and 
emergent cultural forms, from hunting and ‘alpinismo’ to the cinema and 
photography, not least because Communists were and continued to be the great 
‘joiners’ of Italian society. A Bologna tram driver might for example belong to his 
trade union’s after work club, be a member of the local association which represented 
his favourite sport, and frequent the local Party section or bar. For women there 
were less opportunities, but UDI promoted a variety of cultural activities and the 
FGCI organised dances and shows which attracted young women from inside and 
outside the Party.135
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In the years immediately following the war the dopolavoro ferroviarie began its
135 For example the ‘festa delle donne’ held every year on International Women’s Day 
(11th March) was a major social event which UDI organised all over the province. 
Communist women also sponsored more traditional 'spettacoli' such as ‘beautiful baby 
competitions’ and fashion shows.
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tradition of holding a summer season of theatre written and performed in Bolognese 
dialect, and the PCI’s cultural review, Emilia, also sponsored an annual dialect poetry 
festival. Both initiatives indicated the importance which the Party attached to its 
public perception as the custodian of local cultural tradition and development, but the 
PCI tended to see ‘the arts’ and popular entertainment as two quite separate entities. 
The local and national leadership recognised the need to relate politics to the values, 
symbols and rituals of the local community but (with the notable exception of Emilia) 
the party hierarchy did not appear to subscribe to the idea of ‘culture teaching 
politics'.
The ambiguous relationship of the PCI to popular culture was particularly evident in 
its attitude towards the ‘Teatro di massa’ which presented its first performance, Sulla 
via della libertà in Bologna in February, 1951. The play dramatically reconstructed 
the history of the peasants and workers’ struggles from the advent of fascism, and 
ended with a grand finale in which the ‘Battle for Porta Lame’ and the killing of the 
rice worker Maria Margotti were portrayed by many of the actual protagonists. The 
originality of this piece of theatre lay in the casting of ordinary workers and peasants 
who performed in front of their own work colleagues and neighbours. The total cast 
numbered between eight hundred and a thousand non-professional actors. One of its 
directors, Luciano Leonesi described the interest which the play generated among the 
local working-class community,
‘The crowds at the Teatro Comunale were...like propaganda for the party and the 
performance was repeated fifteen or sixteen limes, always to a full house;...there was 
certainly a special appeal in seeing a play of this kind put on for such an audience in 
an elite Bologna theatre where a worker (if he or she went at all) would have to make 
do with a seat in the Gods.,l56
However this interest in ‘people’s theatre’ which unwittingly resembled the work of 
Brecht and the propaganda theatre performed in China during Mao’s ‘Long March’ 136
136 Cited in Capecchi Classe operaia e cultura borghese cit. p.257.
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enjoyed only a brief period of Communist Party patronage, as Leonesi again recalls,
‘The great boom in the ‘Teatro di massa’ was from 1950-51, but then the party began 
to lose interest in it...when in 1952 the first Congress of the Teatri di massa was held 
in Forlì, what was to have been a postive evaluation of the experience aimed at 
promoting its greater diffusion, albeit in a different form, was in fact the moment 
when it was decided to call a halt.’07
In their speeches to the conference, many leading Communist intellectuals such as 
Salinari, Lajolo, Rodari, Schacherl and Del Guercio spoke out in favour of a form of 
cultural practice which could ‘break the bones of bourgeois theatre’ and give voice to 
the experiences of workers and peasants’ lives which the arts had either ignored or 
caricatured. But at a time when Togliatti was trying desperately to reintegrate the 
Communist Party into the political mainstream of Italian society after a series of 
domestic and foreign disasters for the left (the Christian Democrat landslide victory of 
the 18th April, the Saragatian schism, the attempted assassination of Togliatti himself, 
the break-up of the CGIL, the founding of NATO, the war in Korea, ‘Titoism’, the 
suppression of communism in Greece and Turkey, ‘Scelbanism’ etc.) any attempt at 
promoting ‘class culture’ in this way was certain to earn a stern rebuke from the Party 
leadership. And this was exactly what the Direzione’:: representative at the 
conference, Giancarlo Pajetta delivered,
‘The summing-up was provided by Pajetta who attacked the introductory speeches.
He said that to envisage an attack on bourgeois culture was an act of sectarianism, of 
closure and mistaken, and in fact it was necessary to open-up bourgeois culture to the 
working class. Mass theatre is not what comes from the history of the workers but is 
any type of theatre which has cultural validity. Mass theatre is therefore Shakespeare, 
Pirandello, Goldoni, etc...it is important for Communists to enter official cultural 
organisations (established theatres, official cultural organisations, etc.) and to work for 137
137 Ibid, p.258.
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the greater availability of culturally valid works.’13*
Pajetta’s speech signalled the withdrawal of PCI support for the ‘Teatri di massa’ on 
an organisational level and the re-orientation of the Party’s intellectuals working in the 
field of drama into mainstream theatre. It also meant, ‘the complete dispersal of that 
repository of enthusiasm and creativity which came from many little country towns 
and groups of workers and peasants.' But as Capecchi argues, the PCI leadership 
failed to understand that the organisers of the ‘Teatro di massa’ were not trying to 
achieve a cultural separatism or to develop an anti-bourgeois aesthetic, among the 
masses but rather the reinforcement of working class cultural identity in order to 
prepare it for an encounter with bourgeois culture on equal terms.138 39
Whether he was conscious of it or not, Pajetta was not simply attacking a small group 
of radical directors but a long established tradition of popular theatre which had grown 
out of the Emilian countryside and which reflected the harsh lives and the resistance 
of its poor inhabitants. The ‘Teatro di massa’ drew on a rich variety of popular 
drama from puppet theatre to peasant choirs and travelling players. For example the 
recital companies, ‘le compagnie di prosa girovaghe’ were theatre troups who played 
all over the region often staying for as long as a month in a large town and 
performing a different piece every night. Some plays were originally composed by 
established dramatists (Niccodemi, De Benedetti, Giacometti) who wrote dramas such 
as ‘La morte civile’ and other plays with titles such as ‘L’Urlo’ and ‘Primo Maggio’ 
which explicitly foregrounded the political subject mailer of the play. Other 
companies had extensive repertoires which brought precisely the type of plays Pajetta 
wanted to see left-wing artists exclusively performing to a much wider audience than 
could be accomodated in the ‘establishment theatres’ and Melloni refers to the recital 
of pieces by Shakespeare, Sem Benelli, Berrini, Sardou, Pirandello, Goldoni,
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid, p.259.
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Feydeau, Ibsen and Hugo amongst others.1'’0
Such portrayals helped to reinforce the sense of ‘otherness’ and conflict inherent in the 
class relations of the countryside between the twin universes of peasant and 
‘padrone’.140 41 A link between this pre-war oral tradition and the post-Resistance 
struggles of the rural proletariat was provided by masters of the ‘cantastoria’ such as 
Marino Piazza (or as he preferred to be biown, ‘Piazza Marino il poeta contadino’) 
who[tp write and perform as an oetogenerian in the 1970s in the markets and squares 
of the region.
The more contemporary popular songs reflected the formation of a specifically 
Communist mentality among the braccianti. The content of the songs thus took on a 
more global character and the Soviet Union began to symbolise the emancipated land 
of plenty which awaited the Italian working class after e v e r y  prospect for socialism in 
Italy appeared to have been lost with the Christian Democrat landslide victory of the 
18th April. A song dedicated to the trade unionist, Guido Cocchi, sentenced to three 
years imprisonment for organising the braocianli strike of 1948-49 in Bentivoglio 
expresses the despair of the political prisoner and the desire to flee to a new world
140 Remo Melloni, ‘Il teatro popolare’ in Adani, G. & Tamagnini, G. (Eds) Cultura 
popolare neH’Emilia-Romagna. Espressioni sociali e luoghi d’incontro. Silvana Editoriale 
D’Arte, Milan, 1978, p.212.
141 It is also interesting to compare the antagonism of the poor farmers of Emilia- 
Romagna with their counterparts in nineteenth century England and to note how an orally 
transmitted resistance culture was perpetuated among the urban working-class, ‘...rural 
memories were fed into the urban world ng-class culture through innumerable personal 
experiences. Throughout the nineteenth century the urban worker made articulate the 
hatred for the ‘landed aristocracy’ which perhaps his grandfather had nourished in secret: 
he liked to see the squire cast in villainous melodramas, and he preferred even a Board 
of Guardians to the charity of a Lady Bountiful: he fell that the landowner had no ‘right’ 
to his wealth whereas if only by foul means, the mill-owner had ‘earned’ his.’ E.P. 
Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class cit. p.253-254.
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where at least everyone is given enough bread lo eat,
Per una lota giusta m’han condannato,
lor m’han promesso il pane non me Than dale,
lor m’han promesso il pane non me Than dato.
Sentii chiamar: ’Giancarlo, fatti coraggio, 
tre anni di galera son di passaggio, 
tre anni di galera son di passaggio.’
Andrem tanto lontano, tanto lontano 
dove la bela Russia ci dona il pane, 
dove la bela Russia ci dona il pane.
Dove la bela Russia ci dona il pane, 
non vogliati) più menzogne democristiane, 
non vogliam più menzogne democristiane.'17
The peace movement also had its campaign songs and predictably these were directed 
at the architects of the Atlantic Pact and at De Gasperi’s political allies and in 
particular Saragat’s break-away PSLI. The sense of having won the battle for 
freedom and democracy only to see it snatched from the hands of Italy’s liberators by 
the Church and the forces of reaction comes across very strongly in the song ’La 
Colomba della pace’,
Siam stati partigiani contro i fasisti, 
nei campi internati contro i nazisti 
hanno versato sangue molti compagni 
ma non per dar l’Italia agli americani. 142
142 ‘O cancellier che tieni’ in Various authors, Emilia-Romagna. I canti, le fiabe, 
le feste nella tradizione popolare. Lato Side Editori, Rome, 1981, p.37
O colomba che sei 
della patria il vessillo 
ti vogliam con noi per nostro idillio, 
pan, pace e libertà.
Quel dì che in aprile andammo tutti a votar 
quel che siamo stati molti pronti a sbagliar; 
fu allor che la patria stava in nostre man, 
fu allor che ce Than rapita i democristian.
Ci hanno promesso pane, pace e lavoro, 
invece ci hanno dato piombo e bastone, 
ma noi gridiamo: ‘Basta ai democristiani,
Magnani, Cucchi, Sceiba e saragattiani.’
O colomba che sei...143
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These examples give an impression of the vibrancy of cultural expression that existed 
within the social and labour movements in the province during the most intense years 
of social conflict. But although individual Communists were the inspiration for these
143 ‘La colomba della pace’ was a familiar tune throughout the region and could be 
heard on the mass demonstrations which the ‘Partigiani della Pace’ organised after 194S. 
It is likely that the references to Scelba and Saragal were added later, probably in 1953 
or 1954. Curra, cit. p.39. Magnani and Cucchi were two former Communist partisans 
who ‘defected’ from the PCI in the 1950s. They later formed a tiny ‘Risorgimento 
socialista’ list in the 1953 elections which helped to frustrate the coming to power of the 
DC ‘truffa’ coalition but the exit of these two heroes of the Resistance gave rise to an 
extremely bitter polemic between the two sides which has continued until recent years. 
See ‘In memoria di Valdo Magnani. Il dissenso nel comuniSmo’, in G. Beccolati & L. 
Casali (Eds), I Maenacucchi. Feltrinelli, Milan, 1991, p. 17.
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songs and dramas, and the experience of singing, playing or watching was shared by 
thousands more, as we suggested earlier the Communist Party continued to regard 
these forms of cultural expression as valid only insofar as they allowed the Party in 
Rosa Luxembourg’s words, ‘to play the schoolmaster’ with them.
Similarly the ‘falce e martello', the Party hymn ‘bandiera rossa’, and the celebration 
of the 1st May all served to unite an increasingly broad spectrum of Communists 
behind the Party’s programme. Revolutionary symbols, songs and images acted as an 
ideological cement which held individuals as disparate as insurgent partisans and 
socially-concerned school teachers to an organisation which had to become 
increasingly multi-faceted. These traditional and modern cultural celebrations were 
amalgamated in the most successful and enduring of the PCI’s cultural institutions, the 
‘Festa dell’Unità’ which from the end of the 1940s became the main focus of the 
Party’s social and cultural activity.
4. From the sacred to the profane: the Festa deH’Unità between folk ritual and 
political hegemony.
The American anthropologist, David Kertzer, has compared the ‘Festa dell’Unità’ in 
Bologna to the Catholic fesivals which celebrate local saints or particularly significant 
days in the religious calender.144 The first ‘Festa dell’Unità’ in Bologna was held in 
1946, and by the 1950s the Communist festival had become the most important 
cultural focus in the province having completely eclipsed the traditional religious
144 In a 1958 editorial in La Lotta, the Communists made no secret of the fact that 
the ‘Festa dell’Unità’ was seen as a weapon in the battle tor the hearts and minds of the 
local population, a battle which the Church was losing; ‘What scorches the priests: 276 
section festivals, 1,500 branch evenings, an unprecedented provincial festival, 2S millions 
in subscriptions,’ cited in, David Kertzer, ‘La lotta per l’egemonia rituale in un quartiere 
comunista’. Il Mulino. XXV No.244, Mareh-April 1976, pp.225-24S. See also ‘Politics 
and Ritual: Communist Festa in Italy, Anthropoloeical Quarterly. 47, October 1974, 
pp.374-389.
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celebrations and ‘sagre’.145 146 By maintaining the festive and populist elements of the 
religious festival, the ‘feste di partilo’ (and especially the ‘Festa dell’Unità’) were able 
to establish themselves as a permanent fixture in the cultural life of the local 
community.
The ‘Festa dell’Unità* did originally begin as a fund-raising event lor the Party press 
but it quickly became obvious that the festival’s attractions provided a unique 
opportunity for the Party to establish a more ‘organic’ relationship with the local 
population than could be achieved by any number of newspaper sales. Although the 
PCI was fully aware o f the commercial importance of the festival, the ‘lesta’ 
increasingly came to be seen as a ‘shop-window’ for its ideas, values and activities, 
especially for its own members and supporters.11®
145 For example the ‘Festa della Spiga’ (Corticella), the Sagra dei ‘balconi fioriti e 
l’albana’ (Dozza). There were even culinary festivals such as the ‘Sagra dei lorlelloni’ 
(Granagliene), and the ‘Sagra del ciaccio’ (Monte-acuto delle Alpi). In Bologna's Piazza 
Maggiore a ‘Sagra di cantastorie’ was held every July, highlighting once again the 
importance of folksong in the popular culture of the Bolognese. All these ‘sagre’ would 
be accompanied by the procession of the local Madamina and the priest or bishop 
(depending on the importance of the festival) would bless the crowd and the object of the 
‘sagra’. Enrico Dall’Olio ‘Le Sagre’ in Adatti & Tarnagnini Espressioni sociali e luoghi 
d’incontro, cit. p. 120. Dall’Olio suggests that the ‘political festival’ is leading to the 
death of these popular celebrations of the seasons and food and wine. Without further 
research it is impossible to prove, but it is just as likely that the Church appropriated 
these essentially pagan rituals to invent its own festive traditions and is therefore as guilty 
as any political parly of corrupting ‘folklore’ for ideological ends.
146 This point was not lost on the prefect who remarked that the first festival had been 
organised, ‘...with the evident aim of galvanising its own members, and through the 
attractions of the feste, also developing that ideological conviction which inspite of all 
contradictory appearances is nevertheless lacking.’
ACS M.I.(Gab) 85/4903, 22nd September, 1948.
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Each Party section was encouraged to organise its own show every year, and dozens 
of Party members spent months arranging the food and entertainment and hundreds 
more gave up their holidays every year to wait on tables or take tickets. Even more 
work would be put into the provincial festival which would attract the leading 
exponents of the Party such as Amendola, Longo, or Secchia. The provincial ‘festa’ 
was the highlight of the Communist year in Bologna and it not only served a rallying 
and unifying function for the Party’s supporters but confirmed the PCI’s undisputed 
leadership of the working masses. Neither the Church nor the city’s other political 
parties could rival the size and quality of the ‘Festa dell’Unità’ although both the 
Socialists (in friendly rivalry) and the Christian Democrats (in open competition) tried 
unsuccessfully to supplant the Communists’ summer celebrations.
The form the festival took depended on its size and location, but every ‘festa’ had a 
restaurant, a book stand, a tombola, and a variety of entertainments. At the 
provincial ‘Festa dell’Unità’ which the PCI held in Bologna in September 1951, an 
impressive range of cultural activities could be seen, from an exhibition of Chinese 
art, to the ‘teatro di massa’ production, ‘Il grano cresce sulla palude’ by Saltarelli, 
which won a prize at the international youth festival in Berlin, and like ‘Sulla via della 
libertà’ involved young rice-workers and braccianti from the province. The CGIL, 
local cooperatives and artisans also provided displays of their work and activity in the 
local community (the provincial CGIL, for example, exhibited its ideas for the ‘Piano 
del Lavoro’). The highlight of the festival was a large procession of ‘amici dell’Unità’ 
involving workers, farm labourers, mondine, fishermen and young Communists which 
paraded through the streets of Bologna accompanied by musicians and PCI and trade 
union banners.147
Interestingly, in its review of the ‘Festa dell’Unità’, Emilia made a point of discussing 
the appeal which the ‘folklore del lavoro’ would have for those interested in the 
history of dress, in sociology and political history. The attractive presentation of the 
photographs of the ‘festa’ were also clearly directed at a middle-class readership
147 S.A. Emilia. Year 3, No.21, September 1951, pp.302-305.
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which could extract some cultural value and vicarious pride from such an impressive 
demonstration of working-class identity and politics. m  At the opposite end of the 
alliance spectrum, the PCI could boast of its establishment of the festival as the 
highlight of the holiday season in the province arid claimed that many poor mountain 
families made their one annual trip to the ‘city’ in order to lake in the ‘festa’. This 
was a significant accomplishment because it relegated the annual procession of the 
‘Madonna di San Luca’ to a demonstration of faith for tin embattled Catholic minority 
who could not begin to challenge the popular attraction of the Communist festivals.
By the middle of the 1950s, the PCI had established itself as the ‘modern prince’ of 
Bologna, loved by its friends and feared and haled by its enemies.110 The Party had 
established a dominant position within the rural and urban working-class and it was 
also beginning to make progress among the target occupations identified by Togliatti 
at Reggio in 1946; the skilled workers, artisans, lower professionals and white-collar 
employees. In the economic and cultural fields the Communist Party had set the 
agenda, even if the central state and to an extent the local opposition, denied the Party 
a complete autonomy of manoeuvre.
Together with economic and social movements and cultural institutions, local 
administration constituted the third leg on which the Reggio doctrine rested. Through 
its control of nearly all of the province’s 60 comuni the PCI was able to intervene on 
behalf of its real and aspirant electorate in many areas of administrative life. In the 
following chapter we consider how the Togliaiii/Dozza alliance strategy was applied in 1489
148 The Communist Parly claimed an aliendance of 400,000 at the ‘national’ festa held 
in Bologna on the 23rd September. Ibid.
149 As Gramsci wrote. The history of a parly...can only be the history of a 
particular social group. But this group is not isolated ; it has friends, kindred groups, 
opponents enemies. The history of any given party can only emerge from the complex 
portrayal of the totality of society and Stale...’ from ‘The Modern Prince’ in Hoare, Q. 
& Nowell-Smith, G. fEds) Antonio Gramsci. Selections From the Prison Notebooks. 
Lawrence &. Wishart, London, 1971, p. 151.
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the first ten years of PCI/PSI rule in the Comune di Bologna, focusing in particular 
on administrative reform and urban planning.
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C H A P T E R  T W O
Political and Urban Renewal in the Communist Administration of Bologua 1945- 
1956.
1. ‘Il Comune Democratico’ - Municipal Reform during the Reconstruction.
If the impact of the war had been disastrous for Bologna’s industries, the effects of 
the allied bombardment had been no less catastrophic for the city’s housing and 
amenities. Of 280,000 residential rooms available before the war, 45,000 were 
completely destroyed and 80,000 seriously damaged by the end of the conflict. 
Approximately 44% of houses were either hit or damaged by bombing, and many in 
the suburbs and in the centre were completely raized to the ground. Particularly 
badly affected was the zone around the station to the north of the centre and the 
district on either side of the Via Emilia to the west.1 2 The immediate task of the 
reconstruction was the resolution of the two most urgent social problems facing the 
city; public order and the housing crisis.
In September 1945, the prefect of Bologna faced with a growing health and public 
order problem ordered the compulsory repatriation of non-residents, refugees or 
immigrants who had entered the city before 1942.“ The prefect also established a 
commission on housing aimed at resolving the growing conflicts between the 
population over accomodation.3 Grave risks to public health were created by large 
numbers of animals and refugees sheltering in the porticoes and galleries of the
1 Fregna, R. ‘Urbanistica e città: Bologna’, in D’Atlorre, P. (Ed) La ricostruzione in 
Emilia-Romagna. Pratiche Editore, Parma, 1980. p.83.
2 Ventura notes that Bologna’s normal peace time population of 330,000 swelled to over 
400,000 as a consequence of the massive influx of refugees. Ventura, D. Sindacato e 
ricostruzione a Bologna 1945-1948. Editrice Sindacale Italiana, Rome, 1981, p.17.
3 ‘Il problema degli sfollati, e alimentazione e allogi’, Corriere dell’Ernilia. 20th May, 
1945.
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ancient city, while temporary housing had been provided by the conversion of parish 
halls and schools into dormitories. Clearly these had to be restored to their original 
function if civilian life was to be resumed and this further complicated the comune’s 
re-housing strategy.4
The ‘Giunta Comunale’ was reconstituted just one month alter the Liberation of 
Bologna while the provincial council reconvened in December of 1945. Dozza and 
his collaborators felt it was essential that the local civil authorities be restored as 
quickly as possible, not only to provide a representative body to which the Allied 
Military Government could address itself, but perhaps more importantly, to supplant 
the ad hoc committees of the CLN which were beginning to demand a political role in 
the process of reconstruction.
Conflict between the ‘legal’ and the Resistance leaderships was lower in Bologna 
however, because the CLN had been limited in its operations to the periphery of the 
city and the outlying villages and some towns of the province. Undoubtedly the 
domination of the Resistance movement by the PCI helped to smooth the process of 
transition, with Dozza’s elevation to mayor of the city providing a vital continuity of 
leadership between pre and post Liberation government in the province. Moreover, 
the ex-partisans seemed content to assume the important but subordinate task of co­
ordinating the ‘ripresa’ on the ground, rather than establishing themselves as a diverse 
and lasting means of popular representation.
Consequently the CLN increasingly assumed the character of an urban social 
movement representing the interests of the local population in their dealings with the 
civilian and municipal authorities. The CLN itself was resolved to renounce its 
support for extra-legal forms of organisation at a central and local level in the region 
which conformed with the positions calling for a rapid re-establishment of legality 
agreed by the constituent parties of the CLNAI, with the exception of the Action
4 For an account of the housing conditions during and immediately following the war see 
Bergonzini, L. Bologna 1943-1945. Politica ed economia in un centro urbano nei venti 
mesi dell’occupazione nazista. CLUEB, Bologna, particularly pp.S4-S7.
Party.5
At the first meeting of the consiglio comunale on the 19th December, 1945, Dozza in 
his opening speech declared
’..up until now the democratic character of the ’giunta municipale’ (council 
executive) has been expressed through its roots in the liberation struggle and in its 
links with the representative organs of the people, the political parties, the district and 
organisational CLNs which have been a major help in the common struggle, trades 
councils, youth clubs, the union of Italian women, the Italian women’s centres, union 
of young Italian women, artisans’ associations, traders, intellectuals and various other 
different categories.’
The inference was intended to convey the importance of llie new administrative 
demarcation which had been approved by the Allied Military Government (AMG) and 
which was intended to reduce the administrative scope of the ad hoc resistance groups 
and confirm the role of the (as yet unelected) giunta as the sole legitimate interlocutor 
of the AMG and the provisional government on the local level.
Dozza’s continuing pre-occupation in the first months of the Liberation was to restore 
Bologna’s appetite for democracy after over four years of war and twenty years of 
fascism. Having established the giunta’s legitimacy at a local level, the sindaco 
pressed the demands of the communal administrations for a much greater role in the 
political life of the new Italy,
s On the Pani government and the CLNAI see Ginsberg, cit. pp.58-59 & 90 and also 
F.Catalano, Una difficile democrazia. Italia 1943-4S. Documenti. Vol.IT D’Anna, 
Florence, 1980; G.Vacearino, Tl governo Parri e le forze politiche’ in Istituto Nazionale 
per la storia del Movimento di Liberazione in Italia, L’Italia dalla Liberazione alla 
repubblica. Feltrinelli, Milan, 1976; David Ell wood, L’alleato nemico - la politica 
dell’occupazione anglo-americana in Italia 1943-1945. Feltrinelli, Milan, 1977.
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‘Administrative autonomy, decentralisation...are as vital as the air that we breathe for 
a normal, sane and democratic development of the local authorities: and it is for this 
(reason) that the mayors of the principal cities of the region are in unanimous 
agreement regardless of party distinction or opinions. The Constituent Assembly will 
be called upon to decide how to resolve this problem at the highest level; in the 
meantime life as well as its pressing demands must go on.
Reform of local government and the creation of a new tier of regional government had 
been a theme of several political party programmes during and after the war, but it 
assumed a particular significance in the run-up to the administrative and national 
elections in 1946 when the parties began to advance their proposals for the 
constitutional charter. In 1944, the Republican Parly (PRI) saw the new state as,
’a nation of regions with their own assemblies and organs of government’
At this time the CLN was still seen as a vital link between the base and the state and 
as a possible nucleus for consultation and development for the regional authorities.
On all sides the discussion revolved around the need to institute something similar to 
the local administrations founded by the local committees of the CLN which were 
seen as the model for later models of decentralisation. The PCI, however, seemed to 
devote much more time to the importance of the comune itself in the life of towns and 
cities in the new Italy:
The comune should also actively intervene in the economic life of the 
population’, claiming for itself, ‘the most complete autonomy over taxation’ and 
intervening positively in the field of ‘food, hygiene, reconstruction and public health, 
help for the poor, education and finance. ’6 7
6 Archivio del Comune di Bologna, Atti del Consiglio Comunale, speech by Giuseppe 
Dozza, 19th December 1945.
7 PCI Federazione di Bologna internal document April (unreferenced), 1945 in Ceccarelli, 
F. & Gallingani, M., Bologna: Decentramento. Quartieri. Città. 1945-1974, Ufficio per
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The only space conceded to forms of direct citizen democracy was that approved by 
the national council of the Christian Democrats in January, 1946 which contemplated 
the use of the referendum as an instrument of mass democracy.8 9As well as criticising 
the right’s lack of imagination, the conference was critical of the left’s call for the 
complete re-establishment of the prefascist state apparatus which was denounced as 
inadequate to the task of building a modern economy and national infrastructure. This 
position cannot however be reconciled with the later stance of the De Gasperi 
government or indeed the entire post-war record of the DC; rather it represented the 
apotheosis of the temporarily influential ‘social catholic’ faction around Giuseppe 
Dossetti. His supporters such as Fanfani and La Pira argued with some success for a 
more interventionist policy for the DC between 1945 and 1946 but were eclipsed by 
the skillful realpolitik of De Gasperi who persuaded even the sceptical Americans that 
root and branch reforms would only encourage the political pretensions of the 
‘revolutionary left’ and frighten away investment.0
il decentramento del comune di Bologna, 19S0, p. 14. This study, commissioned by the 
Comune di Bologna, remains the most important historical work on post-war 
decentralisation in Bologna. It was also written using sources which are unavailable to 
the public, such as the Dozza Archive of the Istituto Gramsci [Emilia-Romagna] (now in 
the process of re-organisation), making frequent references to this text unavoidable.
8 Ironically, the DC was to be one of the staunchest opponents of the referendum when 
in government, delaying the parliamentary approval of this constitutional provision until 
1970 when the regional governments were also instituted for the first time. See Ginsborg 
cit., p.327.
9 Baget-Bozzo, G. Il partito cristiano al potere. Valecchi, Florence, 1974, pp. 71-97; G. 
Campanini, Fede e politica. 1943-1951. La vicenda ideologica della sinistra PC . 
Morcelliana, Brescia, 1976; Ginsborg, cit. p.91; Pombeni, P. Il gruppo dossettiano e la 
fondazione della democrazia italiana ( 193S-I94S). Il Mulino, Bologna, 1979. On 
Fanfani’s social policy in the years immediately following the end of the war, Pombeni 
(p. 149) argues that, ‘The model proposed is substantially that of the ‘welfare state”  and 
by this the author intended the British model whose twin architects were considered to 
be Beveridge and Keynes. In an important but neglected article in Cronache Sociali 
(which Dossetti edited), F. Duchini notes that the work of the Commission for the 
Reform of Social Welfare had ‘directed its project of reform according to the principles 
of the First Beveridge plan...’ (F. Duchini, TI ‘piano Beveridge’ e la lotta contro la 
miseria,’ Cronache Sociali 10, 31st May, 1948. It must be said however, that such 
influences on central government were short lived and depended on the enthusiasm of 
their ministerial sponsor.
113
Although provision was made for local government autonomy in Article 5 of the 
constitution, the courts and the government itself continued to rely on the pre-fascist 
and fascist legislation of 1915 and 1934 on local administration and local finance.
New legislation in 1970 and 1976 partially implemented some of these constitutional 
provisions, but central government powers actually increased in relation to the comuni 
and provincie. provoking criticism even from the government’s own supporters.10 1
2. Funding the Reconstruction: The Problems of Local Authority Finance and the 
Municipal Rating Councils.
Until the introduction of fiscal control in 1973, local authorities in Italy were able to 
use a range of financial impositions to fund their service provisions through direct and 
indirect taxation." This fiscal autonomy gave the comuni and provincie a subtantial 
contractual force in their dealings with central government and provided for a major 
cohesion over and above political divisions. Inspite of these statutory provisions many 
large city authorities even after applying local taxes to the maximum permitted by law 
were still unable to balance their budgets and sank further and further into deficit.12
In these cases the state would maize a contribution from its capital account, but the
10 On central government control of local authorities see Ginsborg, cit., pp. 152-153. For 
the history of local government reform since the Unification see the still important 
collection of essays by Ernesto Ragionieri, Politica e amministrazione nella storia 
dell’Ilalia unità. Laterza, Bari, 1967.
11 Allum, P. Italy: Republic Without Government?. London, 1973; and Roteili, E. (Ed) 
Tendenze di amministrazione locale nel dopoguerra. Il Mulino, Bologna, 19S1.
12 Until 1950/51 the city of Bologna and many of the surrounding comuni of the province 
faced a grave financial crisis occasioned primarily by the high cost of repairing the 
municipal infrastructure which had been seriously damaged by the war, but also by the 
low level of economic activity which had a drastic impact on the taxation revenue of 
these authorities. The prefect made persistent appeals to central government for 
additional contributions from its local authorities’ aid fund. However, the small grants 
which were made available were entirely inadequate to tackle a crisis of this magnitude, 
and many comuni incurred huge debts which remained a serious burden on their 
expenditure for years after. See the Reports of the Prefect contained in M.I. Gab. 
190/21135/11 (1946), 215/22515 (1 9 4 6 ), 81/14814 0^48), 42/3014 (1949j.
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credit raising powers of local councils were strictly limited to lending institutions 
which were assigned by the state and such loans were only lor the purpose of 
balancing the expenditure and income of local authorities and not for the deficit 
financing of capital programmes.13 14 This had severe implications for the general 
functioning of local authorities in urban centres experiencing a rapidly expanding 
population. In these comuni, the process of planning and allocating funds for mass 
housing projects was made tortuously slow by the formidable bureaucratic apparatus 
which capital spending plans had to go through in order to win final approval.
In 1951 the Comune di Bologna became the first major Italian city to balance its 
budget since the war. This achievement was even more remarkable in light of the fact 
that rateable values for domestic and business properly had not been revised since the 
1930s, thus leading to a progressive decline in real income from local authority direct 
taxation. Despite the obvious attraction of relying on the more dependable and 
efficient local consumer taxes, the giunta look the political decision to actually reduce 
the proportion of the comune’s revenue which carne from indirect sources. In 1946 
taxes on consumption amounted to 60% of all local taxes and 58% of all income, but 
by 1951 the percentages were respectively -17% and 39%, a clear indication of the 
giunta’s commitment to shifting the burden of taxation away from general 
consumption to more progressive forms of direct taxation.11
The main direct contribution which local authorities had at their disposal was the 
family tax (or ‘imposta di famiglia’) which was calculated on the basis of the size and 
quality of the family dwelling space. Because the tax could be varied within the limits 
set down by the T.U. (’testo unico’ - unified code or statute) of 1915 on local 
authorities, the giunta had some discretion in the largetling of Die levy, a facility 
which Dozza and his colleagues exploited to the full.
13 Articles 254 & 332, Legge comunale e provinciale (T .U . 1915'».Law of the 2nd July, 
1952 ONo.703).
14 Compared with a city like Milan however, the figures are less impressive, in 1946 
consumption tax accounted for 56.8% of all municipal revenue, while in 1950 the burden 
had fallen to 39.2%. Source: Roteili, cit. p.87.
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In narrowing the tax bands for the ‘imposta di famiglia’ the socialcommunist 
administration made explicit its ambition to transfer the greater share of local 
authority taxation from the low and middle-income middle classes to the ‘affluent 
middle-class’; a policy which affirmed the administration’s economic solidarity with 
the urban petty-bourgeoisie and which reflected the Communist Party’s effective use 
of the instruments of local government for the realisation of its policy objectives.
Commenting on the importance of the giunta’s financial strategy Renato Cenerini, 
Director of Accounting at the City Treasury and a senior member of the federal 
committee of the PCI observed that,
‘..from the balancing of the budget a lot depends on our|futurejpossib|s work...in the 
sense of a greater autonomy of action..in the. sense of making possible specific 
internal reforms...or at the end of the day for the achievement of other wider progress 
in the general field of council activities.’15
n
It was significant that Cenerini’s remarks were published in the weekly newspaper of 
the Bologna Federation of the PCI which clearly recognised the political value of such 
financial independence.
From the early 1950s the council was moving from the position of consolidating the 
achievements of the reconstruction to a cautious expansionist phase which began 
seriously to examine plans for urban and economic expansion in the city. After the 
1951 budget, approval was given for the first piano regolatore (PR) which expressed 
the administration’s confidence in addressing the complex reality of post-war urban 
growth in a regional economic centre.
In the same year a list of ‘great lax evaders’ was published which exposed the wealthy 
Bolognese who had not made a lax declaration and were therefore avoiding making a
15 Cenerini, R. ‘11 pareggio del bilancio preventivo, 1951 - Raggiunta una meta che onora 
la nostra Amministrazione democratica.’ La Lotta. 5th January, 1951.
116
contribution to local services.16 By this stage the municipality’s attention had shifted 
almost entirely to forms of direct taxation which through the Imposta di Famiglia 
could be specificially directed against (he normally tax-resistant bourgeosie since,
’..the wealth of families could be deduced from income or proceeds whatever 
their nature and from every other sign of wealth’17
Wealth could be calculated not just from local income but also luxury of housing as 
well as social position. Families of more than seven children were exempted 
altogether from the tax as well as those whose income was equal to or less than a 
minimum imposition.18
These rates were decided not by the local authority itself but by the Giunta provinciale 
amministrativa, which was a state appointed committee whose function was to oversee 
the income and expenditure of individual councils on a table of national values and 
according to the proposed rates advanced by the various comuni.19 Although the
16 Tax evasion was a major problem for the comune. Of 100,000 families in Bologna, 
only 75,000 had registered for municipal taxes and of these only 45,000 paid. Assessore 
Paolo Fortunati’s report to the federal committee of the Bologna PCI, APC MF. 141/32- 
96 (1947), p.21.
17 Article 117, T.U. on local finance.
18 The PCI in its electoral programme for 1951, referring to the balancing of the city 
budget claimed, ‘...(this) has been achieved under a financial and taxation policy which 
only the myopic, egoists, fanatical anti-Commuriisls and anti-democrats have...defined 
as sectarian, exclusivist, unilateral and ami-economic.’ Un Libero Comune cit.
19 By law, major financial and institutional decisions made by the comuni and provincie 
had to be approved by the prefect’s office as well as in some cases by the ‘Giunta 
Provinciale Amministrativa’ (GPA), a government appointed council chaired by the 
prefect which oversaw the activities of local authorities. Until the local government 
reforms of the 1970s, such slate authorities could and did dissolve councils and remove 
mayors who they considered to be ‘exceeding their powers’. With the institution of the 
regions, a new regulatory body was established, the ‘Comitato Regionale di Controllo’ 
(Coreco) which was intended to guarantee greater independence from central government, 
although many administrators regard llie new ‘tutorial’ authorities as even more 
interventionist and partisan than the sysiem it replaced. On the function of the GPA see
comune was constricted in its revenue raising and expenditure powers by the GPA, 
the assessore for taxation, Paolo Fortunati, did implement what was to be one of the 
first acts of local ‘nationalisation’ when he municipalised the collection of 
consumption tax in the Comune di Bologna.
As early as the 1890s, private tax collection firms had been licenced to collect the 
imposta di consumo on behalf of local authorities in return for a large commission, a 
practice which encouraged corruption and fraud on a massive scale. By 1947, at 
Fortunati’s instigation, 24 comuni in the province of Bologna had taken back control 
of consumption tax collection and 100 other administrations in Emilia were in the 
process of switching to municipal collection. This action may have been largely 
symbolic but it provided an early indication of the commitment of Communist 
administrators to make the best possible use of existing municipal law as hopes for a 
thorough-going national reform began to fade."0
By launching initiatives such as the municipalisation of consumer levies, the 
socialcommunist giunta of the city council saw a perfect opportunity to involve the 
local community directly in one of the most contentious functions of municipal 
government. A model already existed in the anti-black market and food rationing 
committees of the Resistance which had been established under the CLN and also in 
the anti-speculation squads formed by municipal police and volunteers on the orders of 
the prefect in the months following the Liberation. Nurturing and encouraging what 
the Communists called this popular sense of economic justice was considered vital if 
the comune was to intervene actively in the local economy and offer an alternative to 
the increasingly anti-interventionist economic policy of the De Gasperi government.20 1
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R.C. Fried, The Italian Prefects. Yale University Press, London, 1963, p.254.
20 P. Fortunati, APC MF. 141/32-96 (1947).
21 However, on a national level Ginsborg argues that the left’s ‘...poverty of ideas and 
analysis resulted in a substantial subordination to the neo-liberalism of the employees.’ 
Ginsborg cit. pp.93-94.
The Consigli Tributari Municipali (municipal rating councils) which were also the 
brainchild of assessore Fortunali, signified a new relationship between the town hall 
and the Bolognese which was to have a great influence on Communist political 
culture, namely that ‘transparency’ in institutional affairs had to be the basis for any 
transaction between the town’s citizens and its administration.
On the 11th December, 1945 four such ‘councils’ were instituted by the giunta 
comprising ten townspeople who were co-opted on the recommendation of the 
CLNs.22 Each council elected its own president and the institutional status of these 
bodies was that of ‘cooperative agencies’ with a ‘secretariat function’. This 
essentially meant that in order to comply with the 1915 and 1934 legislation, the 
CTMs’ were to be non-policy making administrative committees. This distinction also 
served to underline the clear demarcation which the giunta intended to maintain 
between the executive authority of the comune itself and the consultative committees 
which it established from time to lime to assist it in its administrative tasks. This 
‘institutional’ view of citizens’ organisations as necessarily subordinate to the directly 
elected central authority was to remain a major obstacle to a thorough-going 
decentralisation of political power in the years ahead.
1 1 8
It would be wrong, however, to see the CTM’s as mere agents of the municipal will. 
The councils were, for example, charged with the delicate task of extending the list of 
contributors liable to local taxation and assessing their taxable income on the basis of 
an agreed tariff of charges. In this endeavour they were supported by a team of 
accountants and financial experts who processed the records and implemented the
22 In 1956, the composition of the consigli tributari was the following: agricultural 
workers (6), artisans (9), small farmers (6i, salesmen and shopkeepers (15), white-collar 
workers (36), industrialists (6), workers (IS), pensioners (7), professionals and students 
(7), sales representatives (5), travelling salesmen (2), other categories (3); source: 
Electoral programme lor the ‘Due Torri’ t PCI ) list. May 1956, p.22. The constitution 
of the CTMs clearly reflected the PCI’s ‘participatory’ bias towards the ceti medi who 
far outnumbered ‘workers’ on the committees despite the tact that more than 5 0 %  of 
family heads in 7 out of 15 quartieri in Bologna in 1957 were working-class; source: 
Athos Belle-li ini, La città e i gruppi sociali. Bologna fra eli anni cinquanta e settanta. 
CLUEB, Bologna, 1984, p.39.
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CTMs’ recommendations.23 24
Each council was assigned a territorial area of the city, and the partition of the city 
into four taxation districts was decided simply by using the axes of Via 
dell’Indipendenza - Via D’Azeglio and Strada Maggiore - Via San Felice which were 
the ancient medieval (and roman) thoroughfares of Bologna. After the administrative 
elections of 1946, the CTMs nominated by the CLN were reconfirmed and the 
expectation was that a national provision would be made sanctioning the activities of 
such sub-municipal committees. The failure of this legislation to materialise was to 
have significant negative consequences, not only lor the work of the CTMs, but for 
every future project involving public participation in municipal administration. 
Nevertheless, the propaganda value of this fledgling democratic initiative was 
effectively exploited by the Communists in the 1951 administrative elections. In the 
PCI electoral programme Dozza wrote,
‘In the most delicate, sector of administrative life, that of local taxation, the Comune 
di Bologna has the historical merit of having given life to a democratic control of tax 
assessment without precedent in the public life of our country, and of having created 
for that purpose organisations which have (positively) impressed...the overwhelming 
majority of contributors for their civil mindedness, evenhandedness, responsibility and 
dignity...(and) for the tone and style of the new service which has destroyed for ever 
the sense of obscurity and mystery which surrounded the application of local 
.tributes.,24
The idea of seeing ‘taxation democracy’ as a prelude to a more extensive participatory 
democracy was developed in a speech to the consiglio comunale of Bologna in June 
1946,
23 In fact Ceccarelli notes that the quota of contributors increased from 41 % in 1949 to 
59% in 1951 and 61% in 1956. On tins level alone the CTMs could be considered as 
having proved their worth. Ceccarelli oil. p.20
24 Un Libero Comune cit. 1951, p. 19.
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‘...the experience (of the CTMs) will...show us the road to follow so that taxation 
justice does not remain (simply) a vain rhetorical expression.’25
The CTMs increasingly assumed a more explicitly political role as an ‘instrument of 
moralisation’ and in the period immediately following the war, ‘one was looking in 
substance at creating instruments of assessment which were capable of explaining their 
efficacy not just in terms of their direct power but for the influence which they 
exercise on the consciousness of the contributors with the aim of developing...that 
new political and moral education which would be capable of effective taxation 
justice.’26
For Fortunati and his Communist colleagues ‘taxation justice’ meant shifting as much 
of the ‘imposta di famiglia’ as possible onto the richest 1 or 2% of Bologna’s 
population while greatly reducing or even eliminating payments for the vast majority 
of middle-income families.27 The political objective behind this strategy was openly 
admitted by the PCI,
‘...we will succeed in this way. Fortunali boasted, ‘in exempting 5055 of the middle- 
class, through which we believe in concretely translating the politics of alliance.*28
By the early 1950s, with the intensification of the Cold War and the persistent 
isolation of the Socialist/Communist left by the coalition government, the PCI was
25 Assessore Forlunati’s intervention in the debate on taxation policy, in ACC 22nd June, 
1946.
26 P. Fortunati, ACC 10th July, 1947.
27 For example, in their electoral programme for 1951, the Communists claimed that the 
owner of a shoe shop who paid 63,000 lire to the comune in 1949, contributed only 
17,000 lire in 1950, while a clothes retailer’s local tax bill went down from 56,000 lire 
to 21,200. Due Torri, ‘Un libero comune...’ cit. p. 17.
28 P. Fortunati, ‘Per le scuole di partito, la politica tributaria dei comuni’, ciclostat; 
Lecture course for administrators, 1949, Dozza Archive of the Istituto Gramsci, Bologna; 
Ceccarelli cit.
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increasingly concerned to counter the government’s ideological offensive by 
highlighting its own achievements in the field of local administration as a responsible, 
democratic and populist political movement.2” The provincial federation of the PCI 
was conscious that more could be done to demonstrate the achievements of the left but 
that this must not be done in a sectarian or class exclusive way; instead there was a 
need to,
‘...make the public more aware of our activities in the local authorities,’ through 
overcoming, ‘the scarce contact existing between council administrators and the 
population’, while at the same time emphasising that, ‘...the administrations of the 
local
authorities are not under the jurisdiction of the party: they are obedient to democratic 
law (and) are composed of representatives of diverse political tendencies.’29 30
But although the PCI clearly had to promote a non-partisan image of the CTMs to the 
general public, many activists on the federal committee could not see the advantage in 
devolving power (even if symbolic) to individuals who did not share the political 
commitment of the Party’s councillors and assessori. Fortunati revealed his sensitivity 
to this internal criticism when he ‘clarified’ the function of the CTMs to his comrades 
at a meeting of the federal committee,
’...we were concerned that everyone should be represenied but at a certain 
point we realised that admitting every occupation into the CTs would involve the risk 
of creating class conflict with all its contradictions. Therefore, although there may be 
a few commercial traders inside these organisations they won’t be represented ‘in 
quanto tale’. An individual would participate as a man chosen by us who had our
29 Ellwood, D. ‘Il piano Marshall e il processo di modernizzazione in Italia,’ in Aga- 
Rossi (Ed) Il piano Marshall e l’Europa. Rome, 1VS3; Ginsborg cit. pp. 157-58.
30 Sabbioni, ‘Far conoscere meglio ai cittadini la nostra attivila negli enti locali,’ La 
Lotta. 19th February, 1954. See also the resolution of the Provincial Conference of the 
PCI on Local Authorities reported in La Lotta. 15th October, 1954.
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trust.’31
Guido Fanti, who succeeded Dozza as mayor in 1966, recalled that the PCI’s 
opponents were very hostile to the CTMs because they saw them as a means by which 
the Communists could ‘sovietise’ the city. Bui according to Fanti, the Communist 
administrators’ aim was simply to de*bure.aucralise the administration and to remove 
the mystery and secrecy surrounding municipal finance.32 However, not all the 
activists on the federal committee shared the pluralist instincts of the Party’s 
administrators. Replying to a question which suggested that there had been a tough 
battle between the ‘pluralist’ and the ‘instrumentalist’ faction on the regional 
committee of the PCI, Fanti confirmed that the administrators had won out;
’...I said before that our opponents accused us of wanting to sovietise 
every thing...but in actual fact there was a similar concept within the Party...but it was 
beaten. It was defeated...and this was another particularly important development 
which subsequently came to an end when the national fiscal reform [1971-73] 
removed all the positive powers which the communes had over municipal taxation.’33 34
The acceptance of the need for greater administrative accountability was 
acknowledged by the periodical of the Bologna federation of the PCI. On the eve of 
the public deliberations on the budget plans for 1955,
‘The new development of (instituting ) prior discussions with the inhabitants has 
allowed democratic administrators to maire more people aware of the justice of our 
local government policies and also to forge greater links with those who are outside 
our (sphere of) influence.’3'*
31 P. Fortunati, APC MF. 141/32-96 (1947).
32 Interview with Guido Fanti, 13th February, 1991, Rome.
33 Ibid.
34 R. Manini, ‘Raccolte nei bilanci comunali le esigenze della popolazione,’ La Lotta. 7th 
January, 1955.
However, despite their innovative characteristics, the CTMs remained fundamentally a 
creature of the municipal administration and therefore something of an appendage to 
the local state. Other organic forms of democratic organisation which were locally 
based and independent from the comune were equally important in shaping the future 
form of administrative and democratic decentralisation. The most important and 
nationally significant of these ‘grass-roots’ associations were the ‘consulte popolari’ or 
people’s councils.
3. Widening the Participatory Basis of Local Government: the ‘Consulte Popolari.*
The consulte popolari in Emilia-Romagna and especially in Bologna where they were 
also known as ‘consulte rionali cittadine’ were established by the CLN in the period 
of the reconstruction.35 The consulte were organs of popular initiative on diverse 
themes which concerned the local citizens and they were linked to die consiglio 
comunale in a non-institutional form, although their activities were described in some 
deliberative acts recorded in the archives of the city council.
However the non-executive status of the CPs, which was to re-emerge as a 
problematic in later designs for local democratic representation, undermined the 
‘people’s councils’ legitimacy 3S an interlocutor between the consiglio comunale and 
their grass-roots neighbourhood constituencies. A weakness which the Communist 
Party acknowledged but was unable to suggest a remedy for in the absence of a 
thorough-going national reform of local and provincial government.36
The CPs had their origins in Milan37 in 1946 as an emanation of that city’s National
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35 Luigi Arbizzani ‘Giuseppe Dozza’ in Storia illustrata di Bologna. 4/V. N.E.A.r Milan, 
1990, p.70.
36 ‘Le consulte popolari’, Rinascita. 11-12, Nov-Dec, 1947.
37 A detailed examination of the post-war administration of Milan is provided by Fabio 
Rugge in i l  Comune di Milano’ in Ettore Roteili tEdi Tendenze di amministrazione 
locale nel dopoguerra, cit. pp.27-92.
Liberation Committee, but they also existed in the south, particularly in Naples where 
a number of similar organisations grew up in the periferia around this time.3’ In 
Milan there were as many as 46 CPs which were, organised on a ward basis, 
matching the fascist urban divisions.
In the first few months of their existence, the consulte were generally representative 
of the social and political composition of the electoral ward (or circoscrizione). Even 
the Christian Democrats who opposed the CPs for being ‘anti-democratic’ (i.e. 
partisan inspired association which were loo often critical of the civil and military 
authorities) continued to participate in their activities. The rhythms of their meetings 
were adjusted to local conditions and concerns and their activities predominantly 
centred around a single pressing local problem, such as lack of sanitation or water or 
inadequate transport services.
These local problems were articulated in the ‘quaderni di 
rivendicazione’ (petitions of demands) which were presented to the comune or the 
relevant council committees involved with the area of municipal activity which most 
required attention in the locality. Contacts between the council and the consulte were 
carried out via the ‘citizens’ co-ordinating committee.’
However, the ‘pluralism’ of the consulte was to be short lived, such an expression of 
localised public opinion inevitably became vitiated by the sharp and rapid polarisation 
of Italian politics which was evident even before the Communists’ expulsion from the 
coalition government in 1947. Although the consulte continually strove to present 
themselves as ‘apolitical’ citizens’ forums, the new republican state was not convinced 
that these groups had even the. slightest autonomy from the socialcommunist block 
which through its ‘collateral’ organisation?, appeared to be advancing with ever greater 38
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38 In 1949 the Interior Ministry recorded the existence of ‘consulte popolari’ in 10 
provinces in Italy: Bologna, Bari, Ferrara, Livorno, Milano, Rieti, Roma, Salerno, 
Napoli and Rovigo, M.I. Gab. 125/7149/14 (1 9 4 9 ).
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determination into every comer of civil society.39
For its part, the PCI continued to regard such manifestations of popular participation, 
not as potential instruments for building party hegemony as Leninism would prescribe, 
but as an important grounding in democratic education which could ween Italians 
away from the authoritarian subjugation of fascism and into a new era of active 
citizenship.
'The consulta popolare was a school of democracy, of responsibility, of civics 
and of administrative cadres besides being an organ of popular control.’40
In Bologna the CPs began their activities at the end of 1947 and their work as in 
many other provinces in Italy was connected with the urgent tasks of reconstruction; 
such as street lighting, re-paving streets, sewage and urban hygiene. The consulte in 
Bologna also even had their own journal, il Consultore which was published from the 
town hall.
According to Ceccarelli, the consulte in Bologna at their peak numbered some 37 
local organizations and were to be found in every part of the city often meeting in 
cafes or latterie. The CPs were active in many areas of social life including cultural 
activities and health, where the groups were closely involved in the re-building of the 
city’s largest hospital, Ospedale Maggiore. Their small size contributed to the 
‘neighbourhood’ feeling of the groups and there was no attempt to reproduce the pre­
war administrative boundaries as in Milan or Livorno.41 This may also have 
indicated a reluctance on the part of the CPs to take on a distinct sub-communal 
administrative role, prefering to remain a local voice rather than a local authority.
39 From the calculations made by the prefecture of Bologna it is clear that the consulte- 
popolari were assigned to the category of ‘organisations and parties of the left’ when the 
Interior Ministry began to make the distinction between ‘left forces’ and ‘others’ in 
January, 1952. M.I. Gab. 69/11911/14 (1950-1953).
40 Supplement to II Comune Democratico. 1950, p.7ó.
41 Ceccarelli cit. pp.41-42.
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However, from Ceecarelli’s account one might assume mistakenly that the consulte 
were an exlusively urban phenomena. In fact, although the CPs were initially mostly 
active in the provincial capital itself, they become more numerous and more active in 
the small towns and villages of the province in the early years of the 1950s. The 
prefecture recorded 175 meetings of the consulte popolari between January 1949 and 
December 1952, of which only S4 were held in the ‘capoluogo’. Whereas in 1949,
31 out of 49 meetings of the consulte were held in the city of Bologna, in 1950 the 
figure has dropped to 16 out of 39, while in the most intensive year of activity for the 
CPs in 1951, 31 of their 52 meetings were held in the communes of the Bolognese 
hinterland, a trend which continued into 1952 with only 1(5 of the 35 reunions held 
that year taking place in the capital of the province.12 It would seem therefore that 
few of the 37 consulte that Ceccarelli attributes to Bologna could have met regularly, 
if at all, during the most intensive period of popular democracy following the 
Christian Democrats’ landslide victory of April, 1948.13
The importance of the CPs lay perhaps more in their capacity to re-focus the atttention 
of administrators on the. specifically local dimension of municipal government rather 
than in any direct representational function. While (he CPs never pretended to offer a 
democratic alternative to the comune, the relationship between the CPs and the 
consiglio comunale was often discussed in the pages of il Consultore.
T he CPs today already represent a new form of administration...they have 
been successful in constructing a fecund collaboration and an extensive contact 
between the popular masses and the directive organs of the public 
administration...they must strengthen the relationship and the collaboration between 
the administration and the citizenry on the basis of concrete programmes.”4 423
42 M.I. Gab. 122/7071 (1949) & 11911/14 (1950-53).
43 See figures 3.1 to 3.9: Meetings of CPs in city and province 1947-1953.
44 ‘L’Autonomia comunale e le consulte popolari’, unsigned article in II Consultore. I 
No.5, 1950.
Flg.3.1. Meetings o f the Consulte Popolari in the city of Bologna, 1949.
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On the eve of the administrative elections of 1 951 the new citizens* convention of the 
CPs took place on the 22nd April. For the first time Mayor Dozza acknowledged the 
important petitioning function performed by the consulte and declared that of 229 
requests made by them, 137 were granted (about 60^.). Yet the effect of the CPs on 
the political work of the council was limited; in the debates recorded by the acts of 
the council the CPs rarely featured and it is difficult to assess the impact of the 
consulte on the giunta itself apart from the occasional public pronouncements of its 
members.
After the 1951 elections which witnessed a further confirmation of the Christian 
Democrats’ dominance of the national political landscape, Bologna was the only 
regional capital to remain under the control of the left, albeit with a slender 2,000 
vote majority.45 * This moment represented the nadir of the consulte and after the new 
council was sworn in, further official reference to them became increasingly rare.4'5
The 8th Congress of the Bologna Federation of the PCI talked once again of the need 
to service and maximize the potential of the consulte ‘...which over time have lost 
their characteristics of small petitioning organisations concerned with specific urban 
themes.’ In 1954 there appeared to be a revival of interest in the consulte experiment 
when at the provincial conference on local authorities held by the PCI in Bologna in 
September, the slogan read, ‘A greater dedication to parallel organisations’ but the 
CPs themselves appeared to have been emptied of their original characteristics and the 
exercise in popular participation seemed destined lo have exhausted its potential.
The demise of the CPs within Bolognese political culture appeared to be confirmed
45 The ‘lista di apparentamento’ was a fore-runner of the ‘legge maggoritaria’ or (’legge 
truffa’ as it was called by its opponents) and it allowed parties presenting separate lists 
in administrative elections to pool their votes and win a greater number of seats than 
would otherwise have been possible. This system almost invariably worked in favour of 
the DC and the government parties, but was abolished together with the ‘legge 
maggoritaria’ after the elections of 1953. For a fuller discussion of this election and that 
of 1956 see chapter live, p.lSo.
44 La Lotta. 5th March, 1954.
128
when in the same- year as the PCI conference on local government, the consiglio 
comunale heard a Communist administrator speak openly about the lack of 
communication between the administration and the administered, curiously choosing to 
ignore, or forgetting the informal consultative organisations which his party had 
encouraged so enthusiastically at the end of the 1940s.47 48
Dozza himself returned to the theme of the consulte when in the debate before the 
division of the city into quartieri he stated
’in different Italian cities there exist various types of consulte popolari which 
cover the serious gap in our local public life, they have assumed different names 
according to the various political origins of the initiatives but they are all equally 
useful...some prefects have even gone as far as reporting them in official circulars to 
the police so that these dangerous movements can be surveilled.’43
Dozza’s speech seemed to imply that the CPs were a new phenomenon and not 
something which had already seen ten years of activity in Bologna. Yet such 
collective amnesia in regard to the first consulte did not mean that the ideas for a 
more fully collective participation in civic life had disappeared. As the debates on the 
future development of the Emilian capital revealed, in their preoccupation with the 
need for an active bilateral relationship between civil society and the local state and 
the stress on territorial autonomy and identity, the experience of the local CLNs and 
the consulte popolari had left a lasting impression on Bologna’s municipal psyche.
47 Ceccarelli cit. p.27.
48 Due Torri. 1957, p.17.
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4. The City. Urban Planning and the Proposals for Decentralisation up to 1960.
(il The Urban Plans.
A Bolognese administrator complained in 1955 that,
’Perhaps with a little more courage, rather than ruining the city, a lew 
generous spaces would have enriched it with a wider perspective, with light (and) 
more life, holding off that opaque provincialism which continued to predominate in 
too many of its parts.’49
The administrator was the Communist assessore Renaio Cenerini and his comments 
were directed against the general town plan (PRO) which was to form the basis of the 
‘new Bologna’.
A critique of the monocentric conception of the city which Cenerini described was 
implicit in an earlier plan developed and coordinated by Marconi which was produced 
shortly before the town planning order of 1942 i l 150)50 came into force. Marconi’s 
scheme was not simply limited to the city but was intended to assume the 
characteristics of an inter-urban plan which would encompass the territorial limits of 
Casalecchio di Reno in the extreme west and San Lazzaro di Savenna in the east.51
This ‘polycenlric’ model of Bologna was by-passed in the first town plan (il piano di 
ricostruzione) by an even older scheme which had been elaborated between 1936 and 
1938 when the idea of the ‘greater Bologna’ was the sine qua non of fascist urban
49 R. Cenerini, ‘Lo sviluppo urbanistico di Bologna’ Emilia. No.l, 1955, p.264.
50 The Town Planning law which remained in force until the 1980s in Italy.
51 E. Avidi, ‘Il dibattilo sulla grande Bologna’ in P P D’AUorre (Ed) Bologna: Cilia e 
territorio tra ‘800 e ‘900. Franco Angeli, Milan, 1923.
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planning. Subsequent amendments were made in 1944 and 1945 to take account of 
the wartime damage, but the plan which was unveiled at a public exhibition organised 
by the CLN shortly after the Liberation was substantially the blueprint approved by 
the deposed regime. The planning commission reaffirmed the grandiose vision which 
had accompanied the original PRG when in October 1945 it described Bologna città 
futura:
’We believe that Bologna should be a great city of commercial traffic and 
tourism and an industrial city at the same time.’52 53
Less than three years later, the reconstruction plan was approved on the 16th January, 
1948 by ministerial decree. The piano di ricostruzione (PR)52 detailed the zones 
which were destined for demolition and reconstruction as well as the new parts of the 
city which were to be assigned as service zones outside the perimeter of the urbanised 
area. The plan had a five year time-table but its terms of reference had to be in 
accordance with the 1942 legislation described above, later amended by a ministerial 
decree of 1951.54
So urgent was the task of reconstruction that little thought appeared to have been 
given to sanctioning an urban plan which privileged the centralising obsessions of the 
fascist authorities. Although there was vague talk of a popular referendum on the PR 
in 1945, the planning process essentially remained confined to the technical offices of 
the comune and the desks of the relevant assessori. a situation which Dozza belatedly 
criticised in 1950,
’The administrative town planning instruments must cease to be a secret for the
52 Cited in Fregna cit. p.83
53 The piano di ricostruzione effectively formed part of the piano regolatore generale, but 
because of the ‘emergency’ nature of its provisions, the PR received government approval 
before the city 'structure plan’ which was approved by the city council in 1955, and by 
the Ministry of Public Works in 1958.
54 Decree No. 1042, 27th October 1951.
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initiated few so that they become known to the vast masses, participating consciously 
in municipal activity.’55
Something of that participatory initiative could be seen in the work of the ex-partisan 
brigades on the level of the quartieri (see above) where- a certain fusion was created 
between the reconstructive spirit of the CLNs and the town planning culture. But as 
Fregna notes, after 1945 no major innovations in the concept of town planning were 
developed in the period immediately following the twenty years of dictatorship,
’It would not appear legitimate to recognise in the urbanist experience of the 
immediate post-war period a real...movement away from the methodological 
elaborations of the second half of the 1930s and the directions contained within the 
law of 1942’56
The traditionalist nature of the plan was revealed in its conceptualisation of the 
centripetal function of the city centre, while nothing was conceded to the elements of 
decentralisation contained in the earlier Marconi plan, or to outline proposals for the 
inclusion of a politica dei send zi (a plan for service provision;.57
The continuity between pre and post Liberation administrations was at least 
stylistically disrupted by the administrative/publie dialogue which Dozza attempted to 
establish via exhibitions and public, meetings on the town planning scheme in 1945 and 
1946. However it would be wrong to interpret these initiatives as any form of ‘joint 
planning’ since although the commie was keen to provide information about the new
55 G. Dozza Bologna - Rivista del Comune. 1950.
56 Fregna cit. p.83.
57 The leading authority on post-war town planning in Bologna has described the piano 
di ricostruzione as being ‘subordinant to a private vision of urban development’ while the 
political apparatus ‘accepted unconsciously the hegemony of speculative capital’ which 
in turn led to a ‘congested and service-less city.’ G. Campos Venuti, ‘L’urbanistica 
riformista a Bologna dalla ricostruzione all’espansione’ in W. Tega (Ed» Storia illustrata 
di Bologna 5/V. N.E.A., Milan 1990, pp.81-82.
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scheme, it was much less prepared to solicit the public’s opinion on whether the 
proposals should be implemented. A separate but connected preoccupation of the 
giunta with regard to the PR did however address the deficiencies of the original 
fascist plan on the ‘classist’ division of the city which the pre-war developments had 
done much to exacerbate.58
This was reflected in the authority’s opposition to the construction of ghettoes of 
working class housing in the new quartieri.
’We certainly do not envisage the city divided into quartieri with special 
characteristics, we certainly do not imagine that the best thing is to create entire 
neighbourhoods for workers and heavy industry. We do not want, through the pretext 
of housing, recreational clubs, nurseries, welfare provision and so on, to make it 
possible to in some enslave these workers to this same industry.’59
In 1948 the repairs of wartime damage were advanced enough to permit the first 
assault on building the area outlined in the civic reconstruction plan. As we saw in 
chapter one, Bologna had not been exempted from the economic downturn which had 
afflicted the whole of the peninsular, and post-war austerity re-launched the problems 
of housing and urban space in ever more urgent terms.60
The ‘Fanfani Plan’ was the government’s response to the crisis and it envisaged a 
seven year programme of public works (subsequently renewed in 1956) which came
58 D’Attorre, P.P. Bologna: Città e Territorio cit. An example of such ‘working-class 
ghettoes’ constructed during the twenty years of fascism are the ‘railway suburbs’ of 
Bolognina and San Donato to the north and north-east of the city.
59 Commissione per lo studio del piano di ricostruitone. Relazione, October 1945, p.3 
also in D’Attorre cit, Citta e Territorio p.38.
“ In the winter of 1946-7 unemployment in Bologna rose to over 100,000, but began to 
fall gradually in the months ahead. Particularly badly hit were the industrial and 
agricultural sectors of the economy. Ventura cit. p .6 l. Unemployment in Italy as a whole 
had risen from 1,654,872 in 1946 to 2,142,474 in 1948.
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into executive force in February 1949.61 62 One of the most significant features of this 
provision was the institution of the autonomous housing authority INA-Casa (Istituto 
Nazionale Abitazione^ whose original scope as well as building affordable rented 
accomodation was to combat unemployment through large public investments in the 
construction and building materials industry.67
The labour movement responded to the government's initiative with one of its own in 
1949 the ‘Plan for Labour’ in which the themes of building and public works were 
advanced as a Keynesian solution to the problems of economic slump and the business 
cycle. The CGIL plan, in contrast to Fanfani, laid strong emphasis on worker 
participation in the new projects, and it was against the background of these dual 
offensives that two tendencies emerged in the discussions over the implementation of 
the first stage of the PR in Bologna. However it was the dominant modernist and 
‘professionalist’ vision rather than the trade union organic, ‘collectivist’ view which 
imposed itself through a diffuse realisation of projects, theories and research on the 
underlying solutions to urban planning.
The problem for the planners centred on the effects of urban growth which had begun 
to have a profound impact on Bologna since the early 1950s when migration into the 
city during the decade 1951-1961 increased the city’s population by half.63 The 
proportionate impact of this demographic growth in Bologna was second only to Turin 
although the geographic and social origins of the immigrant population represented 
less of a cultural contrast.64 *
61 Ceccarelli cit. p.47. Ginsborg oil. p.247, see above.
62 Ginsborg, ibid.
63 The population of Bologna increased in this period from 340,000 to 445,000 but the 
greater part of this expansion occurred in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Source: 
Comune di Bologna, Annuario statistico 1936.
64 On intra-regional immigration info Bologna in the post war period see Capecchi.
‘Classe operaia e cultura borghese’ cit. pp. 159-283. See also Campos Venuti,
‘L’urbanistica riformista a Bologna...’, cit. p.o4.
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This demographic surge gave rise to an intense period of building activity both public 
and private in the 1950s, much of it undertaken by the growing number of cooperative 
construction firms, the most importarli being the Cooperativa per la costruzione e la 
risanamento di case per lavoratori.65
Important though the work of INA-Casa was in providing low-cost mass housing, it 
was not sufficient to meet the demand generated by the urban migration which was 
inundating every major northern Italian city and a sister agency, the Istituto autonomo 
case popolari (IACP) was created to bridge the gap. This semi-autonomous state 
agency operated throughout the country, constructing and managing residential 
properties itself but accepting building contracts and referals from local authorities and 
local voluntary and charitable associations.”6
The INA-Casa ‘village’ of the Due Madonne for example, was an example of a 
spacious and well-planned ‘new build* community which combined traditional and 
modem dwellings in an eclectic mix of apartments and which preserved a ‘human 
scale’ by limiting the height of the tower blocks to six stories. The generous 
provision of light and space which the inhabitants of the Due Madonne inhabitants 
enjoyed was not a feature of later popular housing projects such as the ‘Barca’ 
development where the architectural design of the new quartieri reflected the 
economic constraints imposed by the central housing authority rather than the local 
styles and traditions of housing in the province.67
The IACP extended the urban continuum of the city but also opened it up lo forestieri 
(strangers) who were obliged to found their own communities amid the concrete and 
pastel-coloured plaster of the peripheral estates. The idea of integrating the arriviste
65 Cooperativa per la costruzione e la risanamento di case per lavoratori, 90 anniversario 
della fondazione 1884-1974, Bologna, 1974.
66 Such charitable associations were almost exclusively Catholic.
67 On post-war housing design and the impact of changing land use on the outlying 
districts of Bologna see P. Guidicini i Ed) 1 segni del sociale. Ipotesi su Bologna 
periferica minore. Franco Angeli, Milan, 1980.
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population with the indigenous Bolognese was not contemplated by the planners of the 
first PRG (1955),68 and hence the fears expressed by Dozza and the Christian 
Democrats surrounding the creation of a new ghetto culture seemed well founded.
A typical example of the ‘first wave’ of peripheral development was the Uccellino 
neighbourhood in the locality of San Ruffillo which was considered the jewel in the 
crown of the IACP and constituted the third phase of Francesco Santini’s mass 
housing project on the south-eastern periphery of the city. Santini was the leader of 
the Emilian old-guard of rationalist architects arid was the chief designer of the 
‘villagio della rivoluzione*69. For the Ucellino project Santini adopted a scheme 
which was more open and less hurried and which represented a return to the 
architectural pre-occupations of the IACP in the inter-war period.70
Nevertheless projects such as Saritini’s were all characterised by the isolation of the 
new neighbourhoods from the established residential community. This was a policy 
which the comune sanctioned in its piano di ricostruzione by assigning virtually all of 
the bomb damaged zones in the centre to commercial and high-cost private residential 
use.71
68 The plan received final approval from the Ministry of Public Works in 195S. For a 
discussion of the 195S PRG in relation to the PEEP programme (piano per l’edilizia 
economica e popolare - public housing plan) see below, chapter seven, part three.
69 The ‘villagio della rivoluzione’ was built between 1936 and 193$ to commemorate the 
fascist ‘revolution’ of 1922 in the small suburban town of Borgo Panigaie at the north­
western end of the via Emilia. See S.Zagnoni. Bologna Moderna 1S60-19S0. Bologna, 
1984 pp. 140-143; Bologna - Rivista del Comune. Nov-Dee 1936; Various authors. 
Housing in Europa. Bologna 1978, cited in Ceccarelli cit. p.48.
70 On the inter-war history of the IACP see A. Grassi, ‘Realizzazione dello IACP di 
Bologna’ in Edilizia Popolare. No. 11, 1956 pp. 15-21 and IACP 1906-1956. Bologna, 
1956.
71 28% of buildings in the centre were partially destroyed by the war and 16% were 
totally destroyed. This meant that nearly one quarter of the ‘centro storico’ was included 
in plans for redevelopment but only a small proportion of that area was assigned for 
‘public housing*. Campos Venuti cit. p.81.

The argument which Dozza and his colleagues repeatedly used in their public speeches 
and in the election programmes of the ‘Due Torri’ (PCI) and PSI in 1946 and 1951 
was that the pressing homelessness problem compounded by the influx of immigrants 
from the rural hinterland required a rapid solution through decentred mass housing 
schemes. These pragmatic considerations outweighed the political fears which the 
Communists shared of the creation of a class divided city. Significantly the small 
scale developments of via di Barbiano and via delle Scaline in the predominantly 
middle-class hill districts to the south of Bologna were not the high-density low-cost 
settlements which were spreading like a ‘machia d’olio’ (oil stain) across the norlhen 
pianura.
Here the new developments were more harmoniously integrated into the rural-urban 
fabric leading some critics of the PR to conclude that two planning agendas existed, 
one for the workers’ suburbs of the plains and another for the ‘exiusive’ well-to-do 
districts of the colli and the historic centre. The suspicion was that Dozza’s support 
for the politics of alliance was undermining the Socialists’ and Communists’ 
commitment to the elimination of class inequality, a charge which was to reoccur in 
the 1970s over a similar spatial conflict.71
(iil The Integration of INA-Casa into the Piano Regolatore.
The first real attempt to introduce a spatial element into new housing and which 
perceived such projects as communities in embryo furnished with their own internal 
cohesion and provided with a satisfactory quota of sendees, was achieved only after 
the experience of the first seven years of INA-Casa. As has been shown, in the 
immediate post-war period the planners had been unresponsive to the idea of 
neighbourhood unity (unita di vicinalo! which was first theorised by the Assocazione 
per l’architettura organica (APO') and spread through its journal edited by Bruno 
Zeri - Metron. 72
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72 The ‘PEEP-Centro Storico’ project, see P.L. Cervellali and R. Scannavini Bologna: 
Politica e metodologia del restauro nei centri storici. Il Mulino, Bologna, 1973.
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Metron signified an important break with the nionumentalisrn and the anonymity of 
pre-war architecture and its contributors were much inspired by the example of 
Roosevelt's Garden Cities, which was also to feature strongly in new town planning in 
Britain after the war.73
The theme of the 'urban village’ was taken up on a national level and featured in the 
later version of the Fanfani Plan thus providing the concept with the legitimacy 
necessary for its incorporation into the planning designs of INA-Casa and the 
IACP.74 An emphasis on the spatial element of urban development combined with a 
new accent on the administrative dimension of urban planning.
‘The choice of areas for the INA-Casa quartieri should bear in mind the need to 
organicrMy integrate the new residential nuclei into the strategy of the comune’s 
regulatory plan and according to the future development anticipated by it.’75
However, such a recommendation could only remain an aspiration while the more 
prosaic considerations of cost and economies of scale dominated the planning agenda. 
Because INA-Casa would only build where a room could be constructed for 400,000 
lire or less, there were strong constraints on the location of the new quartieri which 
outweighed other aesthetic concerns.
These considerations notwithstanding, the INA-Casa planners urged the comune to 
create as much social diversity in the neighbourhood as possible, once again reflecting 
an organicist conception of the new estates which was now becoming universal in 
planning circles. However it was less easy to appreciate how the institute’s request for
73 Ceccarelli cit. p.49.
74 On the post-war activities of INA-Casa see Urbanistica , No. 17 special supplement on 
the 4th INU (Istituto Nazionale di Urbanistica - National Town Planning Institute) 
Conference, Venice 1952; R. Caligara, ‘1 complessi INA-Casa’, in Centro Sociale. Nos 
30-31, pp.48n ; G. Astegno, ‘Nuovi quartieri in Italia’, Urbanistica. No.7, 1951; 
Ceccarelli ibid.
15 Ludovico Quaroni, ‘La politica del quartiere', Urbanistica. No.22, 1958.
‘naturalism’ and ‘continuity’ with the countryside could be achieved given the 
constraints on building materials and the decision to construct the new suburbs on the 
pianura which offered no natural relief and required intensive artificial ‘greening*.
This lack of variety in the new residential landscapes was compensated for by the 
creation of different types of building, heights, finishes and interiors76 which could 
be seen in the two neighbourhoods built by INA-Casa in Bologna in the first seven 
years of its activity. The quartieri were located at the extreme western and eastern 
poles of the city. The western development was built around the existing nucleus of 
the flourishing market town of Borgo Panigaie which was home to the Ducati 
electronics factory, while the other site, the Due Madonne bounded the city limits and 
the parish of San Donato.
The intention was to create two neighbourhoods which were intended to look 
‘disordered’ or at least which would be free of the fearful symmetry of fascist 
architecture epitomised in the neo-brutalist monolithisrn of the EUR district in Rome. 
The co-ordinating architect, Franco Santini wanted the area to feel like an ‘unravelled 
jersey’ and through its use of materials and visible structures the sensation was akin to 
that of a ‘local late neorealism.’77
However although the ‘social dimension’ of town planning emerged more strongly in 
the early 1940s, ‘technical solutions’ continued to dominate the criteria for 
dimensioning and zoning new urban areas. But as the tenor of the debate on urbanism 
changed in the 1950s, with new concerns being expressed at the dehumanising effects 
of the metropolitanization of the peripheries of the large cities,78 the argument 
returned to the need to create an urban environment a misura di uomo (on a human
138
76 L. Benevolo, ‘La progettazione del quartiere INA-Casa’, Centro Sociale. Nos.30-31, 
1960, p.64.
77 Ceccarelli cit. p.51.
78 This debate featured strongly in the pages of Adriano Olivetti’s journal Communita and 
in the Catholic architectural and town planning journal Chiesa e quartiere.
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scale).
The ‘Borgo Panigaie’ and ‘Due Madonne' plans were innovative in anticipating some 
of the criticisms of metropolitan expansion in their recognition that the future 
development of the new quartieri lay in the ‘creation of organic residential 
communities. ,19
The reorganization of the new urban centres envisaged by the PRG would be for 
communities of 8 to 12,000 inhabitants made up of ‘units primarily served by centres 
of life, with a school, nursery, playing field and comprising in addition elements of 
the primary unit such as the church, an eventual high school, a market, a local council 
office (registry of births, deaths and marriages, municipal police station etc), a 
welfare centre with a clinic, a post-office, bank, workshops etc.,?0
This elaboration represented an advance on many other town plans of the time 
although it continued to view the urban entity in demographic rather than spatial 
terms, and therefore saw new urban growth as an addition to the pre-existing city 
structure instead of as a potentially integral pari of the urban fabric.
It was only by the mid-1950s that the full implications of ‘professionalist’ led planning 
appeared to be realized by the ruling Communist group on the council. In the first 
years after the war, Dozza and his colleagues seemed almost to accept the town 
planning function of the local authority as ‘ideologically neutral’ and significantly 
chose not to purge the architects’ department of the connine of its leading figures, 
even permitting the original town planning team which drew up the first PR under the 
auspices of the fascist authorities in 1942 to continue their work (see above).
However with the publication of the new comprehensive town plan of 1955, the 7980
79 Relation of the Giunta Municipale on the Piano Regolatore Generale of the City of 
Bologna, 12th October, 1955.
80 Ibid, p.37
Part of the Due Madonne Ina-Casa complex.
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Olivetti’s utopia was a hybrid of socialism and evangelism which called for a moral 
reorganisation and a reunification of what he considered to be the false dichotomy 
between ethics and culture through the recomposition of the political order of the 
community. Society would thus be refounded on strong solidaristic links based on the 
‘communion’ and not by the sum of individual goods to which each person aspires.
’The comune cannot transform itself into a community because the city lacks 
the social ethic and a communal goal.’8'
In this respect Olivetti’s conception of the city is very close to the ethical formulae of 
the early Chicago School of urban sociology and particularly the work of Wirth and 
Park.*5
Olivetti believed that the city would return to being the site of the utopia and 
reconstitute itself as a ‘polis’ in counter-opposition to the slate which had overthrown 
the harmony and the authenticity of human relations, and he argued that the 
responsibility for creating this new urban civilisation belonged to tire town planners 
themselves.84 56
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84 Olivetti, A. Intervention at the 4th Congress of (he INU, Genoa, 14th October 1954; 
Dozza Archive, Istituto Gramsci, Bologna.
85 See in particular Wirth, L. ‘Urbanism as a Way of Life, American Journal of 
Sociology. July, 1938 and On Cities and Social Life. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 111. 1964, and Park, R.E. ‘The City: Suggestions for the Investigation of Human 
Behaviour’, in Park, Bureess &  Mackenzie, The Cilv. University of Chicago Press, 
1925.
86 This theme was importantly echoed in the Dossetti inspired Libro Bianco of the 
Bologna DC which Olivetti anticipated in his speech: ‘...when a city constructs without 
the help of the state something important, it is on (lie way to becoming a community. 
The objective conditions for this passage are:
1) The existence of an optimum organizsatile life space;
2) An adequate organizational structure;
3) The organization of the city in (full) view of its manifestations... This action is not in 
our power...But the responsibility for the work is ours and this we cannot avoid.’ 
Adriano Olivetti, intervention at the 4 th Congress of INU, cit.
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But by this time (in the mid-1950s) town planning in all of its manifestations was 
becoming the main site of local political confrontation over the form of development 
which the city should adopt. Bologna along with many other Italian cities was 
becoming aware of the growing contradictions of rapid urbanisation, and politicians 
from all sides were accepting that solutions to the emerging problems could not 
simply be technical or managerial in nature.
The social and political characteristics of the new urban and suburban settlements 
could no longer be considered as an ‘extension’ of the city ex ante. New problems 
and concerns were articulated which called for an institutional response from the city 
authorities. As the first party to examine in a detailed way the problems and 
opportunities of the new Bologna, the following chapter examines how the Christian 
Democrats forced the issue of ‘decentralisation’ in its several aspects onto the political 
agenda during the administrative election campaign of 1956.
f
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C H A P T E R  T H R E E
The Battle for Bologna: the ‘Libro Bianco su Bologna’ and the Administrative 
Elections of 1956.
1. The ‘Libro Bianco’ as a Critique of Modernity.
'VO
The publication of the Libro Bianco su Bologna by the Christian Democrats in May of 
1956, not only marked a ‘svolta’ in the internal politics of llie Bolognese party, it was 
also the first time a comprehensive decentralist vision of urban life was used to launch 
an Italian election campaign. The authors of the Libro Bianco. Achille Ardigò and 
Beniamino Andreatta, formidable intellectuals in their own right, were the maximum 
expression of this desire to change the DC’s traditional relationship with the left, but 
their intellectual and ideological formation was strongly influenced by the leader of 
the ‘left opposition’ in the Christian Democrat party, Giuseppe Dossetti who was 
chosen as capolista (first choice candidate) for Llie DC for the Bologna 1956 
elections.1 Il
Dossetti’s acceptance of the candidature for mayor of Bologna marked the end of four 
years of political exile when in 1951 he announced his resignation from the directorate 
of the DC and in the following year gave up his parliamentary seat. Dossetti’s 
withdrawal from politics reflected the failure of the ‘Dosseltian programme’ which his 
followers tried to sustain on a national level both inside and outside the DC. The pre­
occupation of Dossetti and his followers, which continued after the debates in the
1 Boiardi,F. Dossetti e la crisi politica dei cattolici. Parenti, Florence, 1956 p.224n; 
Tesini, M. Oltre la città rossa. L’alternativa mancata di Dossetti a Bologna ( 1956-58),
Il Mulino, Bologna, 1986; the latter written by a DC member of Bologna council, inspite 
of its rather combative title, offers a comprehensive and mostly judicious account of the 
electoral battle of 1956 from a ‘neo-Dossellian’ perspective.
Constituent Assembly, was with elaborating the ideas contained in Article 5 of the 
Constitution which related to the ‘rights and obligations of citizens’.
This synthesis between theory and concrete politics, which became modified 
subsequently, owed much to the personalismo comunitario of the French theologians 
Emmanuel Mounier and more specifically Jacques Maritain. Writing during the 
depression of the thirties, Maritain and Mounier saw the decadence of Western 
civilisation as irreversible and believed that the failure of ‘real socialism’ 
demonstrated that salvation could only come from a ‘new humanism’.2 But since as 
Maritain argued, the Kingdom of God cannot exist in time and space, the notion of a 
temporal Christian city could only be an intermediate concept which had as its 
spiritual end the celestial city of God.
The transient nature of this project was reflected in Maritain’s description of the 
imaginary temporal Christian city,
’..this city is a society not of men in permanent residence but of men in 
transit. ’3
The idea of the urban community providing a celestial transmission belt for the 
faithful, while at the same time offering the real possibility of ‘here and now’ justice 
and democracy, was thoroughly consistent with Dossetti’s unique version of Christian 
Democracy. His acceptance of the candidature foi the elections of 1956 was from this 
perspective, proof of his commitment to unite the two strands of the Olivettian 
dialectic; the individualism of ‘communion’ with the collectivism of ‘solidarity’ 
(solidarismo).4
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2 Ceccarelli cit. p.58.
3 Maritain, J. Humanisme intégrale. Problemes temporals et spirituels d’une nouvelle 
chrétienté. Aubier, Paris, 1936. p. 174.
4 For the background to Dossetti’s candidature see, Nicola Matteucci, ‘Dossetti a 
Bologna’, Il Mulino. Vol.V, No.6, 1956, pp.382-390.
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The city was defined in the Libro Bianco as ‘a moral organism* and lor the Christian 
Democrats, good government signified most importantly an understanding of the 
social and personal needs of the citizens who in their complexity constituted the 
‘social urban life* of the city. This organieir.m was posed mainly in terms of an 
ethical or solidaristic concept and as such could be considered above or apart from the 
wider concept of faith which assumed the prior existence of a homogeneous religious 
community.
As the visionary Adriano Olivetti insisted, ‘the projection of the organic community 
necessitated the use of scientific instruments in order to understand the reality (of 
urban society).’ What was required, he argued, was social research based on the 
great social investigations (national and local censuses etc.) and more generally an 
appreciation of the help which sociology could provide for the understanding of urban 
problems.5
However the originators of the Libro Bianco did not consider sociology or urban 
studies to be sufficient in itself because a ‘complete knowledge of social needs’ will 
only be arrived at when the citizens are made the medium of their own feelings and 
inspirations.
‘The traditional channels through which the single citizen or groups, agencies and 
associations make contact with authority (i.e. - the communal administration)... (the 
means available for) the expression of need, of deprivation, requests for help, 
proposals...are outdated.’6
5 On the contradictory positions taken by the Italian left with respect to emerging 
sociological critiques of urban society, see L. Albo &  V. Rieser, ‘La sinistra e lo 
sviluppo della sociologia’ in Problemi del socialismo. No.3 1962, cited in Ceccarelli, cit. 
p.65. As we saw in the preceding chapter, Olivetti’s influence among architects and 
town-planners was not only limited to the Catholic world.
6 Libro Bianco cit, p.10
The ‘Libro Biancisti’ hoped that an affirmation of autonomy would translate itself into 
self-government which was defined as a collaboration between citizens and 
administration and which would be articulated in turn according to, ‘real and organic 
de facto relations existing between citizens themselves.’
The social characteristics of these organic relations were expressed in the following 
terms,
‘Every inhabitant recognises himself not only as a citizen of a whole urban corpus, or 
a whole city, which is more vast than the group of houses or apartments in which his 
neighbours live...this minor organisation of the city, even when its not the intention of 
the constructors (as we in fact see in the case of the ‘villagi’ of INA-Casa) acquire 
characteristics which are not just physical, urbanistic, or (defined by) the economic 
and professional groups that prevail in the zone, but which also give rise to relations 
between people, whether spontaneous (human relations), or as a function of specific 
responsibilities, interests and concrete links (social relations).7
The argument sustained in the pages of the Libro Bianco was that the bureaucratic 
boundaries of the city and the administrative districts did not correspond necessarily to 
the neighbourhood boundaries within which people identified themselves in their local 
surroundings. Apart from the boundaries detailed in the PRG there also existed (as 
alternatives) the parish boundaries, the school catchment boundaries, the territorial 
boundaries of the Ente Comunale di Assistenza (EGA)8, and the census and taxation 
zones. These were all different expressions of the territorial division of the city, but a 
real delimitation of the urban totality, the authors argued, should be done with the 
guidance of the inhabitants of the various residential zones.
The comune for its part should give a ‘form to the new suburban neighbourhoods 
resulting from the spontaneous building expansion guaranteeing comfort, services and
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7 Ibid, p.32
8 Municipal Relief Board
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an environment similar to that found in small comuni. ,q The inference was that a 
large part of greater Bologna had developed without any planning and the need 
therefore was to provide an organic unity which had been lost in the rush towards 
mass housing.
‘Organic unity’ for the Christian Democrats meant a type of micro-stratification in 
which all social groups would find themselves represented and where the conditions 
for a harmonious rapport between classes could be best facilitated. The new quartieri 
showed an alarming tendency towards becoming a working class fringe, ‘una cintura 
operaia’ around the affluent ‘traditional city.’ In this context it was difficult to 
distinguish Communist preoccupations from those of the DC.9 10 1
‘The comune should prevent the formation of great building complexes destined for 
the same social class, but favour where possible the integration of working class 
dwellings with those of the ceto medio ... (and) therefore (create) not a city of 
satellites, but (one) of organic neighbourhoods.’"
2. The Christian Democrat Campaign.
After many years of aggressive open conflict between the majority 
Socialist/Communist administration and the Christian Democrat-led opposition, the 
actual conduct of the election campaign of lc,56 appeared to herald a changing 
atmosphere of political competition. The divisions still existed between the historic 
rivals, but the campaigning language was more muled, more conciliatory and often 
couched in terms of universal concerns, inspite of the strong personal attacks that
Dozza in particular launched against his prof-agonist.
, e t
9 Ibid, p.33
10 See above.
11 Ibid.
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The conduci of the DC electoral campaign centred on a circuit of so-called ‘flying 
election meetings’ (comizi volanti) in the course of which ‘il pubblico domande e 
Dossetti risponde’ (the public asks and Dossetti replies) discussions attempted to make 
real contact with the city’s population, in the new peripheral neighbourhoods as well 
as the centre.12 Through the questions which were proposed by the local residents 
the arguments were elaborated by the DC which were to form part of their electoral 
campaign. In these encounters Dossetti reiterated the themes of family, community 
and organic identity as the cornerstones of civil society.13
The problem of ‘belonging’ and of identification with the organic community was a 
theme which greatly pre-occupied those who draughted the Libro Bianco, and as they 
sought to encourage a better and more extensive dialogue between administrator and 
administered their concerns also embraced the tenuous status of the ‘new Bolognese’ 
whose impact on the traditional life of Bologna had been limited as we have seen by 
their location fuori le murft (beyond the walls).
12 As well as travelling election platforms, the DC used motorised squads of priests 
known as ‘flying monks' (frali volanti) who would dash between electoral districts on 
motorseooters in order to chase up Catholic voters; Nazario S. Onofri, Le due anime di 
Cardinale Lercaro. Capelli Editore, Bologna, 1987 discusses the use of the ‘frati volanti’ 
in the 1956 elections in chapter three. Dozza was especially indignant about this practice 
claimimg that the direct intervention of the Church in local politics represented a type of 
neo-legationism, a return to pontifical interference in the administrative life of the city. 
He reminded the Catholics that the Laterali Treaties while providing guarantees for the 
Church and ‘Catholic Action’ required them to ‘follow their activities outside any party 
organisation’; this they were patently not doing. G.Dozza ‘Le elezioni amministrative a 
Bologna: linee per un programma’, Press Conference held at the Teatro "La Ribalta" 
17th March, 1956, in Giuseppe Dozza: 11 buon governo e la rinascita della città. 1945- 
1966. Cappelli Editore, 1987, pp.289-301.
13 L’Avvenire d’Italia. lSlh, 19ih & 21 si Aprii, 1955; Il Resto del Carlino. 19th & 
21st Aprii, 1956 in the Dozza Archive, cartons 233 &  25ó; Ceccarelli cit. p.90.
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’We need to point to the dangers of the growing numbers of citizens who are 
ignoring or no longer living in direct daily contact with the most authentic and most 
immediate roots of the Bolognese tradition, in the soul of Bologna: particularly 
exposed to this danger are, on the one hand, the inhabitants of the new quartieri who 
have nothing more in common with the traditional character of the city, and on the 
other, the new citizens who provide the city with its organic renewal which can no 
longer be entrusted to the natural increase in births and must depend on immigration 
from outside.’14
This ‘lonely crowd’ as Ceccarelli refers to it, mingles with the equally solitary crowd 
of the immigrants who have recently arrived in an unknown city peopled with 
unknown faces.15 As the suburbs extended themselves into the arable plains of the 
province, the constituent features of the Bologna storica had started to disappear 
warned the authors of the Libro Bianco.
This perceived erosion of the communal spirit of the city was described also in terms 
of the ‘renouncement of night-life’ and was seen in the decline in the use of the city 
centre for recreation and culture, leaving the new inhabitants dependent on local 
entertainments ‘...the cinema thus became the only grand form of recreation and 
passive relaxation for the masses..together with television, or a bar, or a parish 
association or party branch when these provided social activities.’16
There was no reflection on the material and practical obstacles to maintaining this 
communal spirit when public transport services ceased to run to the suburbs after
14 II Libro Bianco, cit.
15 The authors draw attention to the significance of the publication in Bologna in 1956 
of a translation of David Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd as La folla solitaria, by il Mulino 
which would almost certainly have been read by one of the authors of the Libro Bianco. 
Achille Ardigo who was and remains a professor of sociology at the University of 
Bologna.
16 Ceccarelli cit. p.61
dark and disposable income for the worldng class even during the initial period of 
economic recovery in the mid-1950s could not often stretch to outside entertainment.
Television in the Italy of these years was still an unaffordable luxury for the vast 
majority of workers and therefore it had to be watched in the local bar or parish hall. 
Although the Communist Party considered the RAI to be an instrument of DC 
propaganda, the Party was aware that its supporters would not want to be excluded 
from the new media and some case del popolo even bought sets of their own. The 
collective provision of entertainment was seen as important for the establishment of 
the kind of organic solidarity which the Libro Bianco urged, and it is interesting that 
these years witnessed a large growth in the number of cinema parocchiali, particularly 
in the church halls of the new urban periphery.17
The need to integrate the new urban migrants was considered especially vital for the 
‘marginal’ population of the periphery which included the unemployed, the 
underemployed and the socially vulnerable. The comune, Dossetti argued, should 
actively intervene to ensure that newly arrived families were provided with everything 
from residence certificates to books on the history of Bologna.18
This goal could only be achieved, it was argued, by multiplying and giving more 
significance to these small communities or ‘urban villages’ (as they might be 
tentatively described). Indeed it was only through llie realization of the social and
150
17 Stephen Gundle in his forthcoming bool: Italy Transformed: The Communist Party. 
Cultural Change and Modernization 1944-1989 . assigns little significance to the number 
of parish cinemas built in the 1950s, arguing that the construction of a small sala 
cinematografica was almost a standard design feature lor new churches and it is doubtful 
that the films shown had any direct propaganda purpose other than not promoting the 
morally questionable (and extremely popular!) Hollywood features of the period. See also 
his ‘L’Americanizzazione del quotidiano. Televisione e consumismo nell’Italia degli anni 
Cinquanta’ in Quaderni Storici. Voi.XXI (1986), No.62, pp.5ól-94.
18 Libro Bianco, cit. p.5ó.
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cultural potential of these small organic communities that the ‘common civic good’ 
could be reached. A no lesser authority than Pope Pius XI had argued similarly in the 
Quadropesi mo Anno
’to entrust to a greater and higher society that which can be done by lesser and 
smaller communities...is a grave injury (to) and dislocation of the proper social 
order.’19
The Church had been traditionally cautious in its endorsement of the social 
interventionist role of the Italian national and local stale, although the inclusion of the 
Lateran Treaties into the constitution of the Republic and the closer relationship of the 
governing Christian Democrat party with the Vatican had helped to soften the 
Church’s attitudes to modern ‘welfarism’ and to the participation of Catholics in civic 
and political life. In Bologna this rapprochment between Catholics and the civil 
authorities even appeared to extend to supporting the welfare functions of the 
socialist/communist administration provided that such social policy was not overtly 
motivated by ideological ambitions.
This sentiment was evident in the programmatic statement of the DC in the 1956 
municipal election campaign
’The Christian Democrat party will assume...the social and urban 
reorganisation of the city...fin the interests of)..the organic neighbourhoods. On the 
basis of this proposal the DC is committed to...the provision of...administrative 
choices through a real and systematic consultation with the people...Starting from the 
most out-lying (neighbourhoods) and with those whose needs and potential appear to 
be the greatest, the comune will promote periodic meetings and the coordination of 
authorities, associations, institutions, and private citizens who are willing to and 
capable of collaborating fin this task) with the aim of better understanding and 
improving the life of their neighbourhood...This cooperation will be organised through
19 Maritain, J. Humanisme intégrale, cit.
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the consulte di quartiere for particular problems and sectors (and these will be sited) 
next to the. offices and centres of the decentred municipality.vW
Initially though, these participatory bodies would be used for the collection and 
processing of information for the large-scale survey of Bolognese society which was 
proposed in the introduction to the Libro Bianco by Ardigò who lamented the lack of 
a sociological profile of the city and its inhabitants.
The Christian Democrats’ conception of ‘intermediate communities’ communita 
intermedia, was a Catholic model of society and stale which had a Sturzian authority 
and therefore represented an important legacy from the ‘Partito Popolare’ for the 
DC.20 1 By accepting that there existed an autonomous society outside the Christian 
family, the communion of the Church and the Kingdom Of God, the Catholic 
authorities appeared to be arriving at some of the same pre-occupations as Rerum 
Novarum in acknowledging the importance of secular social institutions.
3. The Communist Campaign.
The PCI presented itself in the same elections with a programme which also included 
the theme of the quartieri. But the emphasis was quite different from that of the DC. 
For the ’communitarian theme’, the PCI substituted the notion of the ‘efficient 
administration’ and the quartiere was seen above all in terms of its spatial coherence 
and in the possibility it gave for urban management which favoured, ‘the development 
of the city through the systematisation of the quartieri which in part exist already, and 
in part have still to spring up, (and) is indicated by the types of construction - more or
20 Libro Bianco, cit. pp. 12-13.
21 Don Sturzo was the historic leader o f the Partito Popolare and was forced into exile 
during the years of fascism. He returned to help form the new Christian Democratic 
Party and was a major influence on its post-war leader and long-serving Italian prime 
minister, Alcide De Gasperi. See also Ginsborg cit. p. 170.
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less intensive - which are adapted to the surrounding environment.’22
This was a technocratic solution to the organisation of life in the new periphery which 
had none of the moral precepts of the DC programme; instead it promised a thorough 
overhall of the municipal apparatus aimed at making the representative organs more 
responsive to the needs of the new (and traditional) communities,
‘We maintain that there is a need to move towards a reform of the municipal 
organisation, at least in the cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants - and therefore 
also in Bologna - which would allow the formation of administrative district nuclei in 
which the citizens can find a more direct and immediate reponse to their needs 
and...local problems.’23
The manifesto also drew upon (he experience of the consulte popolari as an example 
of the tradition of popular representation which the Communists intended to revive. A 
spectre of civic participation which had returned once again to haunt the council 
chamber.24
As a concrete expression of their intention, the PCI proposed to develop the idea of 
the case del popolo, the traditional institution of the Italian workers’ movement which 
was to form the model for the new civic nuclei of the quartiere, the case del cittadino,
‘The administration is thinking...of establishing case del cittadino where social 
activities would be combined: social services, a clinic, a library, a meeting room and 
the municipal office. ’2S
22 Vota Due Torri - Yota PCI. Programme for the administrative elections of 1956, 
P-33.
23 Ibid. p.48.
24 See section three, chapter two above.
25 Vota Due Toni, cit. p.33.
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For its part the PSI saw the quartieri as a simple hypothesis for the rationalisation of 
urban development, without specifying the future character which the party expected 
them to take.26
The socialists’ decisive intervention in the field of administrative reform had to wait 
until 1960 when the first proposals for the re-organisation of the city were unveiled by 
the giunta. The history of decentralised planning in the 1950s was therefore 
unquestionably dominated by the Catholic social reformers who in the absence of 
executive administrative power set out to find their own solutions to the ‘moral crisis’ 
of metropolitan Bologna
4. The Defeat of Dossetti and the New Politics of the Comune.
On the 27th May, 1956, Giuseppe Dossetti was soundly defeated by Giuseppe Dozza 
who was overwelmingly confirmed as the Bolognese’s first choice for mayor.27 This 
defeat however also represented something of a victory for the electoral campaign 
which Dossetti and his colleagues fought, in that the 10 seats won by the DC in 1951
26 Programme of the PSI for the administrative elections of 1956 for the list ‘Alleanza 
Socialista. ’
27 In fact Dozza received 31,007 first preference votes, the highest number than at 
any time during his political career. However, in 1951 Dozza polled a greater share of 
the total Due Terri votes - 32.6% compared to the 25.54*5 share he obtained in 1956. 
Dossetti received 13,144 first preferences which accounted for less than 18% of the total 
DC vote.
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were increased to 17 in 1956.28
Table. 7. Results of the 1956 Administrative Elections for the 
Comune di Bologna.
Party Votes % Seats
PCI 121,404 45.80 29
PSI 19,957 7.40 4
PSDI 23,253 8.65 5
PLI 12,496 4.65 2
MSI-PNM 13,622 5.07 3
PR-PRI 3,487 1.30 0
DC 74,501 27.73 ,71
Source: Tesini, p.194.
The Christian Democrat minority while it intended to ‘oppose’ the giunta.
28 See Table 7. Although the PCI polled 40.4% of the vote in 1951, (5% less than 
in 1956), in 1956 their number of seats actually went down from 33 to 29. This was 
because under the ‘lista di apparentamento’ the left were able to combine with the tiny 
citizens’ party ‘Il Gigante’ to produce a slim 2,000 vote majority. The PCI and its allies 
polled 48.79% of the vote and obtained a total of 40 seats while the government parties 
with 47.86% of the vote won only 19 seals because of the refusal of the MSI to join the 
‘pact’. As Tesini perhaps a little hopefully observes, ‘..it would in fact have been 
enough for the left to have polled a few hundred less votes and there to have been slightly 
less support for the MSI, and Bologna would never have become the symbolic city of 
Western communism,’ Tesini, cit. p. 178.
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demonstrated early on that it had no intention of adopting ‘senseless’ blocking tactics 
to score spurious political points. If anything, an atmosphere of reconciliation was in 
the air at the first council meeting on the budget proposals for 1957, the need for the 
provision of ‘adequate social means’ as Dozza pul it for the rapidly growing city 
brought with it the need for an increase in the council’s expenditure of several billion 
lire. The proposal to extend the authority’s scope for social intervention was 
supported at least in principle in the Libro Bianco.
Intervening in the debate on the budget, Dossetti remarked
that the way in which the electoral campaign had been conducted meant that it was
legitimate to expect more from this administration, and rhetorically demanded,
Ts it really illegitimate, too pretentious, our fundamental conviction? Does it 
fail to take into account the objective limits and does it not offer a reasoned 
comparison with the situations of other local authorities? I do not believe that this can 
be true, (and) if it was true I should have to say that to a certain extent the 
reponsibility could not be ours alone, in a sense the blame would be primarily yours, 
because it was you (Communists) who first gave rise to, not only in us, but in all the 
people, the hope, the conviction, the expectation that this administration was an 
administration in a league of its own...which in a certain sense was above the limits, 
the conditions, the mediocrity in which the others had to move.’29
Dozza’s response was typically peremptory,
‘The forecasts of Professor Dossetti are completely out of touch with reality.’30
Dossetti could not easily respond to the accusation of being ‘unworldly’, he was rarely 
predisposed to talk in public, did not read newspapers, or listen to the radio and was 
prone on his occasional interventions in the council chamber to proclaim his faith and
29 Meeting of the consiglio comunale. ACC 4th March, 1957.
30 Ibid.
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cite the scriptures to his bewildered fellow councillors.
’I believe in the angels, I believe in the intervention of the Madonna, I believe 
in the saints, I believe in all these things which belong to the invisible world which 
operates on the visible world, I believe above all you see, beyond this poor human 
word (mine the weakest and most fallible of all), in the Word of God. ’31 32
It was therefore with little surprise that the city council of Bologna heard the mayor 
read Dossetti’s letter of resignation on the 29lh March, 1958.M With the 
announcement of his intention to take-up the priesthood, Dossetti signalled his last exit 
from politics. At the same lime the left opposition inside the Christian Democratic 
Party lost perhaps the only figure who might have been capable of steering the party 
towards a more socially committed politics.33 But the debate which Dossetti 
stimulated and developed in those two years was, as Renato Zangheri admitted, vital 
to the entire process of decentralisation which the Communists were to begin in the 
1960s.34 Paradoxically therefore, ‘Don Pippo’s’ vision was to have much more of an 
impact on the socialcommunist leadership than among his Church’s sceptical and 
conservative flock.35
Arbizzani claimed that Dossetti’s principal merit lay in his attempt to give a ‘respiro 
nuovo’ to Christian Democracy in Bologna. He was also a ‘galantuomo’ who 
conducted himself with great civility throughout the contest. His preoccupation with
31 Giuseppe Dossetti, speech to the consiglio comunale. ACC 12th November 1956.
32 The letter read, ‘...I would not have thought of leaving it (the council), but for one 
sole reason, which has now come to pass; the Lord through His Church has deigned to 
call me to the priesthood of Christ and the religious life. 1 therefore must beg you to 
place before the council my absolute and definite resignation.’ Tesini, cit. p.269.
33 Baget-Bozzo cit.
34 Interview, Rome, February 1991.
35 Interview with Renato Zangheri, Rome, March 1991.
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new and better forms of urban life and the proposals for the quartieri (as we see in the 
next chapter) were to win widespread political consensus across the political divide. 
But essentially Dossetti remained in Arbizzani’s words, ‘an isolated prophet', and his 
convincing defeat by Giuseppe Dozza facilitated a conservative backlash within the 
Bologna DC which left little space for the communitarian pluralism which Dossetti 
espoused.36
Although Dossetti’s followers such as Achille Ardigò continued to elaborate the 
former’s vision of organic renewal in urban society, it would be fair to say that hopes 
for a radical Catholic alternative to the PCI’s practice of ‘buon governo’ ended with 
the political career of Dossetti himself.
But ‘1956’ was also significant for the younger generation of reformers inside the PCI 
who were inspired by Togliatti’s call for a redefinition of the ‘via italiana al 
socialismo’ at the Sth Congress of the PCI to launch their own campaign for 
organisational change within the Emilian federations. The elections of 1956 
overshadowed the process of transformation which was underway in the Bologna 
federation and which was to finally result in the PCI’s regional conference in 1959.
In the following chapter we consider the political background to this conference and 
explain why it was to have a profound importance for the future orientation of 
Communist strategy in Emilia-Romagna.
36 Luigi Arbizzani, Giuseppe Dozza a un’anno della morte. Comune di Bologna.
Documenti del Comune, 9, 1975, p. 132.
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C H A P T E R  F O U R
Bad Godesberg on the Reno? The 1959 Regional Conference, the Amendola 
‘Revolution’ and Political Renewal in the Bologna Federation of the PCI.
1. Introduction.
In 1945, the then leader of the German SPD, Kurt Schumacher wrote an article whicli 
had important implications for the post-war strategy of West German social 
democracy.
‘Socialism is no longer the affair of the working class in the old narrow sense of the 
term. It is the program for workers, farmers, craftsmen, tradesmen, and the 
intellectual occupations. They all stand in unbridgeable opposition to the real 
exploiting groups. That the groups in the so-called middle classes (Mittelstand) were 
taken in by the propaganda of the reactionaries, the militarists, and the Nazis, and 
thereby let themselves be used as political cannon fodder against democracy and 
socialism, led to national and economic catastrophe...The German future depends on 
what kind of position the middle classes take with respect to Social Democracy.’1
If we compare this text to the transcript of the speech which Togliatti delivered to the 
Reggio Communists in 19462, it is clear that the leaders of two of Europe’s greatest 
workers’ parties both agreed that without the support of the lower middle classes, 
socialists would remain marginalised and excluded from the democratic governments 
of post-war Europe. At the Sth parly congress of the PCI, Togliatti returned to the 
same theme when he declared:
1 .Schumacher, K. Turmwaechler der Demokratie. 2. pp.39n cited in Douglas Chalmers, 
The Social Democratic Party in Germany, Yale University Press, London, 1964, p.210.
2 See helow, chapter two, part one.
‘...with the increasingly crushing control of these (monopolistic) groups over the 
distribution and circulation of goods, as well as on the productive process itself, new 
social strata find themselves objectively interested in a socialist transformation of our 
society.
In the cities as in the countryside, millions of small and medium producers see their 
enterprises’ margins of independence and security reduced. They see them becoming 
subsidiary to the monopolies, geared to serve the end of maximizing the monopolies’ 
profits. There is, therefore, an objective concordance of aims developing between the 
working class, which is struggling to defeat capitalism, and no longer only the 
proletarian and semiproletarian masses, but the bulk of agrarian smallholders and an 
important part of the productive middle strata in the cities...’3 4
The new bases of class solidarity were to be found in the cities (rather than in the 
depopulating countryside) where according lo Togliatti, ‘a very numerous population 
of craftsmen’ exists that finds itself in direct conflict with a capitalist system which 
forces it into a marginal economic existence.'1 This community of exploited wage- 
earners and small producers had an objective interest in joining with the Communist 
Party in the struggle against monopoly capitalism.
‘Fighting an effective battle against the great private monopolies is in the immediate 
interests, and in fact today it is a necessity, lor the defence of the productive activity
1 6 0
3 Paimiro Togliatti, La dichiarazione programmatica e le Tesi dd l’VIII Congresso del 
PCI. Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1957, p.39 cited in Stephen Heilman, ‘The PCI’s Alliance 
Strategy and the Case of the Middle Classes’ in Elackrner, D. Sc Tarrow, S. Communism 
in Italy and France. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975, p.373. The emphasis 
is Heilman’s.
4 Paimiro Togliatti, report to the Sth Congress of the Italian Communist Party, Rome, 
December, 1956 in Gruppi, L. (Ed), Teoria e politica della via italiana al socialismo. 
Editori Riuniti, Rome, 1979, p.94.
of the major part of the population, including vast groups of small and medium-sized 
producers whose income is being squeezed in favour of the great monopolies because 
of the way they dominate the market. ’5
It may seem paradoxical that the Bad Godesberg programme which the SPD approved 
in 1959, with its strong emphasis on anti-communism and its support for the NATO 
alliance and free market capitalism, might in any way be compared with the ‘via 
italiana al socialismo’ which Togliatti launched in 1956. Indeed some years after, 
L’Unità expressly denounced, ‘the fallacy of projecting certain ideas about an Italian 
Bad Godesberg within the PCI’ at a lime when the Communist Party had embarked on 
Berlinguer’s eventful journey towards ‘historic compromise’.6
Yet although official condemnations of ‘revisionist’ socialist parties might seem to 
confirm the Marxist-Leninist purity of the ‘Italian road’, often such condemnations 
were aimed at re-assuring grass roots militants that the party leadership’s increasingly 
pluri-class and reformist strategy was merely a conjunctural expedient. Communist 
ideologues such as Lombardo Radice could not accept that social democracy had 
anything to teach the PCI, and once again L’Unità warned its readers of the dangers 
of the egalitarian mirage of northern social democracy:
‘There is no doubt that English and Scandinavian social democracy have limited 
themselves to a good, and even at times excellent social-welfarist administration 
within the capitalist system, without ever posing the question of how to overcome 
it.’(Original emphasis)7
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5 Ibid. p.97.
6 L’Unità 6th March, 1977. Cited in Dominio.? Fisichella, Quel
Giano Bifronte del PCI. Da Togliatti a Berlinguer e oltre, Editoriale Nuova, Milan, 
1979, p.58.
7 Ibid. L’Unità. Sth September, 1978.
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Radice was expressing a view still widely held among the PCI hierarchy that the Party 
must not fall into the old socialist reformist trap of mistaking means for ends. 
Communists knew that the local administrations and institutions they controlled were 
only to be compared to trenches in the ‘war of position’ between the revolutionary 
class and bourgeois capitalist society. Indeed, Luigi Longo speeking to the Central 
Committee of the PCI in his capacity as vice-secretary in October, 1956 insisted on 
the need to maintain ‘proletarian direction’ even if this is, ‘always accompanied by the 
concept of alliance with other social groups.’8 Sassoon describes this concept as, ‘the 
direction of the proletariat within a coalition of classes which in turn exercises a 
political direction over the rest of society.’ This is essentially what Longo understood 
by Marx’s projection of a ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ where the working class 
seeks to exercise hegemony over its allies and dictatorship over its opponents.9
The Communists’ attitude towards ‘bourgeois democracy’ therefore remained an 
ambiguous one, because although Longo and Togliatti accepted that the Constitution 
should be respected (especially by the Christian Democrats who refused to apply it in 
many areas of government), parliamentary democracy remained an instrument of 
bourgeois domination and it had to be radically transformed if a truly socialist society 
was to prevail.
Opportunities did exist, however, for a socialist transformation of the Italian state if 
the devolutionary provisions of the Constitution were fully implemented. The 
experience of Communist administration in the ‘red belt’ had pointed the way to a 
territorial advance towards socialism, initially through the comuni and the provincie 
and later, it was to be hoped, via the regions. Togliatti described the nature of the 
task which faced Communist administrators,
* Luigi Loneo. Documenti per 1*Vili Congresso del PCI - Un partito più forte e 
rinnovato. Supplement to Voce Comunista. No.38, October 4th, 1956, p.7 cited in 
Donald Sassoon, The Strategy of the Italian Communist Party. From the Resistance to 
the Historic Compromise. Frances Pinter, London, 1981, p.l25._
9 Ibid.
163
‘...the struggle for local autonomy is in the first place a struggle for the thorough 
transformation of the administrative and political order and for the implementation of 
the Constitution.’10 Political decentralisation represented a need to, ‘bring closer the 
people to the exercise of power by creating a democratic system territorially 
articulated in three instances: the municipality, the province and the region.’11
But perhaps the real significance of the Communist leadership’s enthusiasm for local 
autonomy was that it demonstrated a serious concern with the functioning of local 
democratic institutions. In the past there had been a tendency to down-grade the 
significance of administrative reform, because if the Communist Party was certain of 
one thing, it was that a future socialist state would have nothing in common with the 
bourgeois-democratic structures it replaced. After 1956, with the perils of the total 
centralisation of political power only too obvious, Togliatti reasoned that local 
autonomy could provide an effective counterweight to overwieldy state bureaucracies, 
particularly in the area of economic planning.12
Considered in the round, there was much in the 1956 version of the ‘via italiana’ to 
encourage the Amendolan reform wing of the Party, particularly in the area of class 
alliances and local government. Equally there was more than a grain of comfort for 
the conservative fraction of the PCI who noted Togliatti’s reluctance to condemn llie 
CPSU for the ‘fatti di Ungheria’ and the unequivocal privileging of ‘socialist 
democracy’ (flawed though it might be) over even the most advanced form of 
bourgeois democracy.
Paolo Spriano’s masterly evaluation of the Sth Congress highlights this very major and 
persistent tension of the ‘Italian road.’
10 ‘Mozione politica’ to the 8th Congress of the PCI, cited in Sassoon, The Strategy of 
the Italian Communist Party, cit. p. 135.
11 ‘Elementi per una dichiarazione programmatica del Partilo Comunista Italiano’, 8th 
Congress of the PCI, in Sassoon, ibid. The translation is Sassoon’s.
12 Ibid, p.135.
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‘...if one thinks of the 8th Congress of the PCI, but also of the congresses which 
came after, the 9th, 10th, 11th; one sees a much more articulate discourse on Italian 
society emerge. It abandons the schema which was born out of the Lyons Theses1* 
in which the northern workers and the southern peasants were seen as the only motive 
force of the revolution, and we start to hear talk of the productive middle class as an 
active element and an essential component for a democratic and socialist development. 
Certain fundamental choices on freedom and democracy are re-articulated, and the 
argument on the state also moves forward, albeit timidly. However, Togliatti himself 
continued to claim that in its complexity, inspite of its degenerations, the nature and 
the substance of the Soviet regime remained more democratic than capitalist regimes, 
even those, which as we said, possessed a bourgeois-democratic parliamentary 
system.’13 4
13 The ‘Lyons Theses’ refers to the revolutionary programme which Antonio Gramsci 
advocated at the 1926 Congress of the PCI.
14 Paolo Spriano, Intervista sulla storia del PCI. Laterza, Bari, 1978, pp.215-21ó.
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2. The ascendancy of the ‘Amendola faction’ and organisational renewal in the 
Bologna Federation of the PCI.
The Bad Godesberg metaphor also provides a key to understanding the process of 
transformation at work in the Emilian economy and within the leadership of Emilia’s 
ruling political class in the years immediately following the Sth Congress. In Italy 
even more than in Germany, these years witnessed an unprecedented growth in 
industrial production, accompanied at the same time by rising real incomes for the 
producer/employee categories who constituted the target constituency of the SPD and 
PCI. In Emilia-Romagna the active pursuit of the productive middle class, which had 
been an aspiration in 1946, now became an urgent requirement as the former skilled 
workers of the region’s manufacturing industries (and particularly those in the 
Bologna industrial zone) increasingly established themselves as independent 
businesses.15
The younger leaders in the Bologna federation such as Guido Fanti, the vice-secretary, 
and a group of administrators who included Renato Zangheri and Pier Luigi Cervellati 
recognised that the PCI had to adapt to the changing socio-economic climate or fall 
victim to it. The ‘old-guard’ of intransigent leaders had been seriously weakened by 
the ‘re-organisations’ of the late 1940s and 1950s. The demotion of the Stalinist MP, 
Giovanni Botonelli, to the mayorship of Marzabolto was symbolic of the waning 
influence of the hard-liners who had also been dealt a major blow by D’Alema’s
15 This process can be seen as early as 1950, when of six metal mechanical firms 
surveyed. 9.5% of those made redundant established themselves as artisans or small 
industrialists. This Figure compares with 43.72% who returned to industrial production 
as employees and 11.7% who found work in other non-productive employment. Elia 
Barbiani & Giorgio Conti, Politiqnes urbaines et luttes sociales ì  Bologne. 
Reconstruction, ‘miracle italien’ et crise dans une municipalité rouge. Vol.l. Centre de 
Sociologie Urbaine, Paris. 1980, p.22. See also chapter seven, part one below.
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purge of the Modena federation leadership.16
The 1959 conference was lo be the occasion for the final assault on the remaining 
enclaves of ‘maximalist’ support among the grass-rools party sections and cells. In 
this sense, Fanti and his colleagues were embarking on a no less ambitious 
reformation of the socialist movement than Erich Ollenhauer’s exorcism of the ghost 
of Trier.
Although the 1956 administrative elections could be considered as an endorsement of 
the soctalcommunist ‘buon governo’ of the previous decade, there was a feeling 
particularly among the ‘new wave’ of administrators that the PCI was squandering its 
political opportunities by merely ‘occupying’ the citadels of local power. The local 
PCI hierarchy continued to emphasise the importance of local government as a 
symbolic instrument of struggle against the repressive controls of the prefect and the 
interior ministry; but the institution itself remained, in Anderlini’s judgement, a 
passive sounding block for the social forces which made up the Parly’s political 
constituency.17 The comune could only ever be a static symbol of the Party’s 
popular legitimacy, and never the agent of revolutionary change. As Gramsci 
insisted, the role of ‘eondotliere’ was reserved exclusively for the parly itself.18 
However, inside the Bologna federation a new generation of activists had begun to 
challenge the conservative position taken by the war-time leadership of the party both 
inside and outside of local government.
16 See Amyot, The Italian Communist Party, cit.
17 Anderlini, Terra rossa, cit. p.86.
18 Gramsci wrote, ‘The modern prince, the myth-prince, cannot be a real person, a 
concrete individual. It can only be an organism, a complex element of society in which 
a collective will, which has already been recognised and has to some extent exerted itself 
in action, begins to talee concrete form. History has already provided for this organism, 
and it is the political parly...’ Antonio Gramsci, ‘The Modern Prince’ in Selections from 
the Prison Notebooks, cit. p. 129.
167
The period which preceded the Sth Congress was characterised by an internal debate 
on the definition to be given to the ‘via italiana’. But just as the ‘svolta di Salerno’ 
was seen by many activists as a regrettable but necessary detour from the 
revolutionary path, the ‘via Italiana’ appeared as a vague and malleable concept which 
could lend itself to many interpretations, as Fanti recalled:
‘...the interpretation which Togliatti gave to progressive democracy...was always seen 
in an instrumental way, that is - we accept the rules of democracy in expectation of 
the arrival of the ‘hour X’, waiting for a certain moment when there would be a 
general rebellion which would change everything, and so on. And we all grew up in 
this...it was the prevailing political culture...and so we arrived at 1956 when this 
element came out in the open.19
The element which Fanti was referring to was the intransigent old-guard of senior 
Communist militants who had never accepted the need for a separate Italian road to 
socialism and who were strongly committed to the ‘partito guido’ role of the CPSU. 
This group was particularly well represented on the direzione of the Part as Fanti 
expalined,
‘The leaders of the Party were prepared to accept the Togliattian line, but with this 
profound conviction that it was only a tactical, instrumental moment...’20
The reasoning behind this explicit admission of the ‘doppiezza’ strategy lay in the 
bourgeois nature of the post-war Constitution:
‘The Constitution was a democratic constitution, (but) bourgeois-democratic not 
progressive-democratic, and it was both valid and not valid; and the rupture between 
the new generation and the old leaders...Colombi, Bonazzi and the rest...occurred on 
this terrain, that is on the recognition to be given to the Constitution as a means of
19 Interview with Guido Fanti, cit.
20 Ibid.
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advance towards socialism and above all...on the choice of the Italian road to 
socialism.’21
But as Fanti admitted, the stand-off conflict between the ‘instrumentalists’ and those 
who supported the idea of a peaceful and progressive transition to socialism was to 
become manifest some time after the Stir Congress.
‘...this rupture...only had an outcome in 1959 when...also with Amendola’s 
encouragement, those of us who thought in this way and who were backing the 
Togliattian line to the hilt - with the Italian, democratic road etc...we decided to join 
the political battle...and to have an open fight inside tire parly.’
Anderlini argues that the Bologna federation needed to have Togliatti, Amendola, the 
regional conference of 1959 and an entire change in leadership to realise 1956 on a 
local level.22 In some ways this is true, but Anderlini seems to imply a collusion 
between Togliatti and the reformist right in llie Party over tire imposition of llie ‘via 
italiana’ on the doublers and the opponents.
As Fanti explains, Togliatti and the other members of the direzione were far from 
convinced of the desirability of such a conference,
‘...there was a period of preparation which saw on the one hand a group from 
Bologna and Emilia, on the other there was an open conflict among the national 
leadership of the Party. There was a group which wanted to have nothing to do with 
it, and they were particularly supported by the leaders with an Emilian background on 
the direzione. Colombi, Romagnoli...who threw obstacles in its way, who were 
against it, naturally with the additional support of all the older leaders, D’Onofri and 
so on...There was a whole group of the direzione of the Parly who were against, it
21 Ibid.
22 Anderlini. Terra rossa, cit. p.88
and they pushed and pressured Togliatti so that he would not agree to it...How did we 
respond? How did we operate? We agreed with Amendola to form a working group 
to develop a set of discussion documents. We would then hold a regional conference 
(which) would be prepared on the basis of the political theses...we submitted these for 
discussion at the regional committee and at the end we arrived at the regional 
conference. ’
Some indication of the importance which the national leadership attached to the 
proposals for a regional conference can be gained from the confrontation at ‘Botteghe 
Oscure’23 which Fanti again describes:
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‘Before this...there was a dramatic moment because these theses were discussed here 
in Rome in an open confrontation between those who said okay and those who said 
it’s not okay. And we just succeeded in winning a majority with the open support of 
Amendola in particular, and with Togliatti's position which was favourable but with 
some reservations of his own...and in fact
Togliatti came to participate in this conference in ‘59 still uncertain as to which 
position to take. ’
The proceedings then took on an even more surprising turn when 
Amendola realised that it would be impossible for a young vice-secretary to open a 
conference of this scale and importance because the task should have naturally fallen 
to the actual secretary of the Bologna federation, Celso Ghini. Ghini had been chosen 
to replace Enrico Bonazzi in 1955 when the latter was called to Rome, and it was 
clear that Ghini’s appointment was a compromise since the new secretary was not 
associated with either the reformist or the conservative wing of the Party.24 
Amendola’s solution to this political impasse was to include Ghini in a delegation of 
PCI officials bound for the Peoples’ Republic of China so that Fanti would be able to
23 The Rome headquarters of the PCI directorate.
24 Bonazzi was predictably a fierce opponent of Fanti’s initiative and tried to block the 
proposals in the secretariat.
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open the conference as acting secretary and convenor.25
The significance of the regional conference was not lost on the government 
authorities, and the prefect described it as, ‘...a  political event of such primary 
importance...that the participation of the leader of the party, Paimiro Togliatti, is 
expected.’26 The prefect also speculated on the organisational role played by Guido 
yanti whose choice as opening speaker, ‘...provides proof of a process of rejuvenation 
and renewal in the provincial organisation which has been under way for some 
months.’27
However, enthusiasm for the ‘via italiana’ was not so evident among rank-and-file 
Communists, and the prefect claimed to have evidence that the, ‘...reluctance on the 
part of the Bolognese workers to accept the basic theses of the Sth Congress of the 
PCI, which constituted the basic formula of the ‘via italiana al socialismo’ - that is the 
policy of widening the alliance with the middle class and Hie abandonment of 
revolution as a means of conquering power - is more profound titan it might seem.’28
If the revolutionary workers were dismayed at the reformist tone of the discussion 
document, they would have been heartened to see the figures of Arturo Colombi, 
Mauro Scoccimarro, Enrico Bonazzi and Luciano Romagnoli on the platform. And 
while these implacable defenders of Marxism-Leninism may not have been able to 
prevent the conference from taking place, they were certainly determined to make 
their influence felt on the proceedings, although significantly none of them look part
25 The prefecture seemed convinced that Ghini was actually being groomed by Amendola 
for the job of regional secretary of the PCI, but it seems unlikely that if Ghini really did 
have Amendola’s trust he would have been sent to China at such a crucial moment. M.I. 
(Gab) 51/12010/14, report of the prefect, 26th June, 1959.
26 M.I. (Gab) 51/12010/14, report of the prelect, 2$th May, 1959.
27 Ibid.
28 M.I. (Gabi 51/12010/14, report of the prelect, 26th June, 1959.
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in the debate.
Only Giorgio Amendola (other than Togliatti) spoke on behalf of the direzione and the 
prefect was in no doubt that the entire project was authored by Amendola himself:
‘the choice of Bologna as the venue for the conference...seems to respond to llie 
precise needs of an organised plan which aims to place under the control of his 
[Amendola’s] current (made up of new recruits, in contrast to the leaders of the old 
guard) - all the apparatus of the Emilian federations so as to move to the gradual 
conquest of all the other regions with the support of the substantial means at the 
disposal of the parly in the region and because of the prestige which ‘Emilia rossa’ 
enjoys among Italian Communists.'29
Further evidence for the ‘Amendolan revolution' inside the Bologna federation could 
be found in the,
‘...removal of Enrico Bonazzi, relegated to a job of little importance in the national 
secretariat of the parly, and in the departure of his most truthful collaborators: Lino 
Montanari, Giacomo Masi, Giuseppe Dalla, Arvedo Forni, Claudio Melloni...’30
The calling of the regional conference could be considered the most decisive episode 
in the Amendolan manoeuvre which was also aimed at,
‘...influencing in a determinate way the proceedings of the provincial conferences 
scheduled for next autumn and in this way consolidating the hegemony of the 
Amendolan current in Emilia.’31
The most important recruit to the Amendolan position, if not to the Amendolan camp,
29 M.I. (Gab) 51/12010/14, report of the prefect, 30th June, 1959.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
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was Giuseppe Dozza who, according to the information available to the prefecture, 
had developed a thesis for the alliance of the working class with the urban middle 
class and contadini which insisted on the necessity of abandoning the positions which 
the Party had previously followed.32 3 Dozza had also insisted that the Party should be 
more active in the defense of local government and called for the formation of a 
‘regional constituent assembly’ which would operate as a centre for the coordination 
of democratic struggle.
Fanti confirmed the importance of Dozza’s position for the process of renewal in the 
federation:
‘...Dozza had the political wisdom to understand that he should come down on our 
side, even though we criticised the (previous) policy towards the local 
authorities...Inspite of this he took up a position which supported us. And what was 
our criticism? That it was no longer enough to have a healthy and proper 
administration of local government, but that in the face of economic development and 
the new problems posed by the social and economic transformations which were 
taking place, it was necessary that local authorities...assumed a policy of economic 
development and did not just restrict themselves to the management of existing 
resources.’35
This meant sacrificing the sacred principle of the balanced budget which had been the 
guiding light of the socialcommunist administration and a source of considerable 
personal pride for Dozza throughout the 1950s.
‘We said no,’ Fanti recalled, ‘we need to move towards the realisation of a policy 
...of economic development and to go into deficit in order to finance all the work that 
is necessary to provide the infrastructure and support for this economic development
32 Ibid.
33 Interview with Guido Fanti, cit.
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which was already growing by leaps and bounds.’74
Fanti described this as a clash between two different conceptions of administration, 
but it was also a clash between two different value systems, between a post-Bad 
Godesberg acceptance of the need for planning ami markets, and a steadfast refusal on 
the part of the older cadres to cooperate in any way with capitalist forms of 
production whether they be small businesses or monopolies.
However, jhnti admitted that Dozza was not an enthusiast for all the reforms the 
‘young Turks’ were proposing, although llie reformers had won the crucial support of 
Paolo Fortunati who was the PCI’s most respected authority on local government 
finance and still a member of the giunta. In addition there were more recent members 
of the giunta such as Umbro Lorenzini who together with the Socialists constituted a 
sizeable group in support of Fanli’s proposals.* 345
But the reformers did not restrict their campaign to the Bologna federation, which had 
already fallen partially under their control. The real struggle for reform had to be 
fought-out among the great ‘Resistance’ provinces such as Reggio Emilia which 
remained under the control the ‘attendisti’. In order to short-circuit the federations’ 
leadership, 28,000 copies of the ‘discussion theses’ were printed and distributed in 
advance to local cadres. On the basis of this document, debates on the proposals were 
held in local section and cell meetings throughout the region.36 The scene was being 
set for a renewal of the party machinery in the classic Leninist tradition; the victims 
of the new party apparatus would be forced to support their own ideological and 
organisational eclipse. As the delegates to the first regional conference of llie PCI 
gathered in Bologna’s town hall, the 445,000 Communists they represented were
è
34 Ibid. See chapter five for a full analysis of the policy of deficit finance in Bologna in 
the 1960s.
35 Ibid.
36 In addition, 15,000 copies were printed as a special supplement lo La Lotta for the 
Bologna membership.
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being prepared for a ‘svolta’ which was to have almost as great an impact on the 
Emilian Party as that of 1944.37 38
3. The Conferenza regionale and the Communists’ response to the ‘economic miracle’ 
and urban growth.
D’Attorre has referred to the 1959 regional conference of the PCI in Emilia-Romagna 
as. ‘the point of departure, for the whole party,’ which led to the, ‘...acceptance of 
the full Togliattian programme of ‘structural reform’ and the ‘Italian road to 
socialism' which until then had barely penetrated the body of the party'.3' The 
essential problem with this characterisation is that it suggests that the 1959 conference 
somehow represented a Garibaldian rallying-point on Toglialti’s journey towards a 
socialist Italian nation.
However, the ‘Conferenza regionale* was not a programme of action aimed at 
translating the vague principles of the Sth Congress of the PCI into a concrete set of 
policies. Had the initiative come from the Party Secretary, Togliatti would not have 
been such a sceptical sponsor of the conference. That it became something of a 
manifesto for Communist administrators and reformers in the 1960s was primarily due 
to the energy and convictions of Fanti’s ‘new wave’ of younger activists and to 
Giorgio Amendola’s zeal for ‘rinnovamento.’
The two most important objectives of the architects of the 1959 conference were to 
stimulate a debate on the national and regional changes in the economy, and to 
consider what consequences these new conditions might have for the Communist Party 
and the working class of Emilia-Romagna. The second objective followed from the 
acceptance of the priorities established by the first, essentially it meant that cadres and 
activists who found it impossible to support the ‘nuovi impegni’ outlined in the
37 The national membership at the time stood at 1,789,269.
38 D’Attorre. P.P. I comunisti in Emilia-Romagna, cit. p.18.
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discussion document would be required to play a less directive role in the life of the 
Party and its mass movements.
Signs of resistance were quick to manifest themselves however, and Fanti 
acknowledged that some local leaders in the Bologna federation were opposed to the 
idea of ‘developing specific plans* from the discussion document. In other words the 
‘old-guard’ were giving notice that they intended to ignore the whole exercise.59 
Another criticism was that the provincial strategy recommended for Bologna could not 
be unproblematically applied to a province like Ferrara. Other federations were 
insufficiently prepared for this kind of grass-roots discussion (such as Reggio Emilia 
which was criticised for not explaining the resolutions of the Sth national congress to 
its members with ‘sufficient energy’).39 40 In his measured, diplomatic style, all these 
‘difficulties’ were presented as organisational rather than ideological, but Fanti was to 
return to the political dimension of the conference theses later in his speech.
The fundamental tasks which Fanti set for the Communist movement were consistent 
with the classical Marxian injunction; first analyse the problem and then work to 
overcome it. The conference was reminded of the need to develop a complete 
understanding of the current political situation, both on a national and on a regional 
level. The second objective was to transport the Emilian workers’ movement from its 
position as the regional leader of civil society to a directive role in the national 
struggle for socialism.41
39 Amendola even argued that the preparation for the Emilian conference had become, ‘a 
measure of the concrete renewal of the whole party.’ G. Amendola, Il rinnovamentor cit. 
p. 176.
40 In fact Amendola accused the hard-line federal secretary of the Reggian parly, Onder 
Boni, of openly trying to wreck the preparations for the conference in his federation. 
Ibid, p.177.
41 Guido Fanti, speech to the Regional Conference of the PCI, Bologna, June 1959, in 
Conferenza regionale del PCIT STEB, Bologna, 1959, p.10.
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Fanti’s brief history of the workers’ and peasants’ struggle in the Emilia of the 1940s 
and 1950s recanted the Colombian and Dozzian nostrums of solidarity and sacrifice 
which were to be joined together by the ever extending bonds of class alliance. The 
new members of the ceti medi had been drawn to the party because workers and the 
ceti medi both faced the menace of 'monopoly capital’ which Fanti defined as the 
‘common enemy’.42 Leaving aside the fact that very few of these new members of 
the ceti medi had actually joined the parly, it was not clear precisely what new 
categories of the middle-class, beyond the small farmers, artisans and lower 
professionals (who were already included) these potential adherents were to come 
from.43 4
Fanti made it clear to his opponents in the Emilian parly that accusations of 
‘regionalist provincialism’ could not be sustained because the objective of the 
discussion document was to stimulate an awareness of Emilia’s position in the national 
economy and polity. He criticised the ‘attendisti’ for their own deformed vision of 
the revolutionary process which contented itself with a passive faith in the collapse of 
western capitalism. But the severest criticism was levelled at the Party’s ‘double 
sided’ agrarian reform policy which separated the campaign for the reform of farm 
contracts from that of farming as a whole. This, Fanti argued, had led to an 
abandonment of the .struggle for farm land by the poorer peasantry and had given a 
false impression of socialist and democratic renewal.
However, the transformation in Emilian agriculture had made the problem of social 
and economic relations in the countryside less urgent than the task of successfully 
integrating migrant farmers and their families into the urban community.14 This was 
a point which Togliatti emphasised in his concluding address to the 1959 Regional 
Conference, ‘We must consider ourselves,’ he argued,‘...to be participants in the day- 
to-day drive towards social progress which emanates from every category of
42 Ibid. p .l l .
43 See Table 12.
44 See Tables S, 9 & 10.
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employee, not just from the workers and braccianti, but also from the rural and urban 
ceto medio, from the sharecropper’s son who no longer wants to live in an old farm 
house and moves to the city in search of a new job, from the peasant family who 
come down from the mountains in search of a new quality of life, from the young 
people who are entering professional training college and high school, from the 
women who are struggling for emancipation.’45
But whereas in the 1940s and early 1950s, social progress had been won through the 
mobilisation of the urban and rural labour movements in the defence of rights and 
salaries, the new challenges which faced the Emilian working class, Togliatti argued, 
required a different form of struggle.
‘Economic strikes and all forms of workplace struggle will continue, to be the stimulus 
that they have always been; but at the same time, in today’s situation, we can and we 
must provide a contribution to the development of the country by presenting solutions 
which are not just...increases in our wages and improvements in the number of 
working days for landless labourers, but (solutions) which deal comprehensively with 
the problem of how to organise the economic life of the region and the economic life 
of Italy.’46
45 Paimiro Togliatti, ‘Democrazia e socialismo’ concluding speech to delegates at the 
‘Conferenza regionale del PCI’, Bologna 29th June, 1959 contained in L. Arbizzani (Ed) 
Paimiro Togliatti. Politica nazionale e Emilia rossa. Editori Riuniti, Rome, 1974, 
pp.522-523.
46 Togliatti, ‘Democrazia e socialismo’ cit. p.522.
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Table S. Agricultural activity by type of employment in the Province of Bologna in 
1948 and 1961 as a percentage of all agricultural labour.
District Direct Cultivators Share-croppers Wage-labourers
194S 1961 1948 1961 1948 1961
Mountains 30.2 44.8 61.8 37.5 8.0 17.7
Hills 15.1 20.2 80.0 65.8 4.9 14.0
Plain 29.9 37.8 44.0 40.6 26.1 21.6
Entire province 25.6 35.0 61.0 47.0 13.4 18.0
Source: Barbiani/Conti (Voi.2, p.31)
In a thinly veiled attack on Professor Ardigò, Togliatti tilled at the ‘Christian 
Democrat sociologists’ who believed that the problems associated with the rural 
exodus could be resolved by ‘tertiary' occupations’ which were described by the PCI 
secretary as nothing other than extensions of parasitic forms of economic life.47 
Problems of agricultural production were seen primarily as problems of capitalist 
ownership, but as Table 9 demonstrates, the large estates which existed in the 
immediate post-war period had given way to a mixture of direct cultivation, share- 
cropping (albeit steadily diminishing), and small and medium-sized proprietors 
employing a limited number of wage-labourers. Although capitalist farming continued 
to expand throughout the 1960s, at the start of the decade, commercial agriculture still
47 However, the DC sociologists were right to emphasise the growing importance of the 
tertiary sector in the capoluogo. The 1961 industrial census revealed that 48.1% of all 
firms in the Comune di Bologna were commercial firms, while manufacturing enterprises 
accounted for 33.3% of the total. It was significant that these commercial firms 
employed only 24.3% of the active population and on average employed between 2 and 
3 people. This was precisely the urban middle-class to whom Togliatti was appealing, 
but he seemed to be scorning their means of earning a living. Barbiani & Conti, Voi.I, 
cit. p.115.
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accounted for less than 2 0 %  of the land under cultivation. While in the industrial 
sector the growth in the number of small and medium-sized firms and the emergence 
of a large productive middle class was much more significant in social and economic 
terms than monopoly capitalism.48 But if Fanti’s ‘new wave’ of Communist leaders 
were hoping for a ringing, endorsement of the plans for local economic development 
outlined in the conference discussion theses, they were to be disappointed.
Togliatti insisted that, ‘If one looks only at the local aspects (of the economy), the 
problem will not be resolved. One might obtain a few advantages here and there, but 
at a certain point there is a limit, the limit which is given by the fact that the market 
is dominated by the big monopolistic proprietors. And therefore it is in this direction 
that it is necessary to aim the blow, by demanding limits to the powers of the 
monopolies, the nationalisation of specific industrial monopolies, a control on 
monopolistic activities and other measures which you have indicated.'49
Table 9. Changes in the agrarian structure of the Province of Bologna, 1961-1967.
Labour Form Families Hectares
1961 1967 % 1961 1967 %
à A
Direct cultivators 22,023 21,321 -3 117,751 134,612 +  1
4
Share-croppers 12,556 7,214 -42 157,511 88,450 -45
** The number of employees per industrial manufacturing firm had increased slightly in 
the decade 1951 to 1961, but overall the number of workers per firm had only increased 
by an average of 7.7 in 1951 to 9.3 in 1961 for the Comune di Bologna. While for the 
province as a whole the average number of workers had increased from 5 to 7.3 per firm. 
See Table 9 and chapter five, part one.
49 Togliatti, ‘Democrazia e socialismo’ cit. p.5'23.
1 8 0
Farms using wage- 2,553 3,608 +4 60,443 97,978 +6
labour 1
Source: Rinascita No.47, 1969 in I comunisti in Emilia-Romagna, p.225.
Table 10. Agrarian structure in the province of Bologna according to tenure, 1961- 
1971.
Tenure Farms Land under cultivation
Percentages Percentages
1961 1970 1961 1970
Direct cultivator 50.1 61.2 28.7 41.6
Tenant Farmer 8.9 10.6 6.3 7.5
Capitalist ownership 6.4 9.3 16.7 29.3
Capitalist tenancy 0.4 0.3 1.3 1.2
Share-cropper 34.2 18.6 47.0 20.0
Totals 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: V. Galletti, Bologna non è un’isola rossa. p.S9.
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Table 11. Proportion of unemployed among the active population in the Province of 
Bologna, 1951-1961.
1951 1961
Total active population 355,817 372,307
(of which women=) 102,821 105,212
Unemployed 5S,2S2 46,811
(of which women=) 30,385 23,658
Unemployment rate 16.4% 12.6%
Female unemployment rate 2 9 .0 % 22.5%
Rate of agricultural 
unemployment
- 29.5%
as a % of women workers - 71.8%
Source: tJarburu/cWiti Voi.l, p.lOS.
182
Table 12. Composition of the Bologna Federation of the PCI by occupational category 
as a percentage of total membership, 1954-1977.
National figures are in brackets.
1954 (1959) (1962) 1964 1977
Workers 35.7 (38.5) (39.5) 38.0 37.7
Braccianti 17.5 (16.6) (12.7) 7.2 2.6
Mezzadri 15.8 (11.9) (10.S) 8.3 1.3
Direct
cultivators
3.0 (5.4) (5.6) 2.2 *****
Artisans, small 
traders & entre­
preneurs
5.2 (5-7) (5.2) 8.8 7.9
r "
Professionals, 
white-collar 
employees & 
students
2.5 (2.7) (3.2) 2.2 8.5
Housewives & 
pensioners
20.6 *(18.7) *(22.2) 33.2 39.0
Source: Elaborated from Anderlini, Terra Rossa. p.S3. and L’organizzazione partitica del PCI e della PC. 
p.314.
•Includes ’others’.
In his speech, Giorgio Amendola also focused on the alliance character of anti­
monopolist politics, but unlike Togliatti who emphasised the common goals of both 
classes, Amendola argued that the alliance with the ceti medi could lead to ‘a new 
majority’ which if it was to be effective had to permanent and not tactical. A new, 
more dynamic role must be given to the local authorities and there must be
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organisational changes in the Party and a renewal of the leadership.50 51
The restructuring of capital in the provinces of Emilia was producing new problems 
for the labour movement and Amendola’s principal concern was the ‘disaggregation’ 
of the rural workforce. Large numbers of braccianti had lost their jobs and had no 
chance of finding farm work again, while among the mezzadri there was a ‘process of 
differentiation’ in course which was leading to greater income variation and declining 
class solidarity.31 He argued that the fall in certain categories of membership should 
sound alarm bells and encourage the Party to be more self-critical and to devote more 
attention to the problem.52 53
Amendola stressed that it was no longer sufficient to fight defensive battles against 
arbitrary redundancies, prefectoral interference and government attacks. If 
Communism was to survive as a major force in Uie region in the next decade, the 
struggle had to renew itself and to move on to a new plain. Those who had doubts 
and uncertainties were preventing the Party from forming new alliances and from 
widening its potential body of support in the fight against the political and economic 
monopolies.33
Amendola drew an explicit connection between the Sth PCI Congress and the 1959 
regional conference when he declared that the preparations for the conference had
30 D’Attorre, ‘I comunisti in Emilia-Romagna nel secondo dopoguerra: un’ipotesi di 
lettura’ in I comunisti in Emilia-Romagna, cit. p. 19.
51 For unemployment figures in the province of Bologna between 1951 and 1961 see 
Table 11. As in the 1940s, it was women who suffered from a disproportionately high 
share of unemployment especially in agriculture.
32 Intervention of Giorgio Amendola in Conferenza regionale del PCIT cit. p.108. Table 
8.1 shows the declining importance of rural occupations in the membership of the 
Bologna federation.
53 Ibid, p.109.
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been inspired by a desire to provide a better understanding and implementation of the 
principles outlined in 1956. Eut because the call for renewal had been ignored by 
many federations, it was necessary to stimulate a firesh commitment to the ‘via 
italiana’ and to remove all the obstacles in its way.54
It fell to Giuseppe Dozza to explain what the concrete reality of this ‘nuova politica 
/A  del£alleanze’ would be in the context of Bologna. ‘It is possible,’ he argued, ‘that we 
might pursue our policy within the Chamber of Commerce despite the fact that this is 
run by elements of big capitalism...’ Another problem was the perennial one of the 
behaviour of trade union representatives towards the owners of small and medium 
enterprises. Dozza pointed out that, ‘while the interests of workers should not be 
compromised’ in dealings with artisans, and small and medium-sized industrialists, it 
was important to remember that the 8th Congress had declared that the interests of 
non-monopolist producers must also be respected.55 567
The fragmentation of manufacturing industry which Amendola confessed was having a 
disastrous impact on trade union organisation in Bologna and other parts of Emilia 
meant that the conflict between the interests of labour and the productive middle-class 
was likely to increase rather than diminish.50
But the mediating influence of the PCI and CGIL did not appear to have an 
appreciable impact on the incidence of strikes which actually registered an increase in 
the years after 1959 after a long period of relative calm on the industrial relations 
front.”
54 Ibid, p.112.
55 Intervention of Giuseppe Dozza, in Conferenza regionale del PCIT cit. p. 124.
56 See Table 13 and chapter five, part one.
57 See Table 14.
Table 13. Average number of employees per firm in manufacturing industry in the 
city and province of Bologna, 1951 and 1961.
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City Province
% of employees per firm % of employees per Firm
1951 1961 1951 1961
Food 16.0 17.2 6.7 9.5
Textiles 4.9 9.8 1.5 4.7
Clothing & Footwear 3.1 5.1 2.1 3.5
Wood & Furniture 4.2 4.6 3.2 4.5
Metal mechanical 10.2 11.6 7.5 9.9
Non-metal minerals 19.0 17.6 18.2 19.3
Chemicals & rubber 13.2 12.9 14.4 12.9
Other manufacturing 
industries
16.5 15.8 15.1 15.8
Total 7.7 9.3 5.0 7.3
Source: Barbiani/Conti Voi.II, pp.26-27.
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Table 14. Number of strike hours in the Province of Bologna 1950-1962.
Year Agriculture Industry
1950 246,960 1,520,000
1951 80,000 249,124
1952 432,000 288,308
1955 291,800 164,700
1956 1,563,500 478,900
1957 174,000 303,700
1960 2,327,741 918,293
1961 2,393,037 1,469,570
1962 1,066,384 2,862,507
Source: Barbiaui/Conti (Vol.l, p.lOS)
In a significant break with the traditional reluctance on the part of the dirigenti of the 
PCI to discuss the control mechanisms operating between the Party and its mass 
movements, Fanti declared that:
‘No organisation, however important can or should be a transmission belt delegated to 
represent or implement the policies of the party, ‘ rather the policy of the party,
‘exists and is applied through the direct activities of the mass of the party which is 
still too weal; and fragmentary. And it is thanks to this party’s mass politics that we 
are able to overcome the...mistaken internal work that puts a break on..the dialectic 
relationship between the party and the mass...’
There was more than a whiff of heresy in this statement, for Fanti appeared to be 
suggesting that Lenin and Gramsci were wrong to insist on the subordination of all 
mass movements to the ‘vanguard party’. Instead he seemed to argue that individual
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Communists should be allowed to decide for themselves the best position to adopt 
inside their organisation. But clearly such a freedom of manoeuvre called into 
question the entire basis of democratic centralism as the organising principle of the 
PCI as a whole. It was a measure of the scale of the process of renewal which the 
1959 conference had initiated that such a prospect could be openly articulated by one 
of the Communist Party’s most dynamic federal leaders.
4. Renaissance or Reformism?
It was Togliatti himself who referred to Italy’s reddest region as ‘il laboratorio 
emiliano’. Communist leaders took a certain pride in this description for it suggested 
that Emilia-Romagna was the test-bed for the socialist model on which the new Italian 
state would be founded. But at the same lime Togliatti was keen to remind his 
audiences in Reggio, Ferrara and Bologna that Emilia was not Italy, it did not have to 
contend with the powerful industrial monopolies which centred on Turin and Milan, 
nor with the desolate poverty and feudal politics of the South.59 Emilia was an 
emerging region which had managed to contain its migration within its own confines 
and to develop a small but efficient industrial base on self-generated capital. It bore 
many resemblances to its Tuscan and Ligurian neighbours politically as well as 
economically, but it also had its own socio-cultural identity which required a different 
form of alliance strategy to that practised in other parts of the ‘red belt.’
It was a testimony to the energy and commitment of reformers like Fanti and 
Zangheri (who succeeded the former as mayor in 1970) that the 1959 regional 
conference ever happened. Amendola described the lag between 1956 and 1959 as, 
‘the price to be paid for caution’ and the price was the slowness with which the 
process of ‘renewal’ took place. He described the experience as being like, ‘punching
59 Even if, as we have seen in the context of his speech to the 1st regional conference, 
Togliatti was prepared to gloss over the structural differences in the regional economies 
in the interest of the PCI’s national reform strategy.
188
a mattress which absorbed these punches but did not react.'59 60Amendola believed 
that Emilia’s importance grew immeasurably as a point of reference for the regional 
policy which the PCI developed in the 1960s and 1970s and on the organisational 
form which the Party’s regional administration should take. However, in his 
interview with Nicolai, Amendola had to admit that the renovators had not negated the 
’attendisti’, and although they might have silenced them, a significant number, he 
believed were still waiting for the ‘ora X .,i0
Yet even the benign idealism of Dozza had become a cause for concern for the 
reformers when at the conference of the city Party in 1958, the proposal to create a 
city of one million inhabitants was condemned despite the fact that in the same year 
the regulatory plan which provided for a large expansion of Bologna’s population had 
been approved by the government.61 The ‘clean hands’ and ‘grande città’ obsessions 
of the 1950s were over, but any chance of exporting the political methodology of the 
young Turks to Rome was never likely to succeed.
A senior Communist official when asked, admitted that the hierarchy of the PCI 
suspected that the Emilian reformers were not real Communists at all, and that 
exercises such as the 1959 regional conference were scorned because it was 
impossible to practice ‘socialism’ under the conditions of bourgeois capitalist society.
59 Giorgio Amendola in Amendola, G. & Nicolai, R. Il rinnovamento del PCI. Editori 
Riuniti, Rome, 1978, p.170.
60 Ibid, p.174.
61 As we have seen, the commitment lo a ‘grande Bologna’ was made by Dozza in the 
1951 electoral programme of the PCI, and the mayor was to reiterate this theme at the 
1961 budget speech. However, the new assessore of town planning, Giuseppe Campos 
Venuti, had no intention of reviving the fascist metropolitan vision of the 1920s which 
he regarded as ‘academic’ and inappropriate to the new demands for mass housing which 
urban migration would bring. See G. Campos Venuti, ‘Piani di generazione e 
generazioni di piani’ in Quaderni di Urbanistica Informazioni. No.2, 1986. The new 
planning agenda of the 1960s is the focus of part three of chapter five below.
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After the success of the June conference, Fanti attempted to make the voice of the 
Emilian party heard within the leadership of the of the Party at the 9th PCI congress 
in 1960, but his appeals were largely ignored. The ‘questione emiliana* was hardly 
discussed at the level of the direzione except when the controversy of the 1959 
conference and its aftermath forced it onto the agenda.63 Fanti also confirmed this 
analysis when referring to the determining role played by Togliatti in the process of 
renewal:
‘...Togliatti had always given great consideration to the problems of Emilia, unlike his 
successors, because...it remained the heart of the party for him...I also believed that 
he drew a certain distinction between the conditions which existed in Emilia and those 
which applied in Tuscany or in Umbria...and also he agreed with (the sentiments) we 
were expressing, that is he was very pragmatic in adapting himself to the prevailing 
conditions. But what was lacking was...the translation of what we were doing in 
Emilia to the national level, he did not do it, no one has done it...*63
After Togliatti’s death in 1964 and the succession of Luigi Longo to the leadership of 
the PCI, it was clear that the ‘via del riformismo’ had been definitively sealed off 
after Nenni’s Socialists had made the DC’s ‘opening to the left’ a reality by occupying 
the reformist terrain which many on the right of the Communist Party had aspired to, 
and now knew was unobtainable.
The Bolognese reformers had no option but to concentrate their efforts on a local and 
regional scale through the great ‘renaissance’ themes of the ‘59 tesi: land reform 
(which depended on the Communists’ eventual participation in government) and more 
importantly, the question of the local authorities. As Dozza’s conversion testified, the "? 
argument, the argument over the need for an active interventionary policy, had been 
won. Suddenly there seemed to be a real prospect for change in the political and 
economic texture of Bologna and the other provinces of the region. *41
62 Interview, Rome, 25lh January, 1991.
41 Interview with Guido Fanti, cit.
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The disciples of the ‘via italiana’ set about the task of re-defining the methods and 
goals of ‘il buon governo. ’ Within a matter of months the Communist led giunta had 
produced a response to three years of ‘rinnovamento’ which at the same time 
addressed the central concerns of Dossetti’s Libro Bianco. The political and 
institutional map of Bologna was about to be re-drawn with major consequences for 
the practice of municipal socialism and urban planning on a local, national and even 
international level.
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C H A P T E R  F I V E
Bologna Moderna. The Economic Miracle, Administrative Decentralisation and 
Radical Planning in Bologna, 1960-1976.
1. Introduction.
The political implications of the 1959 regional conference extended far beyond the 
new class alliances which the renovators had established as llie precondition for the 
transition to socialism in the 1960s. The local federation’s position on the 
management of its political alliances was also changing. The reformers insisted that 
the paternalist relationship with the PSI which Dozza had developed throughout his 
leadership of li.e comune had to be altered to one of partnership and mutuality. As 
Ginsborg argues, it was not on a national level, but on a local level in the Emilian 
capital that the political foundations of the centre-left were being established.1 But 
the rapprochement with the other political forces present in the consiglio comunale 
was not to be limited to the PCI’s traditional alliance partner. As the door seemed to 
be closing still tighter on Communist participation in national government which the 
collapse of the neo-fascist supported Tambroni government had done nothing to 
reverse, the Bologna leadership of the Communist Party embarked on a policy of 
reconciliation with its political opponents which was to initiate a new era of municipal 
reform unparalleled in any other Italian local administration.
When Giorgio Amendola returned to Eologna to speak at a national conference 
organised by the Istituto Gramsci in 1962, the theme of his address was also 
democracy and economic development. Amendola argued that political stagnation 
inevitably produced economic stagnation, and that the task of Communists was to 
wage a battle for the triumph of democracy as well as for the emergence of an 
economically productive region and nation.2 It was increasingly clear that Amendola’s
1 Ginsborg, cit. pp.295-297.
2 Ceccarelli & Gallingani, cit. p. 173.
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reformist grouping within the PCI were asserting the primacy of politics over the 
capitalist mode of production, at least in conjunctural terms if not ‘in the last 
instance’. Amendola insisted that rather than being the ‘wreckers and saboteurs’ of the 
economy, the Italian Communists were as committed to the success of the national 
economy as the government claimed to be. In the months leading up to the Christian 
Democrats’ ‘opening to the left’ the moderate leaders of the PCI were determined to 
banish all talk of the internal crisis of capitalism, particularly in the aftermath of the 
‘extremist’ clashes between the FIAT strikers and the police in Piazza Statuto in 
Turin. Militant ‘street fighting’ socialism was no longer seen as an option for even 
hard-line Communist leaders such as Pajetta, and the focus of Communist strategy 
once again centred on what was to become known as ‘the long march through the 
institutions'.3
It is in this sense, Ceccarelli and Gallingani argue, that Bologna came to be 
increasingly seen as a model for the type of mixed economy which Amendola was 
insisting would be the ‘reality’ of the ‘transition to socialism’ for many years to 
come.4 Bologna was not only a scale model for the Amendolan (and to an extent 
Togliattian) vision of what the ‘function of government’ should be, but the Emilian 
capital also served as an exemplar to other Communist and non-Communist comuni 
which remained immune to the reform virus that had swept through Bologna’s 
administration after the 1960 administrative elections.
But while the idea of using local institutions as a means of achieving a form of 
socialism won support from the non*Slalinist left (Ingrao) as well as from the 
reformist right (Amendola, Napolitano), it should not be assumed that Togliatti and 
Longo, who succeeded him in 1964, saw the Bologna reforms as anything other than 
an interesting regional experiment. The leadership did not insist that these reforms 
were instituted by other Communist local authorities in Tuscany, the Marches or 
Umbria, nor did its local government commission, which was under the control of the
3 See Ginsborg. cit. pp.251-252.
4 Ibid.
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staunchly pro-Soviet Armando Cossuta, require that the more recalcitrant comuni in 
Emilia-Romagna imitate their Bolognese comrades.5 If we are to agree with 
Vincenzo Galleti that Bologna is not and never has been a red island, the blame for 
the non-emergence of an archipelago of reformist administrations in the ‘red belt' 
must surely be ascribed lo ‘Botteghe Oscure* as much as to the flotilla of state and 
monopoly capitalist warships which surrounded Dozza*s fiefdom.6 In the following 
section we examine how the ‘economic miracle* in Bologna contributed to the 
development of a political and economic strategy which could best be described as 
‘Leninist Keynesianism’; a curious admixture of technocratic centralised planning and 
Schumpeterian economic development which characterised the ‘modello Bolognese.’
Part I. The Economic Boom and Industrial Development Policy.
1. The Economic Miracle and the Emilian Model.
The 1960s witnessed an enormous increase in the economic output of the Emilian 
economy, but unlike the rest of Italy which experienced a severe contraction in output 
in 1963-64, the downturn did not affect the Bolognese economy until 1966. The 
structural features which were observable in the 1940s and 1950s were strengthened 
by the effects of the boom, and to a large extent the comparative advantage of the 
lower-wage costs of Emilian industry insulated the regional economy from the 
immediate effects of the slump. Certain sectors such as the garment and textile sector 
and the light engineering industry continued to expand in the first half of the 1960s 
while northern companies were beginning to make massive redundancies.7
5 Ceccarelli & Gallingani p. 173. On the Perugia federation during this period see Shore 
cit. Amyot provides an interesting discussion of the rise oflngraoism and the importance 
of local government for his vision of democratic socialism in, The Italian Communist 
Party, cit. chapter ten.
6 See Vincenzo Galleti, Bologna non è un isola rossa, cit.
7 Fabio Gobbo and Claudio Pasini, ‘Una industrializzazione compiuta', in Gobbo, F. (Ed) 
Bologna 1937-1987. Cinquantanni di vita economica. Cassa di Risparmio in Bologna,
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In the second half of the 1960s manufacturing industry emerged as the true motor of 
the Emilian economy, moving from 36.9?* of the gross regional product in 1963 to 
40.3% in 1971, while agriculture’s share of GRP declined from 19.S% to 18.1% over 
the same period. However, as we have seen, the really significant change between 
primary and secondary activity was to be found in the massive decline in share- 
cropping and the growth in small property holding and capitalist farming.8 This was 
to produce what Barbiani and Conti have called a native reserve army of labour for 
the small manufacturing industries. These worker-peasants often maintained a small­
holding, or continued to provide casual labour for their old employers while 
commuting to the city or the nearby town where they found often equally casual 
employment in small workshops or factories.9 This type of mixed employment based 
on a semi-displaced rural proletariat was typical of Emilia-Romagna. As Daneo 
reveals, between 1961 and 1970 the active worldng population employed in agriculture 
fell by 39.4% (from 591,000 to 358,000), and no less than two-thirds of the 
remaining workforce also had jobs outside agriculture. But despite the fact that 
44,217 workers had disappeared between the 1961 and 1971 census, the average rate 
of agricultural productivity actually increased by S%, a growth rate which was higher 
than that of industry.10
The 1960s also saw the first real emergence of the Bolognese industrial district with a 
significant increase in the number of industrial firms clustered around the capoluogo 
in the neighbouring towns of the comprensorio.11 Bologna’s manufacturers were 
successfully adapting themselves to the demand for greater product variety and for
Bologna, 1987, p.182.
8 See chapter four above.
9 Barbiani & Conti, cit. p.225.
10 C. Daneo, ‘Capitalismo e riformismo nelle campagne emiliane’, Inchiesta. N o .5 ,1972, 
p.27 in ibid. pp.225-226.
“ Although the number of enterprises increased in the 1960s, an overwhelming majority 
of manufacturing companies continued to employ less than ten workers, see Table 15.
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small-batch specialised machinery, especially in the machine tools sector, and it was 
the re-investment of surplus agrarian capital which helped to promote the growth in 
manufacturing industries in the late 1950s and early 1960s.1"
Berselli refers to a locally based Keynesian ‘virtuous circle’ of investment which was 
supported by a pool of highly skilled labour and a working-class entrepreneurial 
culture which ‘rejected the alienating forms of traditional mass manufacture in favour 
of a small family centred operation’.12 3 Although this rather laudatory account of the 
small firm economy in Bologna fails to address the problem of low wages and part- 
time and temporary employment, there can be no doubt that such firms were vital to 
the ‘economic miracle* in the province and region. In the following section we 
examine how the new municipal administration contributed to the emergence of the 
Bologna model and how economic policy dove-tailed with the policy of the permanent 
alliance between labour and the ‘non-monopolistic productive classes.*
12 Aldo Berselli. ‘I protagonisti dello sviluppo industriale’ in Gobbo, F. (Ed) Bologna 
1937-lQ87. Cinquant’anni di vita economica, cit. p.153 and see Table ló.
13 Ibid.
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Table 15. Firms and employees in the Bolognese industrial district according to size 
of workforce in the 1961 census.
Percentage of all firms 
employing 10 or less or 
more than employees
Total percentage of the 
workforce occupied in 
firms employing 10 or less 
or more than 10 
employees
10 or less 10+ 10 or less 10+
Argelato 99.5 0.5 96.3 3.7
Baricella 98.6 1.4 76.9 23.1
Bentivoglio 98.0 1.4 76.9 18.1
Castel d’Argile 97.2 2.8 58.7 41.3
Crevalcore 96.4 3.6 61.5 38.5
Galliera 95.7 4.3 55.0 45.0
Malabergo 97.8 o o 76.0 24.0
Medicina 98.2 1.8 69.1 30.9
Molinella 96.9 3.1 48.3 51.7
Pieve di Cento 94.4 5.6 46.2 53.8
Sala Bolognese 98.3 1.7 79.8 20.2
San Giorgio di Piano 95.8 4.2 63.0 37.0
San Giovanni in Persicelo 96.3 3.7 69.2 30.8
San Pietro in Casale 97.8 2.2 72.9 27.1
Sant’Agata Bolognese 98.3 1.7 88.5 11.5
Total 97.2 2.8 65.5 34.5
(Source: Provincia di Bologna. I comprensori nella provincia di bologna, lie lùgna, i-jnA )
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Table 16. Number of employees and firms active in the pianura district of Bologna in 
1966 according to the period of establishment and type of enterprise.
Before 1951 After 1951 Total
F E F E F E
Agriculture, 
forestry, hunting, 
fishing
2 2S n 6S9 24 717
Manufacturing
industry
25 1,834 70 3,645 95 5,489
Construction 23 1,127 17 2S8 40 1,415
Commerce 5 123 5 177 10 300
Totals 55 3,112 114 4,799 169 7,911
Relative figures 
(in %)
32.5 39.3 67.5 60.7 100 100
Key: F=No. of Firms 
E=No. of Employees
(Source: Provincia di Bologna. I comprensori nella provìncia di Bologna. Bologna, 196S.)
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2. Economic Development and the New Politics of Local Government Finance.
From 1960 onwards the Dozza administration not only saw its role as the guarantor of 
good government and the agent of limited redistribution through local taxation and 
service provision, but increasingly the comune came to play an active part in the 
process of accumulation itself. The Dosseltian criticism of ‘red conservatism’ could 
no longer be applied to a city government which was keen to establish the conditions 
for a Keynesian local economic strategy in which local government would undertake 
the responsibilities for industrial and commercial development which the central state, 
in the case of Emilia, had actively relinquished.1,1 In order to secure the means for 
this interventionary policy, the giunta had to maximise its revenue and credit capacity 
and this required a major re-organisation of the comune’s Finance policy if the 
improvements in the local economic infrastructure were to take place.14 5
Carlo Trigilia claims that the decision to abandon the balanced budget as a leitmotif of 
the red communes at the beginning of the 1960s was highly significant because it was
14 Barbiani and Conti note that, ‘Bologna and its entire region remained an object of 
discrimination on the part of the government’, which, lor example, refused to allow the 
constitution of the Emilian Institute for Economic and Social Research (IERES), while 
Emilia continued to be denied the state investment which could have exploited its unique 
position as a centre of communication and exchange between the industrial triangle and 
the Mezzogiorno. Barbiani & Conti, cit. p.193.
It was ironic that the investment boycott of the region created the ideal conditions for the 
emergence of a strong small firm sector in the absence of the major monopolies who 
naturally preferred the subsidies and inducements which were to be found in Lombardy 
and Piedmont. Indeed it could be said that the red communes had the Christian 
Democrats rather than Togliatti’s ‘anti-monopolist strategy’ to thank for the development 
of the ‘modello Emiliano.’
11 In practice this meant that the comune increasingly resorted to borrowing in order to 
finance its expenditure programmes as Figure 4 clearly shows.
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not only a response by the leftist admininislrations to the fiscal discrimination of the 
central state against these authorities, but it also represented an attempt to defend and 
re-articulate the local political identity of the Communist sub-culture.10 While 
Gianluigi Degli Esposti decribed the lulling of the sacred-calf of the balanced budget 
as the last and most important victory of the ‘nouvelle vague’. However, even when 
Giuseppe Dozza announced the end of the balanced budget he made no apology for 
the conservative fiscal policy which the comune had followed since the war, and 
unlike Paolo Fortunati who appeared to have made a Pauline conversion to the cause 
of deficit financing at the 1959 regional conference, Dozza portrayed the decision as 
an essentially defensive taelie. In fact Dozza argued that the deficit budget had only 
been made necessary because of the expansion of the city, whereas if the stale had 
met its financial obligations to the larger city comuni he believed that such a policy 
could have been avoided.'7
It was only when Dozza’s health began to deteriorate in 1962 that Fanti’s ‘placeman’, 
Umbro Lorenzini, was able to take control of the levers of municipal power. This 
operation required the removal of the ‘old guard’ assessore of finance, Cenerini who 
had been one of the staunchest opponents of the Fanti/Amendola reforms. With 
Lorenzini’s appointment as assessore al bilancio in 1963, all opposition had been 
removed to the ‘novelty or the heresy’ of the deficit budget, and although Dozza was 
to continue as mayor for a further three years, the reconstruction phase of Bologna’s 
post-war history which the ‘sindaco della resistenza’ had led with such skill, charisma 
and fortitude, was all but over.
However, the transition from a balanced budget to a carefully planned deficit budget 
could not be implemented over-night. It was important to be able accurately to 
forecast the population growth which the city could expect over the next ten years and 
the strain on the existing infrastructure which the continued expansion of the local 167
16 Carlo Trigilia Grandi partiti e piccole imprese. Il Mulino, Bologna, 1986, p.181.
17 G. Dozza, ‘Relazione al bilancio preventivo, 1964, Bologna. Documenti del Comune, 
in Piro, cit. p.141.
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economy would create. It was for this reason that in 1963 the giunta published a 
document entitled, ‘Evaluations and directions for a development plan for the city and 
district of Bologna’. The publication was a belated response to the Libro Bianco and 
contained a detailed survey of the ‘needs' of the city and its hinterland in terms of 
services, housing and infrastructure. The document coincided with the publication of 
an article by Guido Fanti which urged the PCI to found ‘a real alliance of labour’ 
which he defined as a ‘permanent alliance between the working class and the ceti 
medi’ much as Amendola had done at the 1959 regional conference. ‘Valutazioni ed 
orientamenti’ also reflected the political objectives of the reformers because the 
docuniement was the first attempt to realise the theses of the 1959 conference by 
concretely describing how the ‘alliance of labour’ would work.
Fanti and Lorenzini believed that urbanisation and economic development presented a 
unique opportunity for the Communist administration to win over the emergent 
entrepreneurial class to the anti-monopolist strategy of the left. If the Party did not 
act quickly, it was thought that the collectivist culture of the former peasants and 
skilled workers who were establishing themselves as independent manufacturers and 
traders would be replaced by petty-bourgeois consciousness. The Communists had to 
persuade the small business community that the Provincial Association of Artisans 
(APB) and the comune were their true allies rather than the large-firm dominated 
Chamber of Commerce, and in this respect the PCI’s strategy was largely 
successful.1* 18
18 Stephan Iiellman shows how the PCI came to dominate the Artigianato Provinciale 
Bolognese (APB) which by the end of the 1960s represented 60% of all artisans firms in 
the province. The PCI lists obtained an impressive 79% of votes in elections to the 
provincial mutual fund board, although of the 22,000 firms belonging to the APB only 
5,100(18%) of artisans were full members of the PCI. (Vincenzo Galletti, ‘Società civile 
e presenza del parlilo’, Critica Marxista 7 (Jan-Feb) 1969, p. 127). Heilman believes 
that, ‘This evidence demonstrates the PCI’s profound influence among artisans. At the 
same time, the evidence also suggests that Bolognese artisans are probably a cautious and 
far from dedicated left-wing mass of small producers. The figures imply that quite a few
2 0 1
This emphasis on urban economic development was not only the outcome of the 
strategic permanent alliance with the productive middle class, it was also the product 
of the increasingly important cooperative sector. Togliatti wanted to see, ‘a great new 
development into new social groups of what for decades has been the greatest weapon 
of the Emilian working class; cooperation, as a new means of access to a position of 
well-being and peaceful development of the masses.’ Yet the cooperative sector could 
not insulate itself from the effects of the economic downturn which afflicted monopoly 
and non-monopoly businesses alike from 1963 onwards.19 The net decline in the 
number of non-construction cooperative enterprises between 1961 and 1966 
demonstrated that in the retail sector in particular there was no alternative to 
amalgamation, and the growth and success of the Coop Emilia-Veneto and the food 
distribution cooperative CONAD, confirmed the hypothesis that if cooperation was to 
survive on a regional scale it had increasingly to assume the characteristics of big 
capital.20
of these artisans only affiliate or vole they way do, because of the material benefits that 
the party and its mass organisations provide.’ Heilman, ‘The PCI’s Alliance Strategy and 
the Case of the Middle Classes’, cit. p.407.
19 Piro, cit. p. 141. See Table 20.
20 CONAD is a particularly important example of the successful incorporation of small 
shopkeepers within the cooperative movement. Zan believes that the establishment of 
cooperatives such as CONAD was a direct consequence of the 1962 Congress of the 
Leage of Cooperatives where for the first time, the cooperative movement was criticised 
for being ‘workerist’ and the participation of the ceti medi in cooperative enterprises was 
actively encouraged. Stefano Zan, La cooperazione in Italia. Strutture, strategie, e 
sviluppo della Lega nazionale cooperative e mutue. De Donalo, Bari, 19S2, p. 158.
Table 17. Composition of cooperatives affiliated to Federcoop in the Province of 
Bologna, 1952-1966.
Sector 1952 1961 1966
CONSUMPTION/
DISTRIBUTION
fl
Cooperatives 84 (61) 108 (67) 95 (60)
Associates 89,606 92,606
AGRICULTURE
Cooperatives 96 122 104
Associates 35,559 34,471
PRODUCTION
Cooperatives 140 90 83
Associates 24,731 12,778
HOUSING
Cooperatives 64 101 143
Associates 6,500 7,158
TOTAL
Cooperatives 384 421 425
Associates 155,834 147,018
Source: Barbiani & Conti, cit.
But if it was to succeed, Amendola and Fanti’s permanent alliance of labour and 
producers could no longer rely exclusively on its traditional support in the Federcoop 
and tire APB, the PCI had to appeal to a wider and more politically hostile 
constituency whose approval would be conditional on the sincere commitment of the
Communist administration to make Bologna safe and attractive to business. As 
Gundle argues,
‘Beyond the issue of ideological sympathy, business people, artisans, and commercial 
and industrial managers identified with the PCI because the party translated their 
demands into basic economic policies and promoted and defended their interests.
What the party was able to provide through its control of local government was 
centialised planning, directed public spending, coordinated urban development, and 
infrastructural provision, capital investment in support of small enterprises, export 
promotion and the setting of agreed commercial priorities and targets.’21
An important example of the type of intervention that Gundle describes was the 
comune*s contribution of a considerable share of the equity for the new Business Park 
(the Ente Fiera) which was planned for the San Donato district of the city to the 
north-east of the railway station.22 The Fiera provided a large and well-equipped 
conference hall (the Palazzo dei Congressi), a new modem art gallery, a business 
exhibition centre (llie Palazzo degli Affari) as well as private ventures such as the 
Crest Hotel and the new regional headquarters of the state telephone company 
(SIP).23 Kenzo Tange’s twin sky-scrapers which dominated the padana skyline were 
not occupied by great transnational corporations as one might have expected in Milan
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21 Stephen Gundle, ‘Urban Dreams and Metropolitan Nightmares: Models and Crises of 
Communist Local Government in Italy’ in Bogdan Szajkowski (Ed), Marxist Local 
Governments in Western Europe and Japan. Frances Pinter, London, 19S6, p.78.
22 The operating company which managed the Business Park was founded in February 
1964 and initially 100 million lire of capital was provided by the Comune di Bologna, 
the Provincia di Bologna and the Camera di Commercio who contributed a third each. 
However, within the space of two years it was realised that these funds were inadequate 
and the operating capital of the company was raised to 400 million lire in I960.
23 Guglielmo Gola & Guido Candela, ‘Su alcune vicende della finanza pubblica locale’ 
in Gobbo (Ed), Bologna 1937-1987. cit. pp.248-250.
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or Turin, but provided the haedquarters for the League of Cooperatives and the 
Regional Artisans’ Confederation. These new ‘Due Torri’ symbolised the 
transformation in the fortunes of the two great collateral organisations of the PCI, and 
by his appointment of a Christian Democrat as president of the Fiera holding 
company,24 Guido Fanti confirmed the ‘politics of consensus’ which had inaugurated 
the ‘rinnovamento’ in the Bologna federation. The Fiera di Bologna quickly 
established itself as one of the most successful business parks in Italy and offered 
eloquent proof of Bologna’s transition from a provincial capoluogo to a major regional 
and national commercial centre.
If projects such as the Fiera underscored the reality of the ‘miracolo economico’ in 
Bologna, the foundations for the entrepreneurial growth which had made such a major 
investment necessary were to be found in the ‘formazione professionale’ that had 
helped to produce a large pool of skilled workers and managers. The long tradition of 
high quality technical education and training for which Bologna was famous assisted 
the development of small, highly specialised engineering firms which were the 
backbone of the ‘modello Bolognese’. For example, the Aldini Variant Technical 
Institute, which was financed by the connine, continued to produce qualified 
technicians and engineers who went on to become successful entrepreneurs and 
designers in their own right.25 The comune also assisted the relocation of artisans’ 
firms which had grown too big for their old city centre workshops to new custom 
built industrial estates such as the ‘Zona della Roveri’ which was located on the 
eastern spur of the Via Emilia where new companies were establishing themselves in 
greater and greater numbers.
This industrial concentration had also been encouraged by the opening of the eastern 
orbital motorway fthe Tangenziale), which was undoubtedly the Dozza 
administration’s greatest contribution to the ‘viabilità’ of the city. The provision of a
24 Fernando Felicori, llie DC group leader in the consiglio comunale.
25 Gobbo &  Pasini, ‘Una industrializzazione compiuta’ in Gobbo (Ed), Bologna 1937- 
1987. cit. p. 186.
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new rapid transport link spawned dozens of new distribution, transport and 
manufacturing companies along the axis which joined Peretta Terme, San Giovanni in 
Persiceto and Bazzano with the Autostrada del Sole.26 But as with the public 
housing projects of the 1950s, the ‘grande Bologna’ vision of the 1950s carried over 
into the economic policy of the 1960s. and for all the planning aspirations of local 
Communist leaders, industrial development conformed to the laissez-faire pattern 
which characterised the rest of urban northern Italy in this period.
Although the ‘meccano della Via Emilia’ confirmed that the comuni rossi were no 
disincentive to economic activity, the over concentration of industrial enterprises along 
the Modena-Bologna-Imola corridor created a disequibrilium which the inter- 
communal plan (PIC) lacked the powers to correct.27 *The Dozza/Fanti 
administration had enthusiastically grasped the Keynesian doctrine of promoting 
economic growth through direct and indirect public investment, but although this 
marked an advance on the non-interventionary stasis of the first three Dozza 
administrations, the fiscal strategy of the city council could only be limited to ‘pump 
priming’ and basic infrastructural initiatives. The Communist administrators had to 
wait until the creation of the regional assembly in 1970 and the regional planning law 
of 1976 before a serious attempt could be made at coordinating economic growth in 
Emilia-Romagna.2*
Limited though its application may have been, this local Keynesianism had its political 
equivalent in the collective desire to stimulate the demand for democratic participation 
in the life of the city. Amendola’s conviction that economic growth followed
26 Ibid.
27 The Piano Intercomunale (PIC) functioned more as a research and information service 
than a planning authority, and in fact the law prohibited comuni from pooling economic 
resources unless it was to establish aziende municipalizzate (such as refuse, water, 
transport etc.) or special ente autonome (such as the Ente Fiera) which had an 
independent legal status.
See below, chapter , part one.
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democratic development may have been a vain aspiration on a national level, but 
Bologna’s Communist reformers were determined to make the 1959 commitment to 
democratic renewal a reality. As with the constitution of the economic 'modello 
Bolognese’, the reform of local government was a slow and difficult process which 
was inevitably conditioned by the realignment of political forces at a national level.
In the following section we analyse the development of municipal decentralisation in 
Bologna in terms of the new demands which urbanisation placed on the city authorities 
and the no less pressing requirements of the ‘politics of consensus’ which the 
Communists hoped to build into the structure of the new democratic institutions.
Part II. ‘La riforma senza riforma': Hie Theory and Practice of Decentralisation 
in Bologna, 1960-1976.
1. The Idea of Neighbourhood and the legacy of ‘56.
Sabino Cassese described the cultural patchwork of decentralist motifs which emerged 
from the 1950s in Bologna in his assessment of the first decade of administrative 
reform,
‘On one side there is the ideal, of Catholic origin, of many ‘street corner socielies’,Iy 
on the other the reactionary tendency of those who would like to see the social and 
public structures ‘glued’ to the individual in such a way as to make collective controls 
and conditioning as penetrating and effective as possible. On the other hand, once 
again, the desire belonging to all Italian provincial culture, but in particular to that of 
the pre-fascist era of turban) ‘dimensions on a human scale,’ and the nostalgia for the 
‘gentle neighbourhood of the past". Finally there were the vague appeals to a 
distribution of the administrative functions between the citizens, a representation far 
from the ideal of self-administration or of ihe ‘self-government’ where the 29
29 Of course this sociological urban type is not Catholic in origin but American. See, 
above all, W.F. Whyte, Street Corner Society. Chicago University Press, 1943.
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‘Communist’ rules the city from the doorstep of his house.'30
Cassese identified three separate models of decentralisation in the programmes of the 
major political parties in the first phase of decentralisation in Bologna. The first saw 
the organ of the comune as the instrument of the decentralisation of municipal 
functions. This was a conception of administrative decentralisation in its purest (or 
most restricted) form where the administration itself decides the extent and the 
location of municipal devolution. The second type envisaged the creation of 
organisations representing the local collectivity which would be integrated at the level 
of the comune with municipal representatives elected in the ordinary way. This 
corresponded to what in English local government is considered a ‘co-optive’ system 
where non-elected community representatives are allocated seats on council 
sub-committees in order to discuss the problems specific to their constituencies.31
The third model Cassese identified was that of the ‘little comune* which had the same 
organisational stmcture as the comune and the same functions but with an arena of 
activity which was not limited exclusively to the traditional fields of council activity. 
Because of its smaller scale and greater represenliveness, the ‘micro-comune* was 
favoured by the Catholics as ‘an autonomous expression of collective life.’
The quartiere in the first case is a function of the communal apparatus, while in the 
second and third it is an instrument for widening participation at the base.
There was also a more generalised objective in the decentralisation proposals of the
30 S. Cassese, preface lo Zacchìni, B. (Ed) Pieci anni di decentramento a Bologna, Luigi 
Parma Editore, Bologna, 1976, p.vi. This volume contains the key speeches from all the
important debates on decentralisation which the consiglio comunale held between I960 
and 1976. Although these debates can be found in the ‘Atti del Consiglio Comunale’ I 
have preferred to cite the page references to speeches where they appear in this volume. 
For a national perspective on local government before the institution of the regions in 
1970 see Cassese (Ed).Il sistema amministrativo italiano. Il Mulino, Bologna, 1983.
31
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left which had its origins in the early life of the Dozza administration and which saw 
Bologna as a means of expressing an alternative vision of Italian stale and society.32 
The decentralist initiatives in Bologna therefore also formed part of the wider 
challenge by the PCI and PSI to the perceived centralist ‘dirigiste’ practices of the 
governing majority.33
As we saw in chapter three, it was the group of academics around Giuseppe Dossetti 
who first formulated the idea of an organic decentralisation of the city administration 
where the ‘street comer society’ of the new peripheral estates would be given a 
community focus in the local civic centres and services provided by the comune. But 
this conception of the emerging metropolitan society was seen by many of the left in 
Bologna as a ‘Trojan horse’ which would be used to break open the administrative 
monolithism of the socialcommunisls and to establish a populist Catholic rival to the 
red sub-culture of the working-class districts.34 But inspile of the mutual suspicious 
between Communists and Catholics, both groups were attempting to grapple, with the 
fundamental problems which urbanisation and changing forms of economic and 
familial life were bringing to the administration of contemporary society.
In 1960 the ‘Due Torri’ list once again raised the subject of democratic renewal and 
in its electoral programme insisted that democratic life and evolution did not simply 
require that citizens conferred their mandate every four years on the city councillors, 
but rather that the electorate should be able to continually participate in decisions
32 See especially, G. Dozza, Il reato di essere sindaco, speech to a public meeting in the 
‘Sala Bossi’ of the Palazzo d’Accursio, 22nd March 1951, in Tega, W. (Ed) Giuseppe 
Pozza: Il buon governo e la rinascita della città. 1945-1966. Capelli Editore, 19S7, 
pp. 197-223.
33 Although when Nenni joined Aldo Moro’s cabinet in December 1963 his followers 
became less critical of centralised controls on local authorities.
34 Barbiani & Conti Luttes polilioues. cit. p.374.
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which affected their lives.35 The most significant aspect of the Communists’ 
commitment to the establishment of neighbourhood democracy was the creation of a 
number of deputy mayors to act as community representatives and advisors to the 
mayor. Dozza insisted that these ‘aggiunti del sindaco’ should not be seen as political 
or bureaucratic instruments but as a real, constant and fruitful link between the 
residents of the city and its council. This was a conception of neighbourhood 
democracy which the Communists were to return to constantly in the years ahead and 
it was also to form the basis of the PCI’s emerging ‘politics of consensus.’
For its part, the DC re-affirmed its commitment to the decentralisation process and to 
the aims and values of the Libro Bianco, particularly welcoming the giunta’s 
establishment of an all party decentralisation commission.36 While the PSDI, 
although expressing its general support, raised misgivings over the contents of the 
proposals and considered the studies and surveys on the structure of the city - on the 
basis of which the quartieri were designed - to be insufficient and limited in their 
town planning and social aspects. They also accused the Communists of seeking to 
make electoral capital from a policy which ought to have been revealed well before 
the expiry of the council’s mandate.37 The giunta responded to this last accusation 
by claiming that the problem had ‘matured’ for the majority as well as for the 
minority and that it was important to put the decentralisation proposals to the 
electorate in order to guage each party’s position and the popular support which 
existed for the initiative. The PCI/PSI giunta was overwhelmingly reconfirmed in the 
elections of that year and the new administration began the process of administrative 
renewal for which the regional conference of 1959 had prepared the ground.33 The
35 Programma della lista ‘Due Torri’ per l’elezione del consiglio comunale, Bologna, 6- 
7th November, 1960.
36 Democrazia Cristiana, Per una città piu moderna e democratica, programme for the 
administrative elections, 6-7lh November, I960.
37 Cassese, preface to Dieci anni di decentramento, cit. p. 11.
M The Communist ‘Due Torri* list improved its vote from 121,404 in 1956 lo 138,256
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Due Torri’s manifesto commitments were quickly translated into plans for the 
territorial re-organisation of the city, although the contours of the new sub-municipal 
zones could already be seen in the PRG of 1955 which was approved in 1958.* 39
Table 18. Results of the November, 1960 Administrative elections in Bologna.
Party % Vote Seats
Due Toni 45.6 28
PSI 8.6 5
PSDI 8.3 5
PRI 1.1 -
DC 26.8 17
PLI 4.9 3
MSI/DN 4.3 2
Total 100.0 60
Source: Ulram, P. Zwischen Burot-rniie und Burecr. Vienna, 1973, p.75.
(Figures have been rounded)
Giuseppe Dozza announced the administrative division of the city into a series of 
quartieri on the 21st September, 1960, and although this declaration was mainly 
symbolic, it initiated the process of decentralisation which was to gather pace in the 
years ahead.40 The significance of this measure was not lost on the prefeetoral
in 1960, a slight percentage increase on 1956 from 45.2,7c to 45.6'^. See Table IS.
39 See chapter two, section four. To avoid confusion this regulatory plan will be referred 
to subsequently by its year of adoption, i.e. the 1953 PRG.
40 See Figure 5.
Figure 5. The fluartieri in December, 1960 showing the future central subdivisions.
authorities who immediately censured the provision inspile of its cross-party 
support.41 42The scale of the project which the giunta was recommending lo the 
consiglio comunale could be detected in the recognised need for,
’a decentralisation of sendees and municipal offices, with particular regard 
to...activities of a social or welfare character,’ and for ‘the institution of centres of 
civic life’ in each neighbourhood lo be entrusted lo a 'deputy mayor’ and assisted by 
‘councils for the participation of citizens in the civic administration.'43
The problem of the size of the quartieri was the subject of much discussion, and the 
DC saw the principal objective of the reform proposals to be the resolution of the 
problems associated with constant inward migration and urbanisation. Only by 
establishing an institutional and participative focus for the burgeoning peripheral 
communities could ‘a measure of homogeneity in social relations and in associalional 
life’ be preserved.43
Councillor Ardigò, Italy’s most distinguished Catholic sociologist, went on to argue, 
‘this does not correspond in any way lo the definition of the size of the quartiere 
which is being given this evening...An average dimension of 10,000 families could 
have a significance from the point of view of an administrative character in order to 
operate at a not too excessive cost a decentralisation of municipal functions, (but) it
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41 The GPA ruled the 21st September decision to be ‘ultra vires’ even though the motion 
did not describe what form the decentralisation was lo take. The consiglio comunale 
responded by declaring that article 155 of the 1934 local government act did not allow 
the GPA to interfere in decisions of this land, and since no detailed proposals lo decentre 
services had yet been made, the GPA could not rule them out of order and in fact the 
GPA accepted the decision in 1962; Ceccarelli & Gallingani cit. p.162. For a description 
of the function of the GPA see chapter two, part one, above.
42 Bruna Zacchini, Introduction to Dieci anni di decentramento, p .l l .
43 Ibid.
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does not make sense on the level of individualising the organic forms of life of 
spontaneous relations.M<
He also criticised the methodological criteria for the establishment of the quartieri 
claiming,
‘the aims of municipal devolution pose problems of a different kind to the aims of a 
welfare centre (casa del cittadino) or .(ite aims of an area where (the intention is) to 
create, develop and stimulate direct democracy.’4 5
Ardigò’s preoccupations were consistent with the views of many contemporary 
American sociologists who believed that the social integrity of communities 
diminished in direct proportion to the rate of urbanisation and re-location. However, 
the Communists were concerned about the effects of migration for different reasons, 
principally because they realised that the rural bedrock of PCI support among the 
braccianti and mezzadri was disintegrating, as peasant families drifted into the larger 
towns and cities where they would often find non-unionised casual work in the 
burgeoning ‘informal economy.’ Thus the redefinition of the city was strongly 
influenced by the main political parties different responses to the problems of 
urbanisation and ‘modernisation’ in Bologna and its periphery and hinterland.
As we observed in chapters four and five, the debate on the ‘grande Bologna’ had 
been raging from the time of the reconstruction, and the decision of llie 21st 
September merely gave concrete form to the policies outlined in llie programmes for 
the administrative elections of May, 1956. The proposal was supported by the DC 
and the PSDI, while the PLI expressed its opposition to the first part of the motion, 
but agreed lo the formation of a joint commission. A bridge to the ‘città invisibile’ of 
the quartieri had been built amid unprecedented consensus and cordiality from the 
interested parties. But it was nevertheless clear that each political grouping was intent
44 Ibid. p. 12.
45 Ibid. p.12.
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on trying to propagate its own particular vision of the imagined future neighbourhoods 
even if in the early 1960s these visions were vague and indistinct.
In the debate Councillor Felicori, the DC group leader expressed, ‘the adhesion of our 
group to the concept... - in terms of the democratic development of the city - ...of the 
subdivision of the city into quartieri. * He continued, ‘the reservations expressed and 
our (original) abstention, as professor Ardigò has mentioned, regard the technical 
contents of the resolution without any implication or extension of a political or 
programmatic kind.’ This allowed the DC to shift its position and vote in favour of 
the general motion while contesting the detail of the reforms.
The subdivision of the city into neighbourhoods and the nomination of a council 
commission on decentralisation was thus approved with 37 votes in favour (Due Toni 
[PCI], PSI & DC), with 2 votes against (PLI) and 2 abstentions (PSDI).16 The key 
divisions in the debate centred on two themes, one the geographic or territorial 
dimension of the division of the city, and the other the socio-political aspects which 
concerned the motives and the possible effects of this type of intervention on the 
communities themselves. The PCI/PSI majority were vague about the social impact of 
the reforms as Degli Esposti for the PSDI reminded the council. Mayor Dozza had 
talked of the need lo ‘move forward a little with an empirical system, with an 
experimental system,’ a ‘wait-and-see’ politics which the Social Democrats found too 
heuristic, preferring to submit the details of the proposal to a permanent 
commission.46 7
But this was hardly in the spirit of the majority’s initiative, since it was precisely the
46 The motion read, ‘The consiglio comunale convinced of the necessity of the subdivision 
of the city into quartieri instructs a joint council commission, chaired by the mayor to 
evaluate the proposals of the giunta for the optimum formulation of the proposed 
resolution.’ In diece anni di decentramento, p.15.
47 Intervention of D. Degli Esposti in the debate of the 27lh July, 1960 in Dieci anni di 
decentramento, cit. p.26.
heavily bureaucratic, centralised, and narrow decision making machinery which the 
giunta were seeking to overcome. Dozza in his speech declared that the aim of the 
reform was,
‘...to provide a development for this initiative which would not be just...bureaucratic, 
which would not only have an organisational character, but which would have...a 
more profound democratic character...'and which would provide, ‘...a  means for the 
people to hear their own voices, demands, and proposals {ja|ened lo ...’48
This idea was close to the Christian Democrats’ vision of refounding urban society 
through the creation of an organic and dynamic community, although in the 
Socialist/Communist version the stress was on active participation and the political re- 
animation of the inhabitants of llie quartieri, a prospect which the opposition regarded 
as offering too many possibilities for direct political interference and manipulation by 
the majority.
However, the Communist conception of neighbourhood democracy was not aimed at 
re-inventing the political system or at disrupting the activities of the ‘partitocrazia’ on 
a local or institutional level. In fact, Fanti’s successor as federal secretary of the 
Bolognese PCI, Vincenzo Galleti, insisted that the organs of neighbourhood 
democracy could only be legitimated through the organisations of the political parlies. 
His reasoning was that without an exact replication of the political forces present in 
the consiglio comunale, individuals or small groups of activists might be able to wield 
a disproportionate influence on the political life of their locality. Decentralisation 
therefore aimed to stimulate political participation at a local level, but only through 
the mediation of the existing party machines.
Despite Galletti’s commitment to maintaining the political status quo, the minority 
group argued that there was a danger that the new provisions might undermine ‘the 
real democratic life of the localities.’ Felicori accused assessore Zangheri of openly
214
48 Intervention of G. Dozza in the debate of 30th June, 1960, ibid. p.lS.
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admitting the role the deputy mayors would play in widening the Communist majority 
in the city. This Felicori asserted did not change the Christian Democrats’ primary 
adhesion to the principle of the creation of the quartieri but it signalled their 
reservations about the subtext of the reforms which the majority group had done 
nothing to dispel.49
This hostile minority voice did not shake the giunta’s defence of the provision which 
was based partly on urbanistic criteria and partly on the revival of the post-war theme 
of participatory democracy. The one proposed the unblocking of the city centre, the 
other the unblocking of the sclerotic arteries of the organs of democracy. As Pietro 
Crocioni declared,
‘We want to avoid people having to come into the centre of the city for business and 
only returning to the suburbs in the evening lo sleep, because this form of associative 
life, practically transforms the periphery into a kind of dormitory where one only 
sleeps at night while every other hour of the day is spent somewhere else. ’ 50
But of course there was nothing peculiar lo Bologna about this ‘pendolarismo’, and if 
anything, the commuting distance between the centre and periphery or between 
Bologna and the other towns of the province was shorter than in many oilier large 
Italian cities. Clearly a quartiere could not provide employment for all of its 
inhabitants, and no administration!! could guarantee people the luxury of being able to 
walk to work in the morning. However, the concept of the city neighbourhood which 
the assessore wished to project did make sense in terms of an imagined community 
which still contained the essential elements of the ‘gentle neighbourhood of the past.’ 
This idea of neighbourhood was as important to the Socialists and Communists as it 
was to the Catholics because the modern (male) commuter had to have something to 
come home for; his wife, his family, his neighbours, his church and perhaps even his
49 F. Felicori’s intervention in the debate of 30th June, 1960, ibid, pp.23-24.
5(1 P. Crocioni, intervention in the consiglio comunale. 30lh June, I960, ibid, pp.20-21.
local ‘civic centre’ which offered respite, education and a fixed point of social contact 
in an otherwise remote and uncharted world.
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The ‘civic centres* (case del cittadino) were thus a central feature of the Dossettian 
vision of a parochially based neighbourhood community as well as being for the 
Communists a municipalised form of the ‘case del popolo’ which had been 
instrumental in the political and cultural education of large sections of the rural and 
urban working-class. In both categorisations, the ‘case del cittadino’ were regarded as 
a key institution for the re-animation of the social life of the satellite districts. As 
Dozza asserted,
‘The case del cittadino (will be places in which) the democratic life of lite quartiere 
will flow. We do not think we are wrong lo affirm that with this provision the city 
will have achieved a qualitative leap forward. Democratic life can spread more 
widely from the centre to the periphery and the comune can present itself as a more 
modem instrument, an instrument capable of co-ordinating a central motor for its 
various activities...with provision for everyone, and where its energy is put at the 
disposal of all the people. ’51
Yet the democratic model which the giunta had outlined in the consultative document 
had a greater scope than the territorial boundaries of the city of Bologna. As Crocioni 
emphasised, the experiment had implications lor the reform of the entire Italian state 
apparatus,
‘The state has been created in order to respond to the needs of a limited number of 
families who were the ones to have emerged victorious from the internal political 
struggle of the decisive years of the Risorgimento. The outcome that this institutional 
solution gave to the historical process of unification has been that, at the moment in 
which the great mass of the people entered into the life of the state, the traditional
51 G. Dozza, cit. 30th June, 1960.
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state, the centralised monarchical state went into crisis...
...something very simitar has happened in the general organisation of the state and has 
also substantially affected the comune. . /  because although, ‘we are infinitely closer to 
the needs of the population...we have not yet succeeded, all of us who are here, in 
acquiring a precise knowledge of every aspect of the city.’52 *
But such a perception of the multi-dimensional reality of the urban mass could only be 
developed through the experience of collectively undertaken common tasks:
‘...the phases which we have called...the reconstruction and the renewal’, and through 
which, ‘we have arrived at a sense of the city, at a perception of the sense of its life, 
we have come to be, if you will permit us the expression, the governing class in the 
ambit of the city, and the more we are the governing class, the more we feel the need 
to respond lo needs which are not just those advanced by one section of the 
population.,53
This disarmingly frank assertion of Socialist/Communist hegemony, while appearing 
to add weight lo the DC hypothesis that the decentralisation scheme might be an 
elaborate ploy to impose socialcommunist domination on the new migrant districts, 
more probably represented a genuine example of the evolutionary alliance strategy 
which the left saw as offering a solution lo its exclusion from the ‘constitutional arc’. 
Having been comprehensively excluded from a role in the national leadership of the 
country, the Communists were determined through Uieir alliance with the Socialists 
and in their dialogue with progressive Catholics to demonstrate that if political 
pluralism was a dead letter in the ministries of Rome, in the Comune di Bologna it 
was about to assume an innovative and dynamic form.
52 Crocioni, cit. 30th June.
S3 Ibid.
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3. Alliance Strategy and the First Phase o f Decentralisation. 1960-1967.
An encouraging sign for this strategy of rapprochement with the centre came when 
professor Ardigò for the Christian Democrats replying to a motion approving the 
regulations for the neighbourhood centres and the participatory organisations 
declared,
’We hope that the development of political forces is such that the experience of 
the quartieri has been initiated within a changed climate of political alliance, and...we 
hope that the possibility of innovation will not be subverted but guaranteed in this 
experiment, which obviously goes beyond the problems of political alliance, but which 
evidently has a precise significance in the extent to which one connects 
(decentralisation) to the problems of political alliance and to the formation of a policy 
of organic synthesis which sees its roots in the consiglio comunale, in the comune, in 
the region, in the state and which does not envisage problems of counter-position and 
opposition.’54
The inter-party consensus on the need to provide a democratic voice to the ever 
expanding periphery had already found its concrete expression with the institution of 
the quartieri the previous April. After the supervisory approval for the council's 
decision on the subdivision of the city into fifteen quartieri, the consiglio comunale 
fixed The boundaries of each of the quartieri',  which provided for the following 
(district) denominations: Borgo Panigaie, Santa Viola, Saffi, Lame, Bolognina, 
Corticella, San Donato, San Vitale, Mazzini, Murri, San Rutililo, Colli, 
A.Costa-Saragozza, Barca, and Centro.55
On the 29th March, 1963 the consiglio comunale defined the democratic structure of
54 Achille Ardigò, speech lo the consiglio comunale. 29th March, 1963 in Dieci anni di 
decentramento, cit. p.3ó.
55 See Figure 5.
219
the neighbourhood councils together with the powers and duties of the deputy mayors 
which were to be instituted in each quartiere. The composition of each neighbourhood 
council was fixed at twenty councillors, ‘nominated through secondary elections by 
the consiglio comunale, preferably from people resident in the quartiere, on the 
independent recommendation of single council groups in proportion to the 
representation of the various groups in the council chamber.’ The mayor retained the 
right to appoint the deputy mayors on the recommendation of the consiglio comunale 
who in turn delegated this function to the CCD.56 This year also saw the first 
concrete manifestation of the decentralisation process with the installation of the 
neighbourhood births, deaths and marriages registries and the first area based field 
social workers.57
The ‘elections’ for the neighbourhood councils and the nominations of the deputy 
mayors for all the civic neighbourhoods with the exception of the centre, were held on 
the 29th April, 1964. However, it would be more accurate to describe the selection of 
candidates as ‘nominations’ since the neighbourhood councillors were actually 
‘elected’ by their party representatives in the consiglio comunale in proportion to the 
seats won by each party.58 In the same sitting the consiglio comunale approved the 
directive which allowed for the creation of neighbourhood offices with provision for 
an office for the registration of births, deaths and marriages, social services,
56 This was for constitutional reasons, the law on the regulation of provincie and comuni 
of 1915 allowed the sindaco to appoint ‘aides' (aggiunti) where the size of the comune 
was such that some form of executive delegation beyond the giunta was necessary (in 
practice for cities with populations of 100,000 or more). Until the 1976 reform (see 
below) all municipal participatory bodies other than the council executive and council 
committees (commissions) were legally considered as ‘emanations from the sindaco.'
57 Giuseppe Longo. ‘Decentrare per costruire le decisioni’, Parametro. No.ól, Year III, 
November, 1977, pp.8-15.
58 Vincenzo Galleti, ‘Nuovo rapporto tra stalo e cittadino nell’esperienza dei quartieri a 
Bologna’, in Terracini, U. (et al) La riforma dello stato. Editori Riuniti/Istituto Gramsci, 
Rome, 1968, p.215.
information, the municipal police and the secretariat of the neighbourhood council and 
the deputy mayor. The swearing in of Italy’s first neighbourhood councillors and 
deputy mayors took place on the 5th June, 1964.
At the sitting of the consiglio comunale on the 16th July, 1965 the council 
reconfirmed its commitment lo the decentralisation process, having renominated the 
CCD on the 7th June.
On the basis of the provision contained in article 5 of the regulations for the 
democractic organisation of the quartiere concerning the possibilty of ’...nominating 
persons recommended by other political forces present in the democratic life of the 
community but not present in the consiglio comunale’ the Italian Republican Party was 
assigned a seat on the neighbourhood councils even though llie PRI’s list in the 
elections did not reach the quota necessary to obtain representation on the consìglio 
comunale.59
This was a clear sign of the PCI’s intention to use the mechanism of decentralisation 
as a means of building political consensus at a neighbourhood and city-wide level.
The consigli di quartieri offered the possibility of a different quality of political 
relationship with the parties of opposition than that provided through the consiglio 
comunale precisely because the executive role of the quartiere was circumscribed by 
existing legislation. The neighbourhoods offered the possibility of dialogue without 
risk, and many of the ideas which the giunta would hesitate about presenting directly 
to the consiglio comunale could be introduced at the level of the quartieri where the 
degree of cooperation was greater and the atmosphere was more conducive to 
innovation. In this way the quartieri spread the impact of the Communist dominance 
of the local polity by decentrili» the focus of political attention if not the actual site of 
political power.
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The strategy of consenus was also revealed in the political composition of the eight
M Zacchini, B. Introduction to Dieci anni di decentramento, cit. p.3.
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deputy mayors which included three representatives from the PCI, three from the PSI, 
one from the PSIUP and two from the DC. The Socialist assessore for 
decentralisation, Pietro Crocioni, emphasised that the institutional formulation of 
decentralisation was such as to,
‘guarantee...the deputy mayor the possibility of widening his executive function in the 
field of administration without as a result assuming the responsibility of the majority 
(on the consiglio comunale) and without losing the qualities of the minority forces, 
(while) at the same time, insuring the executive organs of the comune, the mayor and 
the giunta, against every possible risk connected with the attribution of the office of 
deputy mayor to men with whom there exists no common party responsiblity nor even 
the same political orientation.’60
This was a subtle gesture on the part of the ruling Communist group, for in the 
assertion of the relative autonomy of the deputy mayors there was the caveat that this 
‘autonomy’ must not be abused. Opposition politicians would be tolerated as 
figure-heads of their local community but only to the extent that they observed the 
rules of the game. The DC was in no position to challenge this orthodoxy since 
Ardigò had gone to great lengths in the Libro Bianco and in his several speeches in 
the council chamber to assert the need to preserve the ‘organic integrity’ of the 
neighbourhoods against any ‘politizazzione’ by the parties, his own, by implication, 
included.
After the creation of the fifteen ‘peripheral’ neighbourhoods, the comune turned its 
attention in the latter half of the 1960s to the problem of the ancient city centre. Over 
the previous ten years the centro storico had suffered from a prolonged drift of its
/O
traditional population ‘fuori le mura?, displaced by a combination of rapidly rising 
property prices and badly maintained and provided housing. The community was an 
ageing and increasingly disaggregated one with no focus for its discontents or means
60 Pietro Crocioni, assessore for decentralisation and civic centres, in Dieci anni di 
decentramento, ibid. p.3.
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of expressing its collective identity. Later initiatives such as the ‘piano centro 
storico’*1 attempted to tackle the urbariis^dimension of this problem, but without the 
means of local political expression it was felt that any centrally imposed solution 
would be inadequate.
The CCD therefore requested the Decentralisation Office of the council to conduct a 
research project on the distribution of the population, the institutions and the 
sociological structure of the centro storico. The enquiry’s report recommended the 
subdivision of the urban centre into four quartieri: Galvani, Irnerio, Malpighi and 
Marconi, a measure which the consiglio comunale unanimously approved at its sitting 
on the 5th December, 1966.61 2 63With the increase in the number of quartieri to 
eighteen, the ‘villagisation’ of the urban fabric which Dossetti and his supporters had 
campaigned so vigorously for appeared to have established itself as the criterion for 
progress towards urban integration.
The neighbourhood councils were also being gradually invested with more 
discretionary powers such as control of municipal infant and nursery school rolls and 
local public libraries. The planning commissions of the consigli di quartieri were also 
to be consulted on building licences in their localities and on the proposals for the new 
town plan which was eventually approved in 1969.*3
By the spring of 1967, every district of the city was represented through its own 
consiglio di quartiere. As the most recent central quartieri were instituted, the 
established neighbourhoods were consolidating their presence and their role in the life 
of the city through an increasing participation in the most important decisions of 
municipal policy: the budget debate (1966), the piano collinare (concerning the 
development and environment of the hillside districts of Bologna) (1967), variations to
61 See Comune di Bologna, PEEP Centro Storico - Relazione illustrativa generale 
dell’assessore aH’edilizia pubblica. 9lh October, 1972, and part three below.
62 See Figure 6.
63 Longo, G. ‘Decentrare per costruire le decisioni', cit.
Figure 6. The auartieri in December, 
neighbourhoods. 1966 showing the new centro stnrim
the general town plan (PRG) (1968-9), (and more generally) urban development, 
traffic, and education and social welfare policy.
The following section examines the development of decentralisation in the context of 
the new regulations for the neighbourhood councils which were to heiald the ‘second 
phase’ of decentralisation.
4. Demos in Suburbia: The Second Phase of Decentralisation. 1968-1973.
In the course of a wide-ranging debate held between December 1968 and March 1969, 
the consiglio comunale produced a balance-sheet on the working experience 
undertaken in the first five years of life of the democratic neighbourhood organisations 
and defined the directions for the realisation of the ’secondo tempo’ (the second 
phase) of decentralisation, or in other words of a ’more incisive passage to power and 
functions in the quartieri.’6*
The final document indicated the need to move towards, ’a greater, effective 
decentralisation of services’ which would conform to the intendon of article 12 of the 
establishment regulations, ’...as far as concerns educational activity, social welfare 
activity, sports and recreational grounds and gardens, the municipal police service, the 
aim is to create a greater widening of popular participation in the most direct way for 
the solution of the problems of the quartiere, in strict collaboration with those of the 
comune. ’
In line with this general perspective on participation, a regulation was proposed for 
the consigli di quartiere which provided for the creation of consultative commissions 
to which the neighbourhood councillors had to have recourse, not only for the 64
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64 Comune di Bologna, Secondo tempo del decentramento ed attuazione. Atti del dibatitto 
consiliare, dicembre 1968 - marzo 1969. ‘The theme of the college of deputy mayors is 
"Second phase yes, but for change!" - Remo Pizzi, Deputy Mayor for the quartiere of 
Bolognina, p.67.
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collection of data or useful material for the exercise of their functions, but in order to 
achieve a widening of the participative base. On these commissions it was also 
intended to include non-members of the neighbourhood council. This regulation 
served to assimilate the experience already in progress in the quartieri in relation to 
die neighbourhood commissions and had the intention of providing uniform criteria 
and methods for the ‘new articulations' of neighbourhood activity.65
In consideration of the growing tasks of the quartieri and of the need, highlighted by 
llie deputy mayors, for periodic meetings to collectively examine the problems of the 
quartieri in relation to the general problems of the city, the consiglio comunale in its 
sitting of 10th March, 1969 agreed upon the creation of the ‘college of deputy 
mayors’. The function of this new body was to ‘guarantee, according to the criteria on 
the responsibilities of the deputy mayors, ‘the best exercise of the development of the 
democratic life of the neighbourhood organs.’66
The decisions of the consiglio comunale were gradually implemented with the 
decentralisation, after a year of experiment, of nuclei of municipal police ‘fuori le 
mure’ (outside the walls of the ancient city) (1970), with the allocation to the quartieri 
of new responsibilities and functions in the fields of welfare and schooling: admissions 
to the. municipal primary after-school clubs, to crèches, to summer camps and to 
climactic therapy institutions, the renting of municipal buildings for educational use, 
the organisation of courses for gymnastic therapy, use of sports facilities; in the sector 
of town planning: decisions on the siting of secondary urban construction works, 
examination of building licence applications; and with the decentralisation of cultural 
intitialives in collaboration with the Teatro Comunale and other cultural institutions. *25
65 Introductory speech to the consiglio comunale on the theme of the development of the 
politics of decentralisation by assessore Federico Castellucci, in ‘Sviluppo della politica 
del decentramento democratico’, Bologna. Documenti del Comune. No.3, 1970, pp.24-
25.
46 ACC, 10th March, 1969.
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The realisation of the 'second phase’ of decentralisation nevertheless met with 
difficulties and obstacles both in regard to the old structure of the communal apparatus 
and in the opposition of the supervisory authorities. The regulations for the meeting 
of the consigli di quartiere, and in particular the article relating to neighbourhood 
commissions, did not obtain the approval of the GPA. As a result, the commissions 
were not able to organise themselves as consultative organs of the consigli di 
quartiere. Moreover the consigli di quartiere, according to the interrelation of the 
supervisory authorities, could not be considered as anything other than ‘colleges for 
consultation and information’ and any decision making capacity was by implication 
specifically proscribed.
The consiglio comunale was called to discuss this problem in February 1970 and 
reaffirmed the choices and the directions which had emerged in the previous debates, 
approving unanimously a motion which proposed various recommendations to the 
neighbourhood organisations on the criteria for the constitution of permanent or 
temporary consultative commissions, ‘on the express condition dial these deal with 
supplementary interventions, assistance and articulations which are performed..in 
cooperation with the consigli di quartiere which obviously remain the only collegial 
organs of decentralisation.’67
The themes of decentralisation which were developed in the debate of February 
re-emerged during the administrative and regional elections of the 7th June 1970, 
reflecting a wide political consensus on the need to transform the quartieri into real 
autonomous decision-making centres with adequate administrative support and 
finance.68
67 Comune di Bologna / Assessorato al Decentramento e ai Centri Civici, Problemi del 
decentramento democratico. Bologna 9(h - 1-Uh February. 1970. p.75.
68 See Vivere a Bologna. Programme for the Communists and the independents of the list 
‘Due Torri’ for the administrative elections of llie 7th June, 1970; Per la Bologna degli 
anni SO. Programme of the Christian Democratic Parly (ditto); Per il Comune di 
Bologna. Programme of the PSI (dillo); Programma del PSITJP, (ditto).
226
The new giunta in its programmatic declaration emphasised that, ‘decentralisation and 
participation must be unrenounceable moments in the process of the construction of a 
real democracy, through which the citizens are placed in a condition to exercise their 
power not exclusively through the vote but in the daily process of collective life, 
arriving at a management of the local authority (which is) as direct and least delegated 
as possible.’49
With the establishment of the regions in 1970 a new chapter in the history of local 
government decentralisation in Italy had opened. For the first time the quartieri were 
officially recognised as a unit of local government in the statute of the 
Emilia-Romagna region.69 70 While the democratic organs of decentralisation were 
seen as an ‘operative realisation of the constitutional principles on autonomy and 
decentralisation’, and an opportunity for the widening of spaces for popular 
participation in the political choice and management of important services.71
An example of the less belligerent attitude which llie regional organs of control 
(Coreco) displayed in their dealings with local authorities can be seen in the positive 
solution which was found for the long-standing problem of the reimbursement of 
expenses for the deputy mayors whose payment had been previously forbidden by lite 
GPA. In 1972, the comuni were also able to assign modest funds to the quartieri lor 
cultural activities and miscellaneous inlitiatives (1972), but most important of all the 
new regional reforms made it possible to provide the quartieri with wider powers and 
functions through a new regulation which was more consonnanl with the needs lor the 
development of democratic participation.
The giunta and the decentralisation commission had two main objectives which they 
wished to see achieved by the end of the second phase of decentralisation. The first 
was the need to move ahead with the delegation of the social management of services
69 Dieci anni di decentramento, cit. p.ó.
70 Statuto della Regione Emilia-Romagna, Aris. 5, 38 &  54.
71 Dieci anni di decentramento, cit. p.ó.
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to the quartieri, while the second concerned the widening of democracy through the 
instruments of participation in the form of citizens’ assemblies and the working 
commissions ‘open to the public and to the various organisations and expressions of 
civil society.’
In the neighbourhoods themselves the debate on the recommendations of the consiglio 
comunale was accompanied by the concrete implementation of new forms of 
participation, with much stronger links with workers’ organisations and the 
recreational and sporting organisations and a deeper examination of the problems of 
schooling and social management.72
The consiglio comunale approved a document on the 28th April, 1971 which affirmed, 
‘...the necessity of proceeding to the definition of the precise contents of the powers 
of the quartieri, and at the same time making the functions of the decentralised offices 
more adequate so that the institutional structure of the quartieri itself will come to 
assume a more specific and qualified characterisation aimed above all at guaranteeing 
the instruments and the means for social management.' To this end the council 
commission on decentralisation was charged with elaborating new proposals for the 
specification of the functions of the decentred organs and for the revision of the 
already existing regulations.73
The phase following the debate of April, 1971 was one of intense political activity and 
policy implementation - (including) the planned programme for capital investments 
(piano programma) 1972-75, the plans for the restoration of the historic centre, for the 
improvement and the restructuring of the network of distribution, for traffic and 
transport, the town planning programme, the territorial definition of the local health
72 Giuseppe Longo, ‘L’esperienza del decentramento amministrativo-organizzativo e della 
partecipazione nei consigli’, in C. Doglio, L. Fasoli, P. Guidicini (Eds), Misure umane. 
Un dibattito intemazionale sul borgo, città, quartiere, comprensorio. Franco Angeli, 
Milan, 1978.
731 quartieri e lo sviluppo della politica di decentramento. ACC, 2$th Aprii 1971.
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and social services authorities and the drawing-up of a statute for the new authorities, 
the institution of neighbourhood clinics and a network of crèches, and the 
restructuring of the technical and maintenance services of the council.
All these initiatives were characterised by a more extensive and informed intervention 
by the quartieri in the fundamental decisions of llie city and in the management of 
municipal services. The higher social and political profile of the quartieri was also due 
to the proliferation of neighbourhood commissions and citizens’ assemblies.74
Between October 1970 and March 1975, the quartieri held 1,666 meetings and 
organised a total of 10,446 neighbourhood commission sessions, public meetings, 
assemblies and other local initiatives. Subjects ranged from the PRG to the annual 
budget estimates, from the examination of the local economic situation to the plan for 
economic services in the localities, and from the management of social services lo 
nurseries, infant schools and ‘full-day’ schools.
Education registered by far the highest number of participatory initiatives with as 
many as 3,753 encounters on the theme of the school and schooling. The interest 
shown by the Bolognese in their children’s education was also revealed in one of the 
highest voting rates for educational authority representatives in Italy.75 Other policy 
issues provoked strong interest, particularly town planning, traffic and commerce 
(2,852 initiatives) and social and health policy (2,182). The latter grew in importance 
in the first half of the 1970s will) an increase in the number of public assemblies 
organised by the neighbourhood council increasing from 14 in 1972 lo 75 in 1974. 
The decentralisation office affirmed that the stimulation to neighbourhood democracy 
which the ‘second phase’ regulations had provided was evident in the 111 sittings 
which council commission on decentralisation had held over the five years and in the
74 Ibid.
75 Comune di Bologna / Assessorato al decentramento e di partecipazione democratica e
ai centri civici, Cinque anni di decentramento in cifre, internal council mimeograph, May 
1975.
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165 meetings organised by the college of deputy mayors (collegio degli aggiunti del 
sindaco).76
One of the most important actions of the council commission on decentralisation was a 
new set of proposals for the regulation of the neighbourhood organs and the design of 
a programme for the development of decentralisation policy over a period of several 
years. The programme indicated what the comune considered to be llie fundamental 
directives and instruments necessary for die realisation of ‘phase two' of the 
decentralisation process and these proposals received the overwhelming support of the 
city council with the exception of the Liberal Party which chose to abstain on certain 
parts of the document.77
In October 1973 the city council approved a motion proposed at the end of a 
conference on the ‘quartieri and cultural and recreational associations’ which called 
for a greater decentralisation of cultural services in line with the decision of the 2nd 
July, 1971,78 the institution of civic centres, greater experimentation with the 
management of cultural and recreational sendees and a closer involvement of cultural 
and recreational organisations in the development of local cultural policy via ‘open 
commissions’ linked to the consigli di quartiere.79
Earlier in February of that year, the council commission on decentralisation had
76 Ibid. On the neighbourhood councils and the ‘new left’ in Bologna during this period, 
see below, chapter eight, part one.
77 Comune di Bologna, Per un ulteriore torme di decentramento e di partecipazione 
democratica (Proposte per la definizione dei compiti e delle funzioni dei quartieri 1). 
1972.
78 Ordine, del giorno del consiglio comunale per il decentramento delle attività culturali. 
ACC 2nd July, 1971.
79 L’ordine del giorno conclusivo del convegno su ‘Ouatieri e associazionismo culturale
e ricreativo1. ACC óth October, 1973.
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presented its proposals for the new structure of the quartieri which were lo form the 
basis of the reforms agreed in March 1974.80 The programmatic document indicated 
the two fundamental directives which the development of the politics of 
decentralisation should follow:
‘cooperation of the quartieri in the determination of municipal politics and, via the 
comune, territorial, provincial and regional policy...the attribution of precise powers 
to the quartieri as part of the realisation in Uieir territory of these policies though the 
means of the obligatory expression of general opinions on the material which has been 
specifically defined...comprising all the fundamental sectors of intervention of the 
local authority...’ 81
The neighbourhood councils were expected to provide optional general opinions (on 
city-wide policy such as planning, traffic, the environment etc.), compulsory specific 
opinions (on for example the siting of a school or a civic centre). Neighbourhood 
authorities were also required to hold informational hearings, to exercise the functions 
and powers delegated to them by the comune, the province, the region and 
administrative consortia (the water company, ACOSER, the hygiene and sanitation 
department, AMIU, and the transport authority ATC); to promote citizen participation 
and the participation of social formations operating in their neighbourhoods.’82
This was to say the least a daunting prospect for a neighbourhood council with only 
twenty councillors, a very small budget and few personnel. Little attention had 
actually been given lo the practical obstacles lo a comprehensive decentralisation of 
responsibilities. Many of these criticisms emerged through die process of consultation
80 Impegno programmatico per un ulteriore sviluppo della politica di deeentramentoT 
ordine del giorno, 4lh, 8th and 13th March, 1974 in ‘Per un ulteriore sviluppo del 
decentramento e della partecipazione democratica, (Dibattilo consiliare)’, Bologna. 
Documenti del Comune. No.3, March 1974, pp.Sl-S5.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
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which the decentralisation commission promoted through the neighbourhoods 
themselves and in the many public meetings organised around the theme of ‘per un 
ulteriore sviluppo del decentramento e della partecipazione democratica’ (for a further 
development of decentralisation and democratic participation) held between 1973 and 
1974. The data collected in this way was collated by the CCD and incorporated into a 
series of reform proposals which were put before the city council in (he spring of 
1974.
The March 1974 regulations created a new relationship between the consigli di 
quartiere and the municipal administration which was lo provide the neighbourhood 
councils with much greater powers of initiative in their dealings with the central 
municipal authorities. The quartieri were also able to question the giunta more 
closely on a wider range of policies and they were able to participate in joint activities 
with the commissions of the consiglio comunale. The consigli di quartiere were also 
given greater control over their own affairs with the election of the neighbourhood 
presidents by the council itself, the creation of a secretariat office composed of the 
president and the group leaders (on the neighbourhood council) which had the function 
of assisting the president in the selling of the agenda for the council meetings and 
maintaining contacts between neighbourhood councillors and the working commissions 
(commissioni di lavoro) of the quartiere.
It was clear from the debates and resolutions on the theme of ‘un ulteriore sviluppo’ 
that neither the consiglio comunale nor the consigli di quartiere were naive enough to 
believe that the ‘delegation of power’ could be anything other than a symbolic sign of 
the good intentions of the comune, since the legal restrictions on a proper functioning 
of neighbourhood administrative autonomy still applied. The comune and the quartieri 
of Bologna had to wait until 1976 for Rome to finally approve the municipal reforms 
which the Eolognese had begun sixteen years previously.33 However by 83
83 Law No. 278/1976 which gave formal powers to the quartieri and required every city 
with more than lOO.tXX) inhabitants to create consigli di quartieri which were to be 
elected by direct suffrage at the same time as municipal and regional elections.
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‘institutionalising’ and regulating the neighbourhood councils, much of the spontaneity 
and initiative, argued politicians from across the political spectrum, was in danger of 
being lost.84 This deficit between the participatory impulse of many reformist 
politicians and bureaucrats and the means to implement democratic control over 
municipal policy-making at a neighbourhood level was no more clearly illustrated than 
in the attempt to introduce democratic planning in the Comune di Bologna. The 
following section considers the problems which the ‘new wave’ of radical planners 
experienced in the 1960s and 1970s in designing schemes for public housing and new 
residential districts and the new political climate which gave rise to the PEEP 
projects.
Part m . Communism, Construction & Conservation. Urban Planning and the 
Development of the PEEP Projects in Bologna 1964-1978.
1. Planning Bologna in the 1960s.
If Amendola had insisted on the symbiotic link between democracy and economic 
development, the new assessore for town planning, Giuseppe Campos Venuti, was 
equally convinced that what had blighted Italy’s cities in the second half of the 1950s 
was not the economic miracle but its monopolistic component which had made a 
mockery of any notion of ‘democratic planning’.85 The entire emphasis of Christian 
Democrat policy in the 1950s had been on rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, but 
with very little concern for the long-term impact that massive rural-urban migration 
would have on the social fabric of northern Italy. The PCI had consistently called for
84 See the several interventions of city councillors contained in ‘Funzioni deliberative 
delegale ai quartieri. Nuova normativa per le commissioni dipartimentali' in Bologna. 
Documenti del Comune. No.3-4, March-April, 1983.
85 Giuseppe Campos Venuti, ‘Relazione sul Piano Inler-comunale’ in Casabella- 
Continuità. No.269, 1962 cited in Ceccarelli & Gallingani cit. p.176.
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a national planning body which could manage the process of transformation in a 
rational and effective manner, and although Fanfani experimented with economic 
planning, it suited neither Confinduslria nor the Dorotei to institute controls on an 
economy which was one of the least regulated and most successful in Western 
Europe.w The democratic planning of the local and national economy and llie urban 
infrastructure were therefore important elements in the Communist Party’s alternative 
strategy, and it was logical that after the 1959 regional conference where economic 
planning was one of the most important themes in the discussion theses that Red 
Bologna should fulfil the role of ‘laboratorio’ for the socially conscious planning 
which the PCI was seeking to promote.
The Communist Party was in a far better position lo initiate such a programme at the 
start of the 1960s because it was able lo benefit from the expertise of a number of 
young, professionally qualified activists who were excited by tlie prospect of
*6 Ginsborg describes how Fanfani's ascendancy over the government and the DC in the 
late 1950s represented an early attempt at an ‘opening to the left* and to the creation of 
a Fanfani led DC-PSI alliance which, ‘would be a firm basis for social planning, for 
moderate reform and for further public intervention in llie economy’ and which would 
guarantee the permanent exlusion of the PCI from government. However, Fanfani was 
to be eclipsed by a coalition of opponents within his own faction (Iniziativa Democratica) 
and the centre-right Dorotei grouping led by Mariano Rumor. With the triumph of the 
cenlre-right at the Seventh Parly Congress of the DC in October 1959, as Ginsborg 
writes, ‘...any possibility of a new politics was postponed, at the very moment when 
economic conditions were most favourable.’ [Ginsborg, eit.pp.255-256) Although some 
leading industrialists such as Vittorio Valletta were in favour of limited economic 
planning (on their terms) under the centre-left, the president of Confindustria, Furio 
Cicogna and the thousands of small capitalists he represented were decidedly against any 
state intervention in the economy and as Ginsborg points out, ‘The entrepreneurial class, 
knowing that their profits in the ‘miracle’ depended on low wages and lack of workers’ 
organization, were not slow to gel the message.’ Ginsborg, cit. p.265.
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combining a professional career with their political vocation.87 The new generation 
of planners and architects like Campos Venuti therefore saw their work as part of a 
wider political struggle against the sort of speculative building which had defaced 
virtually every Italian city, but they were confident enough lo attack the ‘big is 
beautiful’ obsessions of previous administrators.88 Campos Venuti and his colleagues 
were also much more prepared to challenge the economic and political constraints 
which local authorities faced in the provision of affordable, spacious and comfortable 
housing for ordinary working-class families. Planning from above, they argued, had 
produced ghetto communities into which new migrants were coralled with little 
thought for the amenities and services necessary for a functioning, integrated 
neighbourhood.
However Ceccarelli and Gallingani argue that it would be wrong to assume that the 
enthusiasm for decentralisation extended to the town planning process itself. Far from 
integrating urban planning with the decentralisation of municipal services as Dossetti 
had recommended in the Libro Bianco, in its first phase of municipal reform, the 
giunta deliberately separated the decentralisation commission from the technical 
planning office. According to Ceccarelli and Gallingani, the reason for this was that 
certain members of the giunta (such as Pietro Crocioni) had reservations about the 
transfer of ‘higher municipal functions' to the decentralised organs or lay 
commissions. As we saw in the previous section, it was only in the ‘second phase’ of 
decentralisation that the administration acceeded to popular pressure and agreed to a 
limited transfer of town planning powers to the neighbourhood councils. However,
87 An early sign of Fanti’s intention lo overhall the ancien regime of functionaries in 
Palazzo d’Accursio was the appointment of Giuseppe Campos Venuti as head of the city’s 
planning department. This was an example of technocratic ‘head-hunting’ by the 
Communist reformers who persuaded the young architect to move from Rome where he 
had recently graduated. Interview with Renalo Zangheri, cit.
88 Campos Venuti explicitly recognised urban planning as a key component of the ‘via 
italiana al socialismo’ in his article, ‘Urbanistica, battaglia politica e lotte sociali in 
Emilia-Romagna’, Critica Marxista. No.ó, 1969, pp.74-87.
we must be careful not to assume as Ceccarelli and Gallingani seem to imply that such 
a separation of functions is proof of institutional resistance to popular participation.39 
In the case of Bologna, the town-planning agenda of the 1960s was certainly 
‘institutionally driven' in that the radical visions for the transformation/preservation of 
the city which became known as ‘radical conservation’ were the product of years of 
intense work by Campos Venuti and his successor Pier Luigi Cervellali, both of 
whom were working from an explicitly ‘political' set of planning values. That this 
town-planning culture became a canopy under which a myriad of different user- 
groups, tenants’ associations, neighbourhood councils, and popular planning 
commissions sheltered is a testament lo the. success of the planning department’s early 
response to many of the key demands which were made by urban movements in the 
late 1960s.50
Although the radical planning agenda reached its apogee in the late 1960s, the 
transformation in the political culture, of town planning dated from the mid-1950s 
where at the 5th Congress of the National Institute of Town Planners (INU)51, *
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M The preparatory document for the second regional conference of the Emilia-Romagna 
federations of the PCI in 1962 called for local groups to take part in the development of 
urban and district plans which would have an ‘anti-monopolist character* and which 
would aim at improving the city-country relationship by extending the experience of 
collaboration between the locally elected authorities and organisations present within civil 
society itself. Clearly within the PCI the political will existed for an extension of popular 
participation to the planning process, but the proposal only acquired a concrete form in 
the second phase of decentralisation which began in 1968. Therefore, while Ceccarelli 
and Galingani are right to suggest that there was little practical evidence of ‘democratic 
planning’ throughout most of the 1960s, this was not because town planning had been 
declared off-limits to decentralisation, but because the entire reform process proceeded 
at a very slow pace. Barbiani & Conti, cit. p.192.
90 For a fuller discussion of social movements and urban planning see the final section 
of part two in chapter six.
91 The conference was held in Genoa in 1954 and was attended by Giuseppe Dozza.
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delegates criticised the laissez-faire approach to urban development which had left 
nearly every major Italian city without a PRG as required by the town-planning law of 
1942. As we saw in chapter two, there were very good reasons why in the mid-1950s 
many authorities were not in a position to present such a plan to the Ministry of 
Public Works, and Bologna was no exception. The war had caused so much damage 
to the urban infrastructure of Italy’s northern cities that re-development had been 
based on the ad hoc criteria of the ‘piano regolatore* which allowed local authorities 
to clear derelict zones and assign new commercial, industrial or residential status to 
these afflicted areas.
At that time, the massive influx of population was not considered a problem by 
planners, and the need to make provision for the new urban migrants was only 
acknowledged by a few forward looking architects’ departments. Only in 195S was 
the general town plan for Bologna finally approved by the Ministry of Public Works, 
and it quickly became obvious to the planners who were required to implement it that 
while the plan may have been able to meet the needs of the Bologna of the 1950s, it 
was woefully inadequate for the problems which the comune was to face in the 
following decade. Like many of the other plans of the time, the Bologna PRG of 195S 
was characterised by a scarcity of public services and a very high density of 
population.92 Only with the introduction of Law 167 on the planning of public 
housing schemes (piani per l’edilizia economica)93 in 1962 and the decree on 
planning standards which was included in llie so-called ‘Bridge Law’ (legge ponte) of 
1968 were legal limits set on the density, height, and proximity of habitations and a 
minimal provision of public space and services established.
92 For the background to the plan, see above, chapter four, section four.
93 A bill which was introduced in 1962 by the Christian Democrat minister Sullo would 
have provided a genuinely radical town planning law. The bills main provisions were the 
integration of town planning with public housing provision and the delegation of strategic 
planning controls to the regions. However, in the 1963 electoral campaign, Sullo’s own 
party denounced the bill and the chance to halt the despoliation of Italy’s cities was lost.
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Campos Venuti’s principal task was to revise the 195S PRG in order to create new 
residential zones which could accomodate the city's rapidly expanding new migrant 
population. Between 1951 and 1961 the annual completion rates for residential 
buildings had averaged 17,000 rooms, while as we have seen, in that same period the 
population had increased from nearly 340,000 to 445,000. However, only 
approximately 20% of the accomodation constructed in the 1950s was built by tire 
public housing agencies, and although there was an over-supply of expensive 
apartments for professional and middle-class tenants and buyers, working-class 
families faced overcrowding and long waits for nominations to the IACP housing 
schemes.
In May 1964, Campos Venuti recommended a new plan to the city council which 
proposed the construction of some 159,462 rooms over a ten year period 
(approximately equivalent lo 16,000 rooms a year) which would cover a site of S92 
hectares including 312 hectares devoted lo construction and 269 hectares of open 
space. The contracts were to be equally divided between the private sector and public 
housing agencies and building cooperatives. This plan was aimed at meeting the 
housing needs of the less well-off sections of Bologna's population without repeating 
the disastrous mistakes of the 1950s where slack planning regulations allowed the 
construction of high density apartment blocks ‘a machia d’olio.
Law 167 was used with great skill and imagination by the comune’s architects, for 
instead of attracting speculative development in the new urban periphery as many 
other town plans had, Campos Venuti and his staff used the law to infill undeveloped 
land between the centre and the metropolitan periphery. In this way Bologna’s 
planners succeeded in closing off large parts of the inner periphery to speculative 
developers.94 5 By 1970, 80,000 inhabitants had been provided with accomodation 
under the scheme. In addition to the initial 4 billion lire which was provided for the 
finance of urban development, public authorities and cooperative construction
94 See chapter four.
95 Angotti, cit. p.68,
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companies invested an additional 40 billion lire and Berlanda argues that some 56 
billion lire had been saved in property speculation by dedicating these residential 
districts to low rental public housing.96
Bologna's planning strategy in these years was moving in the opposite direction to 
public investment in the rest of the country. Della Seta showed that in 1952, 
construction for residential schemes accounted for 25% of all state investment, while 
in 1974, according lo Angotti, it had fallen to 3% of total investment, although 25% 
of all housing loans were financed by the government.97 However, Pier Luigi 
Cervellati who succeeded Campos Venuti as assessore for town planning, saw the 
problem of Italy’s cities as one of housing over-production. By 1973 the surplus of 
rooms to population in Italy was running at 9 million, and although 'second homes’ 
accounted for a large proportion of this total, the 'free’ private sector housing stock 
was the subject of such intense speculation that even the cost of renting became 
prohibitive for most working class families.
While public housing projects were suffering from chronic underfunding, the private 
sector was engaged in a massive expansion of residential housing which had doubled 
and tripled the circumference of cities such as Rome, Milan and Naples in the space 
of twenty years. Bologna’s local administrators were determined lo resist this 
tendency, particularly since many of the rapidly constructed quartieri which were built 
in the 1950s had suffered from this ‘build first, plan later’ mentality.
The Bologna ‘PEEP-plan’ was therefore aimed at avoiding the hectic suburban
96 Berlanda, ‘La variante del PR a Bologna’. Il Comune Democratico. 1970, No.2. pp.IS­
SÒ.
97 The Comune di Bologna’s ‘piano PEEP’ noted that state housing provision had 
diminshed from 26.6% of all housing construction in 1951 to 18.8% in 1961. Claudio 
Bertolazzi, Un piano per Bologna. Appello, Bologna, 19S9, pp.25-26. Luxury'residential 
housing districts could not be included in compulsory purchase schemes by local 
authorities.
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developments of the 1940s and 1950s by including minimum levels of service 
provision and open space in the planning specifications. As with many other PEEP 
plans at the time, the Bologna scheme was a response lo Law 167 which required 
councils with populations of over 50,000 inhabitants to draw up plans for the 
construction of mass, low-rental housing. The comune adopted its ‘piano PEEP’ in 
1963 and it received final approval in 1965. Because only about 3% of the housing 
stock in Bologna could be defined as ‘deluxe’ under the terms of the T.U. of 1938, 
the council used the provisions of the legislation to tackle the problem of public 
housing as a global problem and it refused lo merely limit itself to the provision of 
units of accomodation.9*
The technical appendix lo llie plan specified that the provisions of Law 167 would be 
used to freeze land prices at 1961 levels in order to prevent speculation in the areas 
set aside by the plan. The second objective of the plan was lo use the construction of 
public housing as an instrument for controlling urban development in general." The 
PEEP-plan incorporated three sites (Beverara, Barca, and Fessolo) which had been set 
aside for residential development by the PRG of 1958 and covered a total of 755 
hectares, although only 238 hectares were to be used for residential construction, 
while 222 hectares were dedicated to services and 295 hectares were given over to 
open space, parks and gardens. In all, the new housing areas were to be provided 
with 4 civic centres, 4 commercial centres, 3 religious centres, 8 infant schools, 4 
elementary schools, 3 middle schools, and 4 sports centres.98 100 In line with the 
comune’s educational policy, with the construction of these new schools, the city was 
to enjoy one of the highest quotients of educational provision in the country.101
98 Bertolazzi, C. cit. p.25.
99 Ibid. p.26.
100 Campos Venuti, Tl Peep a Bologna’ cit.
101 See Table 19.
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Table 19. Recommended government standards for educational provision and 
educational provision according to the Bologna Regulatory Plan of 1969.
Type of 
School
Age M2/Pupil Maximum on 
School Roll
School pop. 
as % of 
total
population
M2/Inhabit-
tant
M B M B M B M B
Nurseries 0-3 10 40 80 75 1.0 2.5 0.1 0.5
Infant schools 3-6 18 40 100 100 2.0 3.4 0.36 1.10
Junior schools 6-11 15 40 600 600 8.0 6.0 1.20 1.50
Middle schools 11-14 16 40 720 600 5.0 3.2 0.80 1.20
High schools 14-19 25 80 1,500 1,000 3.5 4.8 0.5 4.00
M = Ministry of Education 
B = Comune di Bologna
Source: Berlanda - ‘La Variante del PR a Bologna’
The projected living space which the plan provided for was designed to accomodate a 
population of 609,000 which was 140,000 more than the actual population at the time 
the plan was produced. Here again, the assumption was that for better or worse, 
Bologna was likely to continue to grow, and rather than allow the market to decide 
where Bologna’s future inhabitants would live, the city’s administrators believed that 
Bologna’s metropolitan transformation should be as coordinated and controlled as 
possible. Ceccarelli and Gallingani summarise this concept as ‘planning a metropolitan 
area without the metropolis’ but it was a tension which Campos Venuti and his 
successors were never able successfully to resolve as Bologna increasingly assumed
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the characteristics of a regional capital.101
If we can talk of a planning ‘mentality' in Bologna city council, one of its most self- 
limiting aspects in relation to the decentralisation process was the planning team’s 
inability or refusal to see the new housing projects as organically separate 
communities, and therefore worthy of independent political and administrative 
definition. Because the quartieri were over-laid onto existing ‘historic communities’ 
the new neighbourhoods which were proposed in the 1963 PEEP plan and the PRG of 
1969 (such as Via Fossolo which had a population at least as big as some of the 
smaller quartieri! appeared as satellite districts on the planners’ chart.102 03 This meant 
that even though Campos Venuti and his team subscribed to the rationalist ‘misura 
umana’ school of town planning in a formal sense, the political consequences of 
giving definition to the new urban centres would have meant falling back on the 
organic and essentially anti-modernist prescriptions of the Dossettians, and therefore 
the new projects fell between the conflicting images of quartiere and new residential 
zone.104
Paradoxically it was not in the ‘green field’ estates that the concept of community 
planning finally emerged as a defining characteristic of the ‘modello Bolognese’ but in 
the historic centre where, as we have seen, the creation of the neighbourhood councils 
encouraged the local inhabitants and local politicians to develop an imaginative 
strategy which could arrest the architectural and socio-economic decline of the oldest 
part of the centre.
102 Ceccarelli & Gallingani cit. p. 177.
103 Ibid, p.178.
104 Ibid.
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2. The PEEP-Centro Storico: A Lesson in Radical Conservation.
‘Bologna is the first industrial city in die Western world to 
have a central city renewal program diat aims to preserve the historic and social 
character of the urban environment by not displacing low income people from their 
homes. This renewal program is probably the only one of its land in a capitalist 
country. Its success is due to a basic political commitment by a Communist 
administration to reinforce the social foundations of the central core by improving the 
physical environment, increasing the level of services available to residents, and 
promoting democratic participation in decision making.’105
When in 1975, the Swiss journalist Sii Schmid, asked the PCI assessore for town 
planning. Pier Luigi Cervellati what he felt his achievements in the area of town 
planning had been, Cervellati replied candidly, “None’.106 The reason Cervellati 
gave for his negative evaluation of Communist planning in Bologna might not have 
been expected from one of the architects of administrative ‘rinovamento’ since he 
claimed that, ‘without public ownership of land there can be no socialist land 
policy.’107 Yet do Cervellali’s comments make nonsense of Angotti’s eulogy for the 
‘piano centro storico’? In an important sense the limited aims of the PCS could be 
said to constitute a major innovation in urban preservation and in the support of
105 Angotti, cit. p.73.
106 This position is also inconsistent with an earlier assessment of the importance of the 
PCS where Cervellati declared that, ‘..llie historic centre might be considered as the 
critical moment and the possible point of rupture with the capitalist logic of the city.’ 
P.L. Cervellati &  R. Scannavini (Eds), Bologna: Politica e metodologia del restauro net 
centri strorici. Il Mulino, Bologna, 1973, pp.9-10
107 Red Bologna, cit. p.45.
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historic communities as well as the urban fabric itself.108 Cervellati was merely 
insisting that the housing interventions of the comune had not and could not produce a 
miracle cure for the problems associated with rapid urbanisation and the depopulation 
of the centro storico.
The 1971 variant to the 1969 PRG laid the foundations for the PEEP-Centro Storico 
by establishing a moratorium on all new construction in the historic centre, the 
suppression of speculation in the periphery, the restriction of tertiary activities in the 
centre and the decentring of commercial and administrative functions. While support 
for the centro storico was to come from improving sendees and recreational space, the 
finance of housing rehabilitation, the improvement of transport links between llie 
centre and other parts of the region together with belter conditions for pedestrians in 
the city centre. But perhaps the most ambitious objective of the plan was the 
maintainance of a stable and socially mixed population.
The historic centre component of the second phase PEEP scheme was intended to 
provide 6,000 out of a total of 16,000 new housing units, but because nearly all of the 
centro storico dwellings contained existing tenants, the PCS was not intended to 
provide a significant net increase in housing. The plan was made possible because of 
a new housing law passed in 1971 (Law 865) which the Socialists had made a
108 This is borne out by an article in Corriere della Sera in which Leonardo Benevolo 
argues that the planning and restoration methods adopted by the Comune di Bologna 
served as an international model for future historic centre projects. The Bologna 
experience was considered so important that a Council of Europe town planning 
conference was held in the city in 1974 in order to discuss how the ancient city centres 
of Europe could be similarly defended against commercial and environmental threats. 
Benevolo described the Bolognese conservation strategy as, ‘the principal architectonic 
invention that Italy has contributed to world culture in the last ten years.’ ‘Restauro 
urbano: né finto antico né troppo nuovo’, Corriere della Sera. 13th December, 1978 in 
Comune di Bologna - Assessorato alla Programmazione e Assetto Urbano, Risanamento 
conservativo del centro storico di Bologna. Gralìcoop, Bologna, 1979, pp. 142-142.
Diagram 1. The Historic Centre - showing the first and second phases of the Piano 
PEEP.
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condition for llieir continuing support of the DC coalition government.1W The new 
legislation was a more powerful weapon in the armoury of local authorities than Law 
167 had been because it allowed councils to expropriate land for public housing at 
agricultural land prices rather than at die market rates of the previous year.109 10 1
Where the PCS differed from almost every other housing project in Europe at that 
time was in its commitment to maintain existing tenants in their homes by restoring 
and converting their run-down properties in order to provide modern facilities at pre­
existing rent levels. The comune was able to use the incentive of subsidised credit for 
building contractors together with the ultimate Uireat of expropriation at below market 
value in order to ‘induce* landlords to cooperate in the restoration scheme.
A total of five districts were selected for public housing from the thirteen areas 
assigned for restoration under the PRG of 1969. These five were chosen because they 
were almost exclusively working class neighbourhoods where the apartments were in 
urgent need of repair, restoration and modemisation.,n The choice of PEEP zones 
was made after a careful survey of all the properties in the centro storico in which 
buildings were divided into one of five categories. This was felt necessary because as 
Cervellati observed, the development of the city centre was the result of successive 
aggregations of morphological clusters each of which possessed a separate identity and 
architectural significance.112
109 The act also allowed a comune to declare part of its territory as a centro storico. The 
legislation was permissive rather than proscriptive and it contained no formal definition 
of a historic centre, although a comune had to make a provision in its regulatory plan or 
building plan if it wanted to architecturally intervene in the centro storico. P.L. Cervellati 
& R. Scannavini (Eds), Bologna: Politica e metodologia del restauro nei centri strorici. 
Il Mulino, Bologna, 1973, pp.47-48.
110 Red Bologna cit. p.53.
111 See Diagram 1.
112 Cervellati &  Scannavini, Politica e metodologia del restauro, cit. p . l l l .
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Depending on the age and state of repair of each property, the comune drew up a 
schedule for the contractors which specified how the work should be carried out. The 
schedule was similar to the ‘listed building* regulations which apply to historic 
buildings and monuments in Britain in that, for example, a 1A classified building 
permitted restoration of the fabric and interior of the building only according to the 
strict guidelines issued by the comune’s architects department. A category 2 building 
did not have to be preserved as carefully as a category 1 building, but where 
conservation was possible (category 2A) the contractor was obliged lo maintain the 
original features. The third category was assigned to severely dilapidated properties 
which required complete or partial demolition, but unless reconstruction was a 
practical impossibility the new building had to be a faithful copy of the original. In 
this way the planning department was able to establish its criteria for building 
restoration which could be summarised as; maintenance, consolidation, restoration, 
substitution and adaptation.113
Although the PCS did not receive full official approval until July, 1975, by then many 
of its main features had been initiated.
From March, 1973, 1.2 billion lire of national and municipal funds had been spent on 
the purchase of land and on the restoration and reconstruction of historic buildings.
By 1973, residential units for approximately 360 people had been completed. Not 
only did the PCS preserve the character and community of the historic centre, it was 
also a cheaper form of housing provision than building new dwellings, the comune 
estimated that for each square metre of residential property provided in the city 
centre, the council paid 200,000 lire, whereas in die periphery llie cost was 2 IS,000 
per square metre.114
The PCS was not able to fulfil the rather ambitious provision for an additional 6,000 
accomodation units which the 1969 PRG had planned, but this was not a great cause 
for concern for its designers. The emphasis of the PCS by the mid-1970s had almost
113 Risanamento conservativo, cit.p.24
114 Angotti, cit. p.75.
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entirely focused on the quality of municipal intervention and what planning 
professionals called ‘standards urbanistici’. Cervellati and his colleagues did not 
believe that the PCS could or should be a solution for the city's housing problem, 
instead they saw the plan for the historic centre as a means of defending the city’s 
cultural and egalitarian values and especially the traditional constituency of the left 
which was being slowly displaced by managers and professionals.115
The ‘tertiarisation’ of the inner-city presented opportunities as well as problems for 
the city’s administrators, and it is ironic that because of the scale and degree of 
localisation of the PEEP-Centro Storico projects, the planners began to talk in 
increasinly Dossettian terms of a new system of ‘cuori’ in the city. The centro storico 
was viewed as the ideal location for the re-birth of an integrated (or organic) 
community wherein the relationship between living space and work might be 
preserved.
This explained the emphasis in the PCS on maintaing traditional craft skills in the city 
centre by refurbishing old artisanal workshops and the support for the expansion of 
the University of Bologna within the centro storico after the ambitious plan to relocate 
the university campus in Ozzano had been quietly dropped.116 Cervellati had shown
115 If we take as our example the Solferino redevelopment zone (compartamento 5) of the 
PCS; the data from the census of 1961 and 1971 reveals that the percentage of 
entrepreneurs and senior manager family heads increased from 1.8% to 16.2% and that 
of white-collar employees from 20.7& to 21.2% while the proportion of self-employed 
workers fell from 36% to 31.3%, and dependent workers who made up 41.5% of all 
families in 1961 also declined lo 31.3% of the total neighbourhood population. However, 
although the employed working-class were diminishing in number, the increase in the 
proportion of retired residents in the centro storico from 5.1 % to 10.8% (many of whom 
were life-long Communist Party members) meant that the ‘embourgeoisement’ of the 
historic centre was less dramatic than it might at first appear.
m On the development of the University of Bologna after the war see chapter six, part 
one, below.
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that it was possible to contain the ‘tertiarisation’ of the city centre by continuing to 
provide modem and well served business facilities in decentred sites such as the Fiera 
while making the centro storico less attractive to large retail chains and corporate 
offices by imposing strict controls on building heights and land use. It was a strategy 
which carried with it the risk of driving commercial investment away from Bologna 
entirely, but the city’s administrators were astute enough lo offer incentives and 
planning concessions to small and medium-sized traders who were entirely behind the 
opposition to the establishment of the large retail chains.
’Bologna moderna’ had developed tlirough llie rediscovery of the central importance 
which ‘Bologna antica’ still had for many of its inhabitants, and Guido Fanti was no 
longer afraid to talk in increasingly Dossettian terms of the need to create a 
metropolitan environment in which advanced economic activity could coexist with 
something resembling the ‘gentle neighbourhood of the past'.
Having examined the social, political and economic policies which had earnt Bologna 
an international reputation for its civic administration, we conclude this chapter with a 
consideration of the distinctive contribution that Giuseppe Dozza's leadership gave to 
the city and the reasons why the process of ‘rinnovamento’ which began in 1959 
signalled the mayor’s eclipse and the beginning of a new structure of feeling in the 
society and polity of the Emilian capital.
Part IV. From Consolidation to Renewal: An Appraisal of ‘l’epoca Dozziana.'
Giuseppe Dozza officially resigned as mayor of Bologna on the 30th March 1966, a 
post he had held without interruption for 21 years. The announcement did not come 
as a surprise to the city council, particularly since his successor, Guido Fanti, had 
been carrying out the duties of mayor since Dozza’s health first became a problem in 
1962. The ‘mayor of the Resistance’ had piloted the comune through the difficulties 
of the reconstruction and through llie most bitter years of the Cold War, he had seen 
off the Dossettian challenge in 1956 and had won support from sections of the middle-
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class who would have been staunch anti-Communists in any other Italian city.117 He 
was perceptive enough to realise that the movement for organisational and political 
renewal which had culminated in the 1959 regional conference was irresistable and 
that although he might have disagreed with the methods proposed for the achievement 
of a permanent worker/ceti medi alliance, his own early commitment to the protection 
of the interests of the petty producers proved that he was no late convert to Togliatti’s 
anti-monopolist strategy.
However, with the emergence of a new and younger administrative class following the 
1960 elections, it was clear that Dozza’s inability or reluctance to grasp the 
significance of the structural economic and demographic factors which confronted the 
modern, post-boom Bologna was a liability for the Party and the city administration.
It was not that Dozza was politically committed to a neutral role for local government 
as many of the ‘old guard’ were and remained, but rather that years of conflict with 
the prefect and the GPA had persuaded him that voting for a deficit budget would 
force the comune into a subaltern relationship with the state authorities. Under 
Dozza’s leadership, the comune had sought to avoid the interference of the prefect’s 
office by balancing income and expenditure so that (he council would not be forced to 
rely on the state for discretionary loans. This conviction stemmed from (he concerted 
attempt by Scelba’s ministry to criminalise the red comuni (described in Dozza’s 
speech II reato di essere sindaco), but it also derived from what the Bologna daily U 
Resto del Carlino described as an overwhelming concern to placate the urban 
bourgeoisie. Thus ‘il buon governo’ meant that efficiency, moral probity, and 
transparency became ends in themselves rather than an administrative culture in which 
interventionary and redistributive policies could evolve.
117 A moving personal account of Giuseppe Dozza’s life is provided by Mario Giovannini, 
Dozza’s aide and confidant. His book is also interesting in that it refutes the myth of 
Dozza’s ‘death-bed conversion’ to Catholicism during the visit of Bishop Lercaro, but it 
does confirm the great admiration (he (wo men had for one another. Giovannini, M. 
Tramonto rosso su San Luca. La resistenza, il pubblico e il privato con Giuseppe Dozza. 
Franco Angeli, Milan, 1984.
i.
249
Although much of Dozza’s ‘buon governo’ was symbolic, such as the installation of 
glass partitions in the town hall offices so that the public could witness the 
‘trasparenza’ of the municipal machine, other initiatives such as the municipal taxation 
councils (CTMs) were an important first step tow'ards the comprehensive 
decentralisation of the 1960s. As the city developed, the needs of a large urban 
population provided increasing opportunities for social and cultural intervention by the 
comune. The new ‘Ospedale Maggiore’, the ‘Palazzo dello Sport’ and peripheral 
sports grounds and cinemas, the new livestock and wholesale markets, the 
construction of a small power station and the creation of municipal water, sewage and 
waste disposal services were achieved with little or no assistance from central 
government. Bologna’s system of infant and primary education was second to none in 
Italy and the provision of free pre-school education allowed many thousands of 
women to take a full and active part in the labour market for the first time. Bologna 
was not slow to introduce new forms of trams and buses in the constant search for a 
fast and regular mass transport system which allowed the population of the suburban 
quartieri and the surrounding towns affordable access to the city centre."8
Although his number of personal preference votes continued to decline after 1956, the 
charismatic attraction of the Mayor of the Resistance was certainly an important 
contributing factor in the mounting electoral success of the PCI. Dozza was a 
politician in the Weberian mould who demonstrated the mobilising powers of charisma 
and the qualities of a genuine populist who celebrated his humble origins and left the 
post of mayor no richer than when he assumed the leadership of the city on the eve of 
Liberation in April 1945. When he welcomed Cardinal Lercaro at Bologna railway 
station after the Second Vatican Council in 1966, Dozza established a dialogue and a 
mutual respect for the Church which Fanti and Zangheri were lo build on with some 
success. Dozza never forgot that, in Zangheri’s words, the PCI was ‘the biggest 
Catholic party in Bologna.’
“® These were advances which even the staunchly anti-Communist II Resto del Carlino 
had to credit to Dozza’s civic vision. See Luigi Arbizzani, Giuseppe Pozza, in Storia 
illustrata di Bologna. 4/V.. cit.
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As an administrator both the left and the right wings of the Party accused Dozza of 
over-caution and a reluctance to take risks. In its obituary of Dozza, II Manifesto 
claimed the development of a ‘model administration’ was aimed at maintaining the 
Communist dominated comune and the mass movements as ‘separate instances’.119 
And although some of the smaller rural comuni acted as spearheads for the peasant 
struggles in the 1940s and 1950s, the city government was careful not to give the 
prefect a pretext for dissolving the council even if Dozza was personally charged with 
defamation of the stale for his outspoken criticism of the central authorities. Caught 
between the ‘attendisti’ who still harboured thoughts of the ‘Ora X’ and the 
Amendolan ‘miglioristi’ who had all but displaced the left by the early 1960s, Dozza 
had no constituency inside the federation he could call his own. Much as Zanardi had 
been a maverick Socialist mayor who felt more comfortable with his institutional role 
than the factional conflict which is endemic to the Italian party system, Dozza 
preferred his occupation as ‘il sindaco del popolo’ to that of ‘dirigente comunista.’
The political world of post-boom Italy may not have been harsher than that of the 
1940s and 1950s but it was certainly more complex. It was a world where politicians 
and administrators were possessed of university degrees and whose English was good 
enough to read the Herald Tribune, a world in which men of Dozza’s generation had 
to either adapt or retire. Bologna like the rest of the country was experiencing the 
growing pains of modernity with a mixture of excitement and regret. The partisans, 
the old battle songs of the risaia, the memories of the ‘anni duri’ would even assume 
an increasing symbolic significance in the years to come, but the protagonists of those 
struggles could only be spectators in the next. The social conflict which was to erupt 
in Bologna a year after Dozza’s resignation was that unthinkable spectacle of 
Pasolini’s blue uniformed proletariat facing the slings and surrealist slogans of the 
‘figli di papa.’
In the following chapter we examine the phenomenon of ‘6S in two of its most
119 See L. Arbizzani &  S. Soglia (Eds), Giuseppe Dozza a un anno della morie, Bologna. 
Documenti del Comune. 1975, No.9, Sept. 1975, pp. 174-176.
significant aspects; llie students’ revolt in the university and the high schools, and the 
resurgence in worker militancy during and after the Hot Autumn of 1969. The 
chapter focuses in particular on the PCI’s attitude and relationship lo the new social 
movements, and assesses the consequences of industrial restructuring for the ‘Emilian 
Model’ and for the alliance strategy of the PCI. The chapter concludes by returning 
briefly to consider how effective the comune* s decentralisation reforms were in 
responding to the collective demands generated by the social movements of these 
years.
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C H A P T E R  S I X
An Emilian Autumn: New social movements in Bologna 1967-1973.
1 .Introduction
Although the ‘May movement’ which erupted in Paris in 1968 became an emblem for 
the wave of youth and student protests which swept Europe in the late 1960s, in Italy 
the cycle of occupations, demonstrations and violent clashes with llie police which 
connected Trento in the nortli to Palermo in the south had almost come to end by the 
spring of 1968. The disturbances in the Italian faculties did not have one focal point, 
instead conflicts broke out at university or faculty level seemingly at random and often 
for quite different reasons. Tarrow’s analysis of the Corriere della Sera reveals that 
in 1966 there were eight incidents, in 1967 there were fourteen, while by 1968 the 
number had risen to fifty-one.1 Yet by the end of 1968, protests in Italian 
universities and high schools had fallen off sharply, as Tarrow states, ‘...after flaring 
up in late 1967 and early 1968, the excitement, the exhilharation, and the solidarity of 
the university student movement were quickly extinguished.’2
It was at the University of Pisa during a protest occupation that the first serious 
attempt to provide a theoretical and revolutionary analysis of the crisis of the 
universities was developed. The ‘Pisan Theses’ identified the disfunctioning of the 
universities with the general crisis of late-capitalism, and much of their theoretical
1 As Tarrow admits these figures are certainly an underestimate, the journal Tempi 
Moderni showed that 102 incidents had occurred in 33 universities between November 
and June during the 1967-68 academic year. However, Tarrow’s figures are smaller 
because he combines incidents relating lo the same issue. Sidney Tarrow, Democracy 
and Disorder. Protest and Politics in Italy. 1965-1975. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1989, p. 144.
2 Ibid. p. 161.
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inspiration came from the small but influential ‘operaisti’ journal Quaderni Rossi.3 
From then on the protests assumed an increasingly wide focus ranging from the 
conditions of Italian workers to the war in Vietnam and the political uses of the mass 
media. The movement had become conscious of itself and of its fundamental 
opposition to the ‘games’ of the parliamentary parties and their youth and student 
organisations. As Lumley argues, attempts by the main parties to assimilate the 
movement by founding pseudo-parliamentary forums or by establishing new front 
organisations were doomed to failure and, ‘by the end of 1968 all the organisations 
had formally dissolved themselves.’4
If the student movement was becoming increasingly conscious of what Marcuse called 
the ‘new proletarian/ function of graduates in capitalist society, there were several 
features of the Italian experience which made the 1967/68 conjuncture a particularly 
fertile one for the development of ‘cultures of revolt.* Marco Boato considers that 
there were important political, social, cultural and religious reasons why ‘6S became 
the compression chamber for all these oppositional forces in Italian society.
Because it affected the entire country, the most significant feature of ‘sessantotto* was 
the generally acknowledged crisis in the Italian state (as opposed to the perpetual 
coalition and Christian Democrat infighting which all previous'war-time governments 
had experienced). With llie break-up of the ‘centro-sinistra’ and the abandonment of 
the tattered ‘book of dreams’, as Boato describes the Socialists’ programme for the 
introduction of planning and welfare reforms, a political vacuum was created in the 
direzione of the country which the DC found it impossible to fill. This rudderless 
state was increasingly unable to meet the demands of either capital or labour and it 
fell easy prey to the subversion of its own security forces who were able to carry out 
atrocities such as the 1969 Piazza Fontana bombing with impunity.
On the economic front, faced with declining rates of profit, industrialists continued to
3 Ibid. p.65.
Ibid. I i l  : A. T i  '  $ e : ' T  ,
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raise productivity targets and to resist wage-demands. But lor llie first time since 
1962, thousands of employees seemed willing to contest the harsh conditions under 
which they were required to work and the isolated strikes and demonstrations which 
gathered momentum in the northern cities in 1967 and 1968 were finally to explode in 
the ‘Hot Autumn’ of the following year.5 Italian society was also undergoing a 
cultural transition where the old ideology of provincial-peasant-Catholic-traditionalist 
Italy was giving way to an increasingly urbanised, white-collar and lay culture. Even 
the Church had experienced its own ‘revolution’ during the Second Vatican Council in 
1966 in which Bologna’s Cardinal Lercaro and his spiritual adviser Don Giuseppe 
Dossetti played leading parts. Vatican II was welcomed by many young Catholics as 
an endorsement of a modern, tolerant and socially conscious faith, and several radical 
Catholics who had been inspired by John XXIII were to become leading protagonists 
in the student movement in the following years.
But for the vast majority of the new generation of Italians who were not bom into 
staunchly leftist or Catholic families, consumerism offered the only alternative to the 
old-value systems of the past.6 Yet if the social disaggregation and transformation 
which Boato describes had helped to produce an alienated generation of middle-class 
students in the great university cities of Milan, Turin and Rome; in Emilia-Romagna, 
as we have seen, the transition to a modern, urban society had been less complete and 
more measured than in the northern regions, and this was to have important 
implications for the form which the protests took both inside and outside the 
University of Bologna. Similarly, the political and economic distinctiveness of 
Emilia-Romagna meant that llie ‘autunno caldo’ differed in its scope, duration and
5 As Tarrow points out, it is important not to over-estimate the ‘spontaneous’ nature 
of these strikes in the months leading up lo the period of industrial conflict which was 
initiated by the 1969 contract negotiations. Indeed Pizzomo shows that, ‘...the early 
impetus for the Hot Autumn was provided by skilled workers who had been politicized 
by the unions in past periods of industrial conflict,’ Tarrow, Democracy and Disorder. 
cit. p.91.
6 Marco Boato, Il ‘68 é morto: viva il ‘681. Bertani Editore, Verona, 1979, pp. 18-19.
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intensity to the rest of northern Italy.
In the following sections we examine the post-war development of the University of 
Bologna, the local and national genesis of the student movement, its internal 
organisation and the Communists’ attitude and response to the movement. In part two 
we consider the significance of the ’autunno caldo’ for PCI hegemony within the 
workers’ movement and we discuss the significance of industrial restructuring in 
Bologna for the functioning of the ’Emilian model.’ The chapter concludes by 
reviewing the comune’s housing and decentralisation initiatives in the light of the new 
collective and political demands developed from the new social movements.
Part I. The Student Revolt in Bologna, 1967-1970.
1. The City and the University: from the Liberation to the Economic Miracle and the 
expansion of the 1960s.
Immediately after the Liberation, the Communists were able to install their own 
candidate, Edoardo Volterra, as rector of the newly re-opened University of Bologna. 
But although Volterra played a crucial part in restoring the university to its didactic 
function, his political background ensured that he would be voted out by his opponents 
on the Senate when the appointment came up for renewal.7 Unsurprisingly in a 
university where only one professor had resigned in protest at Mussolini’s seizure of 
power, many academics owed their positions to the former regime, and but for the 
very few who had been shot or dismissed because of murderous complicity with the
7 Volterra had been a member of the Partito d’Azione during the Resistance, and 
although he did not formally become a member of the PCI, the prefecture obviously 
considered him a ‘fellow traveller’. The prefect believed that it was for this reason that 
he was not re-elected after his three year term. M.I. (Gab) 2/60/P/14/I, report of the 
prefect, 27th January, 1948.
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Nazifascists, the University teaching body remained virtually unchanged after the 
war.* The students of the university in the 1940s and 1950s came predominantly 
from wealthy Bolognese families and many shared the rightist sympathies of their 
professors. In one memorable incident soon after the war, students clashed with 
workers in Piazza Maggiore over the threatened Yugoslavian ‘annexation’ of Trieste, 
and although this form of open conflict was rare, the hostility between the 
townspeople and the ‘goliardi’ remained for many years after.8 9
Volterra’s replacement, Felice Battaglia, was a liberal and well respected 
administrator who made an early commitment to improving relations between the 
university and the city on the basis of a mutual respect for their ‘autonomy’. In a 
famous speech to the consiglio comunale in 1952, Battaglia called for cooperation 
between the civil authorities and the university in seeking to restore the Ateneo to its 
medieval status as a European centre of learning and academic excellence, a sentiment 
which was warmly endorsed by Giuseppe Dozza.10 However, with the departure of
8 The fascist rector, Goffredo Coppola was in fact shot by partisans on the 29th 
April, 1945. M.A. Gallingani, ‘Gli insediamenti universitari di Bologna dalla 
ricostruzione al progetto di decentramento a Ozzano Emilia (1945*1970), Storia Urbana. 
44, July-September, 1988, pp. 139-183.
9 M.I. (Gab) 183/18065, report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Carabinieri, 12th 
July, 1945. The report records that students chanting, ‘On with the war!’ and ‘Down 
with Tito!’ clashed with local workers who, on the instigation of the federal Labour 
Chamber, arrived in Piazza Maggiore in the back of lorries which they had comandered 
from their employers. A meeting of 3,000 students held in the aula magna of the 
university was called to protest at the ‘roughing up’ the polliardi had received from the 
workers. Rector Volterra and mayor Dozza who both spoke at the meeting promised a 
‘clarification’ of the situation and called for a ‘ravvicinamento’ between students and 
workers, although significantly no representatives of the camera del lavoro came to 
advocate reconciliation.
10 Gallingani, ‘Gli insediamenti universitari di Bologna..’ cit. An interesting account 
of the history of the University of Bologna seen from an ‘urbanistica’ perspective is
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Volterra, the PCI had not lost its influence in the university even though, as we saw 
in chapter two, few intellectuals, academics and students were drawn to the Party in 
the years immediately following the war. The Communists' most important 
representative was Paolo Fortunati, who as we have already noted, was a member of 
the giunta and an effective spokesman for the administration in the university Senate.
The Christian Democrats were also well represented in the city council and the 
university Senate by professors Ardigò and Andreatta, and in the Libro Bianco its two 
authors declared that the relationship between the city administration and the 
University of Bologna was fundamentally important to the city’s history and future 
development. But although the Dozza administration was given credit for the Tiberal 
and comprehensive' way it had dealt with the Ateneo it was criticised for not having 
an organic policy on the university.11
This charge, unlike many in the Libro Bianco was hardly fair however, since the 
university sector came under the control of file ministry of education and the comune 
could hardly be accused of failing in its responsibilities in this area of policy. Indeed 
the giunta would have welcomed some control over the expansion of the university so 
that its own projections for population growth, housing and services could make 
provision for the new demands which the student population was placing on the city. 
After a decade of relative stagnation in the 1950s, the university began to expand 
between 1959 and 1964 at an average rale of nearly 1,000 a year, reflecting the 
national economic trend and the general migration into the city which was reaching its 
peak in this period.12
New buildings were constructed to accomodate llie recently created Mathematics 
department and to provide a much needed extension to the Faculty of Letters and
provided by Francesco Ceccarelli & Pier Luigi Cervellati, Da un palazzo a una città. _La 
vera storia della moderna Università di Bologna. Il Mulino, Bologna, 1987.
11 Ibid. p. 161.
12 Ibid, p.164.
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Philosophy and the Faculty of Economics and Commerce. Bologna’s importance as 
an international centre of learning was finally realised by the construction of the 
Italian centre for the Johns Hopkins University in via Belmeloro between 1959 and 
1961, and many of the students who had come from the anti-Vietnam and civil rights 
campaigns in the United States supported their Italian colleagues in a rare act of 
cultural and political solidarity during the agitations at the University of Bologna.13
By the 1960s the urban congestion of the centro storico meant that space for 
expansion was severely limited and a scheme was adopted which would re-locate the 
scientific faculties to a green-field ‘university park’ in Ozzano Emilia 10 kilometres to 
the south-east of Bologna. The design for the campus was to be based loosely on the 
pavilion style adopted in the construction of the new University of York. However, 
by 1968 the planning authorities had ‘suspended judgement’ on the proposed 
university centre and inspite of the constantly increasing student numbers, the 
University of Bologna continued with its traditional practice of taking-over large 
palazzi in the area of San Donato and via Zamboni and converting them to didactic 
use as best it could.14 Ironically, had the science faculties been decenlred as the 
Ozzano project recommended, the Institute of Physics would not have become such an 
important site for the political coordination of the Bolognese movement which we now
13 A poster at the time read, ‘Vietnam. Guerra sbagliata? Oggi Martedì 5 Marzo’ 
(1968) and in English and Italian it invited all students from the University of Bologna 
to, ‘attend a discussion with american students of Johns Hopkins at 9pm’, the poster was 
signed ‘Comitato del Tet. Università di Johns Hopkins.' The text is reproduced in Marco 
Capponi (Ed), Studenti a Bologna 1967-196S. Istituto Gramsci Emilia-Romagna, Bologna, 
1989, p.62. As we shall see in the final section of this chapter, Johns Hopkins radicals 
were also to play a part in the ‘Movement of ‘77’, but on this occasion they were 
demonised by local Communist leaders as CIA agents-provocateurs. Indeed some over­
excited comrades suggested that Johns Hopkins had been established by the CIA to spy- 
on and destabilise the PCI’s ‘show-case’ city. See Salvatore Sechi, ‘Il PCI: l’albero, la 
foresta e la nuova peste’, Il Mulino. No.250, 1977, pp.274-302 and part three below.
14 Gallingani, ‘Gli insediamenti universitari a Bologna...’ cit. p.lS2.
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go on to examine in more detail.
2. The ‘Movimento Studentesco’ in Bologna. 1967-1970.
"Vogliamo parlare!": Between Movement and Institution.
‘One should not present a piece of history in our country...as a location of existential 
or ideological memoiy of restricted privileged groups, of friends and 
acquaintances.’15 Capponi argued that this is what ‘68 was in danger of becoming 
with the spate of accounts of the ‘lotta’ by now famous and respectable intellectuals 
and politicians who felt safe enough with the idea of ‘6S as a personal, cultural and 
intellectual liberation to ignore the anti-materialist dimension of the protests of those 
years. According to Capponi it was not surprising that in this context the Bolognese 
student movement had been completely overlooked, even in the chronological 
reconstruction of the occupations, despite the fact that at that time the Bologna 
protests attracted national press attention.16
As Capponi suggests, this may have been because in Bologna the relationship between 
the student movement and the tradition of the workers’ movement and its 
organisations was certainly more complex than elsewhere. Inspile of the different 
paths which the protagonists of ‘68 took in succeeding years, Capponi argues that the 
leaders of the various groups at least retained a mass conception of the nature of 
political struggle. Another reason why Bologna differed from Trento or the Cattolica 
in Milan was that the leading groups in the student movement were not predominantly 
composed of bourgeois or petty-bourgeois exponents who had a Catholic and anti-
15 Marco Capponi, ‘Dopo il "ventennale",’ in Capponi (Ed), Studenti a Bologna 
1967-1968. Istituto Gramsci Emilia-Ròmagna, Bologna, 1989, p.7.
16 L’Unità. 16th Aprii, 1968 and Rinascita. No.46 22nd November, 1968 on the 
occupation of the Institute of Physics. There was also a long interview printed in II 
Giorno of 10th March, 1968 with the occupying students of the Faculty of Medicine 
entitled, ‘Un giornalista interroga l’assemblea degli occupanti.’
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Communist family background. A significant part of the movement was made up of 
students who came from families with an experience of the workers’ movement and 
many of their parents would have been participants in the great social movements of 
the 1940s and 1950s.17 This made for perhaps a more genuine encounter and 
solidarity between workers and students in the city, but as we shall discover later the 
political and economic conditions did not exist for the type of worker-student 
collaboration which characterised the ‘Hot Autumn’ in Turin or Milan where 
paradoxically the class and cultural differences between the two movements were 
much greater.
An attempt at dialogue.
The official representative body of the Bologna students was the ORUB (Organismo 
rappresentativo universitario bolognese) and in 1967 its representatives proposed the 
establishment of what was to be one of the first experiments in university democracy 
in Italy. Every faculty was to elect a number of ‘consultative committees’ composed 
of professors and students which would have the task of discussing university 
activities.1* Felice Battaglia who was still the rector of the university saw the 
initiative as a major turning-point, not only for Bologna but for the university system 
as a whole,
‘What was the mother of Italian universities and which today accomodates 23,000 
students is now the guinea-pig for the future.’19
It was the students’ first taste of victory after months of sit-ins, strikes and 
demonstrations in support of a liberalisation of university life and teaching methods. 
At the time of the Pisan occupation, a number of Bologna students had taken part in
17 Capponi, cit. p.7.
18 Corrado Stajano, ‘1967 La crisi della rappresentanza’ in Capponi (Ed) Studenti a
Bologna, cit. p. 10.
19 Ibid.
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what the Senate saw as a scandalous act when the aula magna of the university was 
occupied in order to prevent the opening ceremony for the new academic year. The 
students declared that they wanted to, ‘prevent this absurd ritual involving professors 
draped in ermine who are completely divorced from reality, and to make public 
opinion aware of our problems.* They described the academic senate as, ‘Barons of 
power,* who, ‘often hand-on their university chairs like an hereditary title. They are 
a caste that is frightened to lose privileges won over centuries of craveness. When 
they sit in an assembly it’s sad to see even liberal men completely forget their own 
ideas and become an active part of a bureaucratic and backward organism.’20
As an experienced university director and an accomplished diplomat, inspite of these 
insults and disruptions, Battaglia did not threaten sanctions or the police as other 
university rectors had done. Instead he addressed the students in a paternalist, almost 
indulgent manner. Using the language which readers of his journal II Mulino would 
have been familiar with, Battaglia asserted that,
'The youth of today are knowledgable and mature. But during the strike they became 
cloudy and confused and they demanded absurd things.’
In turn, the protestors who had nothing but contempt for most of the conservative 
members of the Senate, had a good deal of respect for Battaglia and were prepared to 
listen to what he had to say. But in reply to the accusations of violence which had 
been levelled at them, the students replied that, ‘Our violence is only bom out of 
impotence and the fear that everything will carry on the way it is...we have been 
accused of aggresivity, but only through our provocations has something new 
developed. ’21
Thus the consultative committees were seen as offering the possibility of a new 
climate of dialogue where the views of the student body would at last be taken
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
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seriously. The committees were composed of IS members each, and initially many 
students were enthusiastic about the prospects for the establishment of a real 
democratic structure in the university.22 But although the university representatives 
of all the main political parties described the committees as a positive experience, the 
movement was becoming increasingly suspicious of organised politics. As we saw in 
the case of the Pisan episode, the new generation of activists did not want anything to 
do with the student organisms of the political parties, and because of its party political 
domination ORUB was no longer seen as the represenlive body of the student 
body.23 24 Battaglia’s entire ‘accomodationist’ strategy looked like foundering, with the 
demise of ORUB as a corporate interlocutor, the university authorities were now faced 
with the prospect of several factions presenting different demands to the Senate and all 
claiming popular legitimacy.
Fisica Occupata! The struggle intensifies.
With the occupation of the ’Istituto di Fisica - A.Righi* on the 14th February’, the 
student movement in Bologna entered a new and decisive phase. The decision to 
occupy was taken after the Senate had refused to recognise the movement politically 
and to grant it an autonomous status within the university.31 The occupation of the 
Physics Faculty was to last seventy days and it became the focal point for the entire
22 The committees comprised 8 full professors, two junior professors, two associate 
lecturers, two students and one graduate technician. Almamater Medicina. ‘Comitato 
Consultivo: che cosa é ? \  ciclostat, CLUEB, Bologna, 1967 in AIGER.
23 A bulletin of the ‘assemblea occupante di medicina’ used the words of one of the 
right-wing menbers of the Senate to demonstrate its contempt for Battaglia’s concept of 
‘co-gestione’: ‘It is an instrument of dialogue created by professors to persuade two 
students that they are wrong.’ Medicina 8 giomo di occupazione. Marzo ‘68. Bollettino. 
‘O.R.U.B. Assemblea Occupante della facoltà di medicina - comitato consultivo’, 
ciclostat, March, 1968, AIGER.
24 ‘L’Anti-Università’, Qui Bologna. 2nd May, 1968, p.36.
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‘movimento studentesco’ (M.S.) in Bologna.25 Not only did lite occupiers block the 
teaching programme, on the 22nd February they also managed to bring all research in 
the institution to a halt with the support of many of the institute’s professors.26 The 
resolve of the Physics students inspired similar forms of direct action in nearly all of 
the remaining faculties in the university and on the 7th March, a massive assembly of 
occupying students from six faculties met at the Istituto di Fisica and besieged the 
offices of rector Battaglia before heading for the city centre in one of many ritual 
‘encounters’ with the cittadini.27
Subsequent initiatives took many forms, in March a meeting on the problems of the 
university was held by the ARCI circle ‘Cesarmi’ in the working-class quartiere of 
Bolognina and this provided an opportunity for students and local residents to discuss 
the reasons behind the protests. The day after a ‘counter-course’ was taught by the 
Black Power leader Dale Smith on ‘The anti-imperialist struggle in American 
cities. *28 Such ‘counter-courses’ were popular and attracted sympathetic junior
25 By this time had it had become common to refer to the student movement as ‘il 
M .S.’ but it is important to distinguish this term for the movement as a whole from the 
specific group of Marxist-Leninists at the Statale University in Milan who were often in 
conflict with the student movement in other parts of Italy. Although they referred to 
themselves as ‘Movimento Studentesco’ they were effectively a tightly disciplined 
political party. All references to the M.S. in the remainder of the chapter refer to the 
student movement as a whole in Bologna and nationally. See Lumley, States of 
Emergency, cit. p.93.
26 The academics of the Physics Institute were completely split over the occupation 
with some professors taking part in a ‘counter-occupation’ (which failed when they were 
thrown out by the occupiers') and sympathisers such as the vice-director Marcello 
Ceccarclli, who abandoned his chair and became one of the leading dissident voices in 
the movement. ‘L’Anti-Università’, Qui Bologna, cit.
27 Capponi, cit. p.32.
28 Ibid. p.32.
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professors and even full professors as well as non-members of the university.
Although they were on a much smaller scale, the ‘contracorsi’ resembled the ‘free 
university’ movement which was especially strong in Germany in this period, and they 
provided a prototype for a politicised form of open learning which was to develop 
from the 150 hours scheme.29
The coordination of these activities and the political relations with the university 
authorities, as we noted previously were no longer being conducted through the 
machinery of the ORUB, as the faculty assemblies increasingly took on this 
representational function.30 However these representational forms were not 
susceptible to the bureaucratic incorporation which had so endeared the ORUB to the 
Senate. The M.S. was very clear that the assemblies were not just an alternative 
forum for student participation, they were a living form of ‘real’ democracy which 
drew its inspiration from many sources including the Paris Comune of 1871 and the 
Cultural Revolution of Mao Tse-Tung.
‘Each aspect of the Movement is to be found in the assemblies which are the only real 
challenge to the old élite representation, to burcaucratisation and to the intrusions of 
the parties. The assembly has thus developed...as an instrument for the immediate, 
even if violent, acquisition of political maturity by the student masses, a maturity 
which through the means of the occupations finds its realisation in a combative 
approach to political work and struggle.*31
A binary opposition within the assemblies soon became apparent and interestingly the 
conventional left/right dichotomy was replaced by a more complex opposition between 
the ‘gauchisli* who included Communists, left-wing Catholics and independents, and
29 See Capecchi, 150 ore, cit. on the use of the scheme in Emilia-Romagna.
30 Even though its name was often attached to manifestos published by the M.S. by 
the spring of 1968 the ORUB had become no more than a ‘rump parliament.’
31 Centro Franz Fanon, La miseria dell’università accademica. Per una storia recente
del movimento bolognese. I documenti delle lotte studentesche, Bologna, 1968.
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the so-called ‘RR’ or ‘rivoluzione due volte’ who saw the revolt of the universities 
merely as a precursor to a world-wide proletarian revolution. Both these factions 
were involved in organising the occupation of the Institute of Physics which was 
considered to be the ‘diamond point’ of the agitations. The leaders of the occupation 
reflected the political diversity of the movement; Capponi and Tommasi were leftist 
Catholics who were identified with ‘gauchisti’ such as Giorgini and Morigi, while the 
Communists La Forgia and Garibaldo took a more orthodox Party line.
Another feature of the student movement’s creative opposition to the existing syllabus 
and teaching methodology was the ‘working commissions’ which were established in 
many faculties in order to examine a particular aspect of the function of the 
university.
The medical students were perhaps the most innovative in developing alternative 
approaches to tneir discipline, and a commission was formed by a number of 
occupying students in order to study the relationship between 'Medicine and Society’. 
The commission researched the extremely high rate of deaths from industrial accidents 
in Italy compared to the United States and other European countries and condemned 
Italian employers’ contempt for health and safety at work. It also wrote special 
reports on ‘occupational diseases’ such as silicosis and the role which the doctor was 
expected to play in contemporary capitalist society which was described as being that 
of ‘the mechanic of the human body.’32 However, the most significant initiative 
which the medical students undertook in the field of community medicine was the first 
and perhaps the most significant encounter between the student movement and the 
local workforce.
32 Capponi, cit. p.32. Lumley describes a similar critique of the medical profession
in his study of the university occupations in Milan. See Lumley, States of Emergency, 
cit. p .l l l .
266
The < < Pancaldi > >  Occupation and the Student Movement in Bologna.
On 6th June, 1968, 450 women workers from the Panealdi textile factory went on 
strike to demand better pay and conditions. Having failed to induce the management 
to begin negotiations on their claim, the workers then occupied the factory on 19th 
June. The ‘pancaldine’ (as the women referred to themselves) promised to carry on 
an 'unlimited’ strike until the 'accelerated rhythms’ of the conveyor belt were slowed 
down and the appalling health and safety conditions in the factory were improved.
The lack of a factory canteen also meant that the women did not have time to eat a 
proper meal in the 55 minutes which were available for lunch and they made the 
construction of a purpose built ‘mensa* a condition for their return to work.33
The Panealdi workers were among the most exploited of Bologna’s industrial 
workforce and their low pay and poor conditions had everything to do with the fact 
that they were women employed in an industry where trade union organisation was 
traditionally weak and ineffective. The very fact that the women had managed to 
organise a unified strike with very little outside help made the Panealdi occupation 
even more significant than the 'contract strikes’ which took place in the larger 
Bolognese factories such as Ducati, Weber, Sabiem, and AMF-SASIB in the following 
year, and as we shall see, the Panealdi workers acted as an inspiration for the strikes 
that were to follow.
Once news of the occupation spread, the plethora of banners and posters which 
sprouted from the windows and balconies of the factory offered an eloquent testimony 
to the solidarity which existed between the strikers and the constellation of old and 
new social movements of the province. Together with the official trade union banner 
(CISL-CGIL-UIL Le operaie della Panealdi occupano la loro fabbrica) there was 
another from the ‘Coop di consumo di Castelmaggiore’ which offered, 'solidarietà con 
le operaie della Panealdi’ a sentiment which was echoed by ‘La Coop la libertà’, ‘Le 
maestranze AMF-SASIB’ and ‘Gli operai ditta Donini.’ There were also more
33 ‘La Panealdi occupata - La carica delle 400’, Qui Bologna. 4th July, 1968.
267
poignant messages from the strikers themselves such as, ’Siamo giovani vogliamo più 
libertà’ (We’re young, we want more freedom) and ‘Con 60,000 lire non si vive’
(You can’t live on 60,000 lire a month). Interestingly, the M.S. banner which 
declared ‘Operai gli studenti sono con voi’ used the masculine form of the noun for 
workers whereas lire ‘reformist’ established social movements had at least recognised 
that this was an all female dispute.34
But the M.S. did not simply limit itself to symbolic gestures. A group of medical 
students from the ‘movimento giovanile comunista’ decided to make a more practical 
contribution to the strike by carrying out a health survey on 107 workers at the 
factory. The results seemed to confirm the findings of the ‘Medicine and Society' 
commission on work-related illnesses and the survey found that 61 women complained 
of digestive problems, 60 suffered from muscular pain because of uncomfortable 
working positions or tiredness, 57 claimed to have suffered from weight loss, 64 
experienced violent headaches and 10 had experienced nervous attacks.35
This spontaneous initiative on behalf of the medical students attracted more publicity 
for the Panealdi workers and it helped to raise the profile of the dispute within the 
various trade union organisations. One month after the beginning of the occupation, 
FILTEA-CGIL, FILTA-CISL, UILA-UIL had agreed a common platform of demands 
to present to the company management which included an increase in the value of 
piece-rate work, an end to re-grading (which was seen as a means of discriminating 
against women who complained about working conditions), an additional meal 
allowance pending the construction of a factory canteen, the creation of a joint- 
technical committee on health and safety, and full accident and sickness insurance for 
all workers.36
34 Although since one of strikers’ own banners referred to themselves as ‘giovani’ the 
gendering of the collective subject had perhaps less significance than it was to have in the 
1970s.
35 Qui Bologna. 4th July, 1968, cit.
36 Qui Bologna. 25th July, 1968.
After a further period of occupation and negotiation, the dispute was eventually settled 
when the Panealdi management promised to improve working conditions and to look 
into better shift arrangements. It was a victory for the new ‘direct’ forms of industrial 
action, but as we shall see in part two, as with other trade disputes during the 
‘autunno bolognese’ the settlement of the dispute was achieved through conventional 
trade union channels and if anything it was the trade union organisations themselves 
rather than ‘shop-floor democracy’ that benefited from the strike.37
The Panealdi occupation had been the first major strike in Bologna to unite the new 
working subjects (unmarried young women) with the protagonists of the new social 
movements, and while there was nothing consciously feminist in the way that the 
dispute was conducted, the foregrounding of issues such as women’s health, child care 
(which was to be taken up by women workers at ‘Ducati-Electronica’ in the early 
1970s38) and wage and employment discrimination (low-pay, part-time and temporary 
employment, and poor or non existent pension and insurance provision) confirmed the
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37 This point is bom out fully in Lumley’s analysis of the participation of women 
workers in the ‘Hot Autumn’ in Milan, ‘..women workers tended not to be regular 
members of the unions, but were often the most angry and intransigent during 
mobilisations. With the return to ‘normality’, the women workers tended once more to 
delegate decision-making to the male organisers.’ States of Emergency, cit. p.259.
38 M. Jaeggi, R. Mueller, S. Schmid, Bologna rossa. I comunisti al governo di una 
città. Feltrinelli, Milan, 1977, pp.65-68; ‘Le operaie della Ducati’, Lotta Continua. Year 
II, No.7, llth  March, 1970, p.15. The latter article describes how the assembly lines 
were staffed almost exclusively by women workers who often worked ten hour shifts. 
The company ‘nursery’ was no more than a disused building which was supervised by 
older women who had no child care training. Because of the unsafe surroundings and 
the lack o f facilities, the Ducati women staged a successful stike in 1974 which resulted 
in the construction of a purpose-built nursery in Borgo Panigaie which the comune 
provided with the company’s financial support.
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emergence of women as key protagonists in the ‘contestazione’ of this period.39 It is 
important therefore to look at how, and more importantly if, this consciousness was 
manifested within the university itself.
Women’s. Liberation and ‘68 in Bologna
In chapter one we saw how the female protagonists of the social movements of the 
1940s and 1950s were predominantly working-class women who took part in strikes 
and demonstrations for land, for decent pay and conditions, and for peace. These 
movements had a measure of autonomy, but they nevertheless remained ‘collateral’ 
organisations within the mondo comunista, and it was from this working-class 
tradition that nouons of female emancipation were first articulated, as Victoria De 
Grazia writes,
‘Insofar as it actively promoted the rapid and pervasive changes in custom and culture 
following in the wake of the economic miracle of the 1950s and 1960s, the Left it 
could be argued, fulfilled the historical role of bourgeois feminism by modernizing the 
status of women. In the process, the stage was set for the neofeminist 
associationalism of the early 1970s; its precedents were not so much early twentieth- 
century feminist as post-1968 American liberationist.’40
But in Emilia at least there was an indigenous ‘emancipatory’ tradition which revealed 
itself in the Resistance heritage of partisan women martyrs such as Irma Bandiera. It
39 Lumley writes, ‘Women’s wages were on average 12% lower than those of men, 
while 67% of women as opposed to 23% of male workers were in the lowest grades.’ 
States, of Emergency, cit. p.326. This observation is born out by the example of women 
assembly workers at Ducati who were on the lowest salary grade (4*) unlike male 
colleagues performing identical tasks, ‘Le operaie della Ducali’, Lotta Continuaf Year
II, No.7, 11th March, 1970.
40 Cited in Lumley, States of Emergency, cit. p.315.
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was an ambiguous tradition because the spirit of sacrifice and courage which women 
partisans characterised were conventionally male traits, and this image sat 
uncomfortably with the conventional gender roles of wife and mother which 
organisations like UDI continued to promote.
As we saw in chapter one, UDI was assigned the task of repulsing the ideological 
offensive which the Church and the DC were launching on the ‘free-love’ and 
‘divorce supporting’ parties of the Left. UDI therefore came to be seen as a secular 
rival to Azione Cattolica and increasingly concentrated its efforts on charitable and 
voluntary activities. Judith Adler Heilman provides an interesting example of how a 
woman active in UDI in Emilia-Romagna was expected to combine different roles so 
that, if anything the traditional role of the Italian housewife was reinforced rather than 
challenged by her association with the PCI:
‘...a reggiana might attend a women’s meeting at the party section on a Monday 
night, pass the better part of Wednesday involved as "a concerned neighbourhood 
figure" in a community effort to establish a day-care centre in a quartiere, and spend 
all day Friday with other women from the UDÌ circolo mincing up the ham, cheese, 
and pork, and rolling and twisting the dough, to form tortellini for sale to raise funds 
for the organisation.’
‘Analysing the form of activism practised throughout Emilia-Romagna, a UDI woman 
from Bologna wrote that this pattern represented "simply another aspect of women’s 
double role".’41
It was this double role of good comrade and dutiful mother and daughter which even
the most ‘politicised’ women students found it difficult to shake off. This was not
(
surprising given a family sub-culture in which, according to Kerlzer, even a female 
PCI activist could lament the attitude of many Communist wives who declined a
41 Judith Adler Heilman, Journeys Among Women. Feminism in Five Italian Cities. 
Polity Press, Cambridge, 19S7, pp. 117-1 IS.
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tessera of their own because, ‘my husband deals with that.*42
Unlike the United States where women’s liberation and Black Power were two strong 
(if often conflicting) aspects of the movement of ‘68, in Italy as Sidney Tarrow 
argues, women were often ‘the secret agents of protest’ and were, ‘disparagingly 
referred to as angels of the mimeograph machine.’43 The authors of Donna o cosa? 
wrote that,
‘...the criticism of the capitalist system which was sustained by the student movement 
and the new left groups failed to really examine the position of women, and in this 
sense they rehearsed the roles and games which were characteristic of the social 
organisations which we were trying to fight...’44 45
This is not surprising if we consider that despite the reforms of 1961 and 1965 women 
continued to be under-represented in the student body and even more so among the 
lecturing staff. Of the women who studied for degrees in Italian universities, the 
overwhelming majority were from middle-class and professional family backgrounds.
It was from this social milieu that the first ‘neofeminista’ groups came, and although 
they took their inspiration from the women’s movement in the United States and 
Britain, the two main centres of early Italian feminism, Milan and Rome, varied 
considerably in their conception of women’s liberation and in their relationship to the 
student and workers’ movement.43 Such groups were small and socially restricted in
42 Quoted in Ginsborg, cit. p.367.
43 Tarrow, Democracy and Disorder, cit. p.99, Lumley, States of Emergency, cit. 
p.313.
44 Maria Linda Odorisio, Anna Rossi Doria, Lucetta Scaraffia, Monica Turi, Donna 
o cosa? Storia dei movimenti femminili in Italia dal 1S60 ad oggi. Edizioni Milvia, 
Turin, 1986, p:184.
45 Camilla Ravera, Breve storia del movimento femminile in Italia. Editori Riuniti, 
Rome, 1979, p.251.
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the 1960s and it was a number of years before a ‘women’s movement’ could be said 
to have established itself in Italy. Although the M.S. had helped to develop the ‘spirit 
of struggle’, it was issues like the divorce referendum in the early 1970s and later the 
campaign to legalise abortion which brought the constellation of local women’s groups 
together under a national movement.46
For young women in Bologna and many other Italian cities, ‘68 and the ‘Hot Autumn’ 
was a time for questioning the role which women were expected to fill in a society 
undergoing great economic and cultural transformations where traditional values were 
coming under sustained attack by the M.S. and the new left. Increasingly the family 
was identified as a primary site of oppression, particularly since even the most 
hardened activists went home in the evening to a nourishing ‘pastasciutto’ which their 
mother had prepared for them and which they had to eat under the often disapproving 
gaze of the capo famiglia.47
Thus the acquisition of what might be called ‘feminist consciousness’ came from the 
life experience of women who aspired to more than the holy status of wife and 
mother. A revealing ‘autoritratto’ of a high school teacher M. Teresa provides an 
example of the obstacles which young women from working-class families faced in 
fulfilling their ambition to go to university. She describes her shock at learning that 
her father did not want her to continue schooling beyond the ‘terza media’ because 
‘women are destined to marry and the school diploma will just lie in the drawer,’ 
besides which, ‘the expense of it all was not insignificant.’ Her father refused to 
allow her to go to the ‘liceo scientifico' which would take too long, but she was 
allowed to attend the ‘magistrale’ where the course was much shorter (and less 
valued) leading to a qualification, ‘which would provide the chance of finding a job
46 Ibid, pp.252-253.
47 This conflict between the public and the private realm of the young student activist 
is brilliantly if rather eclectically explored in Jean-Luc Godard’s film, La Chinoise. A 
confessedly partisan account of Godard’s representation of the movement of ‘68 is to be 
found in David Caute, Sixty-Eight. The year of the Barricadesr cit. pp.228-231.
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suitable for a woman.’ Unusually for someone from her background, M. Teresa was 
still not married after she obtained her ’maturità’ and she did farm work and gave 
lessons in order not to be too much of a burden on tire family when she came to enroll 
at the University of Bologna.48
M. Teresa would like to have studied physics, but because attendance was compulsory 
her father vetoed the idea because, ’it is not nice for girls to be away from home too 
much. ’ Her father suggested ’Lettere* instead because it would, ’allow her to look 
after the house and her family’ while she studied. The day after she graduated M. 
Teresa married and soon she had two children and was working as a teacher in one of 
the outlying towns of the province. Returning to the city die found a job in a 
secondary school where her realtionship with the students became increasingly 
difficult. They demanded more variety in lessons and better teaching methods but 
even though she ‘felt increasingly guilty’ she was unable to give the time to studying 
alternative methods and discussing new ideas with her colleagues because of her 
family responsibilities and the large amount of marking and preparation she was 
already obliged to undertake.
M. Teresa’s story was typical o f many women who went through the university 
system and although they found jobs which had the potential to be interesting and 
stimulating, the nature of the ’double role’ which Heilman’s informant identified 
meant that the new opportunities and personal development which the university 
expansion of the late 1960s promised was often not fulfilled. Indeed the by now 
manifest contradictions of the ’boom economico’ which had fuelled the protests among 
the university students were equally apparent to the new generation of high school 
students who as we learnt from M. Teresa’s testimony were becoming increasingly 
disgruntled and angry. As the ‘movimento studentesco’ in the university began to run 
out of steam at the end of 1968, it was the high school students who took up the call
48 ‘La femminilizzazione della scuola. Storia di M. Teresa’ discussion paper, 
‘Gruppo di delegate all’interno del congresso provinciale del CGIL-SCUOLA’, ciclostat, 
Bologna, circa 1972, AIGER.
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for a radical transformation of the education system and the capitalist organisation of 
Italian society. In the following section we encounter some of the protagonists of the 
‘movimento della scuola’ in Bologna and examine the motives for their protests.
The Movement in the Secondary Schools
In November, 1968, the Communist Party’s theoretical journal, Rinascita, published 
an article entitled, T figli di Bologna. La più giovane leva della lotta di classe.’ The 
article discussed the ‘student tidal wave which has now overcome the secondary 
schools.’ The article was important not only because of the historical insight it gave 
on the student movement in Bologna but also because it shed light on the PCI’s 
relationship to the new social movements of the late 1960s. Indeed the leader of the 
m s  technical school occupation, Mauro Moruzzi, went on to become a PCI assessore 
for health in the Imbeni administration of the 1980s and at the time when Rinascita 
interviewed him was already an active member of the FCGI.49 50
Moruzzi criticised the journal’s enquiry because it risked becoming in his words, ‘a 
little sociological.’ When asked why he had reservations about its sociological criteria 
he replied that, ‘there’s a risk...of looking for the reason for a mass movement in the 
personal reactions of single individuals. In fact the reasons lie in the usual social 
contradictions.,so Moruzzi emphasised the point by arguing that, ‘Today these 
movements are exploding not so much because an organisation has developed but 
because the contradictions of the system have become more acute. For me the
49 Rinascita. 22nd November, 1968, No.46, pp. 13-15.
50 Ibid. The student movement’s critique of sociology as a bourgeois and reactionary 
science because of its perceived positivist, ‘pseudo-scientific’ bias was most famously 
formulated by Daniel Cohn-Bendit and the students of Nanterre in Paris in the same year. 
However, it is likely that Moruzzi was also articulating a traditional Communist hostility 
to a social science which in Bologna was most closely associated with the Catholic world. 
See chapters 2 and 3 above.
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greatest contradiction which is pushing the students into conflict is authoritarianism, 
that is the profound contradiction of an ‘imposed culture’. ’
But for all his contempt for sociological enquiry, Moruzzi displayed a keen 
sociological awareness of why the contemporary generation of high school students 
had begun to resist the authoritarian culture of the academy, ‘Today the unemployed 
technician is a common feature of our schools51...and they have influenced the way 
we’ve been taught...even if (the teaching methodology) in the schools is still very 
closed.’52
The following year, Rinascita asked a round table of activists for their assessment of 
the year’s activity by the school students. Once again Moruzzi was interviewed and 
he admitted fhat in the third term the movement (at least in Bologna) had entered a 
crisis stage because, ‘it did not know how to define its own strategical argument 
within the school. ’ But although the movement in the licei had begun to contract, in 
the technical schools and institutes which had a more direct contact with the working 
world a direct relationship was beginning to be established and the movement was also 
spreading to the middle schools.53
Although the students of the scuole medie could not have been older than 16, they 
were as well versed in the proto-situationist language of the new revolutionary groups 
as any of the protagonists of the M.S. This could be seen on the cover of the 
Bologna middle-schools’ bulletin Ideogramma which featured an auto-ironic endless 
telegramme styled in the manner of the Ministry of the Interior and II Resto del
51 Because of the Education Ministry’s preference for ‘substitute teachers’ who were 
cheaper than full time teachers, many university graduates who were unable to find 
employment in their vocational fields registered as supply teachers and were able to find 
occasional work in the local high schools and technical colleges.
52 Rinascita. 22nd November, 1968, cit.
53 ‘Tavola rotonda di "Rinascita". Bilancio di un anno di lotta nelle scuole’ 
Rinascita. No.25, 20th June, 1969, p.4.
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Carlino, the right-wing Bolognese daily. The article lampooned the images of the 
‘poor, self-sacrificing working class family' which was portrayed in the bourgeois 
press and the handful of 'hooligans’ who were depriving all the other 'ragazzi per 
bene’ of a decent education.54
As the local media (Il Resto del Carlino and the RAD began increasingly to describe 
the activists in the secondary schools and technical colleges as ‘teppisti’, some of the 
leaders of the school revolt (and in particular the editors o f Ideogramma! took a much 
more hostile line to the educational and political establishment. The editorial talked of 
'refusing petty bourgeois legality’ and of 'making a conscious choice for illegalism’ 
but it denied that the movement used violence as an end in itself. Lite the M .S., the 
secondary school movement became much more closely identified with operaisti 
politics and it identified the same sort o f oppression and class selection in the 
classroom as in the factory. ‘For this reason, ' the editorial argued, ‘our movement 
will begin to grow from the moment when we succeed in joining it with the struggle 
of the working class through the refusal of bourgeois legality.'55
The Aldini-Valeriani technical institute even developed a comprehensive plan for the 
creation of ‘Comitati di Base’ which not only drew its inspiration from factory 
organisations in Italy but was also based on similar initiatives in French ‘lycées’.56 
The revolutionary bulletin of the ‘Righi’ technical college, Rottura, argued that the 
movement could not continue with an all out plan of confrontation through strikes and 
sit-ins, rather what was needed was the creation of a different culture inside the school 
itself which would contest the subordinate role the school’s graduates were expected to 
play in the division of labour.
Even the FGCI had been affected by this anarcho-syndicalist atmosphere which
54 Ideogramma, ciclostat, February 1969 in AIGER.
55 Ibid.
56 Their French equivalents were called, ‘Comités d’action lycéen’. On the revolt of 
the lycées in France see David Caute, cit. pp. 197-198.
prevailed in the secondary schools and Moruzzi proudly revealed lo Rinascita that, ‘a 
link between the students of the technical colleges has been made with the young 
apprentices and groups of workers with meetings being held even inside the city's 
larger factories.’57
The movement in the high schools was also beginning to link its demands to those of 
the working class as a whole and demanded a minimum wage within the school.
Taking their cue from the university students, the technical institute students jointly 
produced a newspaper with the workers of the local FIAT factory.5* But when the 
Rinascita journalists put the Bologna experience into its national context, it became 
apparent that the Emilian capital was ‘ahead o f  other cities. In the rest of Italy, the 
school student movement had actually begun in the high schools rather than the 
technical colleges and this perhaps reflected the fact that in Bologna the licei were 
overwhelmingly populated with young middle class students many of whom took a 
‘qualunquista’ or openly right-wing altitude to the disruptions.
However, the participation of high schools such as the ‘Liceo Minghetti’ and ‘Fermi’ 
proved that the ‘second wave’ of the student movement was inundating all sectors of 
the Bologna secondary system and it was a significantly more protracted and 
generalised struggle than that o f the by-now diminishing university movement.59 It 
has been important to analyse the ideological formation of these young, militants 
because it was from the secondary school movement rather than the university that the
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57 ‘Tavola rotonda di "Rinascita". Bilancio di un anno di lotta nelle scuole’, 
Rinascita. No.25, 20th June, 1969, p.4.
5* The factory produced tractors and agricultural vehicles, but even for Bologna it 
was quite a small employer.
59 The journal of the ‘Liceo Minghetti’ was called Per l’azione di massa (ciclostat, 
Bologna, February, 1969 AIGER), and it also made the by now familiar call for 
antifascist class action uniting students and workers in a common struggle.
protagonists in the violent mass protests of March 1977 were to come.60 We will 
examine the Movement of ‘77 in some detail in the concluding chapter, but in the 
following pages we now turn to consider the attitude of Bologna’s ruling party 
towards the student movement on the local and national level.
3. The PCI’s response to the ‘movimento studentesco’ancLthespread of the movement 
beyond the university.
Introduction
The 12th Party Congress of the PCI was held in Bologna in January 1969.61 The 
delegates who assembled in the Palazzo dello Sport were conscious that the Party 
would need to work hard to overcome its perceived silent endorsement of the invasion 
of Czechoslovakia (which was described by Longo as ‘an error’) and to persuade the 
new generation who had taken part in the university protests of the previous year that 
the PCI was capable of supporting a social movement which was not under its direct 
control. Both inside and outside the Party there was a feeling that the PCI could not 
remain detached from what was perceived as a world-wide libertarian, anti-imperialist, 
and anti-authoritarian movement in which young people were playing a determining 
role.
60 One of the most charismatic future ‘leaders’ o f the movement of ‘77 in Bologna 
Francdtl^ lrardi (Bifo) had already risen to fame as a young coordinator of the ‘studenti 
medi di Movimento Studentesco’ and he formed the subject of an article entitled ‘Con 
Biffo si passa. Necessario un ‘visto’ per accedere al Congresso degli studenti medi’, Qui 
Bologna. 17th October, 196S. The article assured its readers that it was enough to say 
you were a friend of Biffo (sic) in order to be admitted to the meeting in the occupied 
Faculty of Medicine which local fascists had threatened to disrupt.
61 Significantly Bologna was to be the venue for the 19th and last PCI Congress 
which was also held in the Palazzo dello Sport, that great monument to the administration 
of Giuseppe Dozza.
279
Inspired by the student and worker protests of the last two years and the success of 
the anti-imperialist struggle in Vietnam, a group of leftist radicals who had established 
a small but influential following within the Party came to Bologna to present a 
programme which was openly critical of the official Party policy in a number of 
important areas. The PCI's ‘Gang of Pour’ were Lucio Magri, Rossana Rossanda, 
Luigi Pintor and Aldo Natoli and collectively they were to become known as the 
‘Manifesto group.’42 Although the Manifesto leadership were expelled from the PCI 
later in the year, Bologna proved to be one of the most important centres for 
Communist dissent in the years that followed and the supporters of Manifesto were to 
play leading parts in the ‘contestazione bolognese.’43
As we have seen, the ‘Prague Spring* and the war in Vietnam had absorbed the 
Communist rank-~nd-file, and To spirito di lotta’ even found its way onto the 
congress platform. However the mistake that Rossanda and Pintor made was to 
assume that this new atmosphere of ‘openess’ included the tolerance of hostile 
criticism of the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries. But if any criticism was to 
be made of the CPSU and its sister parties in Eastern Europe it could not take the 
openly hostile form that the Manifesto group had favoured and any talk o f a breach 
(or ‘strappo’) was strictly ruled out by the Party leadership.
Berlinguer, who had already effectively succeeded Longo as party leader in 1969, was 
keen to stress his commitment to existing policy goals while at the same time 
responding to demands for a more interventionary role for the Party which did not 
rely exclusively on the ‘parliamentary road. ’ In line with the traditional ‘via italiana’ 
strategy adopted at the Slh Party Congress, Berlinguer insisted on the primacy of 
political alliances although he was willing to give the new social movements access to 
the ‘historic block’ which he saw emerging in opposition to the crisis-ridden Italian *63
42 Amyot, cit. p. 177. On the formation of the Manifesto group, see Bogdan Denitch, 
‘The Rebirth of Spontaneity: II Manifesto and West European communism’ Politics and 
Society. V ol.l, No.4, August 1971, pp.463-477.
63 See part two below.
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state.
‘We must...succeed in connecting and uniting the more radical tendencies to the 
movement of the great masses, creating a fusion of revolutionaries, progressives, and 
democrats; we must develop and consolidate the alliance of the working class with the 
masses of peasant smallholders, with (lie urban middle strata, with the 
intellectuals.’64 65
Berlinguer’s position differed sharply from that o f Giorgio Amendola who in June 
1968 had called for a fight on two fronts, ‘which meant counterposing the patrimony 
"accumulated by us over tens of years of hard struggles" to dangerous student 
extremism.’6* The Communist members of Bologna University did not follow 
Amendola’s advice, but they had to walk a tightrope between the demands of the 
Party and the hostility of the M.S. towards organised politics.
A motion put to the regional congress of the Emilia-Romagna PCI at the end of 
March, 1968 by the university section of the Party threw into relief the difficulties 
which Communist activists faced in reconciling their presence in the movement with 
the Party’s desire to ‘institutionalise’ and contain the conflict. The refusal of the 
university authorities’ offer of ‘cogestione’ had by now become, ‘an acid test for the 
political struggle in the university of Bologna.’ The university Communists’ analysis 
of the student movement agreed that no single reform of the higher educational sector 
rould solve the contradictions between tire free pursuit o f knowledge and the 
ntellectual expropriation and the intellectual and professional ‘formation’ which
64 Ibid. p. 178.
65 Giorgio Amendola, ‘Necessità della lotta su due fronti’, Rinascita. N o.23,7th June 
968; quoted in Lumley, cit. p.74. The architect of ‘rinnovamento’ in Emilia carried on
one-man battle against the student movement, but his lieutenants did not share his 
ttitude towards the M.S. and neither did L’Unita which ‘carried out a struggle on one 
ont only, and hardly a critical remark was made about student politics'; Amyot, cit. 
175.
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capital required in order to maintain its system of accumulation and control over its 
processes and organisations.06 However this did not mean that the FGCI and PCI 
activists in the Bologna student movement had somehow 'gone native’ by accepting all 
the theoretical repertoire of the M.S.
The Party was careful not to alienate the M.S. by appearing intent on taking a 
directional role over its activities (particularly after the effective demise of the 
ORUB), and the PCI’s university representatives insisted that relations with the 
movement must not be conducted on an instrumental basis. In the conference 
document, the University Section repeatedly asserted that the movement must decide 
for itself the objectives of the struggle and its own internal organisation, but given the 
fact that the Communists were hardly a majority inside the movement this was not 
such a magnanimous gesture.
Where the University Communists did differ from their extraparliamentary comrades 
was in their interpretation of the status of the student subject. In the PCI 
categorisation, the ‘studente di massa’ was not the Marcusian 'new proletarian’ of the 
Pisan Theses but was rather seen as, ‘the supplier of the social leisure which has in 
fact been made possible by the working class. ’ It followed therefore that ‘the battle of 
the student movement is an internal battle within the dominant class and the issues at 
stake are of a bourgeois-democratic nature...’ Condemning the Marcusian 
monolithism of M.S. neo-Marxist theory, the Communists insisted that it should not 
be the aim of the movement to develop a strategy for its own evolution but instead, 
‘greater effort should be put into the training of intellectual political cadres capable of 
linking up with the working class outside the formal apparatus of the Party in a 
Leninist type relationship.’
The document argued that it was important that these intellectual cadres did not 
attempt to impose too mechanical a concept of revolutionary struggle on the working
06 ‘Mozione approvate al Congresso Regionale Comunista, Bologna, 30-31st March, 
1968’, ciclostat, AIGER.
class and that militants should be constantly adapting to the changing patterns of 
domination in contemporary capitalism. However, it is difficult to see how autonomy 
from the party apparatus could be reconciled with a Leninist concept of revolutionary 
politics and it seemed as if all that the young Communist students and intellectuals 
were advocating was a type of born-again Bolshevism or ‘neo-Leninism. ’
Despite what was seen as the bourgeois and potentially reactionary nature of the 
M.S., the PCI’s University Section urged the conference to support the movement’s 
demands for political autonomy and called for the official recognition of the faculty 
assemblies and the guarantee of rights to political expression and organisation within 
the Ateneo. The document argued that the Communist Party was faced with a choice 
between an instrumentalist/solidaristic approach which had no chance of succeeding, 
or it could use the energy and idealism of the movement to launch a great crusade for 
the political and social transformation of the country. If the Party chose the second 
option it would not only be in a position, ‘to ensure the hegemony of Communist 
students within the movement, which it would be impossible to achieve under other 
circumstances,’ but also it could ensure, ‘the hegemony of tire proletariat over the 
student movement.’67
These contradictions between the advocacy of political autonomy and organisational 
freedom on the one hand, and the need for the student movement to be subordinated 
to the ‘hegemony of the proletariat’ on the other, can be seen in the national strategy 
of the PCI which regarded the student movement as an important feature of its great 
anti-monopolist crusade for the structural reform of Italian society.
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The Student Movement seen from Rome
Several months after the Bologna regional conference, the PCI held a special 
conference at Ariccia on the theme of ‘The Workers’ Movement and the Student
67 Ibid.
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Movement.’ Here delegates were told that the crisis of the universities was only one 
of the features of the general crisis of the Italian state and contemporary capitalism, 
and it was important not to over-estimate the student movement’s scope or 
importance. Although the M.S. had provided an important focus for the collective 
discontent which existed in Italian society, the movement only had a political 
significance in so far as it identified itself with the demands of the organised working 
class. One of the main problems for the PCI was the student movement’s 
vulnerability to ‘instrumental’ manipulation which threatened its internal democracy 
and political autonomy. This was simply a coded complaint against the increasing 
influence of extraparliamentary left-wing groups over the movement whose attitude 
towards the PCI ranged from indifference to outright contempt.68
In contrast ^  the regional conference in Bologna, the conference was told that the 
construction of a movement with clear objectives for the transformation of Italian 
society can only come about if the PCI assumes its responsibilities of leadership over 
that movement. But the PCI hierarchy refused to be goaded into explaining what was 
precisely revolutionary in the Communists’ programme of ‘structural reforms*. For 
example Reichlin declared that, ‘There is no point in explaining from an abstract or 
doctrinaire point of view what structural reforms are,’ unless this is done in an 
attempt to analyse what is original in the student movement’s political forms of 
expression.69 Delegates were encouraged to see the student and workers movements 
as a feature of the development of a new historic block which would transport the 
working class onto a higher level of class relations, but it was still too premature to 
define the new class relationships which would emerge from this conjuncture.
68 Gianfranco Camboni &  Danilo Samsa, PCI e movimento degli studenti 1968-1973. 
De Donato. Bari, 1975, p. 12. The conference was held between 29th November and 1st 
December.
69 See A. Reichlin, Dieci anni di politica meridionale. Editori Riuniti, Rome, 1974, 
p. 160 cited in Camboni & Samsa ibid. p.15.
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Achille Occhetto70 was the first to address the conference and in his opening speech 
he made an explicit reference to the experience of the May revolt in France and 
asserted that, ‘when ten million workers strike and paralyse the entire economy of a 
country it is time to develop new forms of participation in the factories and in every 
sector occupied by the masses in order to prevent repression and to raise the political 
and class conflict onto a higher level.’71 However, Occhetto’s astonishing support for 
the spontaneous growth of ‘self-management’ inspired movements in France (which 
were incidentally strongly condemned by the fiercely orthodox PCF) and Italy was an 
overstatement of his Party’s real position as Occhetto himself confessed in an 
interview with Walter Veltroni ten years after.
Because Ariccia was one of the very few conferences where leading Communists and 
exponents of the M.S. met and openly debated the nature of the struggle, Occhetto 
admitted that there was a temptation to try to overcome the scepticism of the non- 
Communist participants by being ‘excessively open’ towards the movement. The 
majority of delegates to the conference regarded Occhetto’s position as something of a 
‘Trojan Horse’ strategy which the PCI intended to use to assert its hegemony over the 
movement. Occhetto admitted that they were right to harbour this suspicion,
70 After he was elected to the leadership of the FGCI in 1962, Amyot argues that, 
‘...Occhetto and his group developed a line that was considerably to the left of the PCI’s 
position and similar to Ingrao’s on many points...’ Occhetto also, ‘lookup Ingrao’s ideas 
on direct democracy and the new model of development, with a particular emphasis on 
the role of worker’s councils.’ Yet in his speech to the Xlth Congress of the PCI 
Occhetto condemned factionalism and, ‘. . .agreed with Lombardi that the left should unite 
on an advanced democratic programme, not a socialist one.’ This was a measure of the 
extent of Occhetto’s conversion to the official line of the Party and his scepticism about 
the dangerously Bordigan idea of worker democracy. Grant Amyot, The Italian 
Communist Party, cit. pp. 166-167. A discussion of the Bologna PCI’s attitude to 
workers’ councils is provided in the second part of the chapter.
71 Camboni & Samsa, PCI e movimento degli studenti, cit.
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‘I can say that effectively it was a Trojan Horse, the aim was to make the experience 
of the movement develop in the wake of the Italian road to socialism and our strategy 
for structural reforms...We tried at the time to bring the movements into the area of 
the reform strategy.’72
But there was also an explicit disavowal of the traditional Leninist party model insofar 
as the ’autonomy’ of the movement was privileged over the regulating function of the 
democratic party. ’This went back,’ argued Occhetto, ‘to our vision of a non- 
centralised, non-bureaucratic socialist society, which does not replicate the power of 
the party...it is a conception of socialism founded on direct participation, characterised 
by new forms of democracy which are capable of entering into relationships with 
forms of delegated democracy.’73
At ten years distance from 1968 Occhetto seemed to be arguing that the 
encouragement of ’direct democracy’ was the PCI’s greatest contribution to the mass 
movements of the 1960s. However, as we saw in chapter five, the municipal reform 
initiatives which the giunta comunale introduced in Bologna in the 1960s were 
thoroughly institutionalised moments of democratic innovation. There was no trace of 
the ‘council communism’ promoted by Marxist groups such as Manifesto and Lotta 
Continua in the first or second phases of decentralisation in Bologna, and 
decentralisation could hardly have formed part of an alliance strategy if there were.
Fundamentally, the ‘New Left’ which emerged out of the collective protests of ’68 
and the ‘Hot Autumn’ were not interested even in Ingrao’s utopian vision of seizing 
the comuni as ‘red bases’ from which to conduct a ‘bollom-up’ struggle for radical 
socialism.
Instead, the intellectual and political effort of the extra-parliamentary groups was 
directed at realising the multifaceted idea of ‘worker-democracy’ which had been
72 Acille Occhetto, A dieci anni del ‘6S. Intervista di Walter Veltroni. Editori 
Riuniti, Rome, 1978, p.90.
73 Ibid. p.91.
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generated through workplace organisations such as the Comitati di Base (CUBs) and 
the 'delegates’ councils’ (consigli dei delegati). In part two we chart the development 
of the workers’ movement in Bologna during the time of the ‘maggio strisciante’ (the 
stretched-out May) and examine some of the contradictions in the ‘Emilian model’ and 
the Communist Party’s attitude to industrial unrest which the conflict exposed.
Part n . The Workers* Movement in Bologna 1968-1973.
1. From the Faculty to the Factory: Operaismo and the M.S.
The ‘commissione "operai-studenti"’ at the University of Bologna produced a bulletin 
in December 1968 which attacked the view of a certain part of the student movement 
that the workers’ struggles were but one element in the general youth and anti- 
imperialist revolt. ‘On the contrary,* the document argued, ‘the student struggle must 
now insert itself in an organic and effective way within the general dynamic o f the 
class struggle as part of this class struggle...'74
In contrast to the neo-Leninist strategy of the Young Communists, the ‘commissione 
"operai-studenti”’ insisted that the ‘movimento studentesco’ should not send isolated 
groups of cadres to agitate within the workers’ movement but instead it should 
‘present itself as a mass movement.’ Relations between students and workers should 
be conducted through faculty discussion groups and factory cells in order to maintain 
the ‘mass’ nature of worker-student collaboration, while the discussion material would 
-, be furnished by revolutionary operaista journals such as Quaderni Rossi. Classe 
' Operaia, and Gatto Selvagio (Wildcat). Student militants would act as relays between
74 ‘Bollettino a cura della Commissione "Operai-Studenti dell’Università, ciclostat, 
Bologna, December, 1968.
the university assemblies and the shop-floor workers organisations providing a 
constant link between the two movements and helping to unify and articulate its 
activities.
In practice, apart from the medical students’ initiative at the Panealdi works, 
’opportunist’ attempts at joint worker-student industrial action ended in failure. A 
student picket of the Longo engineering factory in Bolognina was easily broken-up by 
the police and only a few dozen committed militants seemed prepared to take part in 
such action.75 Activists who engaged in this type of revolutionary politics were 
mostly the famous ’cinesi’ who, although they used the M.S. as a political vehicle, 
were actually part of a small but tightly organised Maoist splinter party known as the 
PCd’I (the original name of the Italian Communist Party).76 Although the PCd’I was 
strongest in Tuscany, it did have a number of supporters in Bologna and their 
colourful demonstrations with red banners inscribed with mandarin slogans were a 
favourite subject for press photographers.
Although there was little outward sign of worker-student collaboration in Bologna, by 
the end of 1968, the "commissione ‘operai-studenti’" claimed that several joint 
meetings had taken place in the factories of ICO, ACMA and GD. However, it was 
the Bolognina based engineering factory of SASIB that was to become the real centre 
for the anticapitalist movements in Bologna during the ’autunno caldo’. Because of its 
centrality to the workers’ movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s, SASIB 
provides a good example of the attempts which were made to institute new forms of 
‘workers’ democracy’ and the difficulties which trade unionists faced in combatting 
the decentralisation of production which proved to be the employers’ most effective
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75 Capponi, cit. p.74.
76 Very rapidly the PCd’I, which published the newspaper Nuova Unità, was eclipsed 
within factory organisations by new Marxist-Leninist and extra-parliamentary left 
organisations such as Potere Operaio (Emilia-Veneto), and Lotta Continua. As we shall 
see however, none were as important and influential as Manifeslo-PDUP which appealed 
far more to Bologna’s traditional manual working-class.
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weapon against the protagonists of the Hot Autumn.
The ‘Hot Autumn* at AMF-SASIB
As in the rest of Italy, at SASIB the period from 1962 to 1966 was characterised by a 
lack of industrial conflict.77 But as the ‘miracle’ began to give way to recession, 
company bankruptcies and unemployment, a growing tension could be detected 
between shop-floor workers and managers. The workers’ newsletter, ‘Lo smeriglio’ 
(Emery) was re-launched for the first time since the 1950s with the aim of contesting 
the bland self-promotion of the glossy company publication, ‘Notizie nostre’. 
However, from the share-holders’ point of view, the ‘notizie’ were indeed good, and 
in contrast to many large northern Italian machine manufacturing companies the 
owners of AMF-SASIB were able to celebrate an impressive rate of profit growth 
during this period. At the end of 1967, the Confmdustria newspaper II sole 24 ore 
placed SASIB among the top 250 companies in Italy. As Brini argues, by 1968 
SASIB had returned to its status after the Liberation as the most important factory in
77 This was especially marked in the case of SASIB because the management had 
successfully resisted the re-entry of trade unionists into the factory after the purge of 
Communist and Socialist activists in 1954. The small Marxist-Leninist group, Movimento 
Politico dei Lavoratori (MPL) conducted a series of ‘interviews’ with the workforce of 
several Bolognese factories and the MPL described SASIB prior to 1968 as the ‘fascist 
factory par excellence’. This was not only due to the fact that a former fascist leader was 
one of its directors, but also because it was company practice to employ workers ‘hand- 
picked by UIL, CISL and the DC’ (i.e. anti-Communist trade unions) who commuted 
from the ‘less politicised’ outlying comuni of the province. Also the management 
preferred to employ apprentices from Silesia who were led to believe that SASIB was ‘a 
little paradise’ and once they had been taken on none of these ‘guest workers’ took part 
in any disruption, no doubt partly from fear of being sent back to Poland. ‘MPL- 
Fabbriche. Sintesi dell’incontro con alcuni operai del consiglio di fabbrica della AMF- 
SASIB (Bolognina)’, Nelle, fabbriche a Bologna. No. 15-16, 15lh December, 1971.
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Bologna.71
In October 1967, elections for the factory council (Commissione Interna) were held 
for the first time since 1965. 740 out of the 943 workers took part in the ballot and 
the CGIL emerged as the strongest union with four of the seven worker delegates, 
CISL obtained two and UIL one. This was an important breakthrough for the leftist 
unions because SASIB was regarded as having a great strategic importance. If a U.S. 
company was able to freeze-out Communist trade unionists in the stronghold of Red 
Emilia the PCI knew that its chances of advancing in the rest of the country were 
bleak indeed. A measure of the Communist Party’s organisational recovery within 
SASIB after the purge of 1954 is provided by Brini who noted that 51 employees 
belonged to the factory cell while there were over one hundred card carrying members 
of the PCI who were attached to their neighbourhood sections, or ’sezioni di strada.’
A greater optimism on the shop-floor was also bolstered by the results of the national 
elections of 1968 which saw a consolidation of the PCI’s position as the dominant 
political force in the province.78 9
78 Giuseppe Brini, SASIB (AMFt Story. 35 anni di sfruttamento della forza-lavoro.
Edizioni Galileo, Bologna, 1969, p.233.
79 See Table 20.
Table 20. Results of the 1968 General Election in the Comune di Bologna and for the 
two previous national and local elections.
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Party 1968 General 
Election
1963 General 
Election
1964 Admin. 
Election
Votes % % %
PCI 144,715 41.49 40.4 44.8
DC 82,090 23.54 21.2 22.0
PSIUP 13,896 3.98 - 1.9
PSU 57,399 16.46 - -
PSI - - 11.9 7.6
PSDI - - 11.9
_  7 6
PRI 4,919 1.41 0.8
'
PLI 31,750 9.10 11.1 11.0
MSI 11,610 3.33 4.2 3.4
Others 2,409 0.69 - -
Source: Ulram, cit.
In Bologna the PCI advanced slightly on its position in 1963 and although llie DC also 
made gains, the left opposition was much strengthened by the PSIUP* s 4% share of 
the ballot, while the Social Democrats and Nenni’s United Socialists polled nearly 5% 
less than in 1963 representing the loss of a quarter of their combined support. 
Nationally the left won 31.4% of the vole (PCI 26.9% and PSIUP 4.5%) and the 
Communists could at least taire comfort from the high-price which the electorate had 
made the PSU pay for the failure of the ‘centro-sinistra’ to deliver on its reform 
package, although the DC once again proved its political resiliance in the face of
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hostile public opinion.
Communist activists were in a buoyant mood and they believed that the Berlinguerian 
encouragement of the emergent mass movements represented a return to the class 
struggle Communism of the 1940s and 1950s. The tenacious occupation of the 
Panealdi workers had also inspired the workforce in many Bolognese factories and 
particularly those in Bolognina to wage an uncompromising campaign for the national 
contract which was up for negotiation in 1969. Older activists were supplemented by 
a new intake of apprentices who had been recruited at the end of the 1967-68 school 
year. As we saw in part one, these diplomati had been through the lire of the 
'movimento studentesco* and they were much less likely to be subordinated to the 
discipline of the factory than their predecessors.80
At the 4th Workers’ Conference of the PCI held in Turin in December 1967, 
Communist workers were urged to take up the slogan, 'Cambiare la condizione 
operaia nella fabbrica, nella società e nello stato*. With the more pro-active stance of 
the Party a new combative spirit developed among the generation of orthodox 
militants who, as we saw in chapter four, had been marginalised by Fanti’s 
rinnovamento of 1959. This new mood was reflected in the publication of a factory 
newspaper entitled Riscossa Operaia (Workers’ Revolt) which was produced by the 
PCI’s factory cell. Riscossa Operaia’s contributors linked the conditions at SASIB to 
the national political situation and imperialism in Vietnam in a similar way to the 
leaflets and journals o f the M.S. operaistà and the extraparliamentary left.81
The first test of the labour movement’s new found industrial strength was to come in 
December 1968 when a trade unionist was summarily dismissed by the SASIB 
management. The response to the sacking was spontaneous and quite unexpected, and 
the following day the workforce came out on strike in protest for the first time since 
1961. The December 27th strike was to be the start of many such stoppages which
80 Ibid. pp. 250-254.
81 Ibid, pp.246-247.
cumulated in over 500 hours of industrial action in support of national and local 
contract demands during the course of the following year. From December onwards 
SASIB became the point of reference for the whole labour movement in Bologna and 
the focus of attention for the many extraparliamentary left groups who were hoping 
for some local repercussion from tire factory conflicts of the great northern cities.*2
In order to circumvent the increasingly effective industrial disruption of the main 
union federations, the management of SASIB began to radically alter its production 
process by doubling its use of more than 60 satellite factories which were scattered 
throughout the provinces of Bologna, Modena and Reggio. These were the archetypal 
firms of the ‘modello emiliano’; small, family-run, non-unionised enterprises that 
were capable of taking on small-batch precision engineering contracts and turning 
orders around very quickly.82 3 84 The SASIB workers told their interviewers that the 
firm was so delighted with the savings on production costs it had achieved through 
sub-contracting that the management intended to make SASIB, ‘an enormous 
specialised assembly line’ which would buy in all the necessary finished components 
from outside allowing the company to make at least a 50% cut in its workforce.*4
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82 ‘Sintesi dell’incontro con alcuni operai del consiglio di fabbrica della AMF-SASIB 
(Bolognina!*, Alternativa Socialista/Nelle fabbriche a Bologna. Movimento Politico dei 
Lavoratori, No. 15-16, 15th December, 1971, p.8.
83 The degree of industrial decentralisation which the Sasib management undertook 
in the early 1970s was nevertheless quite modest when compared to companies such as 
GD or Marposs. The real savings came from passing on machine investment costs to the 
supplier companies as can be seen in Table 21.
84 Ibid.
Table 21. Rate of investment and degree of decentralisation among a sample of 
manufacturing companies in the Province of Bologna in 1975.
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Company Millions of lire invested in 
machinery per employee
Percentage of 
decentralisation
GD 2.6 50
Zanasi 1.6 50
Cognetex 2.1 40
Calzoni 1.1
Sirmac 3.0 40
Marposs - 72
Wrapmatic - 75
Plessey Arco 1.1 5.8
Ducati-E 1.0 10
Sasib 1.1 20
Minganti 1.1 18
Giordani 0.4 15
Casaralta 0.2 15
Source: FLM (Bologna). 1975 in Barbiani & Conti, cit. Vol.I, p.234.
After five months of near continuous industrial action in support of the abolition of 
piece-rate payments at SASIB the trade unions achieved their first victory. The 
management agreed to abolish piece-rate working in every department of the factory 
but it continued to resort to productive decentralisation and the selective re-
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deployment of union militants in order to weaken the resolve of the workforce.85 86
The consequences for the cohesiveness of the labour movement were very severe 
because small firms were net gainers from this exercise and trade unionists were 
unlikely to mount secondary pickets outside the factories of the ‘padroncini rossi’ 
whose livelihoods would be threatened by an extension of industrial action into the 
small firm sector.84
The contradictions of the economic strategy which Guido Fanti had championed with 
its emphasis on small firm investment and ‘mutual respect’ between trade unionists 
and factory owners now started to be openly contested within the PCI itself. Several 
groups affiliated to the ‘Manifesto’ tendency grew up inside the Bologna federation of 
the PCI and they were quick to establish factory organisations. The Imola faction of 
Manifesto attacked the idea that the working-class in Emilia-Romagna were somehow 
isolated against the effects of capitalist exploitation because they happened to live 
under red administrations. ‘What difference is there,’ argued the ‘Operai-Studenti 
Manifesto di Imola’, ‘between the condition of a worker from Imola exploited perhaps 
by a ‘padroncino’ with the party card of the PCI and a worker from Milan or Turin?* 
The article went on to argue that if the PCI is content with its role as ‘a simple 
administrator’ (according to L’Unità of 10th May, 1970) ‘by adhering to the 
economic, social and cultural reality of the country’ all the giunte rosse were doing 
were simply aligning themselves with capitalism.87
One of the most important ways the working-class could contest ‘the democracy of the 
bosses’ according to Manifesto was to organise themselves politically at their places of 
work. The industrial action at SASIB as well as at Pirelli and FIAT had developed
85 ‘Ristrutturazione della fabbrica e crisi del potere dei padroni sugli operai’, lì 
manifesto - Bologna, colletivo operai-impiegati SASIB del "Manifesto", Bologna, 
December, 1971. p.2, AIGER.
86 ‘Operai Studenti’ Il manifesto - Imola. No.8, 1970, p.2, AIGER.
87 ‘Il comuniSmo dei consigli’, Operai-Studenti. Il Manifesto - Imolar No.8, May 
1970, p.2.
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new experiences of struggle, ‘which have not been imposed by a tew union 
bureaucrats,’ but which have, ‘objectives and forms of struggle directly chosen by the 
work force.’88 The most important form of worker democracy according to 
Manifesto was the ‘delegato di reparto* or shop delegate. These delegates were 
directly elected by their work colleagues and could be recalled at any time, but the 
main advantage which this figure had for the class struggle was that, ‘he is not a 
union bureaucrat who comes every so often to hold a meeting or who shuts himself 
off in an office to ‘study* the problems of the working class; he is a worker who 
suffers daily exploitation in the factory like any other.’89
However as the Manifesto group at SASIB pointed out in its journal, the constant re­
deployment of the labour force makes it almost impossible for the 'worker delegate' to 
represent a homogeneous group of workers. Also by promoting ‘older’ and more 
‘experienced’ workers to foremen and supervisor positions, the management aimed to 
produce a climate in which labour skills are ‘secretly passed on' to the younger 
apprentices thus reproducing the subordinate hierarchies which allow one group of 
workers to be used to control the other.90
Despite this counter-offensive by the management, SASIB workers had succeeded in 
winning additional concessions from their employers to those already achieved by the 
metalworkers’ unions on a national level. But although wages had improved and 
piece-rate working had been mostly abolished, in the province of Bologna it was still 
common for employees to be required to undertake compulsory overtime involving a 
56 hour week while improvements in working conditions had occurred only in a 
piece-meal fashion. For this reason Manifesto urged its supporters to continue the 
struggle on a day-to-day basis in order to defend the gains already made and to win 
better pay and conditions, including the elimination of compulsory over-time and shift 
work.
88 Ibid. p.8.
89 Ibid.
90 ‘Ristrutturazione della fabbrica..’ cit. p.3.
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There was some scope for the achievement of these objectives in the larger factories 
of the province of Bologna, but the overwhelming majority of industrial workers still 
depended on firms employing less than ten people which allowed owners to avoid 
much of the compulsory contributions and employment protection which had been 
won at a national level and which was later incorporated into the ‘Workers’ Charter’ 
(Statuto dei lavoratori).91 This was a major concern to the Manifesto group at 
SASIB who dedicated an entire article to the problem of working class unity and the 
workers’ struggle in the small factories.
The article admitted that there had been divisions within the movement over re­
grading which had been opposed by skilled workers in many factories who feared the 
loss of advantageous differential pay and conditions. This had allowed the owners to 
drive a wedge bewteen unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled workers. Nevertheless, the 
mass mobilisations in favour of the automatic re-grading of workers on the lowest 
‘qualifica’ and for the abolition of piece-work had achieved notable successes. 
However, ‘there has remained a sector, that of the small and medium-sized industries, 
in which the ‘autunno caldo’ struggles have not left any organisation among the 
working class.’92
It is interesting to compare this analysis by shop floor delegates at SASIB with the 
anonymous ‘head of the PCI’s Factory Commission in a Red Belt federation’ who 
provided Stephen Heilman with this insight in late 1969:
‘Let’s understand at the outset that there is nothing to say about those with more than
91 Passed in May 1970, the statuto legally enshrined several fundamental rights of 
labour (which the Constitution had already provided for) such as the right to organise, 
the right to trade union representation and to protection from unfair dismissal. It was 
accompanied by a general amnesty for all workers who had been charged or convicted 
for minor offences in pursuance of a trade dispute. Lumley, States of Emergency, cit.
p.25l &  Tarrow, Democracy and Disorder, cit. p.313.
92 Ibid.
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twenty workers, at least not in any way that can be generalised...’
This statement is bizarre enough given the PCI’s own pivotal role in backing the 
HOM led strikes at SASIB, Ducati, Weber, SABIEM and many other larger firms in 
Bologna in 1969, but the real suiprise comes when this Communist official described 
the situation in the small firm sector:
‘Given the kind of industry we have in Tuscany and Emilia, the issue of renewing 
contracts places the workers’ interests and those of the artisan and small producer in 
direct conflict, and therefore calls the entire line into question. On an idealistic level,
t
many are on our side, but now, with unprecedented militancy reaching all the way / y  
down to firms with, say, three workers, paternalism and all sorts of other issues have 
come forward. Tactically, we do all we can, which is to minimize the damage, but 
still there are open breaks with the party because of the workers...The fact is that this 
is an insoluble contradiction, and so we have to manoeuver tactically.193
7
It is possible that this description of class war in firms of three workers might just 
apply to a tiny Communist enclave near Massa-Carrara or Piombino, but it is quite 
ludicrous to suggest that such a conflict could be universally observed in other ’red 
belt* federations and indeed Heilman provides no corroboration for this testimony. 93
93 Stephen Heilman, ’The PCI’s Alliance Strategy and the Case of the Middle 
Classes’, cit. pp.399-400. Paul Ginsborg argues that ‘...for most of the 1960s, it was 
not difficult for the local authorities to mediate between employer and employed, both 
of whom probably voted for the Communists. But in the ‘hot autumn’ such mediation 
fell apart.’ Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy, cit. p.396. In fact, in the larger 
factories the PCI had never been welcomed as a mediator, particularly in the wake of the 
1962 strikes, while in the smaller firms the very low level of industrial conflict obviated 
the need for such a role. In his summary of the Hot Autumn Ginsborg does however 
concede that in the ‘Third Italy’ a ‘less direct conflict between capital and labour’ 
prevailed, p.341.
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The Manifesto group of workers at SASIB, who if anything had an interest in 
exaggerating the spread of the ‘lotta di classe’ in Bologna, lamented the fact that 
Bologna’s factory owners were,
'Presenting the workers in the small factories as saboteurs of the struggle and 
therefore as their adversaries.,w
Furthermore local capitalists were, ‘playing on the weakness of the workers’ 
movement in the small and medium factories in order to force these workers to 
accept overtime and under*the-counter payments thus increasing their net profit in a 
dramatic way.,M
The deliberate decentralisation of production by SASIB management was evident from 
the many machines which were lying idle. This was not a crisis of production but 
proof that, ‘...most production is being contracted-out where costs are much less and 
production times much shorter...’94 *6
‘Managerial’ Communist leaders such as Galletti and Fanti who talked of the ‘open 
region and the importance of production skills’,97 at a time when, ‘the workers are 
waging a hard struggle against production,’ were implicitly condemned for,
94 ‘Ristrutturazione della fabbrica...’ cit.
93 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 The ‘open region’ (regione aperta) is a conecept which Guido Fanti developed 
during the course of the first regional election campaign in 1970. Fanti wanted to apply 
the ‘eonsociationalism’ that he had practised in Bologna to the new regional authority and 
he called on the ‘parte sana’ (the healthy or progressive part) of all the main political 
parties to join him in a search for new forms of democratic participation (such as the 
neighbourhood councils with their DC ‘mayors’) and political innovation based around 
commonly held principles. L’Unita. 14th April, 1970 cited in Anderlini, Terra rossa, 
cit. p.120. See also the introduction to chapter seven, below.
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‘developing armchair theory on the alliance with the so-called productive middle class 
which pays lip-service to the salvation of the condition of the working class while in 
reality the productive middle class make bigger profits exclusively on the backs of the 
working class.,98
Writing on industrial relations in Bologna in the early 1970s, the Swiss journalist,
Max Jaeggi, claimed that, ‘the Bolognese entrepreneurs have little to laugh about.’98 9 
According to Jaeggi this was because, ‘The class struggle is waged more vigorously in 
Bologna than in virtually any other Italian city. Hardly a week goes by without a 
report on the local page of L’Unith about a dispute between workers and 
employers...Workers, whether employed in small or larger firms, are not afraid to 
fight energetically for the demands of their colleagues in other firms, thereby 
demonstrating the unity of workers’ interests.100’ Inspite of the fact, as Jaeggi 
admits, that Bologna lacks any real large-scale manufacturing and that the industrial 
structure is overwhelmingly dominated by artisanal firms and small and medium-sized 
enterprises, ‘the Bolognese workers demonstrate a true class consciousness and a 
trully enviable disposition to struggle.’101
If Bologna’s workers did have this enviable disposition to struggle, as many did, it 
was not from the Communist dominated CGIL that the militant workforce took its 
instructions, but from their own workplace organisations and the several 
extraparliamentary groups who were seeking to challenge the PCI’s hegemony in the 
factory.102 At Ducati-Elettronica. Avanguardia Operaia had proposed the holding of
98 Ibid.
99 M. Jaeggi, R. Mueller, S. Schmid, Bologna rossa. I comunisti al governo di una 
citta, Feltrinelli, Milan, 1977, p.60.
100 Jaeggi, et al. Red Bologna, cil. p.7S.
101 Bologna rossa, cit.
102 Barbiani & Conti contend that so important and decisive for the PCI was the 
prospect of the re-birth of a unified trade union movement (which seemed increasingly
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an open-air assembly and ihe blocking of the via Emilia, but Lotta Continua 
reluctantly had to report that this proposal had been opposed by the CGIL which held 
an internal assembly and was able to block these forms of direct action by securing an 
overwhelming majority of votes on the factory council.101
More 'articulated’ forms of action took place in Ducati under the organisation of the 
Comitato di Base which involved, '...hard forms of internal struggle with the 
expulsion of white-collar employees and managers during the strikes, internal 
demonstrations, assemblies, etc.’* 10 * Contrary to Jaeggi’s assertion, these forms of 
struggle were not continually reported by L’Unith. and this is hardly surprising given 
the Bologna PCI’s desire to keep the CGIL-CISL-UIL ‘intesa’ together and to prevent 
the formation of autonomous workers’ organisations which had temporarly threatened 
the trade union leadership in the northern factories.101
likely with joint negotiating positions being advanced by CGIL-CISL-UIL) that any threat 
to this new found unity in the factories would be resisted. Also, unlike in 1962 when 
strikes were undertaken to win more favourable contracts at plant level, in 196S-9 the 
emphasis was on winning ‘a lasting national agreement.’ Luttes politiques. Vol.l, p.217.
101 'Bologna: Sospensione alla Ducati’, Lotta ContinuaT Bologna edition, numero 
unico, 14lh November, 1969.
10* Ibid.
101 Although the existence of ‘delegates councils’ and CUBs is well documented,
even in the most strike-prone city and region in Italy, (see Table 21) the legitimacy of
the trade union federations was never seriously called into question. As Lumley writes,
‘The almost unanimous vote in favour of the unions’ final recommendation of acceptance
of the contract offers in December 1969 and January 1970, was also a vote of confidence
in their leadership. The increase in unionisation, which in the province of Milan rose
from 30% to 44% of the workforce in 1968-1970, was a sign of greater interest in and
identification with the unions.’ States of Emergency, cit. p.247. In Bologna, Sighinolfi
describes how although the national and CGIL were interested in building on the
experience of delegates’ councils in their demands for greater worker participation in the
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Attempts at unofficial action were therefore sporadic and mostly unsuccesful. An 
‘anticipatory strike’ by SASIB workers who picketed the neighbouring Bolognina 
factories of Acma, Casaralta, Minganti and SAMP Macchina won only token support, 
and the other workers did not join the SASIB ‘wild-catters.’ Lotta Continua had to 
admit that, ‘the initiatives of the workers’ vanguards, at least in Bologna, clash 
increasingly violently with the trade unions which are now clearly showing their 
repressive features in many situations.’* 106 In another incident which echoed the 
PCI’s industrial policy after the Liberation, a number activists of who had taken part 
in a violent demonstration were denounced to the police by Communist officials.107
Internal demonstrations and ‘articulated’ strikes at Ducati in the following year were 
met with a violent response by the owners who, according lo Lotta Continua, used 
‘fascist squads’ of middle-managers and foremen to break-up a picket of an assembly 
plant which had been kept open by ‘crumiri’ (blacklegs). The official trade unions 
retaliated by organising an external picket but once again the white-collar workers 
responded by organising a counter-demonstration, and (imitating ‘autonomist’ tactics) 
blocked the road outside the factory. The ‘servizio d’ordine* of the CGIL physically 
prevented worker and student activists from Lotta Continua and other 
extraparliamentary groups from ‘castigare fino in fondo i fascisti.’108
management of the firm, the C.ISL and UIL local leadership would not hear of it. In the 
interests of preserving the unity of the ‘intesa’ these proposals were therefore never 
tabled by the unified Camera del Lavoro. M. Sighinolfì, ‘Le tappe di sviluppo del 
processo unitario a Bologna,’ Quaderni di rassegna sindacale. March-Aprii, 1971, p.7S 
quoted in Barbiani & Conti, cit. p.221.
106 ‘Sospensioni alla Ducati,’ cit.
107 ‘Bologna - Scioperi e cortei’, Lotta Continua. Year I, N o.l, 22nd November, 
1969, p.8.
108 ‘Bologna: La citta in lotta’, Lotta Continua. Year II, No.S, 24th March, 1970,
pp.8-9.
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These episodes serve to illustrate the marginal impact of extremist groups on the 
organised working-class in Bologna’s factories and also the inability of either the new 
left or the established trade union organisations to create a unity of action among 
shop-floor workers and employees. As in Milan, relations between blue and white- 
collar workers grew increasingly hostile and impiegati who refused to take part in 
strikes were sometimes driven out of the factory by ‘spazzate’ (sweepings) of younger 
militant workers.109 However in Bologna such incidents were rare and the official 
trade unions never allowed industrial action to degenerate into acts of ‘voluntarism’ 
and reprisal even if this meant alienating the most active part of the workforce.
In other large Italian cities it took several months (and in some factories several years) 
before the main trade union organisations were able to reimpose their authority and 
discipline on the shopfloor, whereas in Bologna the Camera del Lavoro continued to 
be the command and control centre of the workers’ movement. Indeed the CGIL’s 
strength greatly improved as a result of the ‘autunno caldo’ and the mushroom growth 
of extraparliamentary groups was largely a reaction against this entrenched reformist 
hegemony rather than the filling of a power vacuum as was often the case in 
Lombardy, Piedmont and the Veneto.110
If the ‘enemies to the left’ of the PCI had been easily defeated in the ‘war of 
manoeuver’ for the control of the factory proletariat during the Hot Autumn, it is 
necessary briefly to examine the challenge of the ‘new social movements’ to 
Communist hegemony outside the factory. Once again we will focus primarily on 
housing and popular participation as two of the most important pillars of the PCI’s 
territorial ‘politica delle alleanze. ’
Taking Over the City? Housing and collective provision in Bologna seen from the 
‘Movement. *
109 Lumley, States of Emergency, oil. p.203.
110 On the re-organisation of CISL and CGIL in 1969 see John Low-Beer, Protest and
Participation, cit. pp.32-33.
On November 19th, 1969, a nationwide general strike lasted 24 hours and involved 20 
million people. The strike was called in protest at the crisis in Italy's housing and it 
had the backing of all three trade union confederations and the parties of the left.111 
The housing protest movement reached its peak in 1971 when mass demands for the 
swift introduction of the housing reform bill (No.865 implemented on the 26th May) 
culminated in a second general strike in April.
But while housing struggles may have been the most important recruiting card for 
groups like Avanguardia Operaia in Milan and Lotta Continua in Turin (where the 
movement was also strong among the assembly-line workers at FIAT), the same could 
not be said for Bologna. The tenants’ union, SUNIA was under the complete control 
of the PCI and it worked assiduously to support the housing schemes proposed by the 
comune and collaborated actively with the neighbourhood commissions charged with 
the task of widening community involvement in the planning process. Organised 
squatting and ‘autoriduzione’ of rents which were endemic in some working class 
neighbourhoods in Milan, Turin and Rome were almost unheard of in Bologna.
The only national tenants’ group which existed on the left of the Communist Party 
was the Unione Inquilini (UI). UI drew its membership from among the various 
groups of the extraparliamentary left and it saw housing as the site of revolutionary 
struggle capable of mobilising the working class and channelling this protest into 
political action. It was critical of SUNIA’s legalistic and narrow trade union type 
organisation and unlike SUNIA, UI called for the self-management of housing estates 
and the removal of allocation powers from the IACP in favour of tenants’ groups.112
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‘The difference between the reformists’ position and ours is this: for them the left-
111 Bonaccini, Aldo. ‘Lo sciopero generale per la casa neU’azione del sindacato per 
le riforme’ Critica Marxista. 7, No.6 (Nov-Dec), pp. 12-26, cited in Angotti, Housing in 
Italy, cit. p.45.
112 Angotti, cit. p.46.
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wing municipal giunta is already the expression of mass power, and therefore should 
be the principal actor on the political scene. We do not maintain that bourgeois state 
institutions - no matter how much they be ‘occupied* by the left - can be expressions 
of true democracy and the basis for future proletarian power.’113
Given the strategic objectives of Communist policy in Bologna it is obvious why 
SUNIA might be regarded with suspicion by the PCI’s leftist opponents, as Angotti 
remarks;
‘One of the criticisms of SUNIA from the left is its alliance with the national 
association of small property owners and shopkeepers. The alliance is aimed at 
bringing the middle-class into a broad reform coalition.’114
As with Manifesto’s critique of the ‘padroncini rossi' as ‘little exploiters’, UI saw the 
petty-bourgeois rentiers and the shop-keepers of Confesercenti as being parasitic on 
working-class labour rather than ‘victims’ of the great monopolies. Cervellati’s 
ambitious plan for the Centro Storico could not disguise the fact that the vast majority 
of working-class families were forced to live on the new peripheral estates where 
service provision, although better than in most other Italian cities, was still lacking in 
many areas.
One of the few articles to deal with the housing question in Bologna from a new leftist 
perspective reported on an assembly held in the Pilastro, the poorest and largest of the 
PEEP estates and home to many southern migrant families. An old Communist 
partisan who had joined Lotta Continua explained why he had left the PCI,
‘I’ve been in the party for 27 years, I took part in the partisan war, I’ve been in 
prison, but now the PC are just a load of bourgeois. I’m a working-class communist
113 Unione Inquilini, 1975 cited in Angotti, p.47.
1,4 Angotti, cit. p.66.
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in Lotta Continua. In ‘45 they disarmed me, but they won’t get away with it 
now.’115
LC were convinced that many such disillusioned older Communists would come over 
to their party, but this was rather a false hope at a time when the PCI was seeing its 
membership expand quite considerably.116
Table 22. Percentage of voting population belonging to the PCI in the Comune di 
Bologna, 1968-1976.
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
12.87 12.94 12.99 12.92 13.12 13.23 13.35 13.89 14.33
Source: Barbagli & Corbella, ‘Partito e movimento...'cit. p.TST
LC claimed that an increasing number of families were taking part in rent strikes, 
particularly those from the south, but Angotti has shown how even an organised 
tenants' union like UI was unable to break the organisational monopoly of the PCI on 
the PEEP estates and Lotta Continua never managed to organise the working-class 
residents of the run-down estates into a political movement as it had in parts of 
Turin.117
ns ‘Bologna: La città in lotta’. Lotta Continua, Year II, No.8, 24th March, 1970, 
pp.8-9.
116 See Table 22.
117 Referring to the establishment of the consigli di quartieri in Turin, Stephen 
Heilman argues that as they, ‘...took on a semi-institutional character, the influence of 
the New Left overshadowed the more established parties. Under the leadership of groups 
such as Lotta Continua, more confrontational forms of politics, such as fee or rent 
strikes, often unruly demonstrations, and occupations in public housing projects became 
more frequent...While the leadership of the federation generally condemned "excesses",
The giunta comunale was only too aware that the mobilisation of the factories and the 
universities were bound to have repercussions on a local level. As mayor Renato 
Zangheri admitted, Bologna’s building programme had been limited by central 
government financial constraints, but although the lack of affordable housing remained 
a problem, through the PEEP schemes the municipal authorities had been able to 
demonstrate its commitment to ’il diritto alla casa’. Groups like Lotta Continua and 
Manifesto were able to attract a small number of students and a handfull of 
disillusioned militants, but the Bolognese working-class knew that their hopes for a 
better quality of life depended entirely on the PCI, and the Communists improved 
performance in the 1970 local and regional elections further confirmed the Party’s 
domination of its traditional constituency.* 118
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most party militants active in the urban struggles participated in them. And since some 
protests enlisted the support of an astonishingly large number of citizens, even the party’s 
formal condemnations were often quite muted;’ Italian Communism in Transition. The 
Rise, and Fall of the Historic Compromise in Turin. 1975-1980. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1988, p.70.
118 In 1973 the Comune di Bologna provided for 5 7 %  of all new housing compared 
to a national average public provision of 3 fo; Red Bologna, cit. p.60. For the results of 
the 1970 adminsitrative elections see table D.
Table 23. Results of the 1970 Administrative Elections to the the regional 
government of Emilia-Romagna.
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Percentage of Votes Number of Seats
PCI 44.0 24
DC 25.8 14
PSI 8.0 3
PSDI 7.5 2
PRI 4.0 2
PLI 3.7 1
MSI 3.0 2
PSIUP 3.8 2
PDIUM 0.2 2
Total 100.0 50
Source: R. Leonardi, ’Political developments and institutional change in Emilia’, cit. p.17.
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Table 24. Results of the administrative elections to the Comune di Bologna, 1970.
Party Votes % Seats
Due Torri 149,339 42.45 27
DC 74,956 21.35 14
PSI 26,462 8.53 A
PSDI 36,852 10.5 6
PRI 9,347 2.66 1
PLI 25,493 7.26 4 1
MSI 15,633 4.46 2 |
PSIUP 11,545 3.29 2 1
PDIUM 1,411 0.4
Total 360,537 100 60 I
As we saw in chapter five, the interest in participation in direct forms of democracy 
contributed greatly to the redefinition of the objectives of the consigli di quartieri and 
the relationship between the quartiere and the local economy became more politicised 
as a result of the ‘autunno caldo.’119
119 An interesting but short-lived expression of the extension of the factory council 
within the quartiere is to be found in the consigli di zona which developed in parts of 
Bolognina and Borgo Panigaie in the early 1970s. In essence these ‘consigli’ were 
similar to other groups of local service consumers such as parents or council tenants. 
They did not see their role as being antagonistic to the consigli di quartieri and indeed 
worked to cooperate with the decentralised authorities in order to negotiate for better 
transport and canteen facilities from local employers. G.C. Tracchi, ‘La costruzione dei 
consigli di zona a Bologna,’ Quaderni di rassegna sindacale. November 1972-February
Industrial disputes at Ducati and other factories had involved the comune as a service 
provider which would be able to allocate resources won from employers for the 
benefit of local workers. A good example of this were the asili nidi which were built 
in Borgo Panigaie and financed by Ducati.* 120 But other concessions were wrung out 
of local employers such as a compulsory annual contribution to the social fund (a 
modest £1,400 - £1,600 in 1976) and company subsidised public transport.121
If the Communists and Socialists were to maintain their political presence within the 
‘subcultura rossa’ the comune had to play an active role in creating new collective 
forms of expression for popular demands.122 In the neighbourhood councils and the 
neighbourhood commissions, the comune believed that it had established just sudi a 
mechanism for channelling civilised discontent. Examples of ’active mobilisation' 
were to be found in the neighbourhood councils of Bolognina and Corticella which 
involved local residents in petitioning for the transfer of the old army barracks (the 
'Caserme Rosse’) to the quartiere for use as a community centre. This was a popular 
campaign and it was also politically 'safe’ because the target of the mobilisation was 
the central government. The same initiative was followed by the Marconi consiglio di 
quartiere who wanted to take over the old state tobacco factory in order to create a 
new park in an area of the city which had very little greenery.123
1973, p.122 quoted in Barbiani & Conti, cit. p.222.
120 See above and Red Bologna, cit. pp.84-S5.
121 Ibid. p.82.
122 The task was defined by Armando Cossulta, head of the PCI’s local government 
commission, as the establishment of a ‘new mode of governing.’ See, A. Cossutta, ‘Unità 
e partecipazione per un modo migliore di governare regioni, provincie, comuni,’ in A. 
Cossutta & E. Berlinguer, I comunisti nel governo locale. Editori Riuniti, Rome, 1978, 
p.34.
123 Giuseppe Longo, ‘Esperienza del decentramento amministrativo-organizzalivo e 
della partecipazione nei consigli,’ cit. p.81. However, popular participation in this case 
can lead to bureaucratic inertia. Some twenty years on, the neighbourhood council and
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As we have seen, schooling, social services, transport, urban development all became 
live political issues in the years after 1968, but the consigli di quartieri proved to be 
more than an adequate safety-valve for the expression of these collective needs and 
demands.134 The rapid creation of similar democratic structures in all the major 
cities of Italy confirmed that popular participation was an idea whose time had come, 
even if, as we shall discover in the concluding chapter, there were many ‘new social 
subjects’ who could not identify with a political system which made the establishment 
of consensus and the maintenance of authority its guiding principles. *124
the comune have still not come to a decision on the use of the ex-tobacco factory.
124 Renato Zangheri could therefore say with some justification that, ‘In reality there 
is no important question which affects the life of the comune...which the quartieri, their 
councils, their commissions, and their assemblies cannot confront.’ Renato Zangheri, 
‘Partecipazione democratica e trasformazione dello stato,’ in Cossutta, A., Stefanini, M. 
& Zangheri, R. Decentramento e partecipazione. Editori Riuniti, Rome, 1977.
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C H A P T E R  S E V E N
The City of Ideas and the Idea of the City: Conclusions on movements, institutions 
and Communist strategy in contemporary Bologna.
1. 1968 and the Umiliati Model1 *&in Bologna: An Afterview.
By using the energy and enthusiasm of the social movements of the late 1960s and early 
1970s, the PCI and its allies were able to re-articulate the traditional agenda of structural 
reforms and the creation of a democratic and pluralist regional assembly in terms of a 
radical new political vision. When Guido Fanti assumed the presidency of the region in 
1970, the Communists were also able to realise their ‘grand coalition' of the ‘parte sana' 
of the Emilia-Romagnan political community.1 The Leninist Keynesian strategy of a 
centrally controlled economic development which had operated through the cooperatives, 
artisans, small entrepreneurs and trade unions could now be coordinated on a regional 
basis without the threat of direct central government interference.
The PCI in Bologna had ‘ridden the tiger* of the new social movements of 1968-1971 and 
remarkably had escaped with barely a scratch (the Manifesto expulsion was the only 
internal conflict which drew blood). But the Hot Autumn had galvanised opposition to 
a capitalist system which in Bologna the ruling Communist Party had sought to win over
1 Leonardi shows how Fanti’s ‘open region’ policy also depended on the active support
of the regional secretary of the DC, Ermanno Gorrieri who, ‘was deeply committed to
the cause of state reform and the demoralisation of the Italian political system...Thus
the DC was not at all reluctant to open up a dialogue with the leftist parties in Emilia-
Romagna on innovative ways of managing regional affairs. ’ Robert Leonardi, ‘Political 
Developments and Institutional Change in Emilia-Romagna, 1970-1990’ in Leonardi, R.
& Nanetti, R. (Eds) The Regions and European Integration, cit. p.15.
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to its vision of the enterprise culture. The opponents of Amendola’s accomodationist 
strategy came from the traditional vanguardist wing of lire PCI, but they also came from 
the new social movements, from radical Catholic movements, from the universities and 
from the factories where union officials had not previously dared to show their faces. 
Yet groups like Lotta Continua. Potere Operaio and the newly formed splinter party 
Manifesto-PDUP could only be the cheer-leaders of the 'contestazione’ of ‘6^-69, and 
ironically it was organised labour and national bargaining structures that benefited most 
from the social mobilisations which the extraparliamentary groups had worked so 
assiduously to promote.2
2 See Table 25.
313
Table 25. Membership of main trade union confederations in Italy, 1968-1974.
Year CGIL CISL UIL
1968 2,461,297 1,622,158 -
1969 2,625,442 1,641,591 -
1970 2,943,314 1,809,028 -
1971 3,136,345 1,973,499 -
1972 3,214,827 2,184,279 -
1973 3,435,405 2,214,199 900,000
1974 3,827,175 2,372,701 1,050,000
Source: Crouch S t Pizzorno cit. Vol.l, p.317.
Table 26. Wage and Salary variation at 1970 and 1985 prices in Italy for the years 1970- 
1985. Gross wages and salaries per capita (*000 lire).
1970 1973 1976 1978 1982 1985
1985
Prices
1,635 2,475 4,305 7,434 13,030 18,366
1970
Prices
1,635 1,961 2,302 2,28S 2,389 2,405
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Table 26.1. Wage and Salary variation at 1970 and 19S5 prices in Italy for the years 
1970-1985. Percentage changes.
1970-73 1973-76 1976-79 1079-82 1982-85 1970-85
1985 14.8 20.27 19.97 20.57 12.12 18.88
Prices
1970 6.25 1.19 4.02 1.45 0.22 3.22
Prices
Consu- 8.06 18.85 15.33 18.S4 11.88 15.18
mer
prices
Source: Labour and Employment Policies in Italy, cit. p.23.
Arringa and De Luca show that the substantial increase in trade union power which 
resulted from these mobilisations, ‘.. .was manifested essentially on two fronts: substantial 
wage gains, both nominal and real, together with a pronounced levelling of salary 
differentials; and the imposition of a series of guarantees...on working conditions within 
the firm.’3 Tables 26 and 26.1 emphasises how significant these improvements in real 
wages were, although their redistributive effect was weakened by the increased tax 
burden which applied to dependent employees. Hie strike weapon had proved its 
effectiveness and by the early 1970s it was increasingly used to demand social reforms 
which were not directly connected to workplace disputes.4 Employers found themselves
3 C. Dell*Aringa & P. De Luca, ‘Wages and Industrial Relations’, Chapter IV of 
Ministero del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale, Report *87. Labour and Employment 
Policies in Italy. CER/Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini, Rome, 19S7, p.135. See also 
Tables 26 & 26.1.
4 Because official strike statistics are collated from ‘strikes in pursuance of a trade 
dispute* this has led to considerable under-recording of ‘political strikes’ in Italy during 
and after the Hot Autumn.
315
confronted with national stoppages over health insurance, pension benefits, taxation and 
education as well as traditional salary and contract claims.5 The Italian workforce had 
never been so assertive and combative, and for the first time in the post-war period, even 
the peasants of the agrarian South were beginning to organise and strike in great 
numbers.
Although Bologna and Emilia-Romagna have never been considered a locus classicus of 
the ‘Hot Autumn*, an examination of the strike statistics for the period 1968-71 quickly 
reveals that the region was consistently among the most strike prone in Italy.6 In 1968- 
69 there were over 13 million hours of strikes in the province of Bologna alone, and 
nearly 2.3 million of these occurred in the farming sector which by 1971 employed only 
12.4% of the active workforce of the province.7
5 Ida Regalia, Marino Regini and Emilio Reyneri, ‘Labour Conflicts and Industrial 
Relations in Italy* in Colin Crouch and Alessandro Pizzomo (Eds) The Resurgence of 
Class Conflict in Western Europe since 196S. Volume 1. Macmillan, London, 1978, 
p. 121; Tarrow, Democracy and Disorder, cit. pp.225-6. It is important to put these new 
forms of industrial unrest into some perspective however; for example in 1971, a year 
which saw 103,590,000 labour hours lost due to industrial action, only 925,000 hours 
(less than 1%) were the result of ‘solidarity* action and although 18.2 million hours were 
not worked for various ‘other causes’, contract renewal and salary claim actions still 
accounted for over 57 million strike hours. ISTAT, Annuario di Statistiche, 1972, p.358.
6 See table A.
7 See Tables 27 and 28.
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Table 27. Hours lost (000,000s), number of disputes (’000s), workers participating 
(000,000s) and national ‘league table’ position (in parentheses) among the top six most 
strike-prone regions in Italy, 1968-1971.1
All disputes
Year/
Category
E-R LO PI VE TO SI
1968
H/L 8.9(2) 14.5(1) 6.8(5) 6.3(6) 7.4(4) 7.8(3)
N/D 0.3(5) 0.7(1) 0.2(7) 0.3(6) 0.3(4) 0.4(3)
W/P 0.7 (2) 0.9(1) 0.4(4) 0.4(6) 0.5(3) 0.3(5)
1969
H/L 38.1(3) 87.5(1) 43.4(2) 22.6(4) 21.8(5) 11.6(8)
N/D 0.3(7) 0.8(1) 0.2(3) 0.4(4) 0.3(5) 0.5(2) I
W/P 0.9(2) 1.9(1) 0.6(4) 0.4(6) 0.7(3) 0.4(7)
1970
H/L 13.3(4) 36.1(1) 19.4(2) 11.8(5) 17.5(3) 8.8(6)
N/D 0.3(8) 0.8(1) 0.3(7) 0.4(4) 0.3(5) 0.6(2) 1
W/P 0.4(2) 0.7(1) 0.3(4) 0.2(6) 0.4(3) 0.2(5) J
1971
H/L 10.1(4) 19.2(1) 10.2(3) 7.9(6) 6.5(7) 9.3(5)
N/D 0.4(6) 1-0(1) 0.4(7) 0.6(4) 0.5(5) 0.6(3)
W/P 0.4(2) 0.9(1) 0.3(4) 0.3(5) 0.3(3) 0.2(6)
Key: E -R = Emilia-Romagna, LO=Lombardy, PI=Piedmont, V E=Veneto, TO=Tuscany, SI=*Sicily. 
H/L=Hours lost (millions'!, N/D=Numbers of disputes (thousands), W /P=Workers participating (millions) 
auree: 1ST AT
The agrarian struggles in Bologna in the late 1960s are evidence of the strong 
‘movementist’ continuities with the ‘anni duri’ but as Arbizzani admitted, the rural 
peasantry had become the forgotten proletariat and because the occupational and 
economic importance of farming had diminished, in Emilia at least, the PCI had failed 
to make agrarian reform one of its priorities.8 In ‘Ceto medio e Emilia Rossa’, Togliatti 
had argued that because historically the Emilian braccianti had been more politically 
advanced this meant that they should lead the urban working-class. But as a result of the 
contestatory innovations of the new social movements, Ingrao believed that the industrial 
working class were developing new forms of self-management and democracy within the 
workplace which could modernise and radicalise the contemporary struggles of the rural 
workforce.9
The Emilian peasants’ forms of struggle might have been traditional but the urban 
proletariat had nothing to teach the Bolognese rural workforce when it came to the 
‘stomach for the fight.’ Nearly half of all the working hours lost in the agricultural 
economy of Emilia-Romagna in 196S were due to strikes organised by Bolognese farm 
workers. Indeed more than three times as many working hours were lost in the province 
of Bologna than in the whole Veneto farming region for the same period, and only Puglia 
toppled Emilia-Romagna from its domination of the agrarian labour dispute league table 
in 1969 and 1971.10
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* Luigi Arbizzani, ‘Ruolo e alleanze della classe operaia’, round table, Rinascita, No.47, 
1969 in D’Attorre (Ed) I comunisti in Emilia-Romagna, cit. p.222.
9 Pietro Ingrao, ibid, p.119. This position, unliked Togliatti’s, marked more of a return
to the urban-rural alliance strategy that Gramsci had developed in the 1920s.
10 See Tables 28 and 29.
Table 28. Agriculture1. Hours lost (’000,000s) and national ‘league table’ in the top six 
most strike-prone regions in Italy.
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Year E-R LO PI VE TO SI I
1968 2.4(1) 0.K-) O(-) 0.3(5) 1.0(4) 1.5(2)
1969* 6.3(2) 0.3(-) 0(-) 0.4(5) 17(3) 0.8(4)
1970 1.6(1) 0(-) 0(-) 0.2(4) 0.3(2) 0.3(3)
1971*
-
4.2(2) 0(-) 0(-) 0.2(6) 1.8(3) 1.1(4)
1 Numbers are given to the first hundred thousand (or hundred) but bave not been rounded.
2 Cumulative totals of less than 100,000 hours per annum are marked as a nil return.
Key: E-R=Emilia-Romagna, LO—Lombardy, PI=Piedmont, VE=Veueto, TO=Tuscany, SI=Sicily.
* In Puglia 8.8 million hours of agrarian strikes were recorded in 1969 and 9.4 million hours in 1971. 
Source: ISTAT
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Table 29. Number of Strike Hours in the Province of Bologna, 1962-1975.
Year Agriculture Industry
.962 1,066,384 2,862,507
1963 411,310 1,093,040
1964 843,695 935,103
1965 168,745 661,526
1966 736,532 3,032,183
1967 385,000 443,000
1968 1,112,473 1,745,592
1969 1,170,000 9,159,000
1970 540,000 1,513,000
1971 402,000 1,099,000
1972 750,000 3,274,000
1973 - -
1974 -
1975 966,000 2,694,000 I
Source: Barbiani & Conti, cit. Vol.I, p.231.
At the 3rd Regional Conference of the Emilia-Romagna PCI in 1970, Sergio Cavina took 
up Ingrao’s theme of constructing a new historic block and he emphasised the need to 
forge a new alliance between workers, peasants and ceti medi. There were certain 
resonances of the agrarian reform programme of the 1940s in Cavina’s speech, 
particularly when he repealed the old campaigning slogan of ‘the land to those who work 
it.’ But as Cavina admitted, the lack of a national agricultural reform had strengthened
the domination of large agricultural holdings such as Eridania-De Rica-Arrigoni over the 
rural economy in Emilia while the position of small farmers had deteriorated. The social 
mobilisations in the countryside in the late 1960s were an attempt to redress the balance 
in favour of the dependent labourer, but the structural imbalances in land ownership could 
not be resolved through improved wages and working hours.
The Communists saw the new regional authority as offering the solution to the problems 
which small farmers encountered in gaining access to modem machinery, fertilzers and 
adequate distribution and marketing. A new regional agricultural development agency 
would be established, and the local authorities would invest in research and development 
facilities, agricultural consultancy and the market infrastructure which the consorzi of 
agro-coops had already pioneered. In line with Togliatti’s classic strategy, the "regione 
aperta’ and the great anti-monopolist campaign required the unity of all farming 
categories, but there was a new departure insofar as, "this policy brings together all the 
forces of the left, Catholics and DC and those oriented towards the Socialists and 
Republicans in order to make this terrain a point of common research, action and 
initiative.’11 12
Anderlini and other commentators have rightly argued that this prefigured the 
compromesso storico with the DC on a national level.13 But unlike Berlinguer who saw 
the historic compromise as a defensive measure aimed at preserving the democratic 
institutions against a Chilean-style coup, Fanti and his colleagues were more positive in 
that they believed the PCI had "educated’ the centre parties and the DC in the practices 
of "buon governo’ so that political and economic collaboration could take place on the 
basis of mutual respect and commitment. It was clear from the Party’s policy on 
cooperation for example that a tension existed between the belief in working with the
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11 Opening speech by Sergio Cavina to the 3rd Regional Conference of the PCI, Bologna, 
9th-llth January, 1970, in I comunisti in Emilia-Romagna, cit. p.239.
12 Stephen Heilman has even argued that the very structure of the "Emilian model’ with 
its emphasis on consensus and institutional mediation, "recalls the ambitious formulations 
of the compromesso storico. . . ’ Italian Communism in Transition, cit. p.69.
‘forze più aperte’ of the DC and the Republicans and the need to ‘break every link which 
connects and subordinates cooperation to a Catholic and Republican orientation, to the 
Federconsorzi and Confagricoltura.,1J What Cavina meant by this was that individual 
Catholics and Republicans would be welcome to join the ‘regione aperta’ but that their 
cooperative and trade union organisations were still considered a hostile occupying force 
within the red sub-culture.
Critics of this ‘consociativismo’ strategy were quick to point out that the economic 
prosperity Fanti was seeking to promote could only be achieved through a more intensive 
and extensive exploitation of Emilian labour. While every effort was being made by the 
regional development authority to support small business and artisanry, the traditional 
craft-based nature of the ‘modello emiliano’ was changing in ways which considerably 
weakened the power of organised labour. Emilia-Romagna continued to be a significant 
contributor to the industrial conflict of the early 1970s, but the continuing diffusion of 
small and very small enterprises made trade union recruitment and organisation very 
difficult.
In an important article, Fergus Murray has argued that labour militancy in Emilia- 
Romagna was deliberately lessened by the PCI's influence over the local trade union 
leadership,
‘Workers protests in Emilia during the Hot Autumn were, because of the dominance of 
the PCI less explosive and more disciplined than those in the North.’13 4
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13 Sergio Cavina, introductory speech to the 3rd regional conference of the PCI, in I 
comunisti in Emilia-Romagna, cit. p.240.
14 Fergus Murray, ‘Flexible Specialisation in the "Third Italy",’ Capital &  Class. No.33, 
Winter 1987, pp.84-95.
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Table 30. Manufacturing Industries1. Hours lost (000,000s) and national ‘league table’ 
position in the top six most strike-prone regions.
Year E-R LO PI VE TO SI
1968 4.1(4) 11.6(1) 5.8(2) 4.7(3) 4.0(4) 1.8(8)
1969 21.6(3) 74.8(1) 37.0(2) 17.4(4) 12.2(5) 3.2(-)
1970 5.9(5) 26.1(1) 14.4(2) 6.8(4) 10.5(3) 0.2(-) 1
1971 3.3(4) 14.0(1) 7.6(2) 4.7(3) 2.2(7) 1 .2 0  |
1 Numbers are given to the first hundred thousand but have not been rounded.
Key: E-R—Emilia-Romagna, LO=Lombardy, PI=Piedmont, VE=Veneto, TO=Tuscany, SI=Sicily. 
Source: 1ST AT
Murray argues that strike figures suggest that Emilia’s working-class tended to strike for 
demonstrative rather than contractual ends. In fact the high number of workers involved 
in agrarian and industrial disputes, and the lengths of the disputes themselves do not bear 
out Murray’s assertion, but he is right to support Trigilia’s claim that the PCI 
discouraged disruption in the small firm sector just as it had done after the war.15 16
In a similar vein Ferraresi and Tosi argue that in Bologna, ‘the Communist Party has 
paid for its intér-classism through the type of alliances which it has applied - and in its 
vision of the relationship between the party and the base: a hierarchical vision which 
demobilises the base at the moment when it is called to the struggle.,I6
15 Trigilia, Grandi partiti e piccole imprese, pp. 122-3, cited in ibid. If the regions were 
‘weighted’ according to the number of industrial workers and the relative importance of 
the industrial sector in the regional economy, Emilia-Romagna would rank even higher 
in the index of industrial disruptiveness; see table A2.
16 Franco Ferraresi & Antonio Tosi, ‘Crisi delle città e politica urbana’, in Graziano, L.
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The leadership of the federation were very much alive to the 'contradictions’ which inter- 
classism posed for Communist activists in the factories. Cavina talked of the need to 
develop the political autonomy of the Party alongside the autonomy of the trade unions. 
He was also aware that the politicisation of young workers and students was increasingly 
taking place outside the formal confines of the PCI itself and that there was absolutely 
no point in shouting generic slogans if this increasingly disillusioned workforce was to 
be won over to the Party’s position.17 *
Yet the ‘anti-monopoly’ alliance which the PCI hoped to build was based on the naive 
assumption that the small firm sector and the industrial giants such as FIAT were ‘corpi 
separati’ and that the activities of the large monopolies were solely aimed at destroying 
small, family enterprises. In fact as Murray argues and as we have shown, big 
manufacturers were able to offset their labour rigidity and investment replacement costs 
during and after the Hot Autumn by sub-contracting into the artisanal sector of Emilia- 
Romagna and the Veneto. The success of the Emilian model depended on the low-wage 
and flexible (i.e. precarious) structure of these types of enterprises. It may have been 
that some of these entrepreneurs were victims of the anti-trade union purges of the 1940s 
and 1950s, but the ‘padroncini rossi’ were not averse to doing business with their former 
employers. In the late 1970s this relationship became more formalised with groups of 
artisans’ firms forming consortia which had enough manufacturing capacity to take on the 
complete sub-assembly work of large manufacturing companies. In turn this brought in 
more investment capital and hi-tec industries which were keen to exploit this ready-made 
skills base.1*
Although artisans and small business owners benefited from this process, the trade union 
movement was severely weakened by the effects of industrial restructuring. An FLM 
survey of Bolognese engineering companies conducted in the early 1980s found that of
& Tarrow, S. La crisi italiana. Einaudi, Turin, 1979, p.592.
17 Sergio Cavina, speech to (he 3rd regional conference of the PCI, in I comunisti in 
Emilia-Romagna, cit. p.251.
** Murray, cit.
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the 88,000 workers employed in the engineering sector, 28,000 (32%) worked for artisan 
firms employing less than 16 people. In these firms, the FLM admitted that unionisation 
was ‘scarce’ and it is estimated that the rate of unionisation throughout the whole of 
Emilia-Romagna’s manufacturing industries was less than 50%. An organiser Murray 
interviewed in 1982 estimated that union membership within the small engineering firms 
was around 200 (6%) in a workforce of between 3 and 4,000 and falling. Employment 
conditions reflected those in other non-unionised sectors, and an earlier survey which the 
FLM commissioned in 1977 revealed that of 71 engineering firms contacted, 40 had no 
employment contract, and of the firms that did have contracts these only applied to wages 
and working hours and conditions were subjefct to no union supervision or control.19
By the 1st regional congress of the Emilia-Romagnan parly in 1977, the contradictions 
of the ‘modello bolognese’ were accentuated by the impact of the post-1973 fiscal crisis 
which hit Italy very severely. Local government spending went into reverse and 
Berlinguer joined his political opponents in calling for a programme of austerity in order 
to revive the economy and to bring the country’s galloping inflation under control.20
In his concluding address to the assembled delegates, Berlinguer made the by now 
familiar disclaimer that Bologna should not be considered ‘a happy island’ of actually 
existing communism. ‘Emilia-Romagna,’ he stated, ‘has never been and will never be 
a proletarian island in the midst of the sea of Italian society. It has been a focal point 
of the general contradictions within our country and of the political struggles which from 
the end of the last century in Italy have revolved around one decisive question: the 
question of the accession of the working-class to the direction of the society and the
19 Ibid.
20 ‘Berlinguer called on the working people of Italy to make sacrifices and he promised 
them that these would not be in vain: ‘A more austere society will be a more just society, 
with greater equality, more real freedom, more democracy and more humanity.”  
Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy, cit. p.356.
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state.’21
Table 31. Total number of votes cast, percentage of the vote, and seats won in 
administrative elections to the Comune di Bologna, 1975-1985.
1975 1980 1985
Party Votes % S Votes % S Votes % S
Due
Toni
179,622 49 31 158,585 46 29 151,109 44 29
DC 84,840 23 14 77,548 22 14 77,208 23 15
PSI 34,178 9 5 32,275 9 6 40,970 12 7
PSDI 24,509 7 4 21,840 6 4 10,472 3 2
PRI 10,659 3 1 13,656 4 2 15,373 5 2
PLI 13,535 4 n 13,897 4 2 10,008 3
1
MSI 19,067 5 3 15,787 5 2 17,970 5 3
DP - - - 5,897 2 0 8,967 3 0
AIP - - - - - - 8,967 1 0
PNP - - - - - - 1,623 - 0 I
PD-UV
- - - - - 1,375 - °  1
Lista 
del Sole
- - - 4,467 1 - - -
Part.
Fed.
- “ — 468 — *
21 Enrico Berlinguer, concluding speech to the 1st regional congress of the PCI Emilia- 
Romagna, Bologna, April 1977, in I comunisti in Emilia-Romagna, cit. p.345.
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Source: Comune di Bologna, Annuario statistico, p.225. 
Voting percentages have been rounded.
In Emilia, and in Bologna in particular, the PCI had reached its highest point in the 
administrative elections of 1975 winning an absolute majority in the Comune di Bologna 
for the first time.22 But Berlinguer’s speech did not dwell on the past glories of Emilian 
Communism. Instead he drew the delegates' attention to the parallels between the 
Scelban persecution, the massacre of workers at Modena and Reggio and the economic 
war against the CGIL and the red cooperatives. ‘Whoever is conscious of these attacks,’ 
warned Berlinguer, ‘should not be surprised at the provocations which were organised 
last month against the workers’ movement in Bologna.’23
The Communist Party secretary was referring to the events which followed the shooting 
of a young student by the carabinieri in Bologna on the 11th March; an event which 
Berlinguer might have been expected to include in the list of Modena and Reggio 
martyrs. The fact that he did not can only be explained through a careful analysis of 
what was to become known as the ‘Movement of ‘77’, a conjuncture which was to 
symbolise in an extreme form what can only be described as the crisis of the Bologna 
model.
22 See Tables 31 & 31.1.
23 Ibid.
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2. The Return of the Repressed: The Movement of c77 and the crisis of the 'model*. 
Cronastoria di Marzo *77.
On the morning of the 11th March, 1977, the fundamentalist Catholic group Communione 
e Liberazione (CL) held a meeting in the Institute of Anatomy at the University of 
Bologna. A small number of demonstrators from the ‘Movement’ attempted to get into 
the lecture hall in order to disrupt the meeting.24 Subsequently a fight broke-out 
between CL members and the demonstrators and the police were called by the rector of 
the University and by the CL organisers.25
24 For convenience we will refer to the various groups, cultural organisations and activists 
who were involved in the mobilisations of March 1977 in Bologna as ‘the Movement.’ 
This is not to homogenise a variegated and often conflict-ridden cultural-political milieu, 
but ‘il Movimento’ became a generic term for the young urban counter-culture which 
developed in around the universities in Italy in this period. A comprehensive and 
fascinating account of the ‘fatti di Bologna’ by protagonists of the Movment is contained 
in: Various authors, Bologna marzo 1977...fatti nostri.... Bertani, Verona, 1977.
25 The decision was taken during a meeting of the University Senate at which were 
present two professors with known links to the PCI. Mayor Zangheri was not informed 
of the decision, a fact he was to lament in a later interview although he did not say that 
he would have opposed it. According to the NUS (nucleo universitario socialista), 300 
students from CL were present at the assembly in the Institute of Anatomy, and the 
conflict began when 5 ‘extraparlamenteri’ opened the emergency doors to allow their 
fellow demonstrators into the lecture hall. The CL activists responded by arming 
themselves with sticks and throwing benches at the door. The CL organisers also called 
the police, and the ‘Movimento’ students who were outside realised that the CL were 
attempting to provoke the forced ‘disoccupazione’ of the faculty by the carabinieri and 
police, but by this time events had begun to take their own course. Vittorio De Matteis 
& Angelo Turchini, Machina. Osservazioni sui rapporto tra movimento, istituzioni. 
potere a Bologna. Dedalo Libri, Bologna, e. 1979, pp.20-22.
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Soon a considerable number of police and carabinieri had arrived on the scene and the 
first violent exchanges occured between the students and the ‘forze dell’ordine.’ Tear gas 
cannisters were fired into the crowd and a molotov was thrown at a police jeep. At this 
point live gunfire was heard, and at the cross-roads between via Imerio and via 
Mascarella, the body of a young militant of Lotta Continua. Francesco Lorusso is found 
dead. Witnesses said they saw a tall, helmeted carabinieri officer take careful aim at the 
fleeing students. They heard 5,6 or 7 bursts of gunfire from a revolver, 4 of which hit 
Lorusso who fell ten metres from the comer of the street.3* A plain clothes officer of 
the Polizia Statale (P.S.) was also seen discharging his revolver into the crowd of 
students.
Th killing was to spark the longest period of violent civil disorder in Bologna’s post-war 
history, and while street battles between the police and the extreme left were a continuous 
feature of metropolitan life in late ‘70s Italy, not even Milan or Rome experienced such 
a severe and protracted battle. Within the space of a few hours, news of Lorusso’s death 
had spread throughout the university and barricades were quickly erected in the central 
square of the university district, Piazza Verdi. Increasingly large groups of youths took 
to the streets armed with molotovs which they directed at the remaining police and 
carabinieri.
A mass meeting of students decided to call on the main trade union federations and the 
factory councils for support and it was decided to hold a protest march that evening. In 
the meantime the CL bookshop ‘Terra Promessa’ (Promised Land) had been completely 
destroyed and the atmosphere in the university district became increasingly angry and 
tense. Only the metalworkers* union, the FLM, gave its support to the demonstration 
and the contingent of some 10-15,000 students moved off without the anticipated support 
of local workers.* 27
76 Various Authors, ‘Living with an Earthquake* - Italy 1977-8. Red Notes, London, 
1978, p.19.
27 Within the leadership of the Camera del Lavoro there appeared to be severe 
disagreements between officials about whether the unions should participate in the
As the march moved up via Rizzoli several luxury fashion shops had their windows 
broken and a section of the demonstration attempted to attack the headquarters of the DC 
and the questura. Pitched battles broke out between the police and the hard-core of the 
demonstrators and several more windows were broken in via Ugo Bassi. It was at this 
point that a contingent broke-away from the main demonstration and headed for the 
railway station which was occupied in a military-style manoeuver which suggested 
considerable pre-planning. For almost an hour a serious battle developed between about 
400 occupiers and the police and nearly a hundred rounds of ammunition were fired from 
both sides. It was clear that a sizeable core of the Movement were armed with small 
calibre pistols and that they were prepared to use them. Later a restaurant was looted 
in the university district and by nightfall the number of arrests totalled 46.
The following day, many activists boarded coaches for a national demonstration in Rome 
which had been planned for some time.28 A large number of ‘compagni’ stayed behind *21
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demonstration or condemn it. The main confederations finally moved to block all 
cooperation with the Movement and only certain voices inside the FLM were heard to 
dissent from the decision. A journalist of the Movement even claimed that PCI cars 
equipped with loudspeakers were touring the working-class neighbourhoods urging 
supporters to come to the centre to combat the ‘fascists’ and ‘hooligans.’ In the light of 
subsequent reporting of the Movement by the Communist press this account seems 
entirely credible. G. Buselli, ‘Il moderno principe a Bologna’, Primo Maggio. IV, 1977, 
No.8, cited in Machina, cit. p.24.
21 This demonstration had been called some time ago by the extraparliamentary left and 
independent trade unionists in order to denounce the ‘historic compromise’ and the PCI 
endorsed policy of austerity. Many voices inside (and outside) the Movement argued that 
it was no coincidence that Lorusso had been shot the day before this major demonstration 
and that the encouragement of ‘armed insurrection’ by the ultra-left was the key plank 
in the security sendees’ ‘strategy of tension.’ Predictably enough the march did 
degenerate into violence, masked activists wielding P.38s fired on the police while 
undercover police officers dressed as ‘hippies’ fired back from behind the riot shields of 
their uniformed colleagues. Lotta Continua reported that all the major barracks in and
and attempted to join a demonstration which had been organised by the trade union 
federations in solidarity with Lorusso’s family in Piazza Maggiore. Inspite of a trade 
union ‘cordon sanitaire’ arround the square, about half the 4,000 activists from the 
Movement succeeded in getting through. The platform organisers would not let 
Lorusso’s brother speak nor any other representatives of the Movement.* 29 At 2pm a 
press conference was held with journalists and the production-collectives of the free radio 
stations, but it broke-up when news filtered through of a police attack on the university. 
Barricades were reinforced and several skirmishes broke-out in the city centre and the 
university zone. By this time the conflict had started to acquire the characteristics of a 
‘revolutionary theatre’, the police fired volleys of tear gas into the crowded streets and 
indignant members of the public also began to join together and demanded that they 
withdraw. An old Communist gave the signal to re-group after each volley of tear gas 
grenades by playing ‘Bandiera Rossa’ on his mouth-organ.30
At about 8.30pm the police withdrew and the students held emergency meetings to decide 
on their next action. It was decided to move to Piazza Maggiore where they could debate 
with the cittadini just as their predecessors had done in 1968. Shortly after, an armoury 
was broken into and a considerable number of guns and ammunition were removed. Eye 
witnesses claimed that those responsible for the break-in were well known local
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around Rome had been mobilised in preparation for intervention at a moment's notice. 
Soldiers were put on full alert once again on 23rd March during the regional general 
strike. ‘Living with an Earthquake’, cit. pp.59-62.
29 Once again the FLM was alone in urging dialogue with the students, on the day of the 
shooting of Lorusso, the provincial secretariat put out a communiqué which declared that 
the killing was an attempt to outlaw the movement and to divide the workers against the 
students’. The leaflet stated, ‘It is the task of the workers’ movement to prevent this 
design by means of an immediate mass mobilisation together with the students to deny 
any space to those in the ‘forze deH’ordine’ and in the city who are trying to provoke an 
unstoppable spiral of violence.’ FLM Bologna, ‘Comunicato’, 11th March, 1977, 
AIGER.
30 ‘Living with an earthquake’, cit. p.21.
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criminals. It was also alleged that local fascists and agent-provocateurs were behind the 
act, but undoubtedly some of the hard core of the Movement who had already decided 
that the P.38 was a legitimate response to the police violence also profited from the 
occasion.
All this time, news of the response to the killing of Lorusso had been relayed 'in diretta’ 
by a local free radio station, Radio Alice. Radio Alice was one of the pioneering 'pirate* 
stations which sprang-up in 1976 and which had been declared legal after the 
Constitutional Court ruled against the state’s monopoly of broadcasting. As one of the 
most provocative and outspoken of the stations, Alice was considered to be ‘the voice of 
the movement’, not least because its editorial policy was to broadcast the opinions of its 
listeners live (unless they were considered to be ‘fascists’), a facility which the state 
claimed had been used by a group of conspirators to coordinate the street violence against 
the ‘forze dell’ordine’. Late on Saturday, 12th March, the police moved to close Alice 
down and all the staff who were in the building at the time were arrested on charges of 
‘association and instigation to commit crimes. ’3l
Rioting in the university district carried on into Sunday morning 
but when the police returned at dawn with 3,000 men, armoured cars and light tanks, 
they found the university completely deserted. On Monday 14th March, Franceso 
Lorusso’s funeral was held under the conditions of a blanket ban on any type of 
demonstration. The PCI refused to attend and the Socialists sent only a token delegation.
31 Ibid. p.32. L'Unità was strongly in favour of this hypothesis and the PCI daily 
described the radio station as, ‘one of the principle centres of the grave provocations of 
the last few days.’ The broadcasts were, according lo L’Unità^designed to encourage 
exasperated young people to commit acts of violence. Furthermore the paper’s readers 
were asked to draw parallels between the radio stations which sprang up in Chile in order 
to destabilise the Allende government and Radio Alice which seemed bent on 
overthrowing the local Communist administration. By asking ‘who exactly is behind 
Alice’, L’Unità sought to connect the CIA organised coup against Allende with recent 
events in Bologna. L’Unità. 14th March, 1977.
The trade unions called for a one hour strike in the factories at the same time as the 
funeral and students went to talk to assemblies of workers in the larger factories to 
explain what had been happening over the last few days. However, an attempt to hold 
an open air meeting in San Donato was thwarted by the police.* 33
The following day a demonstration had been called by the PCI and the other main 
parliamentary parties together with all three trade union confederations to condemn the 
killing of Lorusso, but also to denounce the violence and lawlessness of the ‘fascists’ and 
‘hooligans’.33 An attempt by a small group of students to lobby the high school students 
of the Aldini-Variani technical college failed when they found it closed by order of the 
comune. Not only that, but SASIB workers went on strike and picketed the school when 
they heard that a ‘horde of autonomists’ were coming to make trouble. By this stage it 
was obvious to even the most optimistic of the Movement activists that the solidarity 
which existed between students and groups of workers in 1968-9 had no chance of being 
re-enacted, particularly after the SASIB workers’ intervention.
While the ‘official* rally took place in Piazza Maggiore, Communist and trade unionist 
stewards ensured that the large gathering of students who had assembled in via Rizzoli 
would not be able to get into the main square. After having been once again refused 
permission to speak, Giovanni Lorusso, Francesco’s brother, read his speech to a singing 
and chanting crowd of some 10,000 students who staged a sit-down in protest at the
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n  ‘Living with an Earthquake’ cit. p.26.
33 A joint PCI-DC-PSI-PRI-PSDI leaflet on behalf of the regional authority and the 
province and commune of Bologna was put out which declared, ‘Bologna, Emilia- 
Romagna, the democratic institutions, the people’s movement have seen the signs in these 
last few days of a very serious attack, of a genuine subversive onslaught.’ It urged 
young people and democrats to energetically oppose this violence and went on to state 
in smaller print, ‘The widest solidarity goes out to all those who have been affected by 
violence and intolerance, to the guardians of public order, to the townspeople and to the 
shopkeepers;’ ‘Appello ai cittadini di Bologna e dell’Emilia-Romagna’, Bologna, March 
1977, AIGER.
refusal of the ‘official* rally organisers to allow them into the square. The demonstration 
then headed for Piazza dei Martiri, and although many townspeople left the main rally 
to join the counter-protest it was clear that the Movement was marching on its own.34
The political parties and the trade unions led by the PCI’s impressive organisation had 
succeeded in mobilising a wide body of public opinion against not only the acts of 
vandalism perpetrated by certain parts of the movement, but against the entire raison 
d'étre of the youth and student protests. The ‘historic compromise’ was cemented much 
more firmly together in the joint operations between the parties against the ‘forze 
eversive.’ However, there were many inside the PCI, the PSI and DC who were 
concerned that the ‘moral panic’ that Renato Zangheri and other Communist leaders were 
generating could have dangerous long term consequences. It is important therefore to 
examine the question that every commentator and sociologist began to ask in the weeks 
and months following the March 11th events: ‘Why the revolt?*, and more specifically, 
‘Why Bologna?’
A Body without Organs: Anatomy of the Movement of ‘77.
The Movement of ‘77 presents enormous problems for social scientists and intellectuals 
who wish to explain how it cnme into existence and what its goals and objectives were. 
Umberto Eco argues that this is because the continual re-coding of the Movement’s 
language and symbols and the intensity and variety of its ironic discourse excluded the 
scribes of ‘il potere’ as well as potentially sympathetic intellectuals and activists from its 
subculture. By inverting well-known PCI and trade union slogans the Movement parodied 
the formalised vocabulary of protest of the parliamentary left. In this way Lumley 
argues, the Movement demonstrated its familiarity with the mainstream language of the 
organised working class, but while this is obviously true, it was a familiarity which bred 
a good deal of contempt on both sides.35
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34 Ibid. p.27.
35 States of Emergency, cit. p.303.
Thus when the students chanted slogans such as ‘Gui and Tanassi are innocent, the 
students are delinquents' at a trade union demonstration in Rome, the slogan was 're­
translated' by the workers as ‘Gui and Tanassi are delinquents, the students are innocent.' 
Eco suggests that it was not that the workers did not understand the ironical content of 
the message, but that they could not accept it as a means of political expression.36
In 1968 trade unionist leaders such as Luciano Lama had grown accustomed to being 
called reformists by student leaders, but at least ‘reformism* belonged to a grammar 
which both movements agreed on and understood. When Lama made the mistake of 
coming to the occupied University of Rome in February 1977 he found a platform 
already occupied by a dummy version of himself complete with pipe and a large 
valentine’s heart which read, ‘Nessuno L’Ama’ (no one loves him).37 The presence of
2,000 PCI and trade union stewards and a sizeable number of autonomists almost 
guaranteed that there would be violence, but although most students did not take part in 
the fighting, many saw Lama’s visit or ‘fatherly talk’ as an act of provocation.
The Movement appeared to assume the collective role of the precocious child ‘sending- 
up’ the father (the state) and the mother (the old PCI, the old workers’ movement) in a 
show of petulant intellectual superiority. This is not to suggest that the social conflict of 
the late 1970s can be reduced to the familial Oedipal triangle, but rather that the 
generational aspect of the confrontation between Movement, parties and institutions has
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36 Umberto Eco, ‘Une nouvelle langue; ITtalo-Indien’ (trans.) from L’Espresso. 10th 
April, 1977 in Fabrizio Calvi (Ed), Italie 77. Le ‘mouvement’. les intellectuels. Editions 
du Seuil, Paris, 1977, p.125.
37 Taking up Berlinguer and Lama’s call for workers to restrain their pay demands so that 
the depressed Italian economy might recover in order to provide ‘jam tomorrow’, a group 
of Metropolitan Indians (the satirical/surrealist ‘terrorists’ of the Movement) chanted 
‘Sacrifices, sacrifices we want sacrifices’, ‘More churches, fewer homes’, and ‘More 
work, less pay.’ They were lampooning the old Stalinist dichotomies that Orwell had 
satirised in Animal Farm, i.e ‘Four legs good, two legs bad!’ Living with an Earthquake. 
cit. p.53.

perhaps been neglected in the rush to understand the expressly political component of the 
challenge to the existing order.38
It was this elaboration of a new Metalanguage* (Italo-Indian, Mao-dadaist, transversalist) 
based on what Melucci has called ‘other codes* that sociologists and cultural critics had 
great difficulty in understanding and explaining.39 But while sophisticated intellectuals 
tried desperately to grasp the rudiments of this language; 14 year olds were able to 
comprehend the syntagmatic array of films (from ‘Yellow Submarine’ to ‘Lassie Come 
Home’), music (from Strauss to Frank Zappa), and literature (from Lewis Carol to 
Majakovsky) which were discordantly spliced together in the press and radio broadcasts
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38 Achille Ardigò has described the student’s experience of the university as a form of 
‘prolonged adolescence* which defers or even circumscribes completely the normal rites 
of passage which a young adult would have to perform. He argues that this is not the 
fault of the individual undergraduate but a necessary outcome of an economic system 
which uses the universities as ‘parking lots’ for intellectual labour. It was because in the 
mid-1970s, the Italian economy had a large surplus of intellectual labour that the laurea 
was no longer sufficient to guarantee a career, particularly for arts graduates. The ‘un­
guaranteed’ (non-garantiti) were a feature of the disfunction of reformist Keynsianism and 
it was not surprising that their reaction against the state, the political parties and the older 
generation who made promises they could not fulfil would be an angry and violent one. 
Archille Ardigò in Gianluigi Degli Esposti, Perché la rivolta. Giovani sotto inchiesta. 
Cappelli Editore, Bologna, 1978, pp.24-43.
39 The authors of a ‘Lettere dal Movimento’ described the relationship between the 
intellectuals and the young in Gramscian terms as a conflict between the ‘generazione dei 
vecchi’ and the ‘generazione dei giovani.’ The older generation could not understand 
because they did not want to understand ‘fino in fondo’, whereas only the work of Pier 
Paolo Pasolini in Le belle bandiere showed how a radical dialogue between different 
generations could be positive and productive. Sandro Iovinelli & Silverio Novelli (Eds), 
Lettere dal ‘Movimento*. Cari compagni....saluti non a pugni chiusi perché a sto punto 
non so che significa. Napoleone, Rome, 197S.
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of the Movement.40
This hermeneutical crisis which most intellectuals over the age of 30 were facing was not 
however an exclusively Italian phenomenon. All over Europe, 1977 was the year in 
which the ‘marginaux’ took to the streets in ever increasing numbers, united in the anti­
authoritarian punk subculture which had grown up in inner-city Britain the year before. 
But unlike the ‘my generation’ iconoclasts of the ‘50s and ‘60s, the cynicism and anger 
of the 1970s rebels could not easily be channelled into the consumption of new cultural 
commodities and the cultural watchword of 1977 was ‘do it yourself.’41 Indeed what 
distinguished *77 from the counter-culture of the 1960s was the violent rejection of 
‘packaged’ alternative culture from pop music to politics.
The ‘generation of year 9’ as Eco described the participants of the Movement of *77 were 
also in revolt against the values of the ‘summer of love’ and the pacifist soft politics of 
the ‘60s drop-outs. Culturally at least Eco is right to suggest that the Movement of *77 
wanted to make a tabula rasa of ‘68, yet there was also a sense in which the older leaders 
of ‘77 were re-playing the 1969 revolt in the high schools for greater stakes and that for 
them the ‘fatti di Marzo’ represented a culmination of the anti-authoritarian struggles of 
the previous decade.42
40 Umberto Eco, ‘La communication subversive neuf ans après ‘68’ (trans.) of an article 
in Corriere della Sera. 25th February, 1977 in Fabrizio Calvi (Ed), Italie 77, Le 
‘mouvement’. les intellectuels. cit. p . l l l .
41 An impression of this underground cultural explosion can be gained from the estimated 
300 ‘garage-bands’ which sprang-up in Bologna in 1977. Some of the city’s most popular 
groups such as Skiantos became nationally famous and the patois of Bologna’s urban 
periphery could even be heard in the street slang of Rome and Milan.
42 A key figure in the Bologna movement and one of the most important theorists of the 
Movement of ‘77, Franco Berardi tBifo), sees 1977 as, ‘the culminating moment of the 
process which began in ‘68,’ but also as an, ‘imminent precipitation of the forms of 
socia% and culture which have animated the revolutionary movements of the twentieth 
century.’ Franco Berardi, Dell’innocenza. Interpretazione del ‘77. Agalev, Bologna,
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Although the Movement has been frequently depicted as a purely violent, negative or 
nihilist rebellion in the press and by establishment commentators. Such a reading 
priviliges the P.38 and the ‘partito armato’ over the ‘creative’ and feminist wing of the 
movement which rejected the cult of violence and the neo-Leninist style of Autonomia 
Organizzata. However, as Lumley contends, the degeneration of the street conflict, the 
special laws and generalised and indiscriminate persecution of the Movement allowed the 
‘armed faction’ to impose its agenda on the rest of the groups.43 The disappearance of 
the Metropolitan Indians and the ‘Vipere Padane’ (as they were called in Bologna) was 
symptomatic of the decline of the ‘creative wing’ and of the transition from a culture of 
revolt which expressly labelled itself as ‘jacquerie’ to a much more desperate and 
vengeful Thermidor.
The ‘appeal of the intellectuals’ and the ‘Conference on Dissent.’
In July 1977 a group of leading French intellectuals including Jean-Paul Sartre, Michel 
Foucault, Roland Barthes, Félix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze issued an appeal which 
condemned the arrest and persecution of Movement activists and the closing down of 
radical bookshops and radio stations and demanded the release of all political prisoners. 
It immediately sparked-off an angry debate in the Italian press, and several Communist 
intellectuals rushed to condemn the appeal, accusing their French colleagues of excessive 
naively or willful misrepresentation of the facts. Even Sciascia who was nò apologist for 
the PCI leadership or the historic compromise accused Sartre and Guattari of national 
chauvinism for assuming that Italy’s repressive characteristics had not been manifest and
1989. In his essay ‘Il cielo e caduto sulla terra’, which was issued as a leaflet in 
February 1977, he describes the struggle for ‘autonomia’ as necessarily revolutionary and 
opposed to the containment strategy of the PCI which was described as an ‘instrument 
of terror and repression against the emarginaled, the young, the unemployed and the 
students.’ ‘Finalmente il cielo è caduto sulla terra. La rivoluzione è giusta necessaria 
possibile’ in Lucio Castellano (Ed), Aut.Op. La storia e i documenti: da Potere Operaio 
aH’Autonomia organizzata. Savelli Editori, Perugia, 19S0, p.145.
43 See Lumley, States of Emergency, chapter nineteen, cit.
apparent to ordinary ItaJians for some lime.44 Paolo Spriano described Italy as, ‘...the 
freest country in the capitalist west,’ while even il Manifesto accused Sartre and his co­
signatories of ‘exaggerating. ’ The Corriere della Sera tried to connect the authors of the 
appeal with the anti-Marxist ‘nouveaux philosophes’ and Renato Zangheri angrily told Le 
Monde that instead of showering accusations from Paris, these intellectuals should 
actually come to Bologna to discover whether the repression existed for themselves.
The appeal committee took up Zangheri’s offer and the ‘conference on dissent’ took place 
in the following September. For a few days the Movement was briefly re-animated as 
tens of thousands of young people from all over Europe descended on Bologna for an 
international conference on dissent.45 They came expecting to find armoured cars but 
instead they were greeted by marquees and free refreshments and entertainment courtesy 
of the comune. There was no need for autoriduzione,, since Zangheri had decided that 
the city would foot the bill. It was an important sign of the PCI’s ‘opening to the ultra­
left’ but by then the city fathers had little to fear since rather than constituting the 
renaissance of the Movement, the September conference proved to be its requiem.46
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44 L. Sciascia, ‘Le droit (et le revers)’ (trans.), La Stampa, lltli August, 1977 in F. 
Calvi, (Ed) Italie ‘77. cit. p.212.
45 Paul Ginsborg describes the conference itself as ‘a damp squib, marked by opportunist 
interventions by the French "nouveaux philosophes" and by squalid hand-to-hand fighting 
for control of the microphone...’ But however unruly the conference might have been, 
it is quite wrong to argue as the Corriere della Sera did that the French visitors were 
‘nouveaux philosophes.’ Gilles Deleuze in a pamphlet entitled, ‘Signs and Events* 
attacked ‘nouveaux philosophes’ writers such as Andre Glucksmann for being anti- 
Marxist and pro-capitalist, while Jean-Paul Sartre said that, ‘...the nouveaux philosophes 
are nothing, they aren’t philosophers, they are people who are disgusted by Marxism who 
want to make a career for themselves, they are publishing company directors, they are 
nothing.’ ‘Libertà e Potere non vanno in coppia’, Lotta Continua. 15lh September, 1977, 
reprinted in Various authors, Lo stalinismo italiano. Agalev, Bologna, 1990, p.42.
46 Berardi has written that, ‘Unfortunately, the Convention turned into a reunion against 
repression, and this greatly reduced the theoretical importance and the possibilities of this
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According to Guattari, ‘...it seemed (to the people who created Radio Alice) that a 
movement that could succeed in destroying the vast capitalist-bureaucratic machine world 
would, a fortiori, be capable of constructing a new world. Collective competence would 
grow with collective action; it is not necessary at this stage to be able to produce 
blueprints for a substitute society.’47 But any political movement needs to be in broad 
agreement about its aims and objectives, the culture of the void and the ‘micro-politics 
pf desire’ could never be a vehicle for the concrete transformation of society, and the 
Movement’s theorists could only take consolation from their belief that an alternative 
cultural practice was in itself revolutionary.
This illusion could not persist for long, and the Movement’s house journals 2ul and 
A/trnverso announced in typically sensationalist style, ‘The revolution is over. We’ve 
won!’ However this time the publishers were not inviting an ironic reading, at least in 
the first statement. What remained of the Movement ‘dissolved itself, although this 
might have seemed a contradiction in terms given the refusal of most of the Movement 
to organise itself in the first place.48 In practice, the collectives disappeared, the small 
publishers folded and the free radio became increasingly party oriented as PDUP and the 
remnants of Lotta Continua reformed under the banner of Democrazia Proletaria and 
swept-up the debris. Leninism, that repression-proof stand-by of the extraparliamentary 
left, offered its cheerful orthodoxies to comfort the wounded. The rest, and there were 
many more of them, found comradeship in the needle, began inward journeys via Lacan 
and radical pyschoanylsis, or outward ones to different if equally bleak ‘ghetto scenes’ 
in Berlin, Paris and London.
period...the gathering concluded without producing any direction for the future, any new 
program, and without advancing the Movement...A long crisis had begun for the 
Movement, a crisis that involved dispersion, disorganization and above all, the lack of 
prospects.’ Franco Berardi, ‘Anatomy of Autonomy’ in ‘Italy: Autonomia. Post-Political 
Politics’, Semiotexte. Intervention Series, Voi.Ill, No.3, New York, 19S0, p.160.
47 Félix Guattari, ‘Millions and millions of potential Alices’ in Molecular Revolutions. 
Psychiatry and Politics. Penguin, I-Iarmondsworlh, 19S4, p.241.
48 Berardi, Dell’Innocenza, cit. p.8.
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The Blague-Bearers* and the PCI.
If the Movement’s targetting of the Zangheri administration had stemmed from the 
extraparliamentary left’s hatred of the historic compromise and the right-ward swing of 
the PCI towards an increasingly ‘law-and-order agenda’,49 the clash between Movement 
and municipality was also the result of the city administration’s greater accessibility to 
local protest. As Friedland has argued,
‘The electoral-representative arrangements which underpin municipal governments make 
them vulnerable to popular discontent...local governments are often important loci for 
popular participation because they are structurally accessible, the point of daily contact 
between citizen and state. The relative visibility of local government policies and the 
relative accessibility of local government agencies make them a more susceptible target 
of political opposition than other levels of the state.’50
Unlike in 1968 when the Party had sought to use its University organisation to direct the 
movement towards the PCI’s national ‘structural reform’ strategy, in 1977 the 
Communists and their administrative leaders had become too closely identified with the 
government of national solidarity, with the call for austerity and the war on the ‘enemies 
of the Constitution and the Republic’ to play a genuinely oppositional role in civil 
society. The local state which Giuseppe Dozza had built in the teeth of fierce opposition 
from Scelba’s prefects, became in the eyes of the Movement increasingly co-terminous 
with the nation-state and the hated Interior Ministry of Francesco Cossiga. Zangheri’s 
‘conspiracy theory’, his support for the police intervention, his ambiguous attitude
49 See Stuart Hall et al. Policing the Crisis. Mugging, the State and Law and Order, 
Macmillan, London, 1978, for an explanation of the ‘law-and-order agenda’ in the case 
of Britain in the 1970s.
50 Friedland, R. et al ‘Political conflict, urban structure, and fiscal crisis,’ International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research. Vol.l, 1977, pp.449,451 in Saunders, Social 
Theory and the Urban Question, cit. p.301.
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iaffermato ieri dalla protesta popolare
La compattezza dei lavoratori e dei cittadini bolognesi dice vino » ai corpi estranei che inqui­
nano il libero pacifico confronto di idee - Sciopero di un’ora domani nelle aziende del Bolognese
PARTITO COMUNISTA ITAUAHO 
Federazione di Bologna
De alcuni- settimane & in atto a Bologna una torbida manovra di 
provocazione e un attacco contro le istituzioni democratiche e la ste£ 
sa convivenza clv.le, < diritti di libertà e di organizzazione, patrio» 
nio di tutta la p&oolazione.
Gli atti dì violenza e di devastazione nulla hanno a che fare 
con l'emozione e lo sdegno suscitati dall'uccisione dello studente 
Francesco Lo Russo. Gruppi ben individuati di provocatori fanno leva 
sul disagio reale dui giovani e degli studenti, par scavare un solco 
tra settori delle nr-sse studentesche, i lavoratori i la città, per se­
minare confusione o panico nella popolazione con atti di squadrismo, 
per rendere sempre p ;D arduo alle forza dell'ordine il compito di tu­
telare 13 libertà e la sicurezza dei cittadini.
L'uccisione :: Torino del brigadiere Giuseppe. Ciotta, i gravi 
incidenti di Poma r di altre citts confermano che quanto avviene a 
Bologna si inserisci, in tentativi che si propóngono di colpire le for­
ze democratiche e p- polari, le loro conquiste sociali e politiche,
I comunisti bolognesi
parte fondanentalc dalla vita democratica chiamano i lavoratori,- 
i giovani., gli antifascisti alla mobilitazione e alla vigilanza di mas^ 
sa per stroncare le violenza, riaffermar* - nello sviluppo e nel con­
solidamento dell'ordine democratico - la difesa dello Stato repubblica­
no nato dalla Resistenza.
P.C.I. Federazione di Bologna
13 mario 1977
towards the killing of Lorusso, which took a back-seat to the PCI’s solidarity with the 
bottegai victims of teppismo, enraged the students and many on the left of the PCI.51 
However the national leadership stood firmly behind Zangheri’s support for the forces 
of law-and-order and the description of the Movement as ‘fascists’, while expressions 
such as ‘black shirts’ and ‘squadracce’ fell thick and fast from the lips of Communists 
as diverse as Amendola and Pajetta. The Movement of ‘77 had become the new folk- 
devils of Italian society, and Zangheri was outraged that they had brought their contagion 
to the healthy environs of Red Bologna.
Yet as the violence subsided and the tear gas began to clear, while many PCI hierarchs 
still saw the leaders of the Movement of ‘77 as ‘plague bearers’ (as Berlinguer had 
described them at the Festa dell’Unità in Modena), many Communists knew that the 
‘ragazzi di settantasette’ were not the devils they had been painted, not least because 
some of them were their own sons and daughters. In an attempt to explain why Lama had 
been chased out of Rome University, one of the Communist Party’s most respected 
intellectuals, Alberto Asor Rosa, wrote of the existence of ‘two societies’ in the Italy of
1977. The first was represented by the organised working class and the second by 
marginalised and unemployed youth; ‘non-garanliti' for whom state legislation and the 
trade unions offered no protection against unemployment, under-employment and non- 
representation.52 It was tempting for many Communists to join with Asor Rosa in
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51 See for example, ‘Zangheri: c’é stato un complotto’, La Repubblica. 15th March, 
1977, and Zangheri’s speech to the Bologna Confesercenti conference in which he likened 
the events of March to the fascist violence of 1920-21. He confessed that the city 
administration’s mistake was in not recognising that the acts of vandalism and 
autoriduzione should have been ‘strangled at birth’ by the forces of law and order. ‘No- 
one should delude themselves said Zangheri - amidst loud applause - that our tolerance 
means giving in. We should know how to discuss and respect other ideas: but we will 
not give into violence or force...’ ‘I commercianti chiedono con forza un nuovo corso 
politico nel Paese’, L’Unità. 3rd Aprii, 1977.
52 A. Asor Rosa, Le due società. Einaudi, Turin, 1977, in Lumley, States of Emergency, 
cit. p.308.
condemning the state and (to a much lesser extent) the trade unions for creating this ‘stato 
di disagio’ among the young. However in the case of Bologna this meant pointing the 
accusing finger at the ‘modello* which PCI leaders had cheered to the echo for delivering 
more votes than ever before in the elections of 1975 and 1976. By the mid-1970s with 
their control over the region, the province and the comune complete, the Communists had 
to admit that in a partial but significant sense, Tétat c’est nous.’
Unsurprisingly therefore Zangheri was unable to agree with Asor Rosa’s ‘two societies’ 
theme although he did acknowledge that special problems were presented by the large 
presence of southern students and ‘fuori sede’ particularly in regard to housing.53 
Generally, Zangheri said that employment levels, service provision and general well­
being was high, although he admitted that among the unemployed there were a significant 
number of young people, and in particular high school and university graduates.54
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53 In fact Zangheri was probably correct to identify Bologna as ‘the biggest southern 
university in Italy’. In the accademie year 1976-1977 there were 57,500 students 
registered at Bologna University (more than twice the number in 1968) of which it is 
estimated that 40,000 came from provinces outside Bologna, and among these a large 
proportion would have come from the south. (Comune di Bologna, Annuario statistico. 
1986. p.128.) Because of poor university facilities and the lower status of a southern 
degree, if they are in a position to be able to, many students preferred to enroll in a 
northern university in order to increase their employment prospects and to perhaps enjoy 
a more liberal life-style than certainly young women would be allowed in their home 
towns.
54 Ibid, p.18 Vittorio Capecchi saw the problem in much starker terms. As the research 
director for the FLM in Bologna he described how the teriary sector in the province of 
Bologna had began to contract in the second half of the 1970s leading to an over-supply 
of graduates and high-school leavers who were traditionally attracted to these professions. 
Although the metal mechanical industries continued to expand, these firms had no use for 
arts or even for science and engineering graduates who were well versed in theory but 
who had no practical experience of manufacturing. Degli Esposti, Perché la rivolta?. 
cit.p.59.
Zangheri suggested that the exasperation of the students from outside Bologna may be a 
result of arriving to find so much wealth and affluence in the city and assuming that they 
should be able to enjoy it too without realising that this is the product of 'struggles, 
battles and sacrifices’ and that it had not been offered on a plate.55
If the subtext of Zangheri’s observation was that the Movement were nothing other than 
'fuori sede’ petty-bourgeois 'figli di papa’, he was an astute enough politician to realise 
that if the shop-window of Italian Communism was not to be broken again, something 
concrete had to be done to harmonise relations between the city and the university. But 
as with the M.S. of 1968, the PCI was only able to propose an institutional solution to 
the youth and student problem.56 Since the Movement could not and would not provide 
the PCI and Bologna’s administration with responsible spokesmen, the Party contented 
itself with involving the Socialists57 and the opposition in a 'profound analysis* of the
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55 Ibid. pp. 18-19.
56 The Emilian Communist leadership wanted to integrate the universities more fully into 
the regional planning apparatus and called for a modernisation of courses and teaching 
methods. The PCI criticised the Malfatti reforms for their threat to 'open access* (this 
had been the original catalyst of the faculty occupations earlier in 1977), but the 
Communists were less forthcoming about how they proposed to overcome the chronic 
overcrowding in the universities and the problem of graduate unemployment. See, 
Luciano Guerzoni, 'Relazione introduttiva - 1 Congresso regionale del PCI-Emilia 
Romagna,’ Bologna, 14th-17th Aprii 1977, in I comunisti in Emilia-Romagna, cit. 
pp.319-320
57 The PSI took a more open stance on the Movement of ’77 which allowed it to be 
critical of the wilder statements of local PCI spokespmen. There are two possible 
explanations for the Socialists’ 'softer* line, the most obvious is that they saw some 
electoral advantage in distancing themselves from the PCI’s position and the other is that, 
in Bologna at least, the PSI was becoming a power base for the post-’6S generation who 
found that the opportunities for political advancement were tar greater in the PSI than in 
the rigidly hierarchical PCI. Having come from a movemenlist background, these young 
Socialist leaders such as Franco Piro had much in common with the anti-Communist
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problems which confronted young people and the reasons for the violence of the 
protest.5*
The trade unions, the federation leadership and the administrative representatives were 
concerned that they had in Zangheri’s words ‘been taken by surprise’ by the Movement 
of ‘77.58 9 Criticisms were made of the federation leadership’s complacency in ignoring 
the changing character of the local economy and the problems it posed for the non- 
integrated sections of the province’s population. However, this critique which had been 
advanced in particular by the ‘68 generation in the local PCI hierarchy went far deeper 
than a specific response to the ‘fatti di Marzo’60 since it called into question the
iconclasts of ‘77. For an assessment of the PSI’s ‘pursuit’ of the generation of year 9, 
see Gianfranco Pasquino, ‘Il PSI. Un alternativa per il Movimento o un movimento per 
l’Alternativa?’, Il Mulino. No.250, XXVI, March-April, 1977, pp.250-259.
58 Because the politicai will was lacking, Salvatore Sechi argues that the promise made 
by Zangheri to open a dialogue with the students, ‘without reservations and 
preconditions’ had little outcome. ‘Il PCI: l’albero, la foresta e la nuova peste*, Il 
Mulino. No.250, 1977, p.280. Instead the PCI contented itself with the establishment 
of ‘comitati di difesa dell’ordine democratico e per la sicurezza dei cittadini’ which were 
more of an exercise in public relations than an attempt to provide a concrete response to 
the youth revolt. See the speech of Luciano Guerzoni in ibid, p.318.
59 Renzo Imbeni, secretary of the PCI in Bologna, at the XVlh party congress of the 
federation asked, ‘what were the mistakes and the limitations of our initiative, if a part 
of the youth was able to direct its own dissatisfaction even against the party and the 
democratic institutions?’ (Emphasis added) While Berlinguer at his speech to the regional 
congress admitted that, ‘we are not immune from the vices of bureaucratism and 
hierchism.’ Marzio Barbagli &  Piergiorgio Corbelta, ‘Partito e movimento: aspetti e 
rinnovamenti del PCI’, Inchiesta. Year Vili, No.31, Jan-Feb, 1978, pp.3-46.
60 Antonia La Forgia who was the secretary of the PCI University Section and a leading 
figure in the occupation of the Physics faculty (see above chapter six, section one) had 
risen to the position of PCI group leader on Bologna city council by 1977. In a round­
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‘administrationist’ culture which had overtaken the PCI and led to calls for a re-definition 
of the Party’s strategy which finally resulted in the first regional congress in April
197? «
The Historic Compromise in Bologna
Paradoxically, it was the post-Fantian generation of technocratic reformers who came 
under attack for their conservative attitude to local government and their reluctance to 
institute a specifically political agenda. The striving for consensus and ‘consociativismo’ 
had diluted the Party’s principles so effectively, argued the left, that Communist 
administrators no longer knew what they stood for. As De Matteis and Turchini put it, 
‘In Bologna the political intellectual tends to become an administrative intellectual,’ and 
one might add, an intellectual who begins to see administration as an end in itself. With 
the 1975-76 fiscal crisis and the Starnati decree which almost eliminated local government 
fiscal autonomy, the administrative agenda had to be re-drawn in the light of resource 61
table discussion with the FGCI periodical La Città Futura. La Forgia accepted that the 
PCI had experienced difficulty in imposing its class hegemony over the Movement of *77 
just as it had been difficult in 196S to weld together the student movement with the 
workers’ movement. He attributed some of the blame to the national leadership of the 
Party which failed to recognise the impact that 40,000 ‘extra-provincia’ students would 
have on the base culture of the city but, but he also claimed that the PCI had been slow 
to reflect on the changing nature of the ‘mass’ and had become dangerously time-locked 
in its conception of the working-class. ‘Il partito, gli studenti, gli intellettuali - Una 
riflessione sul disenso e la ’’criminalizzazione"’, La Città Futura. No.9, 6th July, 1977.
61 The distinction between the preceding regional conferences and the regional congress 
was perhaps more one of a style than substance, although the ‘congress’ denomination 
implied a plenary assembly rather than a forum for the discussion of policy objectives. 
This reflected the growing importance of the regional party apparatus which in turn look 
its legitimacy from the PCI’s control of the regional assembly. See Robert Leonardi, 
‘Longitudinal change in councillor attitudes towards the regional institution, 1970-198S’ 
in Leonardi, R. &. Nonetti, R. (Eds) The Regions and European integration, cit. p.49.
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constraints and hence the political priorities of the giunta came under much closer 
scrutiny within the federation.62 3
Guido Fanti had encouraged the administrative intellectuals to develop their own political 
agenda in the comune and the region, and this had been justified by the exigencies of the 
‘regione aperta’ strategy and the need for autonomy in negotiations with coalition partners 
and opposition groups. However, the ‘open region’ strategy which was already under 
great strain after Fanti's resignation as Regional President in May 1976, could not 
survive the crisis of 1977. In 1970, Emilia-Romagna had been the first regional 
administration to experiment with the ‘historic compromise’ which Enrico Berlinguer was 
to announce three years later.63 and Bologna symbolised the type of political 
cohabitation which Berlinguer sought to promote on a national level.64 But if Emilia 
had to an extent anticipated the ‘compromesso storico’in 1970, in 1977 it was the first 
to experience its demise. During the PSI’s vote of no confidence in the regional giunta. 
the DC capogruppo. Menzioni gave his reasons for torpedoing the regional ‘compromesso 
storico.’
‘...Our refusal is based on the fact that we consider the conception, in which the defence 
of the institutions against destructive attacks works better in conditions of confusion
62 See chapter five above and the graph on municipal expenditure, Figure 4.
63 On the development of the historic compromise and its consequences for the PCI see 
Peter Lange, ‘Crisis and Consent, Change and Compromise: Dilemmas of Italian 
Communism in the 1970s’ in P. Lange & S. Tarrow (Eds), Italy in Transition. London, 
1980.
64 Renato Zangheri highlighted the significance which the historic compromise had for 
the PCI in Bologna, ‘This compromise consists of joining in the necessity of planning and 
working together, all forces in the population, whether Communist, socialist or 
Catholic...This, of course, implies a Christian Democratic Party which intitiates an 
energetic process of self-criticism and which just as energetically suppresses its tendency 
to arrogant, improper use of power. What we are doing in Bologna fits organically into 
this PCI policy.’ Red Bologna, cit. p. 194.
347
rather than in a situation where the role of each political force is clear, to be deeply 
mistaken if not politically unprofitable.’65
For the DC it was certainly more electorally profitable to allow the Communists to 
assume full and exclusive responsibility for the events of March. Had Botteghe Oscure 
looked to Emilia for an indication of how ‘consociativismo’ could work out in practice, 
Berlinguer might have had reason to question the Christian Democrats* real commitment 
to ‘national solidarity.’66
With the appointment of Renzo Imbeni to the direzione of the PCI in 1976, the national 
Communist leadership had at least recognised the electoral and strategic importance of 
Bologna as a ‘punto caldo.’ But there was another and more significant reason for 
Imbeni’s elevation, and this was directly related to the increasing criticism of the giunte 
rosse and their perceived lack of political accountability. With Imbeni’s heightened 
status, the Party ‘machine’ had a federal secretary who was prepared to restore Party 
discipline and to impose democratic centralism on the more wayward elements of the 
municipal, cooperative and trade union apparatus.
Imbeni earned himself the reputation of the ‘wood-cutter’ for his energetic restructuring 
of the federation; but in practice his re-organisation of the Bologna PCI was more of a 
‘damage-limitation exercise* aimed at restoring party unity and harmonising relations 
between the federation, the comune, and the collateral organisations.67 Imbeni’s defence 
of the secretariat’s swift condemnation of the violence of the 11th March confirmed his 
advocacy of ‘my party right or wrong’, but in private, criticisms were being levelled not 
only at Zangheri’s ‘Sun King’-like leadership style, but also at the Parly’s subordination
65 Cited in Robert Leonardi, ‘Political developments and institutional change in Emilia- 
Romagna,’ cit. p.23.
66 Anderlini has described the ‘consociative’ politics in Emilia-Romagna in the mid-1970s 
as a natural outcome of the ‘consociativismo implicito’ of the 1960s. Terra rossa, cit. 
p.143.
67 Machina, cit. p.97.
of its strategy to the professional and commercial celi medi who (with the exception of 
the artisans') did not appear to repay in votes what the PCI invested in political 
concessions.6*
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6> It was ironic that for all Renato Zangheri’s appeals to the commercianti to join with 
the Communists in the struggle against fascism and subversion that the neo-fascist MSI- 
Destra Nazionale Party, after the Christian Democrats, attracted more shop-keeper votes 
than any other party in the period 1972-1976. In these three elections the MSI-DN took 
19%, 17.9% and 13.1% of the commercianti vote. In the same elections, the DC took 
53.6%, 57.S% and 67.5% of the commercianti electorate which suggested that although 
the votes of the far-right declined, they were being collected by the Christian Democrats 
and not the parties of the left. See Fausto Anderlini, ‘I caratteri territoriali del 
comportamento di voto’ in Anderlini, F. Schadee, H. & Corbetta, P. Comportamento 
elettorale città e territorio. Le elezioni amministrative nell’area metropolitana bolognese. 
Clueb, Bologna, 1981, p.100. See Tables 32 and 33.
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Table 32. PCI share of the votes of different occupational categories in the province of
Bologna, 1968-1976.
1968 1972 1975 1976
Manual Workers S1.0 86.2 90.8 90.7
Artisans 57.3 54.9 60.4 61.6
Service workers 
(basic grade)
4S.6 37.2 52.9 49.5
White-collar
employees
(salaried)
3.7 2.8 9.5 5.2
Shop-keepers & 
commercial trades
2.7 4.0 0.0 1.5
Managers & 
professionals
2.7 2.2 0.1 1.5
Source: Anderlini, Corbella &  Schadee, Comportamento elettorale cilia e territorio, p.102.
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Table 32.1. Total share of PCI vote by occupational category, 1972-1976.
1972 1975 1976
Farm workers 1.6 1.5 1.4
Manual workers 61.4 57.7 58.4
Artisans 25.3 24.7 26.0
Service workers 
(basic grade)
8.9 11.2 11.0
White-collar workers 
(salaried)
1.6 4.8 2.7
Shop-keepers & 
commercial trades
0.6 0.0 0.2
Managers and 
professionals
0.5 0.0 0.3
Source: Anderlini, Corbella & Schadee. Comnortamento elettorale citta e territorio. d.Uu. J
Imbeni’s swift translation from federal secretary lo sindaco in 1980 represented a return 
to the traditional pattern of élite selection within the PCI.69 After a decade of 
experimentation, for the most part positive, it was felt that a period of consolidation was 
necessary. Tire PCI’s dramatic transition to power in every major city in Italy in 1975 
was reversed in the succesive administrative elections and Bologna once more stood alone
69 Before the appointment of Zangheri as mayor, Communist civic leaders had generally 
been party career functionaries and not intellectuals. Apart from Giuseppe Dozza who 
enjoyed a special prestige within the PCI in his own right, all the other mayors of 
Bologna (Fanti and Imbeni) had been federal secretaries and their assessori had held 
senior positions within the Bologna federation, with the exception of some noted 
‘imports’ such as Giuseppe Campos Venuti.
as the ‘roccoforte’ of Communist city government.70 If the Emilian Communists were 
starting to develop a siege mentality they had good reason to. Already the Craxian 
struggle for power which was to result in the ‘pentapartito’ national governments of the 
1980s was having repercussions within the local and regional giunte. Liguria fell in 1980 
and this was followed by Lazio and Piedmont in 19S5.71 In Emilia-Romagna, although 
the Socialists were not in a position to bring down the PCI regional giunta of Lanfronco 
Turci, they refused to join it and the Communists were forced to govern with the support 
of the PDUP. Also in the Comune di Bologna, Imbeni was obliged to form a giunta 
monocolore in the summer of 1989, although the Socialists continued to support the 
administration on crucial votes like the budget.
As Bellini argues, the statutory definition of regional powers in the Law 382 of 1975 and 
the DPR 616 of 1977 gave the Emilia-Romagnan executive a much better idea of its 
powers of planning and intervention.72 There is no doubt that the position of managerial
351
70 Peter Lange partly attributes the PCI’s decline in the post-1976 general and local 
elections to the strategy of the compromesso storico itself, arguing that the Communists’ 
obsession with electoral alliance underscored their lack of political direction and identity. 
Peter Lange, ‘Crisis and consent, change and compromise*, in P. Lange & S. Tarrow 
(Eds), Italy in Transition. Frank Cass, London, 19S0. A similar argument is made by 
Raymond Seidelman in his study of Communist organisation in Florence where he argues 
that the PCI was unable to respond to the emergent youth and student movements because 
of its obsession with the ‘national-popular’ constituency of the ceti medi and organised 
labour. See R. Seidelman, ‘Urban movements and community power in Florence’, 
Comparative Politics. Voi. 13, No.4, 19S1; and also ‘PCI, decentramento e politica delle 
alleanze’, Il Mulino. 257, May-June, 197S.
71 Leonardi, ‘Political developments and institutional change', cit. p.27,
72 See chapter five above. DPR 616 was particularly important because in Article 11 it 
stipulated that, ‘the central government shall determine national economic planning goals 
with the aid of the regions. The regions shall determine regional development 
programmes in harmony with the national economic planning goals... ’ The provision was 
significant because it made the regions a key interlocutor in the national economic debate
Communist leaders such as Turci was strengthened by the elevated status of the regions, 
but the Emilian experience still failed to impress the national Communist leadership in 
Rome. As Turci declared in 1985,
T am convinced, and I’ve never tried to hide this conviction, that if it wasn’t for the fact 
that Rome (i.e. Botteghe Oscure) is very backward, and even now, slow to bring together 
the experience of Emilia-Romagna with all its richness, complexity and potential 
implications...one could gain from this experience as much as one needs for the the 
construction of a culture of government, or if we prefer, a more concrete approach...to 
the themes of national government.’73
It was a familiar refrain, and one could have heard it from Turci’s predecessor, Guido 
Fanti, a decade before. But what Turci’s complaint underlined was the persistance of a 
‘dual track’ strategy within the Party leadership which dated back to Togliatti’s speech 
in Reggio in 1946 when he celebrated Emilia’s ‘exceptionality* and importance as a 
‘laboratory of socialism’ without ever indicating that the comuni rossi would provide a 
blue-print for the rgal socialist society to come.
As an epilogue to this final chapter it is worth briefly examining how the ‘laboratory’ 
survived the uncontrolled explosion of 1977 and how it faced the new tests of the ‘post­
political’ environment of the 1980s.
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3. Bologna in the 1980s: From reflux to the recovery of the model?
and recognised the need for economic planning for the first time since the collapse of 
the ill-fated Vanoni plan. Sabino Cassese, ‘Italy: A system in search of an equilibrium’, 
chapter two of M. Hebbert and H. Machin (Eds), Regionalisation in France. Italy and 
Spain. London School of Economics, London, 1984. p.12.
73 Lanfranco Turci, interview with P. Carla in Quarantacinque, Jan-Feb, 1985, cited in 
Nicola Bellini, ‘Il socialismo in una regione sola. Il PCI e il governo dell’industria in 
Emilia-Romagna’, Il Mulino. 325, No.5, Sept-Qct. 19S9, pp.707-732.
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After the failure of the historic compromise on a local and national level the PCI was 
once again able to look to its left, and an opportunity for dialogue with the ex-Movement 
and the administration presented itself for the first time. By the early 19S0s there were 
signs of at least a partial rapprochement between the ’generation of year 9’ and the city 
administration.74 In 1980 the comune launched its piano giovani which aimed to 
increase training and employment opportunities for young people, to involve Bologna's 
youth more directly in the local decision making process by coopting representatives onto 
local neighbourhood commissions, and to provide autonomous spaces for culture, 
entertainment and socialising.75 many of the participants in these schemes were ex- 
Movement activists and some were even given jobs in the administration. The comune 
committed itself to establishing ‘self-managed’ centri giovanile in every quartiere and 
youth workers were seconded to provide administrative and technical help and 
assistance.76
In the employment field, the comune sponsored new cooperative ventures such as 
‘Opencoop’ which employs ex-offenders (several of them former Red Brigades members) 
and produces recycled paper products for the comune, and other local organisations and 
businesses.77 In the field of social services and community care, the comune also
74 This included the commissioning by the Comune di Bologna of a sociological study into 
the attitudes and behaviour of approximately 1,000 young people aged between 14 and 
25 in the peripheral quartiere of ‘Barca’ by Adele Pesce and Vittorio Capecchi. The 
study’s findings are summarised in Capecchi & Pesce, ‘Paure e incertezze convivono con 
speranze e progettualità,’ Bologna (Mensile dell’amministrazione comunale) Supplement 
to No.2, February 1985, pp.54-58.
75 Patrizia Faccioli, ‘Un bilancio fra stabilità e sperimentazione’ in Bologna (Mensile 
dell’amministrazione comunale) Supplement lo No.2, February 1985, pp.61-62.
76 Interview with Lamberto Gamberini, officer in the Youth Pian Office of the 
Assessorato alle Politiche Sociale, 15th February, 1988.
77 Interview with Dr Raffaele Tomba of the Assessorato alle Politiche Sociali, November,
1989.
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provides training for young people working in cooperatives formed to provide, for 
example, services for the handicapped or the elderly. The city administration, together 
with the region and the province has also been an important sponsor of community 
theatre and the performing arts, while Bologna has two arts cinemas, one of which (the 
Lumière! provides video and film-production courses and it is also an important venue 
for the work of local film-makers.78
The ‘underground* media which the Zangheri administration accused of plotting to 
overthrow Italian democracy has in recent years been on the receiving end of local 
government grants rather than municipal invective. The assessorato alla cultura now sees 
community radio and alternative publishers and printers as a vital component of the 
cultural life of the city.79 The radical printing coop Alpha beta which was once the 
scourge of the giunta rossa receives orders from the comune and even the PCI. 
Publishing cooperatives are also able to benefit from an information technology training 
scheme promoted by the region which provides valuable income for the cooperatives 
themselves and interesting and varied experience for school leavers attracted to a career 
in the media.
On the political level it was highly significant that in the 1990 administrative elections, 
Diego Benecchi, the Bologna leader of Lotta Continua in the Movement of '77 was
78 For a discussion of Bologna city council's cultural and arts policy in a wider European 
context see, Stephen Mennell, Cultural Policy in Towns, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 
1976.
79 This was true until the last administrative elections of 1990 when the Socialists took 
control of the assessorato and the new assessore made it clear that support would only 
be given to prestige cultural institutions such as the Teatro Comunale and the Teatro 
Duse. This policy was intended to disrupt what the PSI saw as the cosy realtionship 
between the Communists and the ex-Movement. While the alternative culture sector in 
Bologna is far from pro-PCI or (PDS), it is uniformly hostile to the strongly Craxiite 
Bolognese PSI and so this reaction might have been expected.
elected to the consiglio comunale on the PCI’s Due Torri list.80 It was a measure of the 
political distance which some former leaders of the extraparliamentary left such as 
Benecchi had travelled that a Communist pensioner could ask the ex-Lotta Continua 
leader and other PCI candidates why they were proposing to privatise the municipal 
pharmacies which Giuseppe Dozza had worked so hard to establish. The ‘settantasettino’ 
was not able to re-assure the older members of the neighbourhood section that this policy 
really was in the best interest of the working-class.81 Had the PCI finally embraced that 
brand of electoral reformism that Togliatti had warned his militants away from in the 
1940s, or was Imbeni’s 1990 programme merely another step on the ’Italian Road to 
Socialism?’
Transformations
The new managerial agenda which characterised the ‘Due Toni* programme in 1990 was 
already evident in what was to become known as the ‘third phase' of decentralisation in 
Bologna which was launched in 19S5. If, as we saw in chapter five, the first phase 
covered the period 1960-1968 and was associated wit!) the creation of the idea of
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80 Benecchi was in fact arrested and charged for his involvement in the March revolt to 
the loud approval of Communist leaders at the time. Salvatore Sechi, *11 PCI: l’albero, 
la foresta e la nuova peste,’ cit. p.283.
81 Electoral meeting of the Nanni-Reggiani section of the PCI, Bolognina, on ‘The 
private-public relationship and local authority autonomy’, 23rd April, 1990. For the 
recent debate on ‘privatisation’ in Bologna see, ‘Bologna, comune chiama privati’, 
L’Unità. 21st September, 19S9 and ‘Se la Thatcher va a Bologna’, La Repubblica. 25th 
September, 1989. Interestingly the CGIL leadership supported the ‘arms length’ 
management of some municipal sendees although many of its members struck in protest 
at not being consulted in advance on the proposals. This was convincing proof that 
inspite of 30 years of decentralisation, the Communist administration still preferred to 
deal with policy issues at the level of the ‘vertenza’ - an eloquent testimony to the 
procedural continuity between the ‘epoca Dozziana’ and the new managament culture in 
Bologna.
neighbourhood, the second from 1969 to 1984 represented the moment of participation 
and the delegation of powers. The third phase really constitutes a response to the late 
arrival of the welfare state all’italiana which as Ginsborg argues was probably the only 
positive outcome of the ‘compromesso storico.’8'  The 1985 re-organisation of the 
consigli di quartieri constituted the new politico-administrative face of sub-municipal 
government and the ‘territorialisation’ of service provision.82 3
The new administrative culture also derived from a recognistion that contrary to the views 
of the founders of the quartieri, the party system could not always guarantee the full 
representation of the community and its active participation in decision making.84 As the 
‘anni di piombio* demonstrated, the danger to Italian democracy of a ‘blocked system* 
in which emarginated groups felt they had no legitimate representation was all too 
apparent. Bologna had not only experienced the trauma of 1977 but it also witnessed the 
horror of fascist terrorist violence on the 2nd August 1980 when a bomb exploded in the 
central railway station leaving 85 people dead and over 200 wounded.
The ‘crisis of representation’ which had given rise to the break-down in the democratic 
fabric of Italian society, argued Walter Vitali, the new assessore for decentralisation 
could only be resolved by giving life to new representative structures which can also exist 
outside the formal apparatus of the party system. This meant enfranchising previously
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82 The most important pieces of legislation were the creation of a national health service 
in 1978 which was to be administered by the regions via the comuni, and the housing and 
town planning acts which were passed in 1977 and 1978. Ginsborg, A History of 
Contemporary Italy, cit. pp.390-394.
83 Comune di Bologna, Nuovo regolamento sul decentramento e sulla partecipazione dei 
cittadini nell’amministrazione del comune. 25th March, 1985.
84 This amounted to a full recognition of Achille Ardigò’s conception of organic 
neighbourhood democracy which as we have seen dated from the Libro Bianco of 1956. 
However on this occasion the Communists were more than willing to acknowledge their 
debt to the professor. Introductory' speech of Waller Vitali in Problemi del decentramento 
e del riordino istituzionale. Dibatitto del consiglio comunale, February - March, 1984.

marginalised groups such as the unemployed, the sick, the elderly and the young.85 The 
1985 decentralisation reforms therefore set the consigli di quartiere the task of combining 
the flexibility and sensitivity of ‘extensive* participation in the localities with the cohesion 
and integration of administrative practice which would allow the city to function 
effectively as a whole. So difficult had this balance been to achieve in the light of the 
new national welfare reforms that not until the middle of 1986 was final approval given 
for the transfer of all social services functions to the quartieri.86
By the end of 1989, the decentralisation of social services had been virtually completed 
and small teams of social workers and administrative personnel had been established in 
Bologna’s nine quartieri.87 As part of the greater commitment to community 
involvement provided for in the 1985 regulations, the comune sought to prioritise the role 
of neighbourhood commissions as a means of creating a dialogue between the 
neighbourhood centre workers and the local service users.88 However Vitali had to 
concede the limitations of this form of participation and in a debate in the consiglio 
comunale he admitted that petitions were a more effective means of community 
participation than assemblies and commissions.89 Vitali’s less than enthusiastic support
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85 Walter Vitali, ‘Dai consigli di quartiere all'area metropolitana* in Partecipazione e  
Potere Locale supplement to Democrazia e Diritto. No.6, Nov-Dec. 1984.
86 Interview with Rossana D’Arrigo, administrator in the social services department of 
the Assessorato alle Politiche Sociale, 17th February, 1988.
87 One effect of the 1985 decentralisation regulations was to reduce the number of 
neighbourhood councils from 18 to 9. The Christian Democrats contested the measure 
but the PCI, PSI and PRI argued the change was necessary if the quartieri were to work 
as viable organs of sub-municipal administration particularly given their new role of 
service providers for the U.S.L.s (district health authorities). Comune di Bologna, 
Problemi del decentramento e del riordino istituzionale - Conclusioni del dibattito in 
consiglio comunale. January - February, 1985. See Figure 7.
88 Comune di Bologna, ‘Nuovo regolamento sul decentramento* (1985) cit.
89 Comune di Bologna, Stato di attuazione della riforma dei quartieri Dibatitto del
Figure 7. The enlarged quartieri created in March, 1985.
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for what might be termed ‘populist’ or ‘assemblarist’ participation no doubt derived from 
a report which the comune had itself commissioned by the Cattaneo Institute into public 
attitudes to political participation in Bologna. The report highlighted the difficulties 
which the left-wing administration faced in creating what Renato Zangheri has called (a 
different city.’* 90
Una Città Diversa? The Limits to Participatory Politics in Bologna.
The survey of political attitudes and political behaviour that the Cattaneo Institute 
undertook on behalf of the city council in 1984 was one of the largest and most detailed 
surveys of its kind ever conducted in Italy, and nearly 2,000 inhabitants were 
interviewed. The survey found that 60% of respondants had taken part in some form of 
political activity in the last three or four years, but the political education of the vast 
majority of interviewees was extremely poor.91 92 79% declared themselves to be not at 
all or hardly interested in politics, and 48% admitted to never talking about the political 
activities of the Comune di Bologna.93
• Although 72% of respondants could recall die name of the city’s mayor (a much higher 
percentage than one would expect if people were asked to name the head of Uieir borough 
or county council in Britain), only 5% could correctiy identify the president of their
consiglio comunale, April-May, 1989, p.17.
90 This was the title which was given to Enzo Biagi’s interview with Zangheri that was 
published in 1976. The book presentation was interrupted by the university ‘collectives’ 
who gave the mayor advance notice of their intention to contest the administrative 
‘reality’ he had tried to describe. The interview itself is contained in Enzo Biagi, Ì! 
sindaco di Bologna. Enzo Biagi intervista Renato Zangheri. Franco Levi, Modena, 1976.
91 Marzio Barbagli & Alessandro Maecelli, La partecipazione politica a Bologna. Il 
Mulino, Bologna, 1985. p.9.
92 Ibid, statistical appendix B, pp.l54n.
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neighbourhood council. Disconcertingly for the Communists, 50?* of respondants were 
able to correctly name their local parish priest, but only 17% realised that the 
neighbourhood council was elected by universal suffrage. The PCI could nevertheless 
take comfort from the relatively high percentage of interviewees who frequented the Festa 
dell’Unità in 1983 (34%) and the high proportion of lapsed communicants (60% admitted 
to going to mass ‘years ago’) which confirmed the secular trend that David Kertzer had 
previously identified.93 94
However, the Bolognese' long term commitment to political activity appeared to be sadly 
lacking, with only 15% of those surveyed admitting to membership of a political party 
(1S% of men and 13% of women)/4 This figure is all the more surprising if one 
considers the fact that the PCI claimed a membership of 121,159 in the province of 
Bologna in 1984 out of a total population of 922,423 (approximately 16% of the adult 
population). Either these figures prove that the hinterland of the province of Bologna is 
the real stronghold of the PCI (as election results would tend to suggest) or that rival 
parties have an almost non-existant membership profile in the capoluogo. An alternative 
explanation might be that individuals are reluctant to disclose their membership of a 
political party, or as many of its opponents allege, the Communist Party has grossly 
exaggerated its real membership base in Bologna.
Whatever the reasons for the discrepencies between the survey and the PCI’s own data 
on party membership, not even Communist assessori would deny that the 19S0s witnessed 
a substantial contraction in participatory activity with respect to the 1960s and the early 
1970s. Yet Walter Vitali’s ambitious plans to widen participation through voluntary 
organisations and neighbourhood commissions does at least demonstrate a continuing 
commitment to the Dossetlian ideal of the integrated and self-supporting urban 
community. Indeed this policy has been a marked success in the area of services for the 
elderly with a burgeoning of pensioner involvement in the life of the neighbourhood 
centres which has also brought about improvements in home-care and general service
93 Ibid., David Kertzer, Comrades and Christians, cit.
94 La partecipazione a Bologna, appendix B, cit.
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provision.95
Inspite of the difficulties which the comune has experienced in politicising the population 
of the quartieri through its decentralisation reforms, it is important to realise that even 
the modest extension of citizen participation which has been achieved in nearly 30 years 
of decentralisation in Bologna is still a major advance on almost every other European 
city of comparable size. Paul Hoggett, referring in particular to Bologna, argues that 
compared to the rest of Europe,
‘...the experiments in decentralisation in Italy probably go further...both in terms of 
devolving political power within representative democratic institutions and in terms of 
involving the public and community groups in these neighbourhood representative 
institutions.’96
Given the fact that, ‘...decentralisation alone is not sufficient to provide all sections of 
the community with access to political power...’ are we not setting our critical standards 
too high in the case of local authorities such as Bologna?97 Perhaps a belief in the 
existence of a ‘happy island’ of enlightened administrators and active citizens motivated 
the authors of Red Bologna to become almost evangelic in their enthusiasm for the 
‘model’ they observed in the years before the crisis of ‘77. A certain utopianism has 
crept into both friendly and hostile studies of Bolognese Communism which has meant 
that in a perverse way the city’s administrators have become victims of their own 
success. It is not for nothing that the sometime Bologna PCI federal secretary, Vincenzo 
Galletti, entitled his own contribution to the literature on the model, ‘Bologne non é 
un’isola rossa.’ But there has been a tendency on the part of the PCI and its intellectuals 
to present Bologna and its political culture as both a victim and a victor over capitalism.
95 Interview with Raffaele Tomba, cit.
96 Paul Hoggett, ‘Political parties, community action and the reform of municipal 
government in Europe’ in P. Hoggett &. R. Hambleton, (Eds), Decentralisation and 
Democracy. Localising public services. SAUS, Bristol, 19S7, p.47.
97 Ibid.
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This is certainly the impression that Renato Zangheri gave in his interview with the 
Swiss journalists when he declared that,
‘We have never claimed to be a model; we have always rejected the idea of Bologna as 
a model or an exemplary experiment,’98 while also arguing that Bologna was, ‘an 
instrument of popular sovereignty. It refuses to act the role of executor of choices made 
within the mechanisms of capitalist development. On the contrary, the commune is the 
bearer of a vision which is antagonistic to these choices. It promotes, within its sphere 
of action, decisions and initiatives which are capable of establishing the priority of social 
needs and consumption.’99
This idea of being in capitalism but not of it has coloured all the PCI’s economic and 
political strategy since the first regional conference in Bologna in 1959. Yet not even the 
reformers of the time would have had the self-assurance to declare that, ‘...emergence 
from capitalism comes about if one solves the contradictions of capitalism.”00
Neither Colombi, Masseti, Bonazzi or Dozza would have accepted that the task of the 
Italian Communist Party is to solve capitalism’s contradictions, yet in practice, although 
the PCI could not solve the problems of unemployment, rural dislocation, low-wages and 
poor housing, in its 47 years of local power and through the growth of its mass 
organisations it went a long way to alleviating them.
In a stimulating article. Vittorio Capecchi looking back on the post-war development of 
Communist local government in the Emilian capital asked in the words of a recent PCI 
electoral poster, ‘Is Bologna still the city of ideas?’ He argues that Bologna’s political 
system has essentially been characterised by the twin features of ‘legitimation’ and
91 Renato Zangheri in Red Bologna, cit. pp. 190-191. Zangheri reinforced this point more 
recently when he declared, ‘Socialism cannot be created in only one region or city.’ 
Interview with author, Rome, March, 1991, cit.
99 Renato Zangheri quoted in Ginsborg, cit. p.297.
100 Renato Zangheri, Red Bologna, cit. p.199.
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'exchange’ allowing a social and economic development which has created a positive 
dynamic equilbrium.101 The process of legitimation which Capecchi describes also 
corresponds to the party and movement-building phase of the PCI in Bologna which 
Anderlini has called 'negative integration.’
The PCI of Togliatti had been overwhelmingly working-class in its membership and 
electorate in the 1940s and 1950s and although the pursuit of the productive middle class 
produced some results for the Communists, the Party’s support never really expanded 
further than the artisans and share-croppers. This made for a rather compact political 
constituency and the 'noi/loro’ dichotomy which the Communists presented in terms of 
the comune and state, and the monopolies versus the small producers. This division also 
had an important cultural component in the folk memory of the struggle against fascism 
and the violent class and ideological polarisation of die Resistance. The celebrations of 
the 1st May, the defence of the case del popolo and die diffusion of the feste dell’Unità 
all assisted the creation of a 'red sub-culture’ which fostered the conditions for a lasting 
Communist hegemony within the countryside. Throughout the period of intense rural- 
urban migration in the 1950s and 1960s the subcultura rossa found its continuity and its 
articulation in the city through the PCI and PSI sections and an elaborate network of 
sporting, cultural and recreative associations.102
Yet as share-croppers became small-holders and artisans took on the characteristics of 
entrepreneurs, the ‘consensus for legitimation’ became progressively transformed into a 
‘consensus for exchange.’103 Planned and socially responsible growth acquired an 
increasing importance for the rennovators who had overthrown the sacred Dozzian 
nostrums of the balanced budget and ‘il buon governo’ as ends in themselves. The
101 Vittorio Capecchi, ‘Bologna: è ancora la città delle idee?’ Inchiesta. Year XX, No.SS- 
S9, April-September, 1990. pp.51-63.
102 Carlo Trigilia, ‘Subcultura rossa e partito comunista’ in Silvano Belligni (Ed), La 
giraffa e il liocorno. Il PCI dagli anni ‘70 al nuovo decennio, Franco Angeli, Milan, 
1983, chapter four.
103 ‘Bologna: è ancora la città delle idee?’ cit. p.59.
administrations of Fanti and Zangheri were pro-active and imaginative in the field of 
economic development but orthodox in their means of allocating powers and 
responsibilities.104 This gave rise to a political structure where the party-condottiere 
and its lieutenants and subalterns in the region’s social movements and institutions 
combined with the exchange promotion ethic of the social market to produce that unique 
historico-cultural formation which we have called Leninist Keynsianism.
Unlike social democratic parties in most other European countries, the PCI had the 
advantage of not having to rely on cumbersome and lengthy selection processes for the 
renewal of its cadres and political representatives. Given this flexibility to ‘hire and 
fire’, the Bologna federation became a veritable forcing ground for talented young 
administrators and functionaries who the Parly allowed (within certain limits) to develop 
their own agenda. This ’managerial’ climate that Fanti and Zangheri created was crucial 
to the advances which were made in conservation and town planning. As assessori for 
town planning, Campos Venuti and Cervellati were allowed to develop an internationally 
acclaimed approach to community architecture and ‘radical conservation.’ But the 
negative aspect of the ‘ideas first’ approach to local government was that the giunta 
allowed itself to be driven by a reform culture which was understandable in the context 
of central government immobilism, but which distracted attention from the underlying 
dynamics of social and economic change.
The prioritising of the alliance with the ‘healthy’ parts of the Bolognese body politic 
meant that the spread of the ‘Italian disease’: high youth unemployment, the
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104 Here we can agree with Panebianco that, ’The more institutionalised the party, the less 
organised are the internal groups.’ Without democratic centralism it is doubtful whether 
the PCI in Bologna could have survived the rupture of 1959 and the new left challenge 
of the 1960s. It is in this crucial sense that the PCI differentiated itself from other social 
democratic parties al potere in that the institution of the party imposed its own logic on 
the administrative apparatus and not vice versa. Panebianco, A. Modelli di partito. Il 
Mulino, 1982, cited in Percy Allum, Democrazia reale. Stato e società civile nell’Europa 
occidentale. Liviana Editrice, Padova, 1991, p. 121.
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overcrowding of the universities, and disaffection at the widening gap between the 
guaranteed and the ‘precarious’ members of society went largely undetected. 1977 
proved that Bologna was not immune to this national disorder nor was it uniquely able 
to dispense a cure, but the instinct for trasformismo which the PCI had acquired in the 
movementist years of Scelba and Marcuse served equally well to rehabilitate the 
generation of year nine from their addiction to Majakovski and the Molotov.
It is because this most favoured of Italian cities*05 has survived the severe tests of the 
last 47 years under a Communist Party whose own administrative practice has forced 
scholars, journalists and politicians to question their assumptions about Communism 
(whether of the European or Soviet variety) that the city of ideas may offer a key to 
understanding the idea of the (socialist) city in its other manifestations.
4. The Idea of the City: Culture. History and Locale: or Political Sociology Otherwise.
This study has sought to demonstrate the need for what might be provisionally called an 
‘historico-culturalist’ perspective on urban social change, a need which arises from the 
inadequacy of ‘formal’ analyses of political organisations and political transformations. 
Notions of contingency and context are anathema to social scentists intent on providing 
a ‘total explanation’ for problems which are ‘common* to all industrial societies from the 
housing crisis to drug abuse, and from traffic congestion to civil disorder. But if we dig 
below the thin synchronic crust of most urban research it quickly becomes obvious that 
while social problems of this type can be identified in urban environments around the 
world, we cannot say that they arise from the same causes or that they are experienced 
in the same way by different city dwellers. These distinctions are immensely important, 
for without an appreciation of the specificity of different urban experiences, the social 
scientist is likely to malte general claims about environmental or consumption 105
105 Bologna has consistently come at or near the top of public opinion surveys on the most 
desirable city to live in. See Capecchi, Bologna: è ancora...cit. p.51.
determinations which only apply to a particular location or to a particular point in 
time.106
The term used by Raymond Williams to describe the mediation between the individual, 
society, and the process of historical change in The Long Revolution is the ‘structure of 
feeling’. This concept which refers to the distinctive social and cultural practices of an 
‘active’ generation at any one time in history bears with it a number of important features 
which are conspicuously absent from functionalist paradigms.107 Williams describes 
it thus,
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’...it is as firm and definite as ‘structure’ suggests, yet it operates in the most 
delicate and least tangible parts of our activity. In one sense, this structure of feeling is 
the culture of a period: it is the particular living result of all the elements in the general 
organization.’
T do not mean that the structure of feeling, any more than the social character, is
106 Peter Saunders in his critique of Pahl’s more recent work in which the latter moves 
away from his earlier ‘determinisi’ positions in relation to housing management and urban 
location makes the following observation: ‘To the extent that (Pahl) offers an answer to 
the problem, it is that it is an empirical question to be resolved by empirical research. 
This, however, is inadequate, for it is a recipe for extremely dubious inductive 
generalisation, the conclusion to which is likely to be no more than the observation that 
things are different in different places at different times.’ Peter Saunders, Social Theory 
and the Urban Question. Hutchinson, London, 19S6. How much less satisfactory it 
would be however if social scientists abandoned empirical enquiry for fear that ‘different 
realities’ might obstruct the search for a totalising urban theory.
107 Enzo Mingione rightly identifies the tendency of both positivist and Marxist 
sociologists to provide functionalist explanations of urban behaviour. Fortunately, C. 
Wright Mills provides a compelling sociological antidote to this disorder in The 
Sociological Imagination. Oxford University Press, 1959; Enzo Mingione, Social Conflict 
and the Citv. Blackwell, Oxford, 19S1, p.65.
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possessed in the same way by the many individuals in the community. But I think it is 
a very deep and wide possession, in all actual communities...One generation may train 
its successor, with reasonable success, in the social character or the general cultural 
pattern, but the new generation will have its own structure of feeling, which will not 
appear to have come ‘from’ anywhere.’103
In this case study, the analytical perspective that the concept of structure of feeling 
provides has for example been used to explain the generational and political shift in the 
leadership of the Bolognese Communist Party and in the civic administration in the early 
1960s. Similarly the effects of rural dislocation and urban migration have been studied 
in terms of the cultural continuities and breaks which combined to produce the dense and 
highly articulated communities which comprised ‘Bologna moderna.’ But clearly the 
transition to modernity in Bologna has not been smooth or total, and the persistance of 
often conflicting structures of feeling helps to explain the need for the elaborate and 
elastic ‘alliance strategy’ through which the PCI was able to dominate both ‘movement* 
and ‘institution’, a strategy which also allowed it to survive its severest challenge in the 
spring of 1977.
The problematic that Williams advances, and which we have sought to develop in this 
study, is intensely relevant to the study of the development of urban socialism and social 
movements where ideology plays such an important part in connecting together periods 
of struggle and by giving meaning to collective action and institutional conquests.109
,0* Williams, R. The Long Revolution. Pelican, London, 1975, pp.64-5.
109 It is heartening to note that urban theory is also gradually moving in this direction, 
particularly in the work of Manuel Castells whose book The City & The Grass Roots, 
(Edward Arnold, London, 19S3) marks a considerable advance on the orthodox 
Althusserian approach of The Urban Question. (Edward Arnold, London, 1977). In his 
more recent books Castells has emphasised the importance of the diachronic frame and 
the corrective value of comparative studies in the construction of new theoretical 
paradigms. For a good review of the contribution of Castells to the theory of urban 
change and social movements, see Lowe, S. Urban Social Movements. The City After
The threads of this tapestry of collective consciousness bind together historically located 
structures of feeling to form a continuous pattern, but this process is always selective, 
haphazard and often unsuccessful,
’We can learn a great deal of the life of other places and times, but certain 
elements, it seems to me, will always be irrevocable. Even those that can be recovered 
are recovered in abstraction, and this is of crucial importance. We learn each element 
as a precipitate, but in the living experience of the time every element was in solution, 
an inseparable part of a complex whole. The most difficult tiling to get hold of, in 
studying any past period, is this felt sense of the quality of life at a particular place and 
time: a sense of the ways in which the particular activities combined into a way of 
thinking and living.’110
To see culture as the historical articulation of forms of social life is not to banalise it, on 
the contrary, our terminology becomes immeasurably enriched by reappropriating the 
‘ordinariness’ of cultural expression. For llie elusive character of urban identity is 
constructed upon the ensemble of relations between the individual, the family, the 
neighbourhood, the community and the concrete structures of social life - the workplace, 
the state, the urban infrastructure. The ‘mass’ character of urban society has made the 
investigation of collective identity extremely demanding. But rather than unpicking the 
threads of urban culture, researchers have generally preferred to treat with statistical 
abstractions and abandon narrative details to the social historian. There are very good 
reasons for this approach, but the single pursuit of this form of knowledge can begin to 
resemble palleontology, measuring and weighing the fossilized remains of human society, 
as if life on earth had long since disappeared. As Williams again argues,
‘...we have become increasingly conscious of the positive power of techniques of 
analysis, which at their mxvimum are capable of interpreting let us say, the movements 
of an integrated world economy, and of the negative qualities of a naive observation
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uastells. Macmillan. London. 1986.
1,0 Ibid, p.63
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which can never gain knowledge of realities like these. Gut at the same time, it is an 
ideological crisis of just this society, that this inevitable awareness has also led to a 
privileged dominance of the techniques of rational penetration and a corresponding 
undervaluation of areas where there is some everyday commerce between the available 
articulations and the general process that has been termed ‘experience’.1 u
The reproduction of urban identity depends therefore on a matrix of social and economic 
relations of which fordist modes of production or forms of tenure are by no means 
necessarily the most important. There/of course ‘contradictions’ between lifestyle and 
political identity, but instead of attempting to understand these contradictions as an 
essential component of our social identity, political scientists have often attempted to 
‘control’ for them.
In the preceding chapters I hope to have made what I believe is a strong case for the 
primacy of politics seen in its widest cultural and historical conceptualisation. This is in 
no sense an excursus against urban theory tout court but an appeal for humility in the 
face of what are often disagreeably complex social realities. The intellectual founder of 
Italian communism had this to say about sociology’s quest for knowledge,
‘...any sociology presupposes a philosophy, a conception of the world of which it is but 
a subordinate part.. .Naturally this does not mean that the search ibr ‘laws’ of uniformity 
is not a useful and interesting pursuit or that a treatise of immediate observations on the 
art of politics does not have its purpose. But one should call a spade a spade, and 
present treatises of this kind for what they really are.’" 2
More than anything else I hope to have demonstrated that the Italian Communist Party 
in Bologna can be understood in such straightforward terms but only if a careful 
distinction is maintained between how the PCI and its intellectuals represented its
1.1 Williams, R. Politics and Letters. New Left Books, London, 1979, pp. 171-2.
1.2 Antonio Gramsci Selections Front the Prison Notebooks. (Eds) Quintili Hoare and 
Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, Lawrence & Wisharl, London, 1971, pp.426-427.
objectives and achievements and the actual application of the Parly’s strategy.113 In 
presenting not one, but a series of observations, I hope to have answered Gramsci’s 
objection to sociological enquiry as one-dimensional. Any investigation into human 
society, particularly in a rapidly industrialising country such as Italy, can benefit from 
new perspectives on the dynamics of social and political change. In this dissertation I 
have tried to combine approaches to the case study which have not previously been 
synthesised while seeking to transcend the provincialism which has shrouded much of 
the existing research.
Many who have studied Bologna from a historical or social scientific point of view have 
seemed to treat the province as if it actually were an island, while Bologna’s 
administrators have been more outward looking and willing to learn from from other 
experiences of progressive city administration.114 Nevertheless it is fair to say that the 
‘Bologna model’ has perhaps been more influential beyond Emilia-Romgna than in Italy 
itself. The ‘exporlability’ of the ‘modello bolognese’ in its various political, social and 
economic manifestations will always be conditioned by the degree of commonality which 
exists between the lived experience of political culture in different local and regional 
contexts. Much more work needs to be done on a comparative European level if  we are 
to locate Bologna within the spectrum of post-war municipal socialist administrations.
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113 This also requires a greater willingness on the part of Communist Party/PDS historians 
and political scientists to have lite courage to ‘fare i conti’ with the PCI’s past, an 
enterprise which Santomassimo admits most Communist intellectuals, until recently, have 
been unwilling to undertake;
Gian Pasquale Santomassimo, ‘Problemi di ricerca sulla storia del PCI nel secondo 
dopoguerra* in P.P. D’Attorre (Ed) La ricostruzione in Emilia-Romagna, cit. Ferraroti 
highlights the importance of the contemporary relationship between the PCI and the 
intelligentsia but his book lacks an explanation of the mechanics of this relationship. See 
Ferraroti, F. PCI e intellettuali a Bologna. Il Mulino, Bologna, 19S2.
114 Renato Zangheri described how in the 1970s the comune became very interested in, 
for example, the Ottowa traffic management plan and social service provision in Sweden; 
interview, Rome, cit.
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However, it would certainly be premature to assign the term ‘real social democracy’ to 
an administrative and political phenomenon which presents so many complexities and 
contradictions and which differs in fundamental ways from the organisational and 
administrative practice of ‘real’ social democratic parties.115
This study has tried to draw out these contradictions, but it has also sought to reveal how 
political authority often relies on the management of contradictions and the 
re/presentation of tradition and collective memory as a commonly shared experience and 
set of values. This is the hegemonic project which Gramsci sketched out for the 
Communist Modem Prince, and in large measure, the PCI and its collateral organisations 
in Bologna were able to achieve this goal. Inspite of the very severe drop in membership 
and electoral support for the PCI which followed the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 
1989 and the Party’s ‘reconstitution’ as a Democratic Party of the Left, the 47 years of 
Communist rule in Bologna will continue to provide the Party leadership with an image 
of socialist government which might ultimately prove attractive to a wider electorate.
Although Togliatti’s successors may have paid insufficient attention to the ‘Emilian 
laboratory’ in the 1970s and 1980s, the practical experience of regional and city 
government which Emilia’s ex-Communist leaders have benefited from, and the large 
proportion of the national PDS membership which Emilia-Romagna now represents, seem 
likely to increase rather than decrease the national importance of ‘Bologna la rossa’ both 
for politicians and for students of political science.
115 Robert Putnam correctly stales that, ‘...historical analogies to the social democratic 
politicians of northern Europe are misleading and, at the very least premature...’ ‘The 
Italian Communist Politician’ in D. Blackmer and S. Tarrow (Eds) Communism in Italy 
and France, cit. p. 183. Although historically the content of PCI policy may have closely 
resembled that of European social democratic parties (as we saw in chapter four), the 
organisational and cultural transition to social democracy in the PDS still remains an 
aspiration, albeit it one which with the exorcism of ‘Ri fondazione Comunista’, Cicchetto 
has a belter chance of achieving.
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APPENDIX
Biographical details of leading Communist figures in Post-War Bologna.
Colombi, Arturo. (Alfredo)
Bom in Massa Carrara, Tuscany, became a building worker. Political prisoner who 
was released after the fall of fascism from Ventotene. Led a series of major strikes 
in Turin in 1944. Member of ‘Direzione’ of PCI from Liberation until 1960s. Began 
as regional secretary of Emilia-Romagna and later transferred to Lombardy.
Persistant supporter of pro-Soviet position inside the party leadership.
Dozza, Giuseppe. (Ducati)
Bom in the province of Bologna in 1901. Son of a baker. Worked as a shop 
assistant and clerk in his youth. Joined the Communist Party when it was first 
launched in January 1921. A supporter of Amadeo Bordiga, he became secretary of 
the Bologna Federation of the PCdT. His house was burnt down by fascists in 1922. 
Later called to Rome by the directorate of the PCd’1 where he was attached to the 
central secretariat. Become national secretary of the Communist Youth Federation in 
1923. In 1927 went into exile and became co-director with Luigi Longo of the 
directorate of the FGCI abroad. In 1928 was co-opted to the central committee of the 
Italian Communist Party and worked in Switzerland and France. In the late 1930s 
became a director of the internal centre of the PCd’I and lived clandestinely in Italy. 
Elected as the Italian delegate to Comintern in 1932-33 and became a member of the 
foreign directorate of the PCd’1.
Returned to France in 1935 where he became political secretary of the Italian
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Communists in France. Following an article published in ‘Stato operaio' which was 
critical of the previous line adopted by Stalin, Dozza was summoned to Moscow to 
account for his behaviour. On his return he was relieved of his duties as a political 
organiser for the Party. Had to flee from German troops to Toulouse in 1941 where 
with Sereni he joined the first antifascist national front together with Nenni and 
Saragat for the PSI and Trentin and Nilti for Justice and Liberty. Returned to Italy 
via Milan in September 1943 where he joined the CLNAI as a representative of the 
PCI. Returned to Bologna on 10th September of 1944 and was appointed to the 
insurrectionary triumverite for southern Emilia. After the Liberation of the city on 
21st April, 1945, Dozza was appointed as mayor of Bologna. Confirmed in his post 
by the administrative elections of March 1946. In June, 1946 Dozza was elected to 
parliament as a deputy. Continually re-elected mayor until his resignation in 1966. 
Dozza died in Bologna in December, 1974.
Fanti, Guido.
Delegate to the 5th Party Congress of the PCI in 1945, Fanti rose quickly through the 
Communist hierarchy in Bologna, becoming federation secretary in 1959. Fanti was 
the main architect of the svolta regional conference of 1959. He succeeded Dozza as 
mayor in 1966 and in 1970 went on to become the first regional president of Emilia- 
Romagna. In 1976 he was elected to parliament as one of the PCI’s most experienced 
administrators. Had the Communists managed to achieve the elusive ‘sorpasso’ of the 
Christian Democrats in 1976, Fanti would have become a minister. He later became 
a Euro-MP and group leader of the PCI in the European parliament.
Roasio, Antonio.
Piemontese, exiled member of PCI leadership, involved in political struggle in France 
and Spain, trained in Lenin party school in Moscow. Firm exponent of Togliattian line 
after ‘svolta di Salerno’. Returned to Italy with Novella to join the northern
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directorate of the party in 1943, founder of Bolognese federation in 1944. Substituted 
Colombi as regional secretary for Emilia-Romagna in 194S. Member of national 
‘Direzione’ from 1945. Like Colombi considered to be a political hardliner and 
strongly pro-Soviet throughout his career.
Zangheri, Renato.
One of Italy’s most distinguished professors of economic and agrarian history, 
Zangheri joined the consiglio comunale as a member of the PCI in 1956. He was a 
founder of the cultural and political review Emilia and an active supporter of the 
‘rennovator’ wing of the Party. Zangheri succeeded Guido Fanti as mayor of Bologna 
and continued to hold office until 1980. He was elected to the Chamber o f Deputies 
and later became leader of the PCI group of MPs.
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